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Abstract

This research is a study of power in contemporary American society which
calls into question the assump tions of openness and permeability so
cherished by the pluralists. Within a power framework, we explore the
functional realities of government that illuminate why some powerful
interests manage to prevail with some consistency, while the broad public is
assigned to a lesser task. The context for the study is the U. S . Army's $ 1 1
billion dollar Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) . The Army's
decision to use on-site incineration for the destruction of the stockpile ignited
a social movement in opposition. Employing participant observation and in
depth interviews, we analyze the citizen-led opposition movement that
began at the Lexingtron-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) in Kentucky, and the
a mbiguous role of the NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act ) regulatory
process. Using the 'three dimensions of power' framework formulated by
Steven Lukes ( 1 974) and extended by Gaventa (1980), and Bachrach and Baratz
( 1 9 74), we uncovered patterns of power (i.e., "hidden faces of power" ) that
a llowed the Army to exploit some issues and suppress others while all the
time urging that citizens abide by " the process." This was accomplished
chiefly through the 'mobilization of bias ' , and propped up by a heavily
financed public relations campaign which emanates from the Pentagon. We
conclude with some recommendations for what can be done to revitalize our
morib und democracy.

Vl

Preface

In the 'SO's, Dwight Eisenhower warned us of the growing power of the
milita ry-industrial com plex. His words are now almost a cliche. However,
never has it been more imperative that we understand the degree to which
the military in conjunction with industry and governmental agencies, have
taken control over the realm of what used to be public discourse. In seeking
to clarify the nature of the military-industrial complex, Pilisuk and Hayden
( 1965) extend the concept. They state that the United States does not contain a
military industrial complex, but instead argue tha t the United States "is a
military industrial complex" {p. 68) .

They write, "We are d escribing the

current system as one of overall 'minimal accountability' and 'minimal
consent' .

We mean that the role of democratic review, based on popular

consent, is made m arginal and reactive.

Eli te groups a re minima l ly

accountable to public s and have a substantial, though my no mea ns,
maximum, freedom to shape popular attitudes" {Pilisuk and Hayden 1 965, p.
68). It is important to emphasize at the outset that the furor surrounding the
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program is not a technical controversy, nor is it
just another local "siting problem," but a profoundly disturbing illustration of
deep-sea ted structu ral change, a move away from 'government b y the
people.'
The story that fol lows i s several things: (1)

I t i s a story of

empowerment, of citizens' a ttempts to take control of decisions that affect
their l ives and that of their children; {2) it is the story of power holders and
their attempts to thwart citizens' efforts; and {3) it is, in the final analysis, a
Vll

demonstration of a profoundly disturbing trend in the United States, away
from classical notions of 'democracy' toward a form hollowed out of any real
meaning involving "government of the people, by the people, and for the
people," to a democracy that is just a shell for the operation of unbridled state
power aided by the very laws that were designed to protect both the citizens
and the environment.

This then, is a study of power, the power of the

modern state to insure its p rerogatives through organized institutional
arrangements and propaganda.
My viewpoint, in telling the story of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program is different from the account as told by the Army in which the
destruction of the stockpile is presented as an issue of "national interest" in
terms of our treaty obligations and the Congressional mandate.

Howard

Zinn (1980) remind s us that "nations are not communities and never have
been." He w rites, "The history of any country, presented as the history of a
family, conceals fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, most often
repressed) between conquerors and conquered, masters and s laves, capitalists
and workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex" (Zinn 1980, p. 9).
Therefore, I prefer to tell the story of the Chemical Stockp ile Disposal
Program (CSDP) from the point of view of the citizens who are being asked to
shoulder the consequences of the current destruction plan or, as Parent (1970)
has suggested, "from the bottom up."
Finally, this is a story about dissent and the context for d issent in
contemporary American society. There are some who argue that dissent is no
longer necessary or "proper" given the plethora of avenues open to citizens
for redress of their grievances. They will find this case study most disquieting.

Vlll
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Chapter 1

Introduction
"We submit to the peaceful production of the means of destruction, to the
perfection of waste, to being educated for a defense which deforms the
defenders and that which they defend."

One Dimensional Man : Studies in the
Ideology of Advanced Capitalist Society

Herbert Marcuse 1968,

1.1

The Problem: Are We a Hobbesian or a Lockean Society?
This research examines the issues of p o litics and p ower i n

contemporary American society. It contributes to our understanding of how
state policy-makers, private p lanners and the military use public institutions
and environmental l aws to serve their own special interests.

To explore

these issues, the study focuses o n the controversy surrounding the
destruction of the United States' arsenal of lethal unitary 1 chemical weapons
(CW) by high-temperature incineration.
The Army' s decision to build eight nerve-gas incinerators to carry out
the destruction of the weapons "on site" will be examined as well as the
regulatory climate and the citizen opposition that has arisen in response. We
can see in the unfolding of the drama to be presented here, not just another
" siting" controversy, or " locational c onflict," but a political and social
conundrum that challenges our fundamental assumptions about the way our
democracy functions. Although policy issues will be discussed , the central
interest is not an analysis of U.S. chemical weapons (CW) policy per se.
1 Unitary weapons are those in which a live agent is loaded into the weapon at
the time of manufacture.

1

Rather, the focal point is the p olitical climate surrounding the plan to destroy
the weapons known as the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP).
The following are an example of some of the fundamental research
questions that have guided this research: (1) What is the nature of p ower in
the modern state as seen through the lens of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program?

(2)

How d oes the state maintain its prerogatives in the face of

organized opposition?

(3)

What legitimations are used to support the status

quo and in what m anner are they p romultaged?

(4)

What part d oes the

regulatory process play in defining the paramaters for citizen input? (5) What
factors gave rise to the early emergence of organized opposition at the
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) in Kentucky (with only 1% of the
stockpile) as opposed to the seven other sites with appreciably more lethal
chemical weapons stored?
This work challenges a general assumption held by many political
scientists, i.e., that siting controversies are debates about competing interests
with equal p ower in a relatively open system (Corry 1979). We maintain that,
although conflicts over siting are involved, this is not just another "siting"
controversy. Nor is it a purely technical
debates about incineration. What it

controversy, notwithstanding the

is a story about power and about the

distribution and operation of power in what is believed to be the exemplar of
Western democracies, the United States. What Michael Crenson (1971) said
in The Unpolitics of Air Pollution, is also true of this research:

"What is at

stake in this investigation is the a llegation of o penness of the American
political system" (Crenson 1971, p. 5).

In addition, there is the further

question of whether we have a democracy at all, or whether we have evolved
some hybrid that only looks like democracy.
2

Parenti ( 1980) suggests that one might b etter think of ours as a dual
(italics mine) political system: a symbolic system centered a round electoral
politics and voting behavior, etc, and a substa n tive

(italics m ine) s y s te m

involving multibillion dollar contracts, tax write-offs, give aways and serving
major p roducer interests.

"The symbolic system," he argues, "is highly

visible, taught in the schools, dissected by academicians, gossiped about by
newsmen.

The substantive system is seldom heard of or accounted for"

(Parenti 1980, p. 304). We are concerned here with the substa n tive system:
the wor l d of a nonymous Pentagon p lanners, hi gh-tech m ulti national
corporations, secret negotiations, and a ponderous and b u reaucratic
regulatory system which all but insures the fact that the status quo will be
m aintai ned against the incursion of outside claims, in this c ase, that is
citizens' demands for change.

In short, we are concerned with analyzing

exactly how the state maintains the status quo and yet gives the appearance of
openness so touted in Army news b riefs about the Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program (CSDP).

Nevertheless, despite the fact that we mention

"secret negotiations" (and indeed there were such), we are not championing a
"conspiracy" theory involving evil individuals consciously conspiring to
elude the laws and cause d amage to the environment and the general
population. In fact, there are many decent, well-intentioned people involved
in this p roject, that really believe in what they are doing (however, this does
not render them harmless) .

The focus of our argument is rather on the

structural aspects of the operation of power. As Michael Albert ( 1992) wrote,
"What we have to understand is the script b ehind the actors, and that script
flows from the interstices of institutiona l power, not from the will of some

3

malevolent conspirators operating outside the bounds of the system or even
against it" (Albert 1992) . .
Finally, w e will present here, what Parenti (1970) referred to a s "a view
from the bottom."

This is a view of power as seen from below, from the

p osition of those involved in the struggle for inclusion a nd empowerment.
We are looking at the emergence of rebellion as a way to analyze the way in
which p ower relationships are altered to meet the challengers. In doing so,
we hope to reveal the underlying structures of power that remain hidden
from view.
I shall suggest that to understand the state's use of power in the context
of the present study, it is necessary to present a dialectical analysis.

The

exercise of power is dialectical in the sense that the relationship between the
Army and the citizen activists is always changing, evolving, never static; it is
dialectical in the sense that the m aintenance of the status quo d epends to a
large extent on the dynamic interaction b etween what the state proposes and
how the challengers respond . Indeed, power holders must always be alert to
innovations on the p art of challengers that call for novel responses and the
erection of either new barriers or the reinforcement of old ones.
In positing a d ialectical relationship, we intend it in the sense described
by Cardechi (1987) who wrote, "A dialectical relation is not a relation between
dependent and independent variables: all variables are dependent upon each
other ... Mechanical causation is alien to dialectical causation {determination)"
(Cardechi 1987, p. 100). Additionally, a dialectical analysis involves attention
to the Marxian distinction between 'appearance' and 'essence'. For Marx, the
distinction between the two in no sense implies that app earance is any less
"real" than essence. The distinction between appearance and essence refers to
4

d ifferent levels of determination rather than different levels of reality. And
finally, as Mandel (1977) cautioned, "The main d anger for any scientist
involved in the study of social phenomena is that of taking anything for
granted, of 'problem blindness'.

The distinction between appearance and

essence, which Marx inherited from Hegel and which is part and parcel of the
dialectical method of investigation, is nothing but a constant attempt to pierce
farther and farther through successive layers of phenomenon..." (Mandel
1977, p. 19). We will return again to this central theme in the course of this
analysis.
The English philosopher, John Locke (1689) argued in his Se c o nd
Treatise of Civil Government

that the state should rest upon consent, and

that the governing authorities should never have absolute or monistic power
(Locke 1689).

Tyranny was und erstood as a rbitrary interference by

government with individual s' natural rights (their p erson and property)
without the backing of law made by representatives. Locke's main target in
the Treatise

was John Hobbes for whom the subject of state power was

pivotaL According to Hobbes, "the Sovereign { i.e., the State} is Judge of what
is necessary for the Peace and Defense of his subjects, and Judge of what
doctrines are fit to be taught them" (Dolan, 1991, p. 6). Hobbes' argument is
taken up in contemporary society by those who champion the idea that
complex technical questions are best handled by "experts." This position is
articulated by A llen Mazur (1981) in The Dynamics of Technical Controversy.
Mazur observes that "We never make a p oint of bringing housewives and
blue collar laborers into formal decisions about the prime interest rate or
whether or not to attack Iran, so why d o it when evaluating nuclear power
plants and recombinant DNA laboratories?" (Mazur, 1981, p. 125-126). With
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respect to the Chemical Weapons Destruction Program, the Army unilaterally
, i.e., without consulting citizens in the p otentially-affected comunities,
decided to use incineration as the baseline technology. This falls directly in
line with the Hobbesian argument that the State has the right to decide what
is best for its citizens.
The Army's rhetoric of inclusion, by which they c laimed to have
incorporated all relevant citizen concerns into their decis ion-making matrix,
belies the fact that many of the important decisions relating to the disposal of
the weapons were made behind c losed d oors in the board rooms o f
multinational corporations and b y high-ranking military a n d

civilian

officials at the Pentagon. In fact Dolan (1991) argues that many people view
the post-modern political condition as demand ing private Hobbesian action
coupled with public Lockean rhetoric ( Dolan 1991) . It seems that whatever
value we place on democracy as an abstract political philosophy, it has no
p lace in the world of 'realpolitik' where power holders can, through the
operation of the system itself, subvert the real meaning of the concept. I shall
a rgue that a lthough we are said to be a Lockean society devoted to
max imiz ing individual freedom, we are, in fact, as Dolan (1991) suggests, a
Hobbesian society couched in Lockean rhetoric.
In a democracy, control is intended to be exercised by the people and
their elected rep resentatives.

As Lukes ( 1 974, p. 29) rem ind s us, "Under

conditions of representative government the people a re supposed to rule
those who govern them." We argue that to a very considerable degree, the
American people are not now exercising effective control over the Armed
Forces; nor indeed is the Congress, despite its p ri mary constitutional
responsibility in this field and despite its requirement for annual progress
6

reports fro m the Army.

As a prominent lawyer fro m a well-respected

Lexington, KY. law firm quipped, "Separation of powers is bogus. The Army
is an extension of Congress. It is in Congress's own interest {to support the
Army} . " So we are left with a problem. How can one argue that d emocratic
principles are b eing violated when power holders are able to control
outcomes to their advantage by working through the system and not having
to revert to "extra-legal" measures? The answer is to shift the study away
from a focus on "process" as an end in itself and toward some empirical
consideration of substantial effects, e. g., who gets what. (Parenti, 1980).

1 .2

Description: Background of the Problem
Aldous Huxley once observed that, "Technological progress has merely

provided us with more efficient means for going backwards " (Larson and
Cyrus-Michells 1 987). His words may be applied to the Army's p lan to destroy
the United States' stockpi le of lethal unitary chemical weapons (CW), also
known as the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP). For we have not
only created weapons whose p otential devastation is wholly unimaginable,
we have been stockpiling them for decades. The ultimate irony is that we
have built weapons that are actually easier to build than to destroy. In fact, a
wel l known scientist involved with the creation of the U.S. chemical
weapons program, admitted that very little thought was given to disposing of
the weapons when they were first created, as it was assumed they would be

used (CBS,

"60

Mi n utes ," January 5, 1992).

Between 1 943 and 1969, when the United States declared an 18 year
moratorium on unitary weapons production, the U.S. military had amassed
an arsenal of chemical weapons that is estimated to be in the range of 27, 000
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tons. (Rogers, et al. 1990) . (The exact amount of the stockpile is classified for
"national security" reasons). The "retaliatory stockpile," as it is referred to by
the Army, includes both nerve a gents and "vesicant" (i.e, b lister agents),
commonly known as mustard gas.

The explosively-configured agents and

munitions are stored in earth-bermed bunkers termed "igloos."

The only

munitions stored in the open are ton containers of mustard agent .

The

weapons a re maintained at Army depots around the country and on Johnston
Atol l, a small island in the South Pacific 800 miles southwest of Hawaii. The
Tooele Army Depot (Tooele, Utah) alone, with 42% of the stockp ile, has
enough nerve agent to kill every creature on earth many times over.

The

weapons a re stored in a variety of configurations such as rockets, spray tanks,
p rojectiles, and bulk containers. Each has been especially formulated to cause
major injury or death to enemy forces in time of war (Department of the
Army, U.S. FPEIS 1988).
The Army offers several a rguments for the need to destroy the
weapons. They argue, for example, that

:

(1) the weapons are deteriorating

posing dangers from leaking or explosion; (2) international treaty obligations
require that both the U.S. and the former Soviet Union d estroy their
respective arsenals of chemical weapons (CW) within ten years, or by the year
2004; (3) Congress has mandated the destruction of the weapons.

Each of

these assertions will be examined in detail later in the analysis. However,
making chemical weapons has p roven to be a lot easier than " unmaking"
them.

In fact, the proposed plan to build eight specially-designed high

temperature incinerators at Army depots around the country has proven to
be a boondoggle for the Army. It faces escalating costs --- the current life-cycle
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cost is approaching $9 billion dollars --- and a militant citizen opposition
movement gaining momentum daily.
No one disputes the fact that the world would be better without these
weapons of mass destruction, however, there is tremendous controversy over
( 1) how to destroy the weapons safely; (2) where to destroy them (either on
site or transported to a regional or national site }; (3) whether continued
storage is still a viab le option---and for how long; and (4) whether some
alternative technology other than incineration should be trie d .

H owever,

the "technical" questions pale before the social, economic and politic a l
considerations. No federal program i n recent history has involved so vast a n
array of federa l, state and local governments and involved compliance with
so many federal laws, i.e., the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969
(NEPA), the Recourse Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ( RCRA), the
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 ( TSCA), and the Clean Air Act of 1970 (as
a mended ) .

Added to this a re the many federal agencies involved in the

project, e.g, the Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA), the Fed era l
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Health and
Human Services (DH HS), the Department of Defense (DOD), and, of course
the Dep artment of the Army (DA). Ad ditional players are the Pentagon,
Congress and several national laboratories.

1 .3

Gas and Fire: Chemical Weapons in Historical Context
The idea of chemical weapons is not new. There is evidence that some

form of chemical weapons were used in wars dating as far back as four or
even five hundred years before the birth of Christ. Thuckydides reports that
the Spartans, in the battles of Plataeae and Belium, during the Peloponesian
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War, 431-404

B.C.,

used smoke containing arsenic for attack. Plutarch reports

in the vita of Quintus Sertorius that he used an ash-like sand in the war
against the Charakitanes in Spain, which was driven by the wind, thus
causing coughing and blindness. In 1 8 7

B.C.

according to Polybius, 22nd Book,

1 1 th Chapter, the people of Ambrajia, besieged by the Romans, produced
smoke from a barrel, filled with fine feathers and glowing coals to drive out
the Romans from the mines (Wachtel 194 1 ).
Fire has always been one of the main weapons

m

war throughout

history. The effects of fire and smoke were frequently combined in old-time
weapons ( Wachtel 1 94 1) .

Such was the case with the famous Greek fire.

"When Acron was besieged in 1 289, three hundred catapults threw Greek fire
into the town, until it was entirely burned down.

Many inhabitants were

asphyxiated by the smoke formed" (Lewin, 1 920, p.678). Other variations of a
more modern character were made by Leonardo da Vinci, Leibnitz and
Johann Rudolf Glauber ( 1604-1668) .

According to reports, Glauber used a

preparation made from turpentine and nitric acid to make incendiary bombs
and smoke shells (Wachtel 194 1 ) .
Modern chemical warfare began with the German gas attack against the
French at Ypres on April 22nd, 1915, when 5,700 cylinders, filled with chlorine
gas were used. With this attack, the Germans achieved complete strategic and
tactical surprise. The Allied troops were wholly unprepared. The enemy had
developed a weapon for which there seemed to be no defense. This segment
from Major. S.J.M. Auld's diary describes the horrors of that day:
Ypres, April 22, 1 9 1 5 : Try to imagine the feelings
and the condition of the {French} colonial troops as
they saw the vast cloud of greenish-yellow gas
spring out of the ground a nd slowly move down
wind toward them, the vapour clinging to the
1 0

earth, seeking out every hole and hollow and
fil ling the trenches and shell holes as it came. First
wonder, then fear; then as the first fringes of the
cloud enveloped them and left them choking and
agonized in the fight for breath---panic. Those who
could move broke and ran, trying, generally in
v ain, to outstrip the cloud which fo llowed
inexorably after them (Auld, 1918, pp. 11-12).
Auld ( 19 18) reports that the casua lties of this attack were the first of
approximately one million gas casualties of World War

L

According to Brown ( 1968), the German decision to initiate gas warfare
enabled Germany to make maximum use of one of her most significant
advantages over the Allied powers---a highly developed chemical industry.
(The chlorine gas used at Ypres was the product of a civilian laboratory.) As a
result of the attack at Ypres, the Allies began issuing gas masks to all troops,
believing, of course, that if the troops were masked , they were p rotected.
"Crude gauze bandages were immediately dispatched to the front and a crash
program was instituted to develop a protective mask" ( Brown 1968, p. 11) .
However, on July 12, 1917, the Germans achieved their second m ajor
technological breakthrough with the discovery of mustard gas---a persistent
agent that could disable by coming in contact with the skin. Under favorable
conditions, mustard can retain its disabling properties for weeks.

The

discovery of mustard introd uced yet another dimension to the waging of
chemical war. Now, masks were not enough to protect troops since mustard
could inflict its damage by coming in contact with skin. Brown ( 1968) reports
that "by mid-19 18, gas was competing with air power and the tank as the most
rapidly-expanding weapon of land warfare." "All belligerents," he observes,
"were employing chemical agents to the limit of their production capability"
(Brown 1968, p. 12).
1 1

After WWI, the Germans were bound by the Treaty of Versailles which
all but brought chemical weapons research to a halt in Germany.
dried up and research had to be done in strictest secrecy.

Funding

When research

resumed, Hitler feared that they were twenty yea rs behind the A llies in
developing offensive chemical weapons.

But despite the restricted research

program, the Germans made the only significant toxic agent breakthrough of
the war when they d iscovered nerve gas.

Brown ( 1 968) w rites tha t

" fortuna tely for the Allies, the Germans assumed tha t a comparable
development had been made elsewhere" (Brown, 1 968 , p. 234). I n add ition
to fearing massive retaliation from the Allies, the Germans also feared the
Russians who were presumed to possess a very formid able a rsenal of
chemical weapons. Brown ( 1968) observes that " Hitler feared poison gas for
the same reason that he feared the employment of strategic air power. Each
was a weapon that could exploit Germany's vulnerab ility as an interior
continental power" (Brown, 1968, p. 236). Hitler also had a personal aversion
to chemical warfare, stemming, no doubt, from his own experience of being
temporarily b linded in a British gas attack near Ypres in 1 9 1 8.

But a s the

nature of the war became increasingly bitter, Hitler's former a version was
turned completely a round and in 1 942, he authorized unrestricted terror
attacks against England (Shiver 1960); however Brown (1968, p. 237) reports
that "saner minds prevented implementation of Hitler's intent."
In reality, a l l the major powers had serious problems with the
"delivery" of chemical agents; and this, coupled with public aversion to the
use of chemical weapons which was shared in large p art by both political and
military leaders, leads us to speculate whether restraint was due less to fear of
retaliation than to lack of readiness to initiate (Brown 1 968). Nevertheless, it
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is ironic that toxic agents, considered sufficiently humane to be used in the
execution of convicted prisoners, were not employed in a war which saw the
extensive use of another weapon with enormous destructive p ower---the
atomic bomb.

1.4

U.S. Chemical Warfare Policy
The fundamental tenet of U.S. chemical weapons policy has long been

one of "no first use." In 1943, President Roosevelt stated categorical ly that
" we shall under no circumstances resort to use of such weapons unless they
are first used by our enemies" (Brown 1968, p. 264). Brown (1968) argues that
the primary sources of this policy were external to the United States.

He

writes, " the p attern of abstention had been formed by allied and enemy
powers alike, and the United States had neither the military capability nor the
will to contest this decision until late in the war" (p. 263).
This "no first use" policy was la ter reaffirmed by Eisenhower in 1960
and again in November 1969 (Stringer 1986). Brown (1968) forcefully argues
that United States policy during the Vietnam War calls into question the U.S.
resolve not to use chemical weapons as a first strike weapon. During the war,
U.S. troops in Vietnam used tear gas to separate Viet Cong from civilians and
sprayed thousands of acres of forest and cropland with an herbicidal defoliant
( "Agent Orange" ) to deny food and cover to communist forces. De facto U.S.
policy was seen by some to have become transformed gradually from no-first
use to " deterrence by offensive capacity" (McCarthy 1969) .
Official American chemical warfare policy has traditionally centered on
two concepts:

disarmament and deterrence.

According to the U. S. Arms

Control Agency' s Public Relations Office, the United States has sought to
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limit the p ro l i feration of chemical weapon s through international
negotiations and agreements.

Of particular concern has been limiting the

spread of chemical weapons to the Third World. United States efforts toward
chemical disarmament include the 1984 sub mittal, at the Geneva Conference
on Disa rmament, of a draft chemical weapons convention, which would
have imposed a global ban on the use, possession and develop ment of
chemical weapons (Apt 1988) .

More recen tly, a multilateral treaty, the

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was concluded on September 3, 1992,
and signed by more than 100 signatories.
While disarmament is one tenet of U.S. policy on chemical warfare,

d e t erre n c e represents the other. In fact, deterrence through threat of
retaliation has been one of the p illars of U.S. chemical warfare policy (Apt
1988). Historically, the doctrine of deterrence can be traced as far back as the
Roman Empire . Gibbon writes, "The terror of the Roman arm s ad ded weight
and dignity to the moderation of the emperors. They preserved peace by a
constant preparation for war. . . " (1963 {1788}, p.33). However, the doctrine of
deterrence as practiced in the context of contemporary society has very
different consequences than "deterrence" a s p racticed by the Romans
preoccupied with keeping the warring barbarians at bay, for they were not
stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. And, for all the reputed m ight and
power of the Praetorian Guards, and the rapaciousness and rapine of many of
her emperors, the weapons a rsenals of the Romans did not possess the
demonic killing power of modern-day weapons systems. Technology and the
structure of the economy have changed the game dramatically, calling into
question the wisdom of trying to keep one step ahead of some i magined
enemy by building bigger and more deadly arsenals that are stored in our own
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backyards. As Walt Kelly's "Pogo" once put it, "We has met the enemy; and
it is us."
The argument for deterrence was bolstered by the belief that the Soviet
Union possessed a greater arsenal of chemical weapons than did NATO (Apt
1 98 8 ) .

Reports of Soviet c hemica l / biologica l wea p ons (CBW) were

exa ggerated, and the dangers to A merican p o p ula tions w ere made
frighteningly clear. Some even estimated the Soviet CBW capability to be ten
times greater than the U.S. stockpile ( Lewis 1 989) . Estimates vary, but most
sources believe the former Soviet Union has about 50,000 tons of (CW) as
opposed to the U.S. 27,000 tons.
The p olicy of deterrence maintains that a strong chemical weapons
(CW) capability is essential to deter possible use by an aggressor. A necessary
adjunct to this stated policy is the maintenance of a credible retaliatory
capability.

Military strategists argued that the United States must have the

ability to respond i n k i n d to a chemic a l weap ons attack, otherwise an
aggressor would possess a tactical advantage (Apt 1 988). They further argued
that our arsenal must contain not only defensive, but an offensive weapons
capability as well; hence, the stockpiling of many different types of agents in
varying weapons configurations. The U.S. Army's breezy acceptance of this
policy was summed up very succinctly by an "Information Officer" at the
Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot (LBAD) a few years ago. In response to
questions posed by newsmen who had been invited to tour the depot's
stockpile of munitions, containing agent GB, which were scheduled for
disposal, Col. Mellon, said, "We'd be living in a cocoon if we thought that
other nations didn't have the same thing", and later, he explained, "It's like
the big bully on the block. If he carries a big stick, you' d better carry one too.
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You may never use it---and you hope you don't have to---but you carry it just
the same" (Lexington Herald Leader, August 5, 1970).
More recently, U.S. policymakers have shifted their attention away
from deterrence and instead, are looking for ways to implement the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) concluded in Geneva in September 3, 1 992 and
signed in Paris on January 1 3, 1 993.

Representatives from more than 1 30

countries (including the United States and Russia) were present for the
signing (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1 993).

Unlike the

Geneva Protocol of 1 925 (not ratified by the United States until 1 975), which
called for a ban only on the u s e of chemical weapons (CW), the CWC
p ro h ib i ts

the

use,

p ro d u c t i on,

and

stoc k p i l i n g

( re tention)

of

chemical/biological weapons, calls for a timetable for destruction o f existing
stockpiles, and bans the sale of precursor chemicals.

The treaty also provides

for challenge inspections. Signatories of the treaty are now preoccupied about
possible use of chemical weapons by Third World countries .

Chemical

weapons are often referred to as "the poor man's atomic bomb," because of
how cheaply and easily a chemical weapons arsenal can be acquired. One
need only recall the recent incident in Tokyo in which twelve people were
killed and 5,500 others sic kened by the nerve gas sarin on March 20, 1 995

(Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 6, 1 995, p. A-4).

1 .5

International Chemical Weapons (CW) Treaties
Scott ( 1 9 1 5) reports that efforts to outlaw or control the use or

possession of chemical weapons have gone on in one form or another since
the Hague Peace Conference of 1 899 in which the signatories agreed "to
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abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases" (Scott 1915, pp.225-226).
In 1925, of course, carne The Geneva Protocol, the first agreement to
include specific mention of bacteriological as well as chemical weapons. At
the time, 29 nations signed the treaty.

A lthough the United States did not

ra tify the treaty until 1975 it did ad here to its terms---at least for lethal
chemical weapons (Seigel, Draft 1990).

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was

brought up for consideration at a General Assembly of the United Nations
held in December 1966.

But it had its limitations.

While prohibiting the

"use" of chemical weapons, it did not speci fically forbid their p roduction,
distribution or stockpiling.

In June 1990, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed a

bilateral agreement to destroy chemical stockpiles .

This Bilateral Accord

required the U.S. and Russia to destroy their existing stocks of chemical
weapons and to cooperate on destruction technology. A major issue that had
to be resolved prior to the final signing of the treaty had to do with the Bush
Administration's wish to retain 2% of the stockpile as security.

In May, 1992,

however, the ad ministration relented and the U . S. aband oned this
requirement.
Finally, on January 13, 1993, the first comprehensive ban of chemical
weapons was signed in Paris. Representatives from more than 130 countries
attended the ceremonies .

The Multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention

(CWC ) is historic in the scope of its p rovisions.

The CWC p rohibits the

development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of
CW; the use of CW against anyone, State Party or not {A State Party is a
country which has signed and ratified the Convention); and the encouraging,
assisting or inducing anyone to en gage in activities involving chemical
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weapons. In addition, the Convention requires all CW and C W p roduction
facilities to be d eclared, declara tions to be checked, and all C W to be
eliminated within 1 0 years, with storage and destruction monitored through
on-site challenge inspections. (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
1 993). Despite all the good intentions of previous treaties, none contained the
rigorous verification regimes incorporated in the
enforcement a lways remained p roblematic.

ewe

and therefore,

The CWC contains two

verification regimes to enhance security of State Parties to the Convention
and preclude the possibility of clandestine CW prod uction, storage and use.
The first includes a routine monitoring regime; the second regime, challenge
inspections, allows State Parties to the treaty to request and have conducted
an international inspection of any facility or location in another State Party in
order to clarify and resolve questions of possible noncompliance. Despite its
requirement to destroy existing stocks within ten years, the treaty does not
contain any p rovisions concerning destruction technology. However, because
every Party (nation) to the treaty must destroy their existing stocks, eyes will
inevitably turn to the United States in terms of technology transfer. Profits
a re likely to be great to nations / corporations who get their foot in the door
first.

1 .6

History of Chemical Weapons Production
Poison gas research in the United States began d uring World War I.

The term " poison gas" refers only to vesicant (i.e., blister) agents, such as
mustard gas and phosgene---the nerve agents were developed later. In fact,
there is no mention of nerve agents at all in a book called, The War Gases
(Sartori 1 939) written in 1 939. However, the term "chemical weapons"
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generally refers to the entire array of lethal weapons, b oth vesicants and
nerve agents.
The conventional wisdom holds that gas research was begun during
the patriotic fervor of WWI and then abandoned soon after the Armistice.
This view has been challenged in a paper written by Whittmore ( 1 975) in
which he contends that while many Americans rejected the legitimacy of
poison gas, Americ an c hemists themselves embarked on a c ampaign to
preserve poison gas research, pressuring Congress to preserve the Chemical
Warfare Society. Whittmore argues that the 'research' ethic took on a new
and emboldened meaning in academia and there soon developed a research
ethic that embodied both a "pure" and an "applied" component. In addition
to this, a p ub lic service ideal was also incubating which was to further
influence the growth of gas research in the U .S.
that,

Whittmore ( 1975) contends

"The combination of a research ethic and a concern for a major social

role, perhaps even a sense of mission, led American scientists into the war
eager to fulfill long-standing expectations" (Whitmore 1975, p. 1 47) .
Although some American chemists were sent to Europe, the bulk o f
America' s poison gas research was done at home.

Ironically, these efforts

began in a civilian agency, The Bureau of Mines. Brophy and Fisher (1959)
report that a national laboratory for " investigation of problems connected
with the use of noxious gases in warfare" was authorized under the direction
of the Bureau of Mines on June 8, 1 9 1 7 (Brophy and Fisher, 1 959, p. 5). This
authorization was the result of the Army's attempt to acquire gas masks to
protect the troops in Europe. Because of its previous work on mine gases, the
Bureau of M ines was thought to be best qualified for such a task. At first,
university chemists were called upon to assist in branch laboratories at their
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universities. A liaison committee of eminent chemists was created to shuttle
non-classified p roblems to students in university laboratories (Whittmore
1975).

Harvard had such a laboratory working by September 1 9 1 7 (Jones

1 969) . However, a larger and more efficient operation was required. Large
scale p roduction of mustard gas was undertaken at Edgewood, M aryland at
what is now the Aberdeen Proving Ground. Whittmore ( 19 75) reports that
"by the time of the Armistice the E dgewood Plant was producing thirty tons
of mustard gas a day" (Whittmore 1 975, p. 1 5 1 ).
After the war the, Chemical Warfare Service was reorganized und er
the Army Corps of Engineers, and later the Army Chemical Corps, greatly
diminishing its importance and activities.

American chemists fought back

with robust lobbying activities directed at Congressional attempts to place a
moratorium on further gas research. The importance of research for national
security was heavily emphasized. It was at this time that the argument for a
retaliatory stockpile as a deterren t first took shape.

Whittmore ( 1975) also

indicates that chemists defended the humanity of gas warfare citing battlefield
casualty statistics which indicated that the survival rate of soldiers suffering
gas wounds was twelve times that of those suffering from conventional
weapons (Gilchrist 1928). In the ultimate defense of chemical weapons, Lewis
( 1922) a rgued that, " It is the most efficient, most economical, and most
humane, single weapon known to military science" (Lewis 1 922, p. 840).
Additionally, the strategic value of poison gas was emphasized . As one high
ranking military officer put it, "The wound-producing weapon has a greater
strategic value than the one which kills outright" (Gilchrist 1 928, p. 1 49). The
a rgument given is that a dead soldier could be left, while a wounded solder
absorbed extensive resources .

Arguments such a s these were obviously
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instrumental in gaining support fo r the Chemical Warfare Service.
However, the majority of military and political leaders, as well as the general
public, retained an aversion to the idea of waging chemical warfare.
During WWI, research and development were oriented to producing
more effective delivery means.

Additionally, the use of gas masks soon

proved to be standard necessary battlefield equipment. Brown ( 1 968) observes
that the Allies naively assumed that once the troops were masked they were
safe.

On J uly 12, 1 9 1 7, this situation drastically changed.

The Germans

unleashed mustard gas, again in a surprise attack at Ypres. Mustard gas was
particularly dangerous because it could disable by coming in contact with the
skin; hence, the masks were of no use against mustard .

Its effects d id not

surface for sometime later, sometimes hours, at which point it was too late.
Moreover, mustard gas was persistent and could, under favorable conditions
retain its debilitating properties for several weeks.
Recently, military thinking has changed regarding the strategic value of
chemical weapons. Some experts argue that their u npredictability (i.e., their
dependence on the correct meteorological and topographical conditions)
makes them less than ideal. As one high-ranking Pentagon official put it,
"Chemical weapons are very inefficient weapons" (Personal Communication:
Army Official 7/29 /91).
The Second World War saw the creation of a new and deadlier form of
poison gas, i.e., the nerve agents, commonly known as "nerve gas." German
scientists discovered nerve agents while conducting research on pesticides to
which nerve agents are chemically related.

B riefly, nerve agents are

organophosphate esters and are not really gases at all. Actually, the word
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"gas" in this context is a misnomer. They are odorless, colorless liquids and
are usually d ispersed as vapor. They can be lethal either through inhalation
o r through skin absorption, making gas masks necessary b u t not sufficient
protection.

The first a gent to be developed was (GA) Tabun, later GB (Sarin)

and VX ("V" is for venom) were developed.

The U.S. unitary stockpile

contains b oth GB and VX, which are two of the most lethal a gents known to
exist. VX is said to b e orders of magnitude more toxic than the most potent
pesticides.
Without fanfare and without public scrutiny, the United States CW
program expanded during the 1960s (Hayes Holgate 1990). It was directed by
the Army Chemical Corps (ACC).

The ACC launched a public relations

campaign to b olster support for continuing chemica l /biological weapons
(CBW) research and funding, again citing the superior Soviet threat. A new
modernization program was proposed in which binary weapons---supposedly
safer to produce and destroy---would supplant the existing, obsolete unitary
stockpile. By the seventies, binary weapons research/p roduction was in full
swing at the Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Binary weapons, which
contain p recursor chemicals which mix upon firing, were thought by the
Army to be the answer to a p rayer because they answered many of the
arguments posed by environmentalists and they could be p ortrayed to the
public as "safer;" i.e., easier to store and destroy. Hayes-Holgate (1990) reports
that "The ACC lobbied vigorously, aware that without production of binaries,
its very existence was in question.

Its efforts finally resulted in Congress

writing initial funding for a binary factory in the 1980 Department of Defense
Authorization Bill" (Hayes Holgate 1990, p. 19). The U. S. produced a reported
69 tons of binary shells before halting production in 1990 (Morrison 1991).
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1.7

History o f Chemical Weapons (CW) Destruction
Prior to 1969, obsolete or unserviceable chemical agents and munitions

were routinely disposed of by open pit burning, land burial, atmospheric
dilution or ocean dumping. These disposal methods were used extensively
dating back to World War I without any casualties or adverse p ublic reactions
(Rogers 1990) . At one time, even nuclear detonation was considered by the
A rmy; however, that plan was abandoned on the advice of the National
Academy of Sciences who studied the p rob lem of disposal of chemical
weapons. The Ad Hoc Committee stated in their report that
burying of the clusters in a deep cavern, followed by
the explosion of a small nuclear device there, cou ld
incinerate and detoxify the clusters. However, the
hazards involved in various states of this operation
and the time required for its completion make this
an undesirable p lan ( National Academy of Sciences
1969, p. 5).
Another popular disposal strategy involved draining chemical agent
from weapons, called, " Drill and Transfer." The Drill and Transfer System
(DATS) was first used in 1979 at an Army facility in Utah where sixty
munitions were demilitarized with no apparent consequences (Rid dell 198 1 ) .
Later i n 198 1 , the Army p roposed bringing in a DATS to the Lexington-Blue
Grass Army Depot (LBAD) to dispose of 1 14 unserviceable rockets containing
nerve gas and mustard agent. Basically, the DATS is similar to a semi-trailer.
It's mobility makes it very useful for this type of operation. The trailer is set
up in a secure area of the depot to insure the safe transfer of chemicals and
explosives contained inside each rocket. Once a rocket is secured inside the
DATS, machinery will drill a hole in the rocket casing to d rain out the
chemical agents and then detach the explosive apparatus from the rocket.
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According to the Army, the chemicals will be processed into relatively
harmless salts and stored. Explosives will be taken to a secure part of the
depot and detonated.
Open pit burning was another popular destruction method . Between
1 949 and 1 965, the Army got rid of mustard-gas projectiles stored at the
Lexington Blue-Grass Army Depot by throwing them in a hole and setting
them on fire (Lexington Herald Leader, November 26, 1 984) .

According to

this same article, the open burning of chemical weapons that took place in
this country was not publicized.
In the 1 950s, Great Britain decided it wanted out of the nerve-gas
business and began eliminating their entire stockpile by burning it in pits and
sinking it in ships. The argument for this method was that it released a very
small amount of toxic material into the atmosphere which "simp ly
dissipated," according to Brad Roberts, an analyst for the Center for Strategic
and International Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.

(Lexington Herald Leader, November 26, 1 984) .
Following Britain's lead, and unhappy with the slow p rogress in
disposing of unusable chemical weapons stockpiles, the Army devised a plan
(1948) to dispose of unserviceable chemical weapons by dumping them at sea.
"Sea d umping had been accomplished previously, but b efore this time,
munitions were generally loose dumped from barges," an Army document
explains (CSDP Chemical Weapons Movement History Compilation 1 987, p .
1 0 ) . However i n this case the Army decided t o fill a World War I I merchant
ship, load it up with chemical weapons, haul it out to sea and scuttle it. This
work was assigned the code name, "Operation Geranium" (Lewisite has an
odor like Geraniums).

Although the Navy's use o f code names fell into
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disuse, the Army revived the practice in the early 1 960s.

The name that

eventually came to apply to the planned sea dump of the 27,000 tons of
unitary chemical weapons was code named , "Operation C HASE. " CHASE
was a U. S. Navy acronym for "Cut Holes And Sink 'Em." The Navy had
been sea dumping conventional high explosive ammunition at sea.

One

series of these dumps were known as the CHASE d umps. The first chemical
weapons CHASE dump, was made in May /June 1 967. The material dumped
was bulk mustard ton containers and GB filled M55 rockets. The rockets were
placed in steel vaults which were then filled with concrete. These "coffins,"
as they were called later, were p laced aboard a merchant hulk ( the S . S.
Corporal Eric Gibson) and then sunk in deep water off the continental shelf.
The second CHASE operation involving chemical weapons took place in
May-June 1 968; the third involving chemical weapons took p lace in June of
1 968.

The cargo in this case was one-ton containers contaminated with

mustard and filled with water. In 1969 the Army planned the ocean dumping
of some 27, 000 tons of unserviceable chemical weapons that made up the
unitary s tockpile.

The plan involved the disposal of unserviceable

chemical/biological weapons (CBW) stored at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, CO. ,
Edgewood, MD., Anniston, AL. ,and Richmond, KY. The weapons were to be
encased in concrete "co ffins" ( similar to earlier CHASE operations) each
weighing roughly six and a half tons. They were to be transported by rail to
Earle, New Jersey (the route being kept secret), and then loaded aboard four
surplus WWII Liberty ships, towed out to sea and sunk 250 miles off the New
Jersey shore beyond the continental shelf at longitude / latitude 390 38'N; 710
O'W. In previous CHASE operations conducted between 1 967 and 1 968 a total
of 1,706 such "coffins" were sunk in a similar location. However, the 27,000
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tons in question were to be dumped at sea at a depth of 15,000 feet, twice the
depth of previous disposals.
According to reports, the Army tried many ways to free the containers
from the concrete before considering another ocean-d umping scenario,
including trying to neutralize the gas through openings. They tried soaking
the concrete in highly abrasive acids. This failed. Then the Army tried using
diamond saws to drill into the concrete but abandoned this plan because of
fears tha t the saws would set off detonators in the warheads. Next, they tried
baking of the concrete to what the Army said would be a point where it would
crumble and slip away. The concrete didn't budge. Col. Jack Curry (1970),
then commander of the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, concluded, "The
most logical way of disposing of the gas is still the sea dump" (Powell 1970) .
Experts acquainted with the p rocess, however, warned that the concrete
would erode over a l ong period of time, and at some d is tant time, the
containers themselves would erode away causing small amounts of nerve gas
to leak into the ocean. In response to objections raised by environmentalists
on this very issue, Dr. Conrad Cheek, veteran oceanographer, said in
Washington tha t if 66 tons of nerve gas to be ocean dumped were released in
water at the same time only two ounces of it would be toxic in ten days
(Powell 1970).
However, when the news broke about operation C HASE and the public
learned of the plan to dump 27,000 tons of chemical weapons in the ocean, a
great hue and cry went out from m any quarters in p rotest .

First, citizens

protested transporting the lethal weapons through their communities.

The

Army assured critics that it had moved large quantities of chemical weapons
over many years with relatively few problems and pointed out that "there has
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never been a chemical accident fatality associated with such movement' '
(CSDP: Chemical Weapons Movement History Compilation, 1 987, p . 1 ) .
Environmentalists questioned the wisdom and the ethics of d umping toxic
chemicals in the ocean, and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the
a gency set up to monitor compliance with the newly-framed National
Environmental Policy Act (1969) NEPA, also raised objections.
To b egin with, Carter ( 1 970) observed that "the Army 's Impact
Statement minimized the possibility of major environmental damage
resulting from Operation CHASE" ( 1970, p. 1298).

Next, the Council on

Environmental Quality (CEQ) disputed the Army's claim that "the resulting
toxicity of the sea should be highly localized" (Ad Hoc Advisory Committee
1 969, p. 10). The Army claimed that there was very little marine life at the
1 6,000-foot depth and no fish of commercial value. However, the Council
countered by stating that present knowledge of sea life at that depth was
incomplete and listed several examples to support their case.

For example,

the CEQ argued that: ( 1 ) carnivorous fishes are found at that depth; (2) there
are numerous deep-water fish whose eggs rise to or near the surface; (3) many
organisms make seasonal migrations from shallow to deep waters and from
coastal to deep waters; and (4) flounder, which occur in shallow waters off the
Southeastern coast of the U.S., migrate into deeper waters in winter. (Ad Hoc
Advisory Committee 1 969) .

Finally, the National Academy of Sciences

suggested that ocean d umping be abandoned and suggested chemical
neutralization 2 of nerve agent GB and incineration of the vesicant agents H
and HD. Incineration of hazardous waste was an emerging technology at that
2

The term "neu trali zatio n " i s u sed in the generic sense to mean a chemical
reaction th at counteracts the to x i c effect of the chemical agent, y i elding an
innocuous product (FPEIS , 1 9 8 8 , Vol. 3, p . D - 3 ) .
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time and was thought to be an environmentally benign method capable of
completely destroying waste materials (Flamm et al, 1 987) .

Part of the

Academy's report read:
We wish to suggest to the Department of Defense
(DOD) that it adopt basically the same approach to
chemical warfare agents and munitions that the
Atomic Energy Commission has adopted toward
radioactive waste products from nuclear reactors. It
should be assumed that all such (chemical warfare)
a gents and munitions will require eventu a l
disposal and that dumping a t sea should b e avoided
(Ad Hoc Advisory Committee 1969).
In August of 1 970, Congress finally called a halt to ocean dumping
(CSDP: Chemical Weapons Movement History Compilation, 1 987).

1 .8
Overview : The Creation of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
(CSDP)
In the early 1 980s, the Army appealed to Congress for funds to proceed
with a new generation of Chemical Weapons---binary weapons, which they
claimed were safer to store and destroy. This modernization program was
necessary, they argued, because the unitary stockpile was obsolete and
deteriorating and no longer represented a credible d eterrent.

Congress

required the destruction of the unitary stockpile as a quid pro quo for funding
binary weapons research. The Army informed Congress that it could destroy
the stockpile by 1 994, at which point Congress then set the Army's self
imposed deadline into law.

Congress then created Public Law 99- 145, The

Departmen t of Defense A uthorization Act of

1 986,

which manda ted the

destruction of the entire unitary stockpile by September 1 994 in conjunction
with the acquisition of binary weapons. This sequence of events is significant
b ecause the Army has used the Congressional mandate many times to
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conjure up an image of the " ab solute" necessity of destroying the stockpile
quickly b ecause of some arbitrary deadline imposed by C ongress.

In fact,

Congress was simply responding to what they were told by the Army. The
original timetable for the destruction of the unitary stockpile has been revised
several times at the behest of the Army (see Table 2.1 for destruction schedule
by site).

For example, in September 1 988, the Army received an extension

from Congress of the 1 994 deadline to April 30, 1997; however, the final date
for the destruction of the stockpile has b een extended to approximately the
year 2004.
Initially, the stockpile destruction effort was to have been limited to the
M55 rockets, but Congress and the Army expanded the program to include
other obsolete weapons as well. According to a background paper prepared by
the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA 1992), the M55 rockets a re
considered the most dangerous items in the current stockpile, s ince the M55
is a fully assembled munition containing either agent VX or GB, along with
fuses, b urster charges, and propellant in a configuration that cannot be easily
separated.
The M55s were produced during the 1960s in groups known a s " lots . "
During one short period o f manufacture, some M55s were filled with a G B
a gent which had p urity specifications. According t o the FPEIS ( 1988) "these
lots have leaked far more frequently than others" (FPEIS, 1 988, p .2-9) and , for
this reason, the Army monitors them very c arefully. Fortunately, the Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA) report ind ic ates that "the Army ' s
monitoring p ro gram has yet to identify trends of increasing deterioration"
(OTA, 1992, p. 5 ) .

Nevertheless, the MSS's have b een the focus of major

concern since the beginning of the stockpile d isposal program. The GB-filled
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rockets were manufactured at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado, between
1961 and 1 965, and the VX rockets were manufactured at Newport Army
Ammunition Plant, Indiana in 1964 and 1 965. The M55 was shown to be
erratic and undependable, and the Army declared it obsolete in 1981 (Army
Independent Evaluation / Assessment of Rocket, 1 15mm: Chemical Agent (GB
or VX} M55).
The Congressional law that created the stockpile destruction program is
known as Public Law 99-145, i.e., the Department of Defense A uthorization

Act,

1 986.

The Act reads:
( 1 ) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law,
the Secretary of Defense (hereinafter in this section
referred to as the "Secretary" ) shall, in accordance
with the p rovisions of this section, carry out the
destruction of the United States' stockpile of lethal
chemical agents and munitions that exists on the
d a te of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Such
destruction shall be carried out in conjunction with
the acquisition of binary weapons.
( PL99-145, p. 99 STAT.747)

The law further stipulates that: ( 1 ) The Secretary shall provide for:
(A) maximum protection for the environment, the
general public, and the personnel who are involved
in the destruction of the lethal chemical agents and
munitions referred to in subsection (a); . . .(2)
Facilities constructed to carry out this section may
not be used for any purpose other than the
de struction of lethal chemical weapons and
munitions, and when no longer needed to carry out
this action, such facilities shall be cleaned,
d i smantled, and disposed of in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations. (PL 99-145, 1985 p.
99 STAT.747)
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However, studies have been commissioned to study the feasibility of
the continued use of the incinerators once the stockpile is destroyed . To begin
with, the 1 984 National Research Council (NRC) study, alluded to earlier,
actually suggested "that the life-cycle costs of incinerators could b e
substantially reduced i f after destroying chemical weapons they were used by
federal, state, and local governments and private industry to d ispose of
hazardous wastes" (C & E News, August 13, 1 990, p. 15). Additionally,

m

November 1 989, the House and Senate Approp riations C ommittee o f
Confereers3 directed the Army "to investigate and report o n the feasibility
and desirability of using chemical weapons disposal facilities for other
p urposes" (Goldfarb, 1 991, p. xv), leading citizens to speculate that the
facilities will never be dismantled for a variety of reasons, not the least of
which is the cost involved in construction and the enormous b acklog of
hazardous waste produced by the military.

When questioned about the

possibility of the "future use" of the incinerators, a high-ranking government
official assured the author that the incinerators would be dismantled "Pac
Man style" .
Finally, a study, conducted by the MITRE Corporation ( 1 99 1 ) entitled,
" Engineering Analysis for Future Use of Chemical Agent Demilitarization
Plants: Feasibility and Desirability," suggested numerous possibilities for the
future use of the facilities given certain reconfiguration requirements, but
emphasized that "in order for the chemical demilitarization facilities to be
3 Title VI of t h e 1 990 Defense Appropri ati ons Conference (DAC) Report 1 0 1 - 345 ,
entitled " C he m i cal Agents and M u nitions De s truct i o n , Defen se . "

3 1

used for other non-stockpile chemical items . . . the law would have to be
changed" (Goldfarb, 1 99 1 , p . 2-5) . This, in fact, is exactly what the citizens fear
--a permanent hazardous waste facility in their midst that will operate in
perpetuity.
Public Law 99-145 also a uthorized the creation of a management
organization within the department of the Army to oversee the destruction
process. "The Department of the Army, as executive agent for the DOD,
established the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PM Cml
Demil) as the agency responsible for implementing the disposal program "
( C a rnes 1 9 89, p . 280 ) .

Initially, a Program Manager for Chemical

Demilitarization was appointed to head the program. Recently, a new federal
agency has been created i.e., the United States Army Materials Destruction
Agency, headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood, Maryland
and headed by Brigadier General Walter Busbee. This agency is charged not
only with oversight for the CSDP but also is responsible for directing the
destruction efforts of other weapons and munitions not directly related to the
unitary stockpile.

This expansion of the program scope to agency level is

certain to have ramifications beyond the destruction of the unitary stockpile
and does not bode well for those who fear that the incinerators will be used
beyond the destruction life cycle.
1 .9

The Army Decides: The Evolution of Incineration as the Technology of
Choice
With the suspension of the planned sea dump, the Army requested the

National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study of alternatives. In
1982, the Undersecretary of the Army, James Ambrose, asked the National
Research Council (NRC) for a study to recommend the most effective,
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economical and safest means for disposing of the Army's unitary chemical
weapons stockpile. A committee was formed under the Board on Army
Science and Technology in 1 983. According to a memo obtained from the
Kentucky Environmental Foundation, this was the first non-governmental
group to study the chemical weapons situation since the National Academy
of Sciences Report (NAS) in 1 969 (KEF Memorandum, 1 /4 / 92) .
According to the Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director,
"the Academy said, 'You need to build complex industrial type disposal
facilities for each site.' The Army said, 'OK. "' Following the NAS report, we
are told that "the Army launched an extensive program that involved the
development of new disposal concepts and process technology" (Army Public
A ffairs Officer: No Date).

Under the Academy's new guidelines, Rocky

Mountain Arsenal became the the first site to dispose of nerve agents through
neutralization.

A knowledgeable Army technical expert boasted

that the

Army had disposed of "over nine (9) million pounds of GB and over six (6)
million pounds of mustard through incineration" at the Rocky Mountain
Arsenal (RMA) facility.
However, neutralization was found wanting. As the Deputy P M and
Technical Director for the CSDP explained:

"We were not p leased with

neutralization," he said,
We created six lbs. of organic waste for every one lb.
of organic material we destroyed. We were adding
too much junk. We felt that we were producing
too many impurities . It [agent GB] was too easily
reformed .
If c ond itions were not c a re fully
controlled it would revert. Primarily for those
reasons we decided we had to look at alternatives.
The rationalization for abandoning neutralization was b ased on a
number of perceived factors according to a document prepared for Greenpeace
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International: ( 1 ) The alleged complexity of the neutralization process as
compared with incineration which was emerging as the preferred industrial
technology; (2) the sensitivity of the process to numerous parameters that
would slow the reaction or even promote hydrolysis reversal, reforming GB;
(3) the quantity and nature of the waste;

4) the high capital costs of

neutralization (at this time, incineration was regarded as a simple and cheap
process) and various cost calculations showed a net cost benefit if incineration
were to be adopted (Picardi 1 991 ) . For these reasons, in March of 1 981, the
Army officially decided to abandon neutralization and adopt incineration as
the method of choice for the destruction of chemical weapons. According to
Picardi ( 1 9 9 1 ) "the decision was highly influenced by early d rafts of the
National Research Council ( 1984) report" (Picardi,199 1 , p. 6).
The Army already had a test incineration facility in Tooele Army Depot
near Salt Lake City, Utah, which had been in operation since 1 9 79---the
Chemical Agent Muni tions Disposal Sys tem (CAMDS) .

Experimental

thermal destruction of agents began around 1981 at this facility. CAMDS was
a high-temperature incinerator facility specially designed to handle nerve
agents .

It was a prototype, (one-third size) not a full-scale fac ility.

The

CAMDS incineration technology is the model for the entire CW disposal
program, but the facility has experienced numerous problems. For example,
in May of 1 986, a drain clogged, causing a chemical agent to overflow to the
floor of a containment area and again in January 1 987, nerve agent escaped
into a work area. The release exceeded health standards but was not reported
to the public for two days. The Army boasted that it had d isposed of over six
million pounds of chemical agents and over sixty thousand munitions and
containers by incineration at the CAMDS and at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal
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(RMA) .

However, the facility has experienced numerous problems.

The

Army did finally admit to a "simultaneous failure of three containment
systems" (Courier Journal, September 12, 1 984, p. 1 ) .
When Amoretta Hoeber, then Under Secretary o f the Army, spoke a t a
public meeting at Eastern Kentucky University in January of 1 986, she assured
those assembled that no decision had been made regarding the ultimate
disposition of the

chemical weapons stored at the Army depot at LBAD,

despite mounting evidence that the Army had already decided upon thermal
destruction. " We're not here to announce any sort of a decision," she said,
"No decision has been made" (Transcript of Public Meeting EKU, Richmond,
KY. January 1 986, p. 4).

After the publication of the Draft Environmental

Impact Statement (DEIS) in July of that same year, which announced
incineration of the weapons as the "Preferred Alternative," the Secretary of
the Army John

0.

Marsh, Jr. repeatedly stressed that the July 1 Draft was not

necessarily the final word . "I am not here to speculate on what the final
decision will be," he said, "I am here to tell you that the Army has simply
presented a preferred alternative. It is not fair to the process to speculate on
what might be the results" (Lexington-Herald Leader, July 10, 1 986, p . 1 ) .
Throughout the p rocess, citizens have been wary o f the Army's
attempts to garner support from allegedly " objective" scientific bodies in
support of its decisions.

For example, the National Academy of Sciences

(NAS) study conducted in 1 984 concluded that: " The Army has already
selected thermal destruction as the most appropriate method. The committee
s u pports

this

d ecision"

( Memorand u m :

Kentucky

Environmental

Foundation, Inc. {KEF} January 4, 1 992) . The exact wording of the National
Research Council report reads:
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When compared to disposal by incinera tion,
chemical neu traliza tion processes are slow,
complicated, produce excessive quantities of waste
that cannot be certified to be free of agent, and
would require higher capital and operating costs .
The panel agrees with the Army's d ecision to
abandon chemical neutralization in favor of
incineration.
(Na tional A cademy of Sciences
Study, November 1 984)
The Deputy Program Manager (PM) and Technical Director for the
Chemical Demilitarization (CHEM ) program explained it this way: He said
that the Army was pleased with the results of their experiments and went
back to the National Research Council in 1 984 to see "if we [ the Army] were
doing the right thing." He then added, "The NRC endorsed our decision to
destroy both nerve agents and mustard; in 1986, Congress asked us to destroy
the whole stockpile" (4 / 24 /92). It is just this endorsement of existing policy
by supposedly "objective" scientific studies that has continually rankled
citizens who oppose the Army's current destruction plan.
Recently, a statement appeared in the Preface to an Army publication,
entitled, STAR

21:

S trategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First

Cen tu ry , which seems to lend credibility to the charge that Academy of
Sciences (NAS) and the National Research Council (NRC) may not be the
objective scientific bodies that they claim to be.
following:

In the book we read the

"The National Academy of Sciences, the National Research

C ouncil, and the STAR Study Committee wish to acknowledge their
indebtedness to the U.S. Army for its continuous and generous support and
encouragement throughout the STAR study" (National Research C ouncil
1992). This "continuous and generous support" also extends to the copious
funds made available to the NAS and the NRC for evaluation of the CSDP .
36

Nevertheless, despite the ample evidence that the Army had already
made up its mind concerning the choice of technology, no "official" decision
was released until Secretary Ambrose's formal declaration in 1 988, i.e., the
Record of Decision (ROD) which recommended the on-site destruction
alternative and thermal destruction of the stockpile. According to reports,
Ambrose preferred not to use the word "decision" feeling more comfortable
with the idea that it was more of a "judgment call," because a decision
implied to him something based on "qu ite definitive information, factual
information, well quantified, by logical process or algorithm of some kind to
get from input to the output" (Carnes 1 989, p. 445)

Instead, he said the

decision was based on "a lot of highly uncertain material . . .It was a judgment
call" (Carnes 1989, p. 445).

1 . 10

Description of the "Baseline Technology"
The Army's current plan which calls for the weapons to be destroyed

on-site in specially-designed high-temperature incinerators, is known in the
literature as the "baseline technology. "

Quite simply, this refers to the

Army's d ecision to designate incineration as the technology of choice. It is
essentially a reverse- assemb ly process, whereby munitions will b e
automatically d isassembled and drained o f chemical agents by computer
controlled machines before being fed into the incinerator Is. At this point we
find it necessary to make a clarification. We read that the Army's plan, i.e.,
the Chemical Stockp ile Disposal Program (CSDP) c alls for siting eight
incinerators on Army depots around the country, but in reality we are not
speaking about one incinerator at each site, but an incinerator complex.

The

b aseline technology involves constructing an incinerator complex at each
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d epot site --- each with up to four separate incinerators to complete the
process of destruction of the unitary weapons. Andy Mead reporting on the
Army's plan in 1 986 wrote, "The 'nerve gas incinerator' the Army proposes
to build in Madison County {Kentucky) would, depending on how you count
them, be four or eight incinerators" (Lexington-Herald Leader, July 2, 1 986, p .
A-14). One type would be used to burn only liquid nerve agent that has been
drained from weapons or stored in ton containers (the liquid incinerator);
another would burn the metal parts (the metal parts furnace); another would
burn the explosive parts of rockets (the deactivation furnace) ; and a fourth
would b urn contaminated packing material, wooden p a llets and used
protective clothing (the dunnage incinerator system) (Dep artment of the
Army, U . S. FPEIS 1 988, Volume 3, p. C-12).
A report drawn up by Greenpeace, long-standing opponents of
incineration technology, states that "the extremely high temperatures at
which the incinerator chambers operate, ranging from 1 ,600 degrees to 2,700
degrees F, place stresses on the hardware and require constant monitoring
and frequent maintenance," and it questions the ability of the incinerators to
meet the rigid 99.9999 per cent "destruction and removal efficiency" standards
set by the federal government, except perhaps in one-time trial burns. (Seigel,
Draft, 1990). The Greenpeace document asserts that, "Commercial hazardous
waste incinerators have suffered serious accidents. At the CW disposal sites,
an accident would be catastrophic" (Seigel, Draft, 1 990, p.8).

1 . 10.1 Cryofracture
As a more cost-effective alternative to the "baseline" technology, a
process known as "cryofracture," was suggested by the Army in 1 986.
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Cryofracture, in which munitions are first frozen, smashed and then b urned,
was considered an alternative to the "baseline" technology of disassembly for
the destruction of the chemical weapons.

The Army's original enthusiasm

ended in 1 989 when work on this technology was terminated . The Army's
reluctance to aggressively pursue a cryofracture program was b ased on its
strong belief in the viability of the b aseline technology.

Opponents of

cryofracture do not see it as an alternative, since it still uses incineration
technology. As of May 1 995, the cryofracture program is defunct according to
the Director of the Kentucky Env ironmental Foundation (Telephone
interview: 5/ 4 /95).

1 .1 1

JACADS (Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System)
In 1 985, when Congress approved the program, the Army began to

design a versatile, full-scale reverse assembly and incineration system on a
small island in the South Pacific, approximately 71 7 nautical miles southwest
of Hawaii.

The facilitly is known as the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent

Disposal System or (JACADS).

It is three times the size of the Army 's

stateside facility at Tooele, Utah known as CAMDS (The Chemical Agent
Munitions Disposal System) .

The JACADS project is administered by the

Army's Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PM Cml Demil).
The operations manager and maintenance contractor is the United
Engineers and Constructors, Inc.

In

December 1987 Congress required that the

Army evaluate full-scale disposal operations at JACADS before constructing
similar facilities in the continental United States. Congress wanted proof that
the b aseline process at the JACADS facility was safe and environmentally
sound before it permitted construction and operation of similar facilities at
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the continental U.S. sites. Operations Verification Testing (or "OVT") was
begun in October 1 989 and testing concluded on March 6, 1 993. A report on
OVT was published in May 1993; the Secretary of Defense certified successful
OVT completion to Congress on August 25, 1993 (Annual Status Report: DA,
December 1 5, 1 993, p. iv) . The JACADS facility has experienced numerous
technical d ifficulties and has experienced extensive down time.

As of this

date (May 1995) JACADS continues to have problems. So far there have been
four live agent releases. However, they were only fined for one because it
exceeded "acceptable levels." (Interview: 5 / 4 / 95 activist) .

Thus far they have

b een assessed fines totalling $ 1 75,000 for numerous env ironment a l
v iolations .
Before the certification to Congress can be made, the Army has to take
JACADS through four separate campaigns. The first is the d isposal of the
M55 rockets containing GB. The second is disposal of M55 rockets filled with
the persistent nerve agent VX . The third phase is disposal of bulk containers
containing mustard agent. The final phase is the destruction of mustard gas
artillery shells. The MITRE Corporation was selected to prepare criteria for
the evaluation of OVT, to perform the evaluation, and to prepare a report on
the results (Menke 1 99 1 ) . The report cited numerous mechanical problems
resulting on one occasion in live agent being released into a worker area,
failure to meet production schedules, and sited frequent worker turnover
(averaging about 45 per cent per year) as a continuing problem. However, the
MITRE Corporation report asserted that, "taken as a whole, the GB campaign
did show that the basic JACADS technology is safe, can be operated within
environmental limits, and is capable of operation for at least short periods at
close to the projected rates" (Menke, 1991, p. 4-9) .
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Supposed ly, "lessons

learned " from JACADS will be applied to the construction and operation of
the continental United States (CONUS) facilities.

1 .1 2

Geography and Distribution
The chemical weapons (CW) stockpile is located on eight Army bases

around the country (see figure 1 . 1 , Appendix A), and at Johnston Atoll, a
small island in the South Pacific. The distribution of the stockpile is given in
Table 1 of Appendix B.

1 .1 3

Agent Characteristics
The unitary chemical weapons stockpile under consideration, consists

of both nerve and vesicant or blister agents. Nerve agents were discovered by
German scientists while conducting insecticide research during the Second
World War.4 The organophosphate nerve agents include GA ( " tabun"), GB
( "sarin"), and VX ( "V" stands for "venom"). These agents are among the
most deadly chemicals known to exist. VX for example, is said to be orders of
magnitude more potent than the most toxic insecticide to which they are
chemically related.

GB, also known as Sarin, vaporizes instantly.

When

inhaled it can kill in a minute. A document prepared by Greenpeace states
that "The explosion of an artillery shell containing 6 pounds of GB will kill
most unmasked personnel within an area the size of two football fields"
(Seigel, Draft 1 990, p . 7). Additionally, nerve agents can also be absorbed
through the skin, so donning a gas mask is necessary but not sufficient to
protect a person from exposure. It has been found that in comparison with
GB human exposure estimates, VX is estimated to be approximately twice as
4

Tabun was d i sco vered i n 1 936 by an I . G . Farben chemist.

4 1

toxic b y inhalation, 1 0 times as toxic by oral ad ministration, and
approximately 1 70 times as toxic following skin exposure (National Research
Council 1 984) .
The nerve agents are all organophosphate esters that directly affect the
nervous system .

Their mechanism of action involves the inhibition of

acetylcholinesterase (AChE), an enzyme that prevents the accumulation of
the neurotransmitter acetylcholine (ACh).

After exposure to nerve agent,

AChE is inhibited and ACh accumulates; at high doses, the results are
convulsions and death due to paralysis of the nervous system (FPEIS, 1 988).
As acetylcholine (ACh) builds up at the nerve endings, death comes in
seconds. Watson (1989) writes:
When ACh accumulates, the following symptoms
can result: drooling, increased bronchial (lung)
secretions, bronchoconstriction, miosis (pupillary
c onstriction), excessive sweating, vom iting,
d i arrhea, ab d ominal cramping, involuntary
urination,
and
heartbeat
irregularities
(arrhythmias) (Watson 1 989, p. 337).
In addition, "ACh accumulation can affect the brain and spinal cord,
resulting in head ache, anxiety, confusion, restlessness, giddiness, (EEG)
changes, or even convulsions and coma, depending on the agent and dosage"
(Grob and Harvey 1 953).

In relative terms, VX is more toxic and GB, which,

in turn is more toxic than GA (soman). Watson (1989) argues that "because
agent GB is highly volatile, an unplanned release could d isperse toxic
concentrations over a large area.

With the less-volatile agent VX, toxic

concentrations would not d isperse widely , but could persist in the
environment long after an unp lanned release" (Watson 1 989, p. 337) .
However, in terms of emergency response, an accident involving agent GB
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would present the most problems because it has the potential to affect a wider
area.
The mustard or "blister agents" in the stockpile include H, HD and HT.
as well as small quantities of Lewisite (L) which are held for research
purposes. The major toxic chemical [bis (2-chloroethyl) sulfide] in both H and
HD is also known variously as (1) as mustard gas, or (2) sulfur mustard, or (3)
simply "mustard. " According to Watson (1989), vesicants are cellular poisons
that destroy individual cells in target tissues.

Accordingly, the vesicants

present quite a d ifferent picture of acute toxicity when compared with nerve
agents .

For example, the vesicants are not as acutely lethal at similar low

doses as are the nerve agents under comparable exposure conditions (Watson
1989).
In an article which appeared in the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,"
Freeman (199 1 ) describes mustard gas---"as a kind of 'jelly' which is extremely
toxic both as a liquid and as a vapor, causing severe eye injury as well as skin
b urns on all p arts of the body, but especially the genitals, underarms, and
tender skin of the joints, hands, and face" (Freeman, 1991, p.34 ). The effects
of mustard, especially the vapor effects on skin, rise sharply with
temperature.

Mustard gas can also cause severe systemic effects such as

vomiting, p rostration, and even death.

Mustard g a s is especially pernicious

in that its effects appear several hours after exposure. Although not as lethal
as the nerve agents, the mustard agents have properties that make contact
with them extremely hazardous, not the least of which is the fact that they are
proven c arcinogens.

Watson (1989) writes that, "Epidemiological evidence

and results of animal studies both indicate that mustard agent can c ause
cancer" (Watson 1989, p. 342) . Freeman (1991) reports that, "in 1980, the U.S.
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Department of the Army asked the National Academy of Sciences to study the
long-term effects of exposure to chemical-warfare agents for 6,720 soldiers
who participated in experiments at Edgewood Arsenal from 1 955 to 1 975. The
resulting report mentions a statistical correlation between chronic mustard
gas exposure and cancer" (Freeman, 1 99 1 , p .38). Mustard gas has also been
known to produce various kinds of chromosomal structure d amage, and its
mutagenic properties have been demonstrated in laboratory studies (Fox and
Scott 1980).

1 .14

The Political Economy of Chemical Weapons Destruction
The political economy of hazardous waste d isposal and that of the·

destruction of chemical weapons are related phenomena . In this section we
will provide an overview of the emerging political and economic factors that
provide the context for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP).

1 . 14.1 Life Cycle Cost
The sheer scope of the stockpile disposal program makes it a fit object
for study. To begin with, there have been massive cost overruns . In 1 985, the
Army estimated the total cost of the disposal program would be $ 1 .7 billion;
"by 1992, the projected life-cycle cost of the CSDP had j umped to $8 billion---a
nearly five-fold increase in seven years" (Opening Statement: Mike Synar {D
OKLA . } Congress of the U. S., June 1 6, 1992). In 1 993, the Army reported that
"As a result of program schedule extensions encountered in FY 1993, the
estimated life-cycle cost has increased again, this time to $8 .6 billion" (Annual
Status Report, DA, 1 993, p. 22). Costs continue to escalate as of this writing,
for example, the total cost of JACADS has soared in j ust three years from $298
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million to $587 million and continues to grow (Dep artment of Defense
Authorization Bill, 1 992, p. 233) .
Although the Army is coordinating and d irecting the disposal
p rogram , the facilities will be designed, constructed and operated b y
commercial contractors who stand t o profit even further if PL 99-145 is
amended to allow the facilities to be reconfigured to process other hazardous
waste. Although the Deputy Program Manager (PM) and Technical Director
for the CSDP assured the author that "the Army is not going into the hazmat
{i.e., hazardous materials) business," there is nothing to prevent them from
turning around the selling the incinerators back to the very people who are
profi ting in their construction (Memorandum: C ommon Ground, April
1 992) .
Although we have some information on who the maJor contractors
are, e.g, "the Ralph M. Parsons Company of California is the designer of the
facilities and CH2 M Hill, Inc. has assisted in permitting to date" (Interview:
Deputy PM for CHEM DEMIL, April 24, 1 992) . There are innumerable other
contractors involved in the construc tion aspect of the program, many of
whom are former defense contractors, e.g., Bechtel National, Inc.; Raytheon;
(M.K.) Morris-Kinutzen; A.J. Little; MITRE Corp ., to name only a few .
Information regarding the bidding process i s n o t available t o the public,
although it is not, strictly speaking, "classified" information. However, the
Deputy PM and Technical Director declined to release that information when
asked commenting that it would be "bad business. ' '
The number of federal, state and local agencies involved with the
chemical demilitarization program is staggering.

The Chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program (CSDP) which, for the sake of brevity, is often referred to as
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the

II

demil" program (the term

II

demilitarization" meaning --- to render

unusable for any military purpose), involves not only top military officials at
the Pentagon, but several federal agencies including: (1) the Department of
Defense (DOD); (2) the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); (3)
The U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency (USATHMA); (4) the
Occupa tional Health and Safety Association (OSHA); (5) the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA); (6) the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS); and last but not least (7) the Department of Energy (DOE ) .

In

addition, some of of the nation's most prestigious national laboratories are
involved with the CSDP, e.g., Los A lamos National Laboratory (NM),
A rgonne National Laboratory (IL), Sandia National Laboratory (NM),
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (CA), Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (TN). Additional support
is provided by their subcontractors around the country, such as Schneider
E ngineers, Harrisburg, PA; Dynamac Corporation, Rockville, MD, and
Westinghouse Corp . The usual procedure is for the Army to award a contract
to a national laboratory, e.g., to assist in the preparation of Environmental
Impact Statements (EISs).
p arts of the projects.

The laboratories in turn subcontract out certain

For example, the subcontractor might collect d ata

relevant to population of schools, hospitals, nursing homes, etc.
Many colleges and universities around the country are involved with
the C SDP, a mong them are the following:

University o f P ittsbu rgh,

U niversity of Southern C a lifornia { Institute of Safety and Systems
Management} , University of Colorado, University of Delaware, Michigan
State University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), University of
California a t Los Angeles and Northern Illinois University.
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A d ditionally, numerous environmental laws impact this program .
The most famous of these is, of course, NEPA, the National Environmental
Policy Act ( 1 9 69);

then there is RCRA, the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act ( 1976), the National Toxics Control Act ( 1 9 76) and, finally, the
Clean Air Act of 1 9 70 (as amended). In addition to these, a number of other
laws have been passed through the years that deal specifically with chemical
weapons disposal; they include: ( 1 ) the Department of Defense Authorization

Act of

1 986

(Public Law 99-145) which mandated the destruction of the

u nitary CW stockpile; (2) the National Defense A u thorization Act for Fiscal

Year

1 988

and

1 989

(Public Law 1 00-1 80) in which Congress directed the

Secretary of Defense to issue the final Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement on the chemical stockpile destruction program by January 1, 1988.
The law further required that the Secretary provide proof in writing to
Congress that the overall concept plan included an evaluation of alternative
technologies a nd full-scale operational verifica tion tests of the selected
chemical weapons disposal technology.

In addition the law required the

Army to establish an ongoing program for surveillance and maintenance of
the stockpile; (3) The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

and

1 989,

1 988

(Public Law 1 00-456) extended the stockpile elimination deadline to

April 30, 1997. It also required the Army to complete Operational Verification
Testing (OVT) of its test facility at Johnston Atoll, i.e., the Johnston Atoll
Chemical Agent Disposal System OACADS) before full-scale disposal facilities
were constructed in the continental United States (CONUS).

Defense A u thorization Act for Fiscal Year

1 99 1

The Na tional

(Public L a w 1 0 1 -5 1 0 ) also

addressed the Chemical Weapons demilitarization program. This law pays
particular attention to the safety status and the condition of the stockpile. It
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requires the Secretary of Defense to develop a contingency plan which would
detail the steps the DOD would follow if the chemical weapons stockp ile
began an accelerated rate of deterioration or i f a ny other question of its
integrity arose.

We should also mention the almost- forgotten F o r e ig n

Military Sales Act Amendmen t (Public Law 91-672), passed in 1 971, which
p rohibi ted the transportation of chemical weapons from the Island o f
Okinawa t o the United States. It further directed the DOD t o destroy these
chemical weapons outside the U.s. s (Office of Technology Assessment
Report {OTA) 1 992 ) Currently, legislation involving the Chemical Weapons
Demilitarization Program addresses the delays in the program and proposed
dead l ines.

Both the House and Senate bills for Na t i o n a l

Au thorization for Fiscal Year

1 992

and

1 993

Defe n s e

(S. 1 507 and H.R. 21 00) propose

extending the stockpile deadline to July 1999.
The fact that industry is intimately connected to this latest military
venture is nothing new in the annals of American political economy .

The

symbiotic relationship between the military and the economy, better known
as "the military-industrial complex," became widely recognized during the
Cold War when American corporations reaped huge profits from the
p roduction and sale of weapons systems.

Sherman (1 989) argues that " to

measure the full extent of the military impact on the economy, we must
recall that the U.S. Department of Defense is the largest 'planned economy' in
the world today outside the [former] Soviet Union" (Sherman, 1 989, p. 297) .
Profit rates for corporations involved in the production of military hardware
5
In 1 97 1 , the U . S . Army moved chemical weapons from Oki nowa to storage
fac i l ities at John ston Island; in March of 1 990, the U . S . c hemical weapons that
had been stored in West Germany ( 1 00 ton s ) were transferred to John ston Atoll
for de struction amid v i gorou s protest from European G reen s .
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sometimes reached as high as 56.1 per cent according to a study conducted by
the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1969. Not only were the profit rates
on military spending extraordinary, but the profits mostly went to relatively
few firms. Sherman (1989) reports that almost all military contracts go to just
205 of the top 500 corporations, and that just 1 00 of these firms get 85 per cent
of all military contracts.
After p e res t ro ika

and the final break up of the Soviet Union, the

rationale behind the Cold War rhetoric d isappeared and the whole colossus
threatened to come to a grinding halt. However, into the breach c ame some
of those same contractors to handle the military's problem of toxic w aste
d isposal.

Names like Bechtel National, M ITRE Corpora tion, E . G . & G

Instruments, Raytheon---names that we normally associate with the military
industrial complex, are still at it; only the g ame has change d . Now, these
b ehemoths h ave shifted into the business of hazardous waste disposal. Van
Voorst ( 1 992) reports tha t at a time of shrinking defense bud gets,
environmental cleanup is the fas test-growing c a tegory o f milit ary
expenditure --- up 18%, from $2.9 billion last year to $ 3.4 b illion in new 1 993
funding.
One of the foremost of these contractors is Bechtel National Inc . A n
a rticle which appeared in the R ichmond Registe r

o n December 1, 1988

discussed the Army's first contract award for the CSDP. The headline read,
"BECHTEL TO OVERSEE NERVE GAS DISPOSAL," and the article began,
" The U.S. A rmy has awarded Bechtel National Inc. the first installment of a
$284 million, nine-year contract to dispose of chemical weapons stored a t the
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot and seven other sites around the nation"

(Richmond Register, December 1, 1988, p. 1 ) .
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The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) with its projected
life-cycle cost now approaching $9 billion dollars is well-positioned to fill in
part of the void left by the reductions in the military budget. To begin with,
whatever destruction technology the U . S . develops is destined to have
international ramifications.

As mentioned earlier, one provision of the

b ilateral agreement (1990) signed between the former Soviet Union and the
United States commits both sides to cooperate on destruction technology. I n
addition, the Russian stockpile o f unitary chemical weapons exceeds that o f
the U.S. Estimates vary, but Russia i s presumed t o have around 50,000 tons,
although it was once alleged that their stockpile was on the order of 300,000
tons ! However, in an article appearing in the French newspaper Le Monde
(29 December 1 987), the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs affirmed that the
chemical arms reserve of the USSR "does not exceed 50,000 tons of toxic
substances" (Defense Technical Information Center "DTIC " { d atabase} , 1 987,
p . 1 0).
The Russians do not as yet have a program to destroy their chemical
weapons.

They have experimented with neutralization in the p ast, but

abandone d the p ractice.

In 1989 their sole CW destruction facility a t

Chapayevsk (about 500 miles southeast o f Moscow) was shut down b y citizen
protests. Mikita P. Smidovich, the deputy head of the Soviet delegation to the
Geneva Conference on Disarmament explained what h appened.
a mounts to a masterful understatement, he said:

In what

"The Chapayevsk facility

was completed last year but the public objected to it, citing environmental
concerns, so the government decided to close it" (Ember, 1 990, p . 18).

The

closing of Chapayevsk leaves the Soviets without a chemical weapons
destruction facility . Rep. Larry J. Hopkins (R.-Ky) estimates it will take them
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another three to five years to develop an operational chemical weapons
disposal facility.
The Russians are looking to the United States to provide the necessary
technology and expertise for d e s troy ing chem i c a l weapons.

The

impoverished state of the Russian economy makes it necessary for them to
look around for assistance with this enterprise. The U.S. Congress has already
allocated $800 m illion to help Russia destroy chemical weapons .

But

whoever p ays, the destruction is likely to involve lucrative contracts.
Already the German company Metallgesellschaft AG is angling to destroy the
chemicals stored in K ambrak.

According to The Wall S treet Journal, "So

fierce is competition among U.S. engineering firms eager to help the
Russians---with U.S. tax dollars---that the Pentagon still hasn't chosen from
among the 32 concerns that expressed interest last year" (Wall Street Journal,
February 25, 1993) .
It is well known tha t Russian CW experts have already been given
guided tours of the U.S. chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah
In fact, in the fall of 1993, six Russians were invited to participate in a Russian
Intern Program sponsored by the Army for the purpose of training Russian
specialists in our chemical demilitarization technology . According to a report
p ublished by the Army, those participating in the program are made up o f

both chemical disposal managers and plant operators and will be the first
p articipants in the ' Russi an F amiliarization Program,' one of several
provisions contained in a 1 992 Memorandum of Agreement between the
Department of Defense (DOD) and President Boris Yeltzin's Committee on
Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons .

The article

states that " the U.S. Army Chemical M aterials Destruction Agency's
5 1

(USACMDA 's) philosophy is to provide the maximum opportunity for
information exchange as the Russians formulate their disposal p l ans"

( Chemical Demilitarization Upda te, July 1 993, Vol.2, Issue no. 3, p . 4). A
knowledge able U.S. source argues that the Soviets are not p rimarily
interested in our destruction technology (i.e., incineration), but in our safety
and pollution-control technology.

Still, that hasn't p revente d western

engineering firms from trying to interest the Soviets in incineration
technology.

Among U. S. firms m aking such p itches are C ombustion

Engineering, General Atomics, and Stearns and Rogers, a subsidiary of
Raytheon (Ember 1 990).
However, the U.S. military's toxic waste problem extends far beyond
the weapons that make up the unitary stockpile.

Indeed, according to

numerous reports, the Department of Defense (DOD), is the United States
number one polluter. The military's toxic legacy is described most aptly by
Lenny Seigel (1991 ) of the National Toxics Campaign. He observes that "the
military-industrial establishment, i.e., the facilities of the DOD, m ilitary
contractors, and the Energy Department's nuclear weapons p roduction
complex have accumulated a monstrous collection of toxic waste sites" (Seigel
et al, 1991, p. ii ) and that "in 1 989, DOD estimated that it generated about 900
m illion pounds of hazardous wastes, as well as 17 b illion pounds of
wastewater, much of it contaminated with toxic chemicals" (Seigel et al, 1991,
p . ii) . To make matters worse, until very recently, federal facilities were
exempt from the enforcement powers of environmental regulators.

Seigel

( 1 99 1 ) and his colleagues argue argue that the Pentagon's environmental
record has been abysmal. "At facility after facility," they write, "DOD has
concealed or denied the impact, extent, and even the existence of toxic
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contamination.

Moreover, DOD's growing military cleanup p rogram is

dwarfed by the enormity of its other missions" (Seigel et al, 1991, p . iii) . One
could make a case that the security of having destruction facilities located on

federal property rather than on private property, gives the military a better
chance of dealin g with its enormous hazardous waste p roblem because
federal facilities are often exempt from the rigors of certain environmental
laws.

1 . 15

The Political Economy of Incineration: Recent Trends
The Army's decision to use high-temperature incineration as the

baseline technology is in line with recent trends in the hazardous waste
industry.

This is spurred on, no doubt, by the Environmental Protection

Agency which virtually mandated incineration for certain kinds of hazardous
waste .

In 1988, revenues from the manufacture and sale of incineration

equipment were estimated at $1.6 b illion, while income from "incineration
services" was estimated at $370 million (Fredonia Group 1990). Growth in
each sector's revenue has averaged more than 30 percent each year, while
projected growth through 1993 is 20 percent for both sectors (Fredonia Group

1990). Costner and Thornton (1990) argue that the EPA has been the driving
force behind the incineration industry's rapid exp ansion. The United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) encourages incineration as the best
available "permanent" cleanup method for many types of contaminated soils
and other materials (Costner, 1990).
Greenpeace points out that much of the incineration industry's future
and profits are going to come from taxpayer's money since a large share of
expenditures will be necessary to clean up contaminated industrial sites on
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the Superfund list (see Appendix D) and at government sites owned by the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.

The total cost of

Superfund cleanup has been estimated at $500 billion dollars over fifty years
(Office of Technology Assessment 1989). Cleanup costs for inactive DOE sites
alone have been estimated at $35 billion to $65 billion (Gruber 1990) . E P A
administrators and industry execu tives have maintained close ties not unlike
those traditionally found between the Pentagon and other industry moguls.
The close relationship between the hazardous waste disposal industry and
EPA has been alluded to by Costner and Thorton (1990) in what they call the
"revolving door" phenomenon by which former EPA officials take lucrative
j obs in the incinerator industry and the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy. "Neither dep artment," they point out, "has had an
encouraging record of public disclosure, compliance with environmental
laws, or efficient spending in its contract decisions" (Costner, 1990, p. 48).
They are also quick to point out that despite rhetoric about the importance of
"recycling" and of reducing waste, this rush to burn

only exacerbates the

problem by providing lucrative incentives to continue producing more waste.
The rate of hazardous waste generation in the U.S. is rising by at least 5.5
percent per year (Costner 1991) and an ever-increasing share of this growing
quantity of waste is now being directed to incinerators as opposed to land
burial.

1.16

Summ ary
The Army's current plan for the disposal of the lethal unitary stockpile

has drawn fire from many quarters. On one hand, the Army is defending
incineration, with the full weight of the regulatory machinery tending to
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support the status quo decision; on the other hand, we have citizen activists
in the host communities who oppose incineration and insist that alternatives
be explored. Not surprisingly, the Army holds that their incineration plan is
"safe" and they have financed an elaborate protective action program, the
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) to handle any
chance chemical accidents (in the unlikely event of an "unplanned release" of
chemical agent) related to the incineration program.

However, they have

never addressed the issue of the hazards of incineration per se in any of the
documents relating to this program other than to assert that the incinerators
will comply with a certain stringent clean air requirement as determined
from trial burns .
Congresswoman Pat Schroeder eloquently foreshadowed the dilemma
presented by the Army's present plan to destroy the United States' arsenal of
chemical weapons . In speaking to radiation burn victims, she once observed
that "Our nuclear weapons program was built in the name of national
security---protecting the lives of Americans . Now these very weapons, which
were designed to protect citizens from some unnamed enemy, pose d angers
to the very citizens they were designed to protect. One can't help but wonder,
who w as protected and at whose expense" (Schroeder, et al. 1987) . Like our
nuclear p rogram, our chemical weapons (CW) program was created to protect
Americans from some unnamed enemy and today we wonder, at whose
expense will they be destroyed.
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Chapter 2

The Nature of Power: Machiavelli to Lukes

2.1

The Nature o f Power
This is a study of power; more specifically, it is a study of state power

and the uses to which it is p ut in the context of contemporary American
society. Studies of power and the state have been the mainstay of thoughtful
philosophers and social scientists throughout the ages. The concept of power
is perhaps the most fundamental in the whole of political science --- and
perhaps the most contentious.

The political process is the shaping,

distribution, and exercise of power.

Debates about power d ate b ack to

Machiavelli (1532) and probably to Socrates' dialogue with Thrasymachus in
the fifth century

B.C.E.

This study of power is not intended to be exhaustive

and we will not be launching into a full exposition on the concept; rather, we
will limit our attention to the extended debate on the subject that has been
waged in the literature of American social science with emphasis on the w ays
in which Machiavelli's unique perspective c an shed light on the present
study.
Power, like " democracy" is what W. B. G allie once referred to as an
"essentially contestable" concept (Emerson 1983, p .58).

It is an inherently

debatable and changeable idea l ike "freedom," "equality," "justice," or
"human rights," and, as such, is subject to numerous interpretations and
definitions (Arblaster 1 987) . The most widely used definition of power in the
social sciences is that of Max Weber. Weber wrote that, "We understand by
'power' the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in
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a social action even against the resistance if others who are p articipating in
the action" (Wrong 1979, p. 2 1 ) . Or to paraphrase Weber, you have power if
you get what you want.
Domhoff (1983) argues that the partiality shown to Weber's definition,
has the disadvantage of harboring within it the implicit theory that at bottom
the basis of power is the ability to use force or coercion on the other person or
group. It, therefore, prejudices what should be a question open to emp irical
The point is made pithily in Allen Drury 's novel, A Shade of

study.

D iffere n c e , "The more real power you have, the less you can afford to
exercise it, and the less real power you h ave, the more you can throw it
around"(Drury 1 962, p.82).
In order to avoid the problem inherent in Weber's definition, we
prefer the definition put forth by Bertrand Russell: "Power is the c apacity of
some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others" (Russell,
1 938, pp. 1 0- 1 1 ) . This definition avoids the temptation to view power as one
dimensional and allows for a broader structural analysis of power processes.
Marx saw economic power as the source of all power; however, Bertrand
Russell disagreed with this notion. He argued, "It has been customary to
accept economic power without analysis, and this has led in modern times, to
an undue emphasis on economic as opposed to war and propaganda quite as
much as upon the factors usually considered in economics" (Russell, 1938 pp .
1 20,1 35) .

He further argues that, "Power has many forms such as wealth,

armaments, c ivil authority, influence on opinion.

No one of these can be

regarded as subordinate to any other, and there is no one from which the
others are derivative" (Russell 1 938, pp. 1 3-14) . Lasswell (1950) reiterates this
sentiment in the first of his 'propositions' on power. "The forms of power,"
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he says, " are interdependent: a certain amount of several forms of power is a
necessary condition for a great amount in any form. and none of the forms of
power is basic to all others" (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, p . 92,94). Paulo Friere
( 1 9 72) also supports this view, he argues that power is accumulative in
nature, each d imension serving to reinforce the other (Friere, 1 9 72) .
However, Parenti challenges these arguments. He writes, "Far from the fluid
interplay envisioned by the pluralists, the political efficacy of groups and
individuals is largely determined by the resources of power available to them,
of which wealth is the most crucial," and he continues, "those who control
the wealth of society enjoy a persistent and pervasive political a dvantage"
(Parenti 1 980,p . 304) . . This point was made eminently clear by an activist who
commented, "The Army has nine billion dollars; we have bake sales! "
A number o f scholars (Frederick 1937; Lasswell and Kap lan, 1950;
Tawney 1931 ; Dalh 1957) argue that power should be defined relationally, not
as a simple property. Hence, 'political power' is distinguished from power
over nature as power over other men. Frederick ( 1937) emphasizes this point
by devising an "axiom" regarding power stating that, "It is a certain kind of
human relationship" (Frederick 1937,p . 1 2-14). Tawney's definition similarly
reflects this emphasis regarding the relational quality of power.

He says,

"Power may be defined as the capacity of an individual, or group of
ind ividuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the
manner w hich he desires . . . " (Tawney 1931, p. 230). Lasswell agrees that
power should be defined relationally, not as a single property ( 1 950) . H e
argues that unless some connection exists between A and B, then no power
relation can be said to exist. Dahl also agrees with this formulation, "First let
us agree, he says, "that power is a relation, and it is a relation among people"
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(Dahl, 1 957,p . 80). In elaborating on what he calls his 'intuitive v1ew of
power', Dahl writes that power "seemed to involve a successful attempt by A
to get

a

to do something he would not otherwise do" (Bell et al. 1 969, p.82) .

Lasswell and Kaplan extend their concept to include participation in the
making of decisions and they also note that, "the amount of power tends to
increase 'til limited by other power holders" (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950,p. 94).
We will return to this notion later on in this analysis. Further, they point out
that a power relation can exist only if one of the parties can threaten to
invoke sanctions: power is "the process of affecting policies of others with the
help of (threatened) severe deprivations for nonconformity with the policies
intended" (Lasswell, 1 950, p.76) .
Power is often confused with "force," "coercion," "authority," and
" influenc e . "

While force is sometimes used by the powerful to obtain

compliance, Parsons argues that, "securing compliance with a wish, whether
it be defined as an obligation of the object or not, simply by threat of superior
force, is not an exercise of power" (Bell, et al. 1 969, p. 251 ) . Bachrach and
Baratz ( 1962) use "power" in two distinct senses. On the one hand, they use it
in a general way to refer to all forms of successful control of A over B ---that
is, of A's securing B's compliance. Lasswell (1 950) argues that it is the threat
of sanctions which differentiates power from influence in general . H e points
out that, "Power is a special case of the exercise of influence; it is the process of
affecting policies of others with the help of (actual or threatened) severe
deprivations for nonconformity with the policies intended." Lukes ( 1 974)
notes that among pluralists, "power" and "influence" tend to be used
interchangeably, on the assumption that there is 'a primitive notion that
seems to lie behind all of these concepts' (Dahl 1 957 in Bell, 1 969 p. 80) .
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According to Lukes , " Who Govern s ? "speaks mainly of ' influence' , while
Polsby speaks mainly of 'power"' (Lukes 1974, p . 12).
The foregoing d iscussion can easily lead one to conclude that the
concept of power is really of little theoretical utility, however, we feel that this
is not the case. We must be clear, however, that we are concerned with state
power, which is a collective phenomenon, not the individua l exercise o f
power.

The state has enormous resources at its d isposal (both overt and

sub tle) to see that its prerogatives are fulfilled, and unless checked by a
formidable counter force, will pursue its own agenda. In the modern state,
part of the process of retaining power is to cloak its decisions in the mantle of
concensus.

This brings us full circle to a discussion o f the insights of

Machiavelli.

2.2

Machiavelli: Prophet for a Modern Age
We begin with Machiavelli, and properly so, for he was the first

modern analyst of state power. In his eloquent Introduction to The Prince

and the Discourses (1940) Max Lerner writes, "We live today in the shadow of
a Florentine, the man who above all others taught the world to think in
terms of cold political power" (Lerner 1940, p . xxv). Machiavelli's interest was
not so much in defi n i ng
p articuarly, state power.

power as in describing how to u s e

power--

His whole life was bound up with a passionate

fascination with the idea of state power. Gauss ( 1 952) argues that The Prince
should now become required reading for all who wish to understand some of
the central problems of our day, e. g., what is, or should be, the relation of the
citizen to the state, and what is, or what ought to be, the relations of the sta tes
to each other, and finally, and most importantly, what are the sources of, and
60

the limits, if any, to the power of the state.

According to G auss ( 1 952)

nowhere in The Prince do we find any limit placed upon the power of the
state; yet it was this problem of limiting state power that was the primary
concern of Thomas Jefferson.
Now, one may ask what a person who lived four centuries ago can
contribute to our understanding of technological society in the 20th century.
First, Machiavelli lived during the dawning of what we now refer to as the
"nation-state" system. He lived in a period when economic growth had gone
so far as to burst the bounds of existing political forms. Nineteenth century
man expressed ultimate faith in progress and the nation and was inclined to
regard the world of the nation states as a kind of utopia. If there was no other
law over the sovereign, there did remain what has sometimes been called the
first law of nature---that of self-preservation. Many crimes were committed
in its name . No state could afford to see its neighbors become too strong;
therefore, v arious forms of imperialism, colonialism and even "preventive
wars" were undertaken in the name of the national interest or "for reasons of
state." This became, in fact, the only law (Gauss 1952). Christian Gauss (1952)
argues that in regarding the state as a dynamic exp ansive force, Machiavelli
was closer to reality and 'Rea lpoli t ik ' than much nineteenth and early
twentieth-century thinking and in this respect must be considered a distinctly
modern thinker. In fact, Gramsci's concept of hegemony embodied concepts
strikingly similar to Machiavelli.

According to David Forgacs ( 1 988) who

edited a collection of Gramsci's writings, the concept of hegemony is linked
by Gramsci in a chain of associations and oppositions to ' civil society' as
against 'political society', to consent as against coercion, to 'direction as
against ' domination'

"These binaries," he writes, "draw on the coercion6 1

consent opposition in Machiavell i and some other political thinkers"
(Forgacs 1 988, p. 423).
In Max Lerner's Introduction to The Prince and the Discou rses, he
argues that, "Machiavelli wrote a grammar of power, not only for the
sixteenth century but for the ages that followed" (Lerner, 1 950, p. xxxiv) .
Lerner observes that when Machiavelli wrote his grammar o f power, he came
close to setting down the imperatives by which men govern and are governed
in

political

c o m m unities

governmental structure .

whatever

the

epoch

and

w h a tever

the

Lerner (1950) argues that Machiavelli's thinking

amounted to something a kin to a revolution in political thinking.

He

eschewed the humanists' writings about princes because these writings were
rid den with theology and metaphysics, and instead he concentrated on
writing about the actual politics of his time. Machiavelli concluded that the
core of the state was power, and he conceived of the state as something n o t
outside o f our human world.

"The particular form of the state under which

men live is not imposed by either God or the devil," as Christian G auss
observed in his Introduction to Machiavelli's , The Prince. (Gaus 1 940, p. xi) .
Machiavelli argued that to some degree, at least, the state is man's creation,
and like other human creations, subject to his revision, i.e., the particular
formation of the state was not inevitable nor accidenta l .

In this he

forshadowed Marx.
M achiavelli's true legacy is his lack of illusions about the state. As the
author of the concept of "for reasons of state" (raison d ' etat ) , he viewed the
state as a necessary evil rather than as a benign entity, and in this, he opened
up a window on how later analysts of state power might approach the subject.
In speaking about Machiavelli's unique perspective, Lerner ( 1950) writes, "He
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had the clear-eyed capacity to distinguish between man as he ought to be and
man as he actually is --- between the ideal form of institutions and the
p ragmatic conditions under which they operate" (Lerner, 1950, p. xxxii) .
"Where others looked at figureheads," Lerner maintains, "he kept his eyes
glued behind the scenes. He sought the ultimate propulsion of events. He
wanted to know what made things tick; he wanted to take the clock of the
world to pieces and find out how it worked" (Lerner, 1950, p. xxvi) . Thus, he
forshad owed later theorists who refused to accept the conventional wisdoms
(i.e., that of the pluralists) regarding the operation of power in contemporary
society. In particular his emphasis on "structure" as opposed to "personality"
has become an important feature of later developments in conflict theory. In
employing the metaphor of the stage, Michael Albert ( 1 992) described
Machiavelli's perspective perfectly: "What we have to understand," he said,
"is the script that lies behind the actors, and the script in this case flows from
the interstices of institutional power, not from the will of some malevolent
conspirators operating outside the bounds of the system or even against it"
(Albert, 1 992).
Machiavelli recognized four things as essential components of state
power which are germane to our analysis: (1) the centralization of power; (2)
the importance of appearances ["It is not, therefore, necessary for a prince to
h ave all the above-named qualities, but it is very necessary to seem to have
them" (Machiavelli { 1532} 1 940, p. xxxii)]; (3) the need for allowing citizens a
mechanism

for

venting

grievances

" without

h a v ing

recourse

to

extraordinary measures" (Machiavelli { 1 532} 1940, p . 1 33); and (4) the need to
build consensus---hence, the modern state's need for propaganda and other
institutional methods for what has euphemistically been referred to as
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"maintaining citizen concurrence . "

With regard to the importance o f

consensus building h e said, "Well ordered states a n d wise princes have
studied diligently not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to satisfy the
populace and keep it contented, for this is one of the most important matters
that a prince has to deal with" (Machiavelli / 1532 } 1940, p. 59).
Machiavelli lived at the dawning of what we have come to refer to as
the nation-state system .

Lerner ( 1940) writes tha t two elements were

historically to enter into the composition of the nation-state system: one was
national unity and the idea of a common culture and common economic
limits; the second was a concentration of power at the center. A ccording to
Lerner, "Ma chiavelli only dimly foresaw nationalism, but he was keenly
aware of the necessity for the concentration of power from the center in order
to maintain unity and he wrote about the methods by which this could be
achieved" (Lerner 1 940, p.34).

Although history has not been kind to the

memory of Machiavelli, his contrib ution to the understanding of the
dynamics of the modern state and our understanding of political power, as it

is actually exercised, cannot be underestimated . Unfortunately, the common
sense view of Machiavelli, i .e, the notion of "Ma chiavellian" tactics or a
Machiavellian "personality" does not d o j ustice to his truly structural
perspective --- this above all is his legacy. We see in his "Prince" a metaphor
for state power.
Lerner ( 1 940) observes that power politics existed before Machiavelli
was ever heard of and will exist long after his memory. What he did was
recognize its existence and subject it to scientific study. And so his name has
been associated with it. As we progress through the analysis of the empirical
data, Machiavelli's contribution will become clearer.
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2.3

The Three Faces of Power
The analytic framework for this research is that of Steven Lukes ( 1974),

a British sociologist, and his formulation of what he termed, The " Three
Faces of Power". According to Lukes ( 1974), there are three ways of analyzing
power in capitalist societies.

Using what he terms a " three dimensional

view," his schema provides a useful framework for understanding the
dialectics of power and dissent, particularly because his approach emphasizes
structural constraints rather than individual action. It should be emphasized,
however, that the dimensions of power should not be construed as operating
separately. Instead, it should be understood that the separation of power into
three faces or d i m e n s io n s is purely for heuristic purposes.

The three

dimensions, although discussed separately, are to be thought of as occurring
simultaneously.

A useful metaphor for understanding the operation o f

power a s described b y Lukes would b e peeling away the layers of a n onion.
The first dimension according to Lukes' ( 1 974) formulation defines
power (known as the pluralist view) as the ability of A to prevail over B in
formal political decision-making on one or more key issues over which there
is observable conflict (Lukes 1 974) . The second dimension includes the first,
but expands to include the ability to determine what is to count as an issue
where there is observable conflict and the third d imension involves the
ability of A to shape the conceptions of the situation of the powerless and
"this may happen in the absence of observable conflict, which may have been
successfully averted" (Lukes 1974, pp. 24-25) . According to Gaventa, the third
dimension is "by far the least developed and least understood mechanism of
power--at least within the field of political science" ( 1980, p. 15). The present
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study falls somewhere between the second and third dimensions of power
according to Lukes' (1974) paradigm.

2 .4

The First Dimension of Power: The Pluralists
The study of power in the United States has focused on community

studies and has been dominated largely --- at least in political science---by the
pluralists' school of thought, as exemplified in the works of Robert Dahl,
Wolfinger and Polsby (Dahl 1 9 6 1 ; Wolfinger 1 9 7 1 ; Polsby 1 963) .

The

community power literature is not particularly helpful in understanding the
operation of power at the national level in the modern state. Power in local
communities is said to be fractionated and d iffuse, by all accounts of the
pluralis ts. However, pluralists do not confine their analysis of the nature of
power to local community structures, but use this paradigm to explain the
operation of state power as well. Pluralists argue that power is not held by
one group, but plurally by many groups. They affirm that:
The p ower structure o f the Uni ted States is highly
complex and d iversified (rather than unitary and
monolithic), tha t the political system is more or less
democratic, that in political processes the political elite is
ascendent over and not subordinate to the economic elite
(Rose 1 967, p. 492) .
Dahl's study of New Haven is the exemplar of pluralist philosophy and
methodology. He studied three "issue areas" in New Haven politics to see
who prevailed in the decision-making process: p arty nominations, urb an
redevelopment and public education (Dahl 1961). He concluded that no one
elite controlled the politics of New Haven. On the contrary, he argued that
different groups exercise influence over issues of specific concern to them.
Thus, b us iness leaders in New Haven were influent i a l in u rb a n
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redevelopment of the downtown b usiness area, smce this was of clear
concern to them. However, business leaders "did not control education, hold
a large number of political offices, or greatly influence political nominations
in New Haven" (Sherman and Wood 1989, p. 273). Hence, he concluded that
democracy thrived

in

New Haven and he argued that no "ruling class" can be

seen to dominate.
Dahl's central method in Who Governs ?

was to ' determine for each

decision which p articipants had initiated alternatives that were fina lly
adopted, had vetoed alternatives initiated by others, or had proposed
alternatives that were turned down.

In Merleman's words, the pluralists

"studied actual behavior, stressed operational definitions, and turned up
evidence. Most important, it seemed to produce reliable conclusions which
met the c anons of science" (Merelman 1968,p . 451 ) . The focus on observable
behavior in identifying power involves the pluralists in studying decision
making as their central concept. Polsby writes that, "Power may be studied by
examining ' who p articipates, who gains and loses, and who prevails in
decision-making" (Polsby 1 963, p. 55). "The key to the definition is a focus on
behavior --- doing, p articipating --- about which several assumptions are
made . . . First, grievances are assumed to be recognized and acted upon .

.

Secondly, p a rticipation is a ssumed to o ccur within decision-making arenas,

which are in turn assumed to be open to virtually any organized group"
(Gaventa 1 980,p. 5). It is further assumed that the decisions involve direct,
i.e., actual and observable conflict. Thus, for Dahl, power can be analyzed
only after "careful examination of a series of concrete decisions" (Dahl 1958).
The p luralist focus on "observable behavior," i.e., d ecisions reached over
specific issue areas, has its b asis in the theory of logical positivism prevalent
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at the beginning of the twentieth century and venerated by pluralist thinkers
and m any social scientists alike.

Positivists argued that only observable

behavior i.e., behavior that is measurable ( like voting) constituted valid
k n o w l e d g e . Follow ing behaviorist p rinciples, pluralists b elieve that
individuals' interests can be discovered by seeing which policy options they
choose;

hence, pluralists tend to ignore many features of the operation of

power that lay hidden beneath the surface, arguing that you can't study what
you can't measure.

Dahl's findings have not gone unchallenged, however.

Domhoff ( 19 78 ) has challenged Dahl on behaviorist grounds and other
studies (Lyon, et al. 1 981; Tabb and Sawers 1 978) support this critique. In an
interesting rejoinder to the pluralists' insistence on studying only "observable
phenomena," Michael Parenti writes, "Now I, for one, have no quarrel with
the dictum that we observe only the observable, but it may be suggested that
what the pluralists have defined as "observable" is not all that meets the eyes
of other researchers" (Parenti 1970, p . 504).
In his critique of pluralist methodology, Floyd Hunter said, "They { the
p luralists} have begun their structure at the mezzanine without showing us a
lobby or foundation, i.e., they have begun by studying the issues rather than
the values and biases that are built into the political system, and that, for the
student of power, give real meaning to those issues which do enter the p ublic
arena" (Hunter 1 953)
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the pluralists concentra te
their attention, not upon the sources of power, but upon its exercise. Power
to them means "participation in decision-making," and can be analyzed only
after a c areful examination of a series of concrete decisions. (It has been
pointed out, however, that using pluralist methodology, it is possible to come
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to some very non-pluralist conclusions) . The model takes no a ccount of the
fact that power can be and often is exercised by confining the scope of the
decision making to relatively "safe" issues.

In brief, the one d imensional

view of power cannot reveal the less visible ways in which a pluralist system
may be biased in favor of certain groups and against others.

"A deeper

analysis," Lukes suggests, "would concern itself with all the complex and
subtle w ays in which the inactivity of leaders and the sheer weight of
institutions--political, industrial, military, educational, keep people from
even trying to get into the political arena" (Lukes, 1974, p. 1 ) . And I would
add, once there, keep them from p articipa ting in substantive ways in the
decisions that affect their lives.
Dahl did not limit his conclusions to the municipal government of
New Haven, but extended his findings as evidence that the entire American
political system was similarly open based on the fact that groups compete for
power. He wrote: "The independence, penetrability, and heterogeneity of the
various segments of the political stratum all but guarantee tha t any
dissatisfied group will find spokesmen in the political arena" (Dahl 1961, p .
9 3 ) . Similarly, Polsby writes, " i n the decision-making o f fragmented
government--and American national, state, and local government are
nothing if not fragmented--the claims of small intense minorities are usually
attended to" (Polsby 1963, p . 1 18).
The notion that competing groups in society can and d o act as a
restraint on tyranny has wide acceptance. Indeed, even Machiavelli spoke
about the equalizing effect of various competing groups within society. He
wrote, "In fact, when there is combined under the same constitution a prince,
a nobility, and the power of the people, then these three powers will w atch
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and keep each other reciprocally in check" (Machiavelli 1 940,p . 1 1 5 ) .
Similarly, the English pluralist, David Nichols, argued that the existence o f
diverse groups i n society, e.g., "cultural, religious, economic, civic and others,
constitute . . . the principal bulwark against state absolutism" (Nichols 1 9 74, p .
2).

C . W . Mills referred to this as the idea o f "the great balance." H e wrote:

"The idea of the great balance, {italics mine} in all its various forms, is now
the prevailing common-sense view of public affairs" (Mills 1 956, p. 336) .
Sherman and Wood ( 1 989) point out that a newer and more qualified
version of the pluralist conception has emerged in the work of Dye ( 1983), as
well as Orum( 1 967) and Knoke ( 1 982).

Pluralists now make the argument

that "America is ruled by various competing elites" (Kourvetaris and Dobratz
1 982) .

The new pluralists vision a dmits some inequality, but still sees a

resulting political democracy that roughly reflects and arbitrates the desires of
many conflicting groups. However, Sherman and Wood write:
They {pluralists} find it necessary to emphasize,that
political power is to a large degree independent of and
superior to economic power. The reason, of course, is that
economic power is so unequally distribute d . I f the
d istribution of political power exactly followed that of
economic power, the degree of inequality would leave
little to call democracy (Sherman and Wood 1 989, p. 268).
2.5

Elite Theory
Counterpoised to pluralist theory is another view of power, known as

elite theory which postulates a ruling class model of power. Elite theorists
(Domhoff 1 983; Hunter 1 953; Mills 1 956) argue that there is a social upper class
in the United States that is a ruling class by virtue of its dominant role in the
economy and government. Further, Domhoff (1978) argued that this ruling
class is socially cohesive, has, its basis in the large corporations and banks (and
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the military), plays a major role in shaping the social and political climate,
and dominates the federal government through a variety of organizations
and methods. Leaders within the upper class join with high-level employees
in the organizations they control to make up what will be called the power

elite. Domhoff writes:
This power elite is the leadership group of the upper class
as a whole, but it is not the same thing as the upper class,
for not all members of the upper c lass are members of the
power elite and not all members of the power elite are
p art of the upper class . It is members of the power elite
who take part in the processes that maintain the c lass
structure . Domination does not mean total controt but
the ability to set the terms under which other groups and
other classes must operate. (Domhoff 1978, p. 2)
Against the elitist approach to analyzing power several criticisms have
been levelled . For example, Dahl and others, while not denying the existence
of elites, m aintain that their power is checked by other elites. Dahrendorf
( 1959) writes, "If there are elites in our society, the p luralists say, they are
numerous and specialized, and they are checked in their demands by other
elites" (Dahrendorf 1959, p. 67) . According to Dahrendorf, pluralists argue
that no one group can press its advantage "too far" and any group that is
interested in an issue can find a way" (Dahrendorf 1 959, p. 67) . To this
assertion Parenti replies, "Not only are elites often unchecked by public
authority on the most important issues affecting them, but in many instances

p ublic decision making authority has been parcelled out to private interests
on a highly inegalitarian basis" (Parenti 1 970, p. 503). Dahl has criticized the
power elite thesis on other grounds as well. He erroneously conceives of elite
d omination exclusively in the form of a 'conscious cabal' exercising the
power of decision-making and vetoing.
7 1

"In doing so/' argue Bachrach and

Baratz, "he overlooks a more subtle form of domination, one in which those
who actually d ominate are not conscious of it themselves, simply because
their position of dominance has never seriously been challenged " (Bachrach
and Baratz 1 962, p. 952) .
Elite theorists claim that in every institution there is an ordered system
of power, a "power structure" which is an integral part and mirror image of
the organization's stratification, and they imply that this power structure
tends to be stable over time. Polsby disagrees with this formulation and he
writes, "It has been assumed (by elite theorists) that power is as predictably
distributed in the population as the other stand-bys of stratification analysis,
class and status seem to be" (Polsby 1 963 p.232) . It is also argued that elite
theorists wrongly equate reputed power with actual power (Bachrach, 1 962) .
Dahl ( 1 958) maintains that one can only strictly test the hypothesis of a ruling
class if there are, " . . . cases involving key political decisions in which the
preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other
likely group that might be suggested, and . . .in such c ases, the preference of
the elite regularly prevail" (Dahl 1 958, p. 466) . Finally, Frey (1971 ) makes "a
plea for a decent burial" of the elitist/ pluralist controversy, in order to launch
a j oint assault on the important, yet outstanding problems of community
power analysis (Frey, 1971 ). Eventually, the controvrsey was put to rest, but its
spirit escaped the grave and remains alive, embodied in new terminology.

2.6

The Second Dimension of Power
One of the most important aspects of power, Parenti suggests, is not to

prevail

in

a struggle but to predetermine the agenda of struggle--to determine

whether certain issues ever reach the competition stage (Parenti 1 970) . This
72

point of view was elaborated first by Schattschneider (1960) and then later by
Bachrach and Baratz (1970).
According to pluralists, power is exercised when "A" gets "B" to do
something that "B" would not otherwise do.

However, power is also

exercised when "A" devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and
political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political
process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively
innocuous (i.e., "safe" issues).

Lasswell ( 1 930) first commented about the

importance of limiting the scope of conflict.

"The problem of politics," he

sa id, "is less to solve conflicts than to prevent them" (Lasswell 1930,
p . 1 9 6, 1 9 7 ) . Following Lasswell, Schattschneider ( 1 960) wrote about the
importance of containing or limiting the scope of a conflict. He said: "The
scope factor overthrows the familiar simplistic calculus based on the moral
tug of war of measurable forces" (Schattschneider 1 960, p.S).
Power holders manage this in a variety of ways.

One of the ways

Schattschneider describes is through, what he termed, the "mobilization of
bias." He wrote:
All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of
exploiting some kinds of conflict and the suppression of
others because organization is the mobilization of bias .
Some issues are organized into politics while others are
organized out" (Schattschneider 1 960, p. 71 ).
The term ' mobilization of bias' as described by Bachrach and Baratz
refers to, "a set o f predominant values, beliefs, ritua ls, institutional
procedures (i.e., " rules o f the game " ) that operate systematically and
consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of
others. Those who benefit are placed in a position to defend and promote
their vested interests" (Bachrach and Baratz 1 970, p. 43) . More often than not,
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the status quo defenders are a minority or elite group within the population
in question.
Pluralists assert that power is reflected only in concrete decisions,
however, Professor Schattschneider reminds us that, "to the extent that a
person or group consciously or unconsciously creates or reinforces barriers to
the p ublic airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power"
(Schattschneider 1 960, p. 96).

He argued that the crucial problem in politics is

the management of conflict. He wrote:
All politics, all leadership, all organization involves the
management of conflict . . . the consequences of conflict are
so important that it is inconceivable that any regime could
survive without making an attempt to shape the system.
In the interest of their own political survival, therefore,
leaders and organizations must make sure that issues
which threaten their existence, their own allocations of
political space, are not admitted to the political arena
(Schattschneider 1 960, p. 71 ) .

Following Schattschneider, Bachrach and Baratz ( 1962) developed the
concept of "power's second face" by which power is exercised not just upon
p a rticipants within the decision-making process but also towards the
exclusion of certain participants and issues altogether.

In effect, they argue

that the p luralists : ( 1 ) focus upon " issues"; (2) p rovide no way o f
d istinguishing " important" from "unimportant" issues; and ( 3 ) are blind to
the values and biases built into the political system that give real meaning to
those issues which do not enter the political arena.
The second d imensional approach looks at blockages that prevent
griev ances from emerging into conflict within the organization.

For

Bachrach and Baratz ( 1962) it is crucially important to identify potential issues
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which nondecision-making prevents from becoming actual. They argue that
"the d istinction between important and unimportant issues cannot be made .
. . intelligently in the absence of an analysis of the 'mobilization of bias' in the
community which consists of an analysis of the dominant v alues and the
political myths, rituals and institutions which tend to favor the vested
interests of one or more groups relative to others" (Bachrach and Baratz 1 962,
p. 950). They argue that in the interest of their own political survival, leaders
and organizations must make sure that issues which threaten their existence,
their own allocations of political space, are not admitted to the political arena.
This is done in a variety of ways: (1) through invoking the 'mobilization of
bias'; (2) through creating barriers to p articipation, e.g., agenda setting ; and (3)
through decisions and 'nondecisions. '

Nondecision-making

is a term used

to refer to the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to
"safe" issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and
political institutions and procedures. A a non-decision is defined as:
A decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a
latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of
the decision maker.
To be more nearly explicit,
nondecision-making is a means by which demands for
change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges
in the community c an be suffocated before they are
voiced, or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to
the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all of these
things, m a imed o r d e s troyed in the d e c i s i o n
implementing stage of the policy process (Bachrach and
Baratz 1970,p. 44) .
They suggest several ways in which this may be accomplished: (1) by
force; (2) threat of sanctions ( ' nega tive or positive') ' ranging from
intimidation . . . to co-optation'; (3) the invocation of an existing bias of the
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political system, e.g., a norm, a precedent, a rule or procedure; (4) reshaping
or strengthening the mobilization of bias through the establishment of n e w
barriers o r new symbols against the challengers efforts t o widen the scope of
the conflict (Gaventa 1 980). Such processes may take direct observable forms;
however, G aventa suggests that, "there may be other processes of non
decision-making power which are not so explicitly observable" (Gaventa 1980,
p. 15). He refers to two processes, one which he terms 'decisionless decisions'
and the other which he terms, 'the rule of anticipated reactions. "The first of
these,'decisionless decisions', he says, "grows from institutional inaction, or
the unforeseen sum effect of incremental decisions" (Gaventa 1 980, p . 15)

.

A

second process has to do with the 'rule of anticipa ted reactions,' "situations
where B, confronted by A who has greater power resources decides not to
make a demand upon A, for fear that the latter will invoke sanctions against
him" (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, pp . 42-46) .
An example of an empirical work which makes use of the concepts of
"nondecision-making" is Matthew Crenson's book, The Unpolitics of A ir

Pollution: A Study of NonDecision-making in the Cities (Crenson 1 97 1 ) .

He

concludes that the a ir pollution issue tends not to flourish in cities where
industry enjoys a reputation for power.
Lukes has criticized Bachrach and B aratz' view of p ower on the
grounds that they follow the pluralists in adopting a too methodologically
individ ualistic view of power. "As students of power and its consequences,"
they write, "our main concern is not whether the defenders of the status quo
use their power consciously, but rather, if and how they exercise it and what
effects it has on the political process and other actors within the system"
(Lukes 1974, p . 2 1 ) . Lukes argues that the bias of the system is not sustained
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simply by a series of individually chosen acts, but also by the socially

s tructured and culturally patterned behavior of groups, and the practices of
institu tions which may be manifested by individual actors (Lukes 1 974) . In
his classic work

1 984,

Orwell expressed it similarly when he said :

The essence of oligarchical rule is not father-to-son
inheritance, but the persistence of a certain world-view
and a certain way of life, imposed by the dead upon the
living. A ruling group is a ruling group so long as it can
nominate its successors. The Party is not concerned with
perpetuating its blood, but with perpetuating itself. Who
wields power is not imp ortant, provided tha t the
hierarchical structure rema ins a lw a y s the s a m e .
(emphasis in original) (Orwell 1 992, p. 1 53).
To sum up, Bachrach and Baratz resolutely reject the idea that a sound
concept of power can be predicated on the assumption that power is totally
embod ied and fully reflected in "concrete decisions" or in activity bearing
directly upon their making. The second dimensional view of power asserts
that A constructs barriers to the participation of B through non-decision
making and the mobilization of bias.

2.7

The Third Dimension of Power
The second view has been extended by a third v1ew

(Lukes 1974),

which suggests that power not only may limit action upon inequali ties, it
may also serve to shape people's minds so that they do not see certain
problems. Lukes reminds us that daily life work involves the incorporation
of a b asic world view and this view is determined largely by members of a
ruling class.

Lukes' definition of power differs from that of the pluralists.

Whereas the pluralists define power as the ability of A to get B to do
something he would not otherwise do, Lukes ( 1974) writes: "I have defined
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the concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B
in a manner contrary to B's interests" (Lukes 1 974, p. 34). Later, he adds that
whether or not B is conscious of his interests is irrelevant. Thus, an analysis
of the third face (or the third dimension) of power seeks to specify the means
through which power influences, shapes, or determines conceptions of the
necessities, possibilities, and strategies of challenge in situations of la tent
conflict. Such an analysis would include a study of myths, language, symbols
and how they are shaped or manipulated by power processes. It would also
delve into the area of "official ideologies" and "social legitimations," i.e., the
ways in which the powerful cloak the plans /programs they favor in ways that
make them seem reasonable and worthy of consideration---even necessary.
" It may

involve, in short, locating the power processes behind the social

construction of meaning and patterns that serve to get B to act and believe in
a manner in which B otherwise might not, to A's benefit and B's detriment"
(Gaventa 1 980, p. 16).
J. Allen Whitt's (1982) study of the transportation issue in Los Angeles
illustrates the utility of going beyond a s imple view of power.

Whitt

compared three different models of political power with one another in order
to determine which best explains the empirical data. He argues that a class
dialectical model provides the best explanation for the data in his study. The
class-dialectical model shares many fea tures in common with Lukes' three
d imensional model.

It employs a view of power that stresses structural

comp onents while examining the built-in biases of political systems; it also
resonates well with what we have referred to as the third d imension of
power. Whitt (1982) argues that our whole system of transportation tends to
be privatized "lending legitimacy and psychic inevitability to the idea that
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automobiles are the most natural and efficient mode of transport" (Whitt
1982, p. 204).
Another empirical study which Lukes (1974) says lies on the borderline
of the two-dimensional and three-dimensional views of power is Matthew
Crenson's study of air pollution politics.

He concludes that the air pollution

issue tends not to flourish in cities where industry enjoys a reputation for
power (Crenson 1971). Lukes ( 1 974) comments that, "Crenson's analysis is
impressive . . .because there is reason to expect that, other things being equal,
people would rather not be poisoned" (Lukes 1974, p .45). We are reminded
that each dimension of power tends to reinforce the others .

As Lukes put it:

"The d imensions of power, each with its sundry mechanisms, must be seen
as interrelated in the totality of their impact" (Lukes 1 974, p. 20) .
Another example of recent research which employs a power theory
framework is that of Michael R. Reich's (1991) Toxic Politics .

In his book

Reich presents case studies of persons and communities who have been
poisoned in one way or another by various toxics. Reich's study focuses on
the difficulties involved in obtaining redress for grievances -after the fact. His
study is important as it sheds light on the power processes at work which are
similar to those encountered in our study of the Chemical Stockp ile Disposal
Program. However, the present study differs from Reich's (1971) in that we
are looking at power processes that occur "before the fact" rather than after an
emergency has already occurred. This is one of the features that distinguishes
the present work from that of others who have labored with a similar
research problem.
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2.8

State Power
Some of the most interesting debates in political science and sociology

in the last few decades have to do with questions regarding the nature and
character of state power. Questions regarding the nature and operation of
state power h ave a direct bearing on the current research; therefore, it is
necessa ry that we deal b riefly with some of the i mp ortant d ebates
surrounding the subject of "the state." Ralph Miliband once said, "A theory
of the state is also a theory of society and of the distribution of power in
society" (Miliband 1 969,p . 2). With that in mind we turn to a consideration of
some of the major ways of thinking about the state and about the distribution
of power therein. For the purposes of this study, we shall be speaking about
" the modern state" which, admittedly is an abstraction, an "ideal type " i.e., a
model such as Max Weber described .
The modern state is a European, or more exactly, western European
creation which emerged gradually in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries and found its first mature form in the seventeenth. It emerged in
the same time period as, and is coincident with the development o f
capitalism (Lubasz, 1964). Miliband refers t o the modern state as a cap i talist
state. In Jessop's words, the "determinate conjuncture" of the modern state of
which we speak, is the fact that it is enmeshed in a capitalist economy. The
western state system evolved along with capitalism; therefore, capitalism has
influenced the charac ter and nature of the modern state to which we refer in
this work. Speaking about " the modern state/' Heinz Lubasz wrote:
The first thing to be said about the modern state is that it
does not exist and never has existed. What has existed
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historically is a great number of modern states, with very
v a ri e d constitutions, i n tern a l pol itical l i ves, and
international careers. When, therefore, we speak of the
modern s t a te, w e speak of a n abstraction concocted of
common denominators, of features common to m any or
most such states much of the time, but certainly not to be
met with in precisely the same forms in all such states.
(Lubasz 1964, p. 1 )
Lenin once commented o n the " treacherous bog" that characterizes
theorizing about the state. In lecturing to his students, he remarked, "You
will scarcely find another question which has been so confused, both
deliberately and not, by representatives of bourgeois science, p hilosophy,
jurisprudence, political economy and journalism, as the question of the state"
(Lenin 1 929, p . . 3). He remarked that, "it should first of all be noted that the
state has not always existed . There was a time when there was no state"
(Lenin 1929, p .S). Later, he added : "History shows that the state as a special
apparatus for coercing people arose wherever and whenever there appeared a
division of society into classes" (Lenin 1929, p .7).
The community power literature i s not p articularly helpful in
understanding the operation of power at the national level in the modern
state. Power in local communities is said to be fractionated and diffuse, by all
accounts of the pluralists.

However, p luralists do not confine their analysis

of the nature of power to local community structures, but use this paradigm
to explain the operation of state power as well.
Pluralists advocate methodological individualism which asserts that
all hypotheses about human collectivities can and should ultimately be
reduced to statements about ind ividual agents .

This implies that we can

understand the opera tion of state power by studying the behavior of
individual actors (Elster 1982; Lukes 1974). Expressing a similar idea, Lasswell
8 1

(1950) argued that the 'power of the state' cannot be understood in abstraction
from the forms of power manifested in various types of interpersonal
relations. Both of these reductionist views fail to capture the real nature of
the state, for the state has an institutional quality that puts it beyond the pale
of agency alone.
Weber argued that there was no one task which specifically determined
the state. Therefore, one had to define the state in terms of the specific means
which it employed and these means were, ultimately, physical force
(Schwarzmantel 1 987) .

"The state," Weber wrote, "is a human community

that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given territory" (Weber 1970, p. 78). His view comes closer to a view
of power that stresses its structural components.

We maintain tha t the

individual use of power cannot be held as a metaphor for state power.
In a paper dealing with the relation between capitalism and democracy,
Jessop ( 1 978) talks about the character of the state.

He argues that: " In

discussing the nature of the state, three points merit special emphasis: (a) the
state is a structural ensemble rather than a subject; (b) the state is a system of
political domination rather than a neutral instrument; and (c) state power is a
complex social relation that reflects the changing balance of social forces in a
determinate conjuncture" (Jessop 1978, p . l l ) .
A review of the literature reveals that the state h a s been variously
conceived : ( a) as a force of divine origin, or as Hegel put it, "The idea made
actual," p art and parcel of God's journey towards self-realization" (Dunleavy
and O'Leary 1 9 87, p . 7) ; (b) as an instrument of the ruling class ---" the
instrumentalist," i .e., the Marxist view, or as Lenin put it, "as a machine for
maintaining the rule of one class over another" (Lenin 1 929, p . l l ) ; (c) as a
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neutral agent (Birch 1964); (d) as an autonomous arb iter among contending
"interest" groups, i.e, "the broker state" (Allison 1971; Halpern 1975); (e) as
relatively a utonomous (Skocpol 1 980); (f) and as a fully autonomous entity
(Block 1980); and (f) as a fully autonomous entity (Skocpol, 1993).
According to Dunleavy and O'Leary ( 1987), the pluralists really have
no theory of the state. In their view, the state becomes a neutral or benign
Using the "weathervane" or "cipher" model described by Dunleavy

entity.

and O'Leary ( 1 987), p luralists a ssume that the state simply mirrors or
responds to the balance of pressure group forces in civil society.

State

organizations are seen as mainly inert recipients of pressure from interest
groups.

This image suggests a state highly responsive to political p arties.

Dunleavy writes, "Cipher pluralists regard both elected politicians and
administrative elites as malleable and passive people whose actions conform
to the prevailing patterns of pressure" (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, p. 5 1 ) . On
the other hand, in the "broker" state model, the state does not mirror its
society, nor neutrally follow the public interest; it is an interest group state in
which elected party government is only 'first amongst equals, as if contending
groups were equally balanced---which is not the general pluralist assumption,
as Dunleavy reminds us (1987, p. 47) .
or a b lack box.

The broker state is not passive, neutral,

It should be noted, however, that much goes on outside

p o litical p arties and the electoral process, a fact which the p luralists
summarily dismiss out of hand as either non-existent or as unimportant, i .e.,
trivial.
Contrasting these views are those of the Marxist school.

Marx and

Engles expressed their basic premise on the nature of the state in T h e

Com m u n is t Man ifes to: (1848): "The executive of the modern state is but a
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committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx
and Engles { 1 848} 1 971 ) . Three perspectives have characterized work on the
state in the Marxist tradition.

They are: ( 1 ) the instrumentalists; (2) the

structuralists ; and (3) the Hegelian-Marxists .

Gold, Lo and Wright ( 1 975)

argue that, " Regardless of which of these traditions is drawn upon most
heavily, v irtually all Marxist treatments of the state begin with the
fundamental observation that the state in capitalist society broadly serves the
interests of the capitalist class" (Gold, et al. 1 975, p. 3 1 ) .
The classic instrumentalist position as originally articulated b y Marx
and Engles says the state is the instrument of the bourgeoisie (Baran and
Sweezy 1 966; Domhoff 1 967; Miliband 1 969; Mills 1 956) .

From this

perspective, the ruling class is seen to utilize the government rather directly
for its own benefit. It should be noted, however, that Domhoff vigorously
denies being a member of this camp .

In an article entitled , 'I am not an

Instrumentalist," Domhoff insisted that instead of focusing solely on the
political power of the capitalist class he made class struggle (italics mine) basic
to his analysis (Domhoff 1976) . Structuralists stress the "relative autonomy"
of the state.

While still retaining the overall context of the determinant

nature of the objective capitalist environment, structuralists seek to elaborate
how state policy is determined by the contradictions and constraints of the
c ap italist system, while instrumental manipulation remains a secondary
consideration. Two of its most well-known formulators are Nicos Poulantzas
(Poulantzas 1 9 73; Poulantzas 1974; Poulantzas 1 975) and Louis Althusser
(Althusser 1 971 ).
The Hegelian-Marxist tradition places its emphasis on consciousness
and ideology while the link to accumulation and instrumental m anipulation
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stays in the background. To the question, "What is the state?" the Hegelian
Marxist answers that the state is a mystification --- a concrete institution
which serves the interests of the dominant class but which seeks to portray
itself as serving the nation as a whole thereby obscuring the basic lines of
antagonism.
With respect to the present study, the relative autonomy position
appears to be the best fit. The Army seems to operate quite automously from
the direct control of c apitalists, yet it is the capitalist sector that the Army
defends.

2.8.1

The Problem of Centralization
A number of political theorists argue that state activity has grown in

scope and become increasingly centralized (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). In
the United States, this trend has historical roots in the early days of the
republic in the split between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. From
1 776 to 1 787 America under the Articles of Confederation was, in reality, no
more than a loose alliance of sovereign independent states. Most Americans
agreed with John Adams who wrote, "No one thought of consolidating the
vast continent under one national government" (Butterfield 1 962, p. 352) .
The inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness referred to
in the Declaration of Independence were, it was assumed, best protected by
small and local state governments.

Kramnick asserted that, "The spirit of

Rousseau hovered over these Anti-Federalists as they identified with small,
simple, face-to-face, uniform societies" (Kramnick 1 987, p . 60) . The federal
government was formed only to defend the whole against foreign nations in
case of war and to defend the lesser states against the ambitions of the larger.
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The Confederation was seen merely a temporary expedient, required to wage
war against Britain, which would fade with the coming of peace . (Kramnick
1987 )

.

The C ontinental Congress was the sole integrative institution created
at the center under the Articles. With the cessation of hostilities in 1 783, the
C ontinental Congress became virtually impotent with all effec tive power
residing in the states. Additionally, there was no executive branch provided
for the central government by the Articles. "The Revolution, a fter alt was
against authority and power" (Kramnick 1 987, p . 19 ) . In one after another state
constitution drafted after 1 776 a clear expression of the "politics of liberty" was
the fear of rulers and of magisterial a uthority. The new state constitutions
also severely limited grants of executive authority. With the exception of one
state, South Carolina, all the new state constitutions totally eliminated any
role for the governors in the legislative process. It became common practice
to require that any changes in the state constitution be a pproved not by the
state legislatures but l2:}c the people themselves in convention.

Kramnick

writes that:
the 'politics of liberty' under the Articles. . . expressed
itself in an aggressive egalitarianism. The suffrage was
extended from 1 776 to 1 789 in most states so that from 70
to 90 percent of all white adult males became eligible to
v o te . Religious o aths were complete ly eliminate d
(Kramnick 1987 , p . 23) .
Many voices arose lamenting this egalitarianism, e . g . , John Otis had
warned in 1 776 that "when the pot boils the scum will rise," a frequently used
metaphor for the "politics of liberty" under the Articles. In 1 788 Madison
wrote that the state legislatures were filled with " men without reading,
experience or principle" (Kramnick { 1 788} 1987, p. 24) . They were men whom
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Jay, his fellow author of the Federalist, thought "wisdom would have left in
obscurity" (Wood 1972, p. 476) .
Kramnick argues that virtually all traditional notions of the separation
of powers were ab andoned in the states under the Articles.

In the

Pennsylvania constitution, b ills could not become law until after their first
reading in the legislature; they were then publicized throughout the state,
d iscussed and approved by local conventions and then voted upon in the
next legislative session.

"The very notion of representation, of being

governed by officials, even elected officials, however frequently elected, c ame
under attack in the states" (Kramnick { 1 788} 1 987 , p. 22). In many states the
legislatures had virtually taken over the administration of justice.

In

Vermont, for example, the legislature reversed many court judgments, stayed
executions, and even intervened in cases involving land titles, contracts and
debt. The state legislatures appeared to many to be tyrants in liberty's cloak,
even c ausing Thomas Jefferson to comment that, "One hundred seventy
three despots would surely be as oppressive as one . . . An elective despotism
was not the government we fought for" (Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the

S ta te of Virginia, p. 1 95 as cited in Kramnick 1 987,p . 310). Jefferson forcefully
supported the idea of the separation of powers embo d ied in the new
C onstitution.

He saw this system of checks and b alances as essential to

preserving liberty. It was this problem of limiting state power that ultimately
consumed Jefferson and about which he wrote so eloquently.
The Articles of Confederation were ultimately replaced in 1 787 by the
Constitution.

The fear of popular sovereignty, combined with the severe

financial crises faced by most sta tes after the war, created an a tmosphere
where the ideas embodied by the federalists seemed the only logical solution.
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The new Constitution represented the triumph of the center over the
periphery, and Madison, writing in Federalist No. 1 0, left no doubt that the
new Constitution with its eclipse of the periphery and shift of power to the
central government would "secure the national councils against any d anger
from . . . a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division
of property, or for any other improper or wicked project" (Boyd 1 950,p . 246) .
The trend toward centralization has continued throughout our history,
and intensified after the second world war. It is an integral feature of the
modern state. Numerous writers have shared the view of the inevitability of
centralization, for example, George Orwell warned, "What is coming is the
centralized state, and the new World War will only hasten its arrival"
(Orwell 1 992, p . 1 93). A d d itionally, Dunleavy observed that, "Weber and
later organization theorists shared the common assumption that a single
hierarchical ordering of the state organizations is an ineluctable, but generally
desirable, feature of the modern state" (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1 987, p. 1 76) .
Poulantzas ( 1978) identified the rise of authoritarian statism as the
principal trend in contemporary liberal democratic politics and defined it as
"intensified state control over every sphere of socio-economic life combined
with a radical decline of the institutions of political democracy, and with
d ra conian and multiform curtailment of so-called " fo rm al" l iberties"
(Poulantzas 1 978, pp. 203-4). Commenting on the consequences of this trend
towards centralization, C.W. Mills once wrote, "That the facilities of power
are enormously enlarged and decisively centralized means that the decisions
of small groups are now more consequential" (Mills 1 956, p. 23).
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2.8.2

The Rise of the Pentagon
One area of state power that has received scant a ttention in the

literature is that of the Pentagon. Mills (1956) was writing about the time of
post-WWII America when the growing power of what President Dwight D.
Eisenhower termed the "military industrial complex" was beginning to be
recognized .

Mills ( 1 956) argued " that postwar military elites wielded

unprecedented influence and have joined with the d irectors of capitalist
firms and high-ranking civilians in the federal government to form the
power elite" (Mills 1956, pp. 212-1 3).
While Mills has been criticized for offering an overly-psychological
interpretation of power elites, many agree with his claim the the military has
played a relatively autonomous role in the postwar structure of state power.
In a recent article dealing with the unprecedented and largely unexamined
rise in the power of the Pentagon, Gregory Hooks (1990) decries the fact that
the Pentagon ' s

significant ( though not unlimited)

power and

its

implementation of a " de facto" industrial policy have received insufficient
attention.

He argues that despite the fact that the military " in theory" is

subservient to the Congress, it has become relatively autonomous, a fact
alluded to by C.W. Mills in 1 956 when he wrote, "Since Pearl Harbor those
who command the enlarged means of A merican violence have come to
possess considerable autonomy, as well as great influence, among their
political and economic colleagues" (Mills 1956, p. 198). Hooks argues that the
Pentagon has established a "de facto" industrial policy and is, for all intents
and purposes an autarky --- a separa te, autonomous entity c ap able of
independent a ction, garnering enormous resources and setting its own
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agenda. Hooks examines the microelectronics and the aeronautics industries
and concludes that military requirements are increasingly at odds with the
industry's commercial development. He contends that the defense program
hinders the competitiveness of U.S. firms. "As noted," Hooks writes, "in the
c ase studies of aeronautics and microelectronics, the Pentagon has been the
dominant influence in research and development, but its goals have been
and continue to be remote from civilian applications" (Hooks 1 990, p. 399) .
This, he concludes is a clear case of the state's pursuing an agenda d istinct
from that of the dominant class. In making this claim, Hooks overlooks an
important fac t about state power namely " that the different elements of the
state need not be in harmony" (Schwarzmantel 1 987,p. 4). Whatever the
relative merits of Hooks' analysis may be, he makes one point that is relevant
to the present study, and that is an appreciation for the enormous power
(about which we know very little) wielded by the Pentagon (see Hooks for a
review of the literature) .

2.9

Summa ry
The following work is divided up into seven chapters each treating a

separate issue relating to the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. Chapter
One will present an overview of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
(CSDP) as well as a glimpse at the historical record in terms of use of chemical
weapons throughout various cultures throughout history. It will also d iscuss
the framework for the Army's initial decision to use on-site incineration as
the technology of choice. Chapter two will discuss the various theoretical
orientations that guide the research, namely, the Three Dimensions of Power
framework developed by Steven Lukes, Bachrach & Baratz and Gaventa. In
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Chapter three we will look at the history and dynamics of the citizen
opposition movement that d eveloped in Kentucky at the Lexington
Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD), specifically in Berea and Richmond, KY. as
well as the seven other sites.
d imensions of the problem.

We will also touch upon the international
Chapter four will deal specifically with the

regulatory process, specifically The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and the various "extra-legal" devices the Army developed to deal
with citizen unrest. Chapter five deals with Army discourse surrounding the
issue. We explore various myths, ideologies and
legitimating devices employed by the Army in defense of their decision to
incinerate the weapons / munitions .

Chapter six describes the ponderous

propaganda m achine that evolved in unison with CSEPP ---the Army's
national protective action program which has been developed in conjunction
with the Federal Emergency Management Corporation (FEMA ) .

Chapter

seven investigates the potential theoretical import of the research, discusses
p ossible limitations of the study and poses some questions for further
research.
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Chapter 3

The People of Madison County: 'Causing a Great Tumult'
Suffer not yourselves to be betrayed with a kiss. . . Shall we try argument? Sir,
we have been trying that for the last ten years . . .Shall we resort to entreaty
and humble supplication?
already exhausted?

What terms shall we find, which have not been

We have petitioned---we have remonstrated---we have

supplicated---we have prostrated ourselves before the throne . . . There is no
longer any room for hope. I wish to be free. . .Is life so dear, or peace so sweet as
to be purchased at the price of slavery? Forbid it Almighty God!

I know not

what course others may take, but as for me give me liberty or give me death!
Patrick Henry, Richmond, Virginia. St. John's Church, March
23, 1775

(in Fawn M. Brodie. 1974.

Intimate History,

3.1

Thomas Jefferson: An

p. 122)

A Short History of Two Small Places --- Richmond and Berea, KY.
With very little modification, Patrick Henry's famous speech delivered

in Richmond, Virginia could serve as emblematic of the struggle with the
A rmy over the chemical weapons destruction p ro gr a m that began in
Richmond, Kentucky two centuries later. Although the towns of Berea and
Richmond evolved differently, their des tinies are intertwined and an
exa mination of their early history p rovides the necessary cultural context
which should help shed light on the conduct of the present controversy.
Berea and Richmond a re in Madison County, Kentucky, which is
situated only three miles from the Cumberland Plateau.

The Bluegrass

section of Madison County, Kentucky lies in Eastern Kentucky 130 miles
south of C incinnati, Ohio, and 40 miles southeast of Lexington.

Madison

County Kentucky is known for two things: Berea College and the Lexington92

Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) .

Richmond, which borders LBAD on the

northwest, is the county's largest city. Berea is eight miles southwest of the
Depot. The 1 990 census figures estimate that roughly 57,000 people reside in
Madison County, of that number, 9,126 live in Berea and 21, 155 in Richmond
(U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1 990, Washington, D.
C.).
The citizens of Madison County, Kentuc ky are no s trangers to
controversy.

The early histories of Berea and Richmond, KY are intertwined

in a way that makes their present cooperation on the nerve gas issue seem
improbable.

Although both are allied in their current opposition to the

Army's planned incinerator, they evolved quite differently, and colorful
stories abound about the towns' early rivalries.
Berea evolved as the more liberal community; Richmond the more
conservative.

The leaders of the citizen opposition groups that formed in

these cities reflect this dichotomy. The first, Concerned Citizens of Madison
County (the Richmond group), is headed by two individuals whose roots go
deep in the Richmond aristocracy--- the one a recognized community activist,
the other a noted author, Harvard graduate and war correspondent.
Common Ground, or the Kentuc ky Environmental Foundation, Inc ., ( the
Berea Group) is lead by an experienced environmental activist and Vietnam
W a r veteran.

As p rincipals in one of the nation's longest-running

environmental struggles, these people do not suffer fools gladly. To those
citizens of Madison County who attended one of the Army's first public
meetings on this issue, it appeared to them that the Army had indeed sent
fools to talk to the communities about their plan to destroy the chemical
weapons that were in storage at the Army depot just a stones throw from an
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elementary school and a major shopping mall. A brief history of each town
will suffice to illustrate the context for the development of the present ethos
of the groups that eventually formed to oppose the Army's stockpile disposal
p rogram.
Berea's history is bound up with with the founding of Berea College.
Its roots go back to the Civil War p eriod ( 1 855) .

Cassius M. Clay, an

influential land owner and rabid abolitionist, founded Berea College.

C lay

owned considerable land in the Bluegrass section of Madison County,
Kentucky.

In the early 1850s he sold off much of this land in an attempt "to

demonstrate the advantages of life without slavery" (Peck 1982, p. 1 ) . In 1 855,
Clay hired John G. Fee, a country minister---also an abolitionist---to head a
school based on Clay's ideals of freedom and democracy. A one-room school
was built in 1 855 which eventually became Berea College. The constitution of
Berea Col lege reads, "This college shall be under an influence strictly
Christian, and as such, opposed to sectarianism, slaveholding, caste, and
every other wrong institution or practice" (Berea College Admissions
Brochure, July 1 99 1 , p . 4). It was the first college to integrate after the Civil
War and to this day remains true to the ideals of its founders. Tuition is kept
to a minimum.

Student expenses for tuition, room and board, health and

incidental fees are $2,245. Every student works at least 1 0 hours a week in any
one of a number of affiliated student industries, e.g., the famous Boone
Tavern Hotel, located p rominently in the city square, is staffed 80% with
Berea College students.
The City of Berea has gained national recognition as a h aven for artists,
and small artisan shops decorate its main streets. Berea has become known as
a citadel of Appalachian Crafts and a repository for many otherwise lost arts.
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The City attracts thousands of visitors yearly and hosts several seasonal craft
fairs. The college has really been the driving force behind the culture that
later developed in Berea which includes an emphasis on face-to-face contact,
stresses economy of scale ( there are numerous small family-owned
businesses), and makes social justice issues of paramount importance. It has
much in common with what Ferdinand Toennies ( { 1 887} 1 963), the German
sociologist, described as a Gemeinschaft society. The Berea In terfaith Task

Force for Peace, a local organization which meets monthly and is devoted to
peace and j ustice issues, is one example of the town's culture. Many of its
citizens share a heightened interest in environmental issues, harbor a strong
commitment to the idea of "community" and many take an active interest in
local politics. This is a politically aware community. It is not at all unusual to
have issues of concern hotly debated in the local newspaper, The Berea

Citizen, or at Papa Lino's restaurant, a small deli which serves as a gathering
place for locals.

Citizens take an active interest in examining � new

initiatives that may affect this small community, whether that be a question
regarding the installation of bicycle p aths along the main thoroughfare,
recycling trash, or how to dispose of the nerve gas stored at the Lexington
B luegrass Army Depot.

If there were one concept that sums up the

weltanschauung of Berea, it would be "Question Authority! "
Richmond, o n the other hand evolved as a more c onservative
comm unity, and members of the group "Concerned Citizens of Madison
County" d escribe themselves as "solid citizens. "

The roots of the city of

Richmond date back to the d ays of the American Revolution around 1 775 .
According to a history of Madison County, those pioneers, once established,
" formed a close-knit coterie of families and gathered unto themselves control
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of local government, commerce and central institutions" (Ellis 1 985,p . xv).
The original settlers, ninety percent of whom were from Virg inia, (the
balance were from the Carolinas) were mainly farmers, hunters and perhaps a
few businessmen. According to the archivist in charge of Special Collections
at Eastern Kentucky University, most had fought in the revolution and had
been given land in return for their service.

They first settled along the

Kentucky River in a town called "Boonesborough," named, of course, for the
celebrated Daniel Boone.

However, they soon became disenchanted with

Boonesborough and in 1 790 relocated to Richmond.

Richmond, was not,

however, the original county seat --- that was Milford ( 1 786). There arose a
dispute over whether to move the county seat from Milford to Richmond .
The dispute was settled by a wrestling match (Ellis 1 985). Incidentally, the
Kennedy family was instrumental in the first settlement of Richmond,
Joseph Kennedy being its first sheriff! Key members of Concerned Citizens of
Madison County are descendants of these first families, and as such, they
h ave a fierce a ttachment to the land . What this means is that they love the
land, they are a ttached to the land, and they will defend the integrity of the
land to the bitter end . Ellis ( 1985) has written, "If there is any one social and
cultural characteristic which has been historically notable among Kentuckians
generally it has been their ready and positive identification with a specific

physical place in the universe, their home county" (Ellis 1 985, p. xvi) . He
further qualified this statement by saying:
They have a ttached their loyalties and sense o f
geography not so much t o an area with political
boundaries as to a specific social b ackground and
provincial rura lity .
In this vein they have
sometimes been vehement in their reactions to
broader state public issues, in casting their votes at
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the polls, and in reacting to conditions of changing
times (Ellis 1985, p. xvi) .
According t o the the archivist in charge of Special Collections a t the
Berea College Library, Richmond and Berea share an historic rivalry which
sterns from their d iffering positions vis-a-vis the question of slavery.
Richmond was steeped in a thriving 'slavocracy,' according to Ellis (1 985),
while Berea was horne to missionaries who were rabid abolitionists. This set
the stage for the bitter conflicts that ensued. One p articular incident in the
towns' early histories is illustrative of their early difficulties. The story is told
that in 1 859, after John Brown's raid, Rev. Fee spoke, "We need more John
Brown's," he said, "if not in fact, at least in spirit." As the story goes, Fee was
quoted out of context as only having said, "We need more John Browns !" A t
that point, "sixty of the finest o f Richmond's citizens horsed up a n d gave Fee
thirty d ays to clear out." According to a Berea College archivist, "Rev. Fee and
other founders of the college were often harassed by locals on drunken sprees
(from Mad ison and surrounding counties ) and, in 1 859 a vigil ante
committee ordered them to leave. The governor refused to do anything. The
committee forced Fee to pack up and ninety Bereans left after Christmas. This
was known as "The Exile. " They stayed away for the duration of the Civil
War. According to a Berea historian, "The rivalry sterns from the fact that we
exist. Periodically, the rivalry surfaces in county politics ." Ellis ( 1 985) notes
that despite such incidents, Madison County's "various social and economic
groups, white and black, have lived together, with the exception of the Berea
troubles, with little class conflict and rivalry" (Ellis 1 985, p. xvii) .
To the dismay of many activists, the university located in Richmond,
E astern Kentucky University, has m aintained a low profile concerning the
CSDP. As one activist lamented, "This university { EKU} is the only major
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institution that did not take a stand on incineration . "

Although

E KU

facilities h ave been used for a few public meetings, "official policy" of the
college has been one of silence on the issue. However, the faculty senate has
publicly announced its support of the citizen opposition effort. On April 14,
1 984, the Richmond Regis ter carried a Letter to the Editor from the Chair of
EKU's Faculty Senate.

The letter read: "The Faculty Senate o f Eastern

Kentuc ky University urges tha t the aforementioned obsolete chemical
weapons and agents be transported elsewhere, to a less populated area, for
destruc tion" (Richmond Register, 4 / 14 /84, Editor's Mailbag).
Despite the Army's suppositions, there is no evidence to support the
belief that Berea College is the moving force behind the citizen opposition
that developed at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) regarding the
chemical weapons controversy. This is not a student issue. However, one
c annot escape the notion that the culture of the towns, heavily influenced by
their historical traditions, has created a climate supportive of citizen activism.
A member of Common Ground offered this analysis of the differences
between the two groups: "Their styles evolved out of this historical context.
Berea considers itself the cultured folk; Richmond aren't sure the folks in
Berea are quite upstanding."

3.2

The Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD)
Located on U. S. Route 25, six miles south of Richmond, "LBAD," as it

is commonly referred to in the literature, was established in Madison County,
Kentucky in the early 1 940s at about the same time the United States became
involved in World War II.

According to the DPEIS ( 1 986), approximately

3,000 people live adj acent to the Northern boundary.
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LBAD stores the

smallest percentage of the unitary stockpile of chemical weapons ( 1 .6%),
consisting of approximately 70,000 M55 rockets containing nerve agent GB
and VX.

The rockets are stored in igloos (earth-bermed bunkers) and are

carefully monitored for leaks.

Madison County is very densely populated

with 57,000 people living within a 10 k radius of LBAD. Additionaly, the
depot is s ituated in the midst of a $5 b illion dollar thoroughbred horse
industry. The proposed incinerator complex is to be located one mile from
the Clarke-Moores Middle School.
Originally the depot occupied two sites: one in Lexington and one in
Richmond, i.e., the Bluegrass Depot. "The two sites were almost completely
autonomous," a ccord ing to an Army officer at LBAD, "as they each had
different functions, however, they were under one commander" (Telephone
interview: Chief Public Affairs Officer, LBAD, January 4, 1 994) .

It is now

referred to simply as the Bluegrass Army Depot. The weapons stored at the
Bluegrass Depot at the Lexington facility have been phased out. Throughout
this report, however, we will continue to refer to the Bluegrass Depot in
Richmond, KY as LBAD as this is consistent with its use in d ocuments
relating to the CSDP.
The Mayor of Berea reports that the Depot was built in 1 942 and that
the Army took 15,000 acres. "At the time, there was very little opposition", he
said. According to the Mayor, "many beautiful mansions were torn down ."
After WWII and the Korean War, LBAD became a storage depot. The last
shipments of nerve gas came in 1 962.

According to a local political elite,

"Nobody knew; nobody cared" . "In the mid 1 960s" h e said, "they {the Army}
started looking to get rid of it." The M55 rockets were brought to LBAD in
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Richmond, KY by rail in the early to mid 1960s and have been in storage in
igloos since then.
The Army was seen as a good neighbor for many years. During the war
years, according to one Richmond long-time resident whose father was
involved in the original construction of the Depot, "The Depot would send
its fire truck out to help the community.

The Ordinance (as the Depot is

sometimes called) employed a lot of people---including women---during the
war. There was no way that people would question the Army because they
needed the jobs.

There were no jobs!"

Communi ty I Army relations have

changed since then.
As a general rule, the Army has a his tory of being less than candid with
the public with respect to accidents resulting from Army operations. Citizens
point to a particularly newsworthy event which took p lace in 1 979 at LBAD
which certainly has contributed to the erosion of the public trust once held by
the Army at this site; however, it would be a reduc t io ad abs u rd u m to
suppose that this one incident was the driving force behind the citizen
mobilization there. The incident we are referring to is known as "The Smoke
Pot Incident. "

On August 1 6, 1 979, a l arge dark cloud genera ted by the

burning of 288 smoke pots moved over Peytontown, KY and on past to
Interstate highway
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where it slowed and stopped traffic. Forty-five persons

were hospitalized for burning eyes, difficult breathing and general illness.
Community residents suspected the fumes were corning from the depot,
however, in calls to the Ordinance (i.e., LBAD), the Army a t first denied any
knowledge or responsibility for the incident.

When later presented with

evidence, the Army admitted that it was the source. As the story goes, an
inventory of "smoke pots" had been declared obsolete and ordered to be
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destroyed. However, because of the impending visit of the Inspector General,
Army personnel began burning three times the usual number of smoke pots,
resulting in this "off-post" incident. The Richmond Regis ter (June 27, 1 980,
Terry Lee Vogt) reported that, "Manpower shortages and inadequately trained
personnel contributed to the smoke cloud incident." In recalling the incident,
the Mayor of Berea, who is also a physician, said, "We didn't know what we
were treating. Dr. Lang (his associate) called the Ordinance and the Army
denied it." On another occasion, according to this informant, two cows and a
deer were found dead. Blood samples were positive for nerve agent. Again,
the Army originally denied responsibility and then later recanted their story.
On October 18, 1 982, traces of nerve agent GB were registered by monitoring
equipment at the depot. However, no public announcement was made until
October 2 1st, according to a newspaper account in The Berea Citizen (October
28, 1 982, Jack Hall). The Army later contended that there was no actual leak
but only a faulty reading of one of the gauges.

3.3

Army Credibility Problems
While these incidents surely contributed to the erosion of the Army 's

credibility a t this p articular site, there is a more general problem with Army
candor regarding chemical accidents in general. The "Smoke Pot Incident" is
not an isolated incident. The Army has a history of denying responsibility for
accidents. Two of the most egregious examples will suffice to make the point.
The first incident occurred in March 1 968 at the U. S. Army Dugway Proving
Ground in Tooele, Utah when a chemical-warfare agent test went awry and
accidently killed 6,000 sheep --- called "The Dugway Sheep Kill," the incident
was reported in all the papers.

Apparently, the sheep died as a result of
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ingesting forage contaminated on March 1 3, 1 968, with the chemical w arfare
agent VX (Van Kampen et al 1 970) .

For over a year the Army refused to

admit any responsibility for the deaths, however, mounting evidence forced
them to admit some culpability.

Eventually,

II

After seventeen months of

steadfast denial, the U. S. Army finally admitted responsibility for the sheep
kill incident" ( Technology and Social Shock, p. 365) .

The admission came

d uring a Congressional Hearing in Washington during the summer of 1 969 .
Several articles have been written about the incident in venues ranging from
prestigeous academic journals to news magazines and newspaper stories (Van
Kampen et al 1969,1970; Brodine 1969; Boffey 1968a,1968b; Tanaka 1 988;Science

Magazine 1 989 and Newsweek 1 969) .
Another noteworthy incident where the Army w a s less than candid
with the public occurred on April 1 8, 1 986 at approximately 1 0: 15

A.M.

when a

Titan rocket exploded at Vandenburg Air Force Base near Lampoc, California.
The explosion created an 8000 foot white-orange cloud of hydrazine rocket
fuel . The sheriff's office called the Air Force base to confirm the occurrence of
an explosion, but to no avail. Emergency personnel were hesitant to make
any recommendations to the public due to uncertainty stemming from the
lack of information about the explosion. Police, fire, and sheriff's department
personnel were able to get information only through monitoring radio traffic.
With very little information to guide them, emergency responders a dvised
p eople to

II

stay p u t . "

Several hours l ater, the Air Force released a

communication that a cloud of toxic gas was moving out to sea and posed no
real danger (Rogers 1990, p. D-7) .
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3.4

The Army Decides
Though the Army incinerated chemical weapons during the 1 9 70 's, it

did not put all of its eggs in the incinerator basket until 1 982, when it selected
thermal destruction as the method of choice for the destruction of the entire
stockpile of M55 rockets. Seigel ( 1 990) reports that "At the time, incineration
seemed---to the Army, at least---like the quickest, cheapest, and simplest way
to get the job done" (Seigel 1 990, p.4). "To a large degree, the Army's decision
to use the reverse assembly, high temperature incineration process was based
on the limited knowledge of disposal technologies in the 1 980s," states a
report coming from the General Accounting Office (GAO), the fed eral
watchdog agency (Eas t Oregon ian, July 6, 1992) .

However, a number of

concerned citizens argue that "incineration is a Neanderthal way of getting
rid of waste."

Nevertheless, in 1 979, the Army began testing a p ilot

incinerator, i.e., The Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) at
the Tooele Army Depot, near Salt Lake City, Utah. In 1 982, the Army selected
incineration as its demilitarization and disposal method for the entire M55
rocket stockpile. In 1 985 when Congress passed PL 99-145 expanding the scope
of the destruction program to the entire unitary stockpile at all eight sites, the
Army had already committed a large portion of its energy and resources to
incineration technology. As one activist put it, "It {the Army} is such a big
b ureaucracy and its got an awful lot of momentum built up.

Literally

thousands of people are involved . Many people's entire professional careers
ride on the success of this program."
In the summer of 1 984, the Army took its plan to the people. Several
teams of Army personnel traveled around the country from depot site to
depot site telling the people of its plan to build nerve-gas incinerators in the
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communities that host the aging stockpile.

They encountered pretty much

what they expected at most of the depot sites, i. e. apathy and / or acquiescence
--but not in Kentucky.

As one informant explained:

Previously, this group of Army personnel had been
in Anniston the night before and 15 people showed
up. They {The Army} carried on for perhaps two
hours befo re anyone could talk. They u s e d
overheads and sketches. This attorney, Charles Coy,
stood in the back of the room. He listened (8 P.M.-3
A.M. !); he asked to speak. He said, "I don't need a
microphone." He said, "If you will observe, you
have misspelled ' demilitarization. " ' It brought the
house down. From that we set up Concerned
C itizens.
The Army representatives were not prepared for what they found in
Kentucky.

"We' re used to being the guys in white hats," said an Army

technical expert.

Then he added, "I've never seen anything like this before."

(Courier Jou rnal, July 1 1, 1984). Specifically, the meeting was to discuss the
final disposition of the 69, 512 M55 rockets containing nerve agents GB and
VX which had been stored at the depot since the mid sixties, and which the
Army claimed were leaking dangerously.

As soon as news of the Army's

impending p lan reached the local newspapers, the surprised and shocked
citizenry immediately began telephoning neighbors and friends and in a short
time, a fa irly sizeable segment of the local population was alerted to the
meeting.

One activist who participated in mobilizing the community at that

time proudly reported, "We got 500 people to show up !" Another member of
Concerned Citizens had this to say about these early public meetings: "The
Army sent around a team of people who had only master's degrees in science.
We were left with the impression that you wouldn't buy a used car from
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these people." After what was described by many as a "canned presentation,"
one member of Concerned Citizens vividly recalled that first Army briefing.
After the presentation, the public comment period
opened. It hit me that these guys were serious about
building an incinerator to burn nerve gas. Their
disclaimer was that this was to be the first in {a series
of public hearings on the issue} . . . Immediately after
the presentation, I realized that they had already
decided . The decision had already been made.
But the Army assured citizens that they were there to take "input"
from the public and stated that no decis ion had yet been made on the
d isposition of the stockpile. A decision was to be forthcoming pending the
results of the Army's M-55 Rocket Assessment Program. At one point during
this early period, Amoretta Hoeber, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army, c ame down to LBAD (Kentucky) to meet with the citizens .

The

meeting was set up at the Army Depot cafeteria. As one resident recalled:
She came into the cafeteria . . .She came across as if to
say, 'Look, what we are doing is the best that c an be
done and you peasants ought to be glad. We must
all bite the bullet' she said, as she stepped on to the
p lane to fly back to Wash ington at taxp ayers
expense.
3.5

The Army Delays Announcement
On March 7, 1985, a headline appeared in the Lexington-Herald Leader

that read: "ARMY IS DELAYING NERVE-GAS DECISION." The story went
on to d iscuss the fact that the Army decision on the final disposition of the
70,000 nerve-gas rockets stored at LBAD would be del ayed for at least nine
more months. Rep. Larry Hopkins, R. Lexington, KY., and ranking member
of the House Armed Services Committee, expressed frustration with the
delays. "The Army was very quick to drop an incinerator proposal on us a
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year ago," he said . The Mayor of Berea reacted differently to the delays. He
said, "We've got the upper hand now . . . I think this delay has made us more
determined to get some answers." Hopkins remarked that, "When we began
questioning that decision { to incinerate the rockets on site } , we got nothing
but delays and failure to m ake deadlines. "

One of the co-founders of

C oncerned Citizens speculated that the Army 's delayed decision was
deliberate. It was suggested that the delay might be a sham . She said that she
"worried that the Army was attempting to slow down the process to see
whether people would lose interest." Other people blamed the delays on the
untimely death (January 1 4, 1985) of Brig. General Bobby Robinson.

Gen.

Robinson was the chief spokesperson for the Army and principal liaison
officer with the communities hosting the stockpiles. (Lex i n g t o n-Hera l d

Leader: March 7, 1985).
The Army's Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,
released July 1, 1986, indicated that it had not made a final decision, but only a
tentative one, and that circumstances could lead them to change their mind
(See Executive Summary, page xv of the Report styled Chemical Stoc kpile
Disposal Program Draft Programmatic Environmental Impac t Statement, July

1, 1986). A final decision, called the Record of Decision (ROD), was issued on
J anuary 30, 1987 and presented to Congress in February 1988.

The ROD

indicated that on-site destruction was the Army's "preferred alternative."
That meant incineration.

In a comment which typ ifies the Army's

insouciance regarding the community' s fears about incineration in the early
years of this struggle, Amoretta M. Hoeber, the Deputy Under Secretary of the
Army wrote in a letter to a member of Concerned Citizens, "Incineration is
the safest, most efficient, and most environmentally acceptable method for
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destroying nerve agents today" (19 March 1 986, Letter to member of CC from
Amoretta M. Hoeber, Department of the Army).
3.6

INCINERATION . . NOT! Grassroots Opposition to Incineration
Citizen opposition movements to the siting of hazardous w aste

incinerators, often known by the label "NIMBY" for "not-in-my-backyard"
have become a familiar feature of the American political landscape in the
1980s and 1990s. However, incineration has not been confined to land-based
facilities .

In the United States during the mid-1980s, ocean incineration

emerged as one of the most hotly deb ated issues within the emotionally
charged field of hazardous waste management.

Incineration of hazardous

wastes at sea was proposed as a technology that would helpl solve the unique
handling and disposal problems posed by liquid organic wastes (Bailey and
Faupel 1989 ) .

Bailey and Faupel ( 1 989) argue that opponents of ocean

incineration were extraordinarily effective in blocking adoption of a new
technology that had been clearly favored by the EPA and powerful industry
interests. They recognized four factors as being crucial to their success: ( 1 )
opponents were convinced that local risks far outweighed any conceivable
local gains; (2) there was broad-based opposition; (3) they engaged in coalition
building with other environmental groups; (4) there existed a complex legal
environment, e. g., operations at sea are governed by international laws,
including the 1972 London Dumping Convention, to which the United States
is a signatory (EPA, 1 985d).
In more recent times, the most famous of the "not-in-my-backyard"
movements is focused on closing down the Waste Technologies Industries
(WTI) facility, in East Liverpool, Ohio which is the largest commercial
hazardous w aste facilitly in the world. In 1 992, twenty residents staged a
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hunger strike to protest lack of EPA action regarding their grievances against
WTI (Pittsburgh Against Toxic Incineration Newsletter, no d ate) .
A t the forefront of these efforts is an o rganization called Citizens'
Clearning House for Hazardous Wastes or CCHW. CCHW was started in 1981
by a housewife, Lois Marie Gibbs. The clearinghouse provides information,
organizing assistance, outreach and technical assistance to groups a ttempting
to mobilize in opposition to any of several environmentally questionable
projects, and their work includes efforts to a ss ist those who oppose
incineration as well.
A s a result of these c itizen movements, it has become increasingly
difficult to site h azardous waste facilities . In instance after instance, citizen
opposition has succeeded in either delaying or in outright p reventing the
siting of incinerators.

Benford (1 993) points out tha t public c onflict over

s iting noxious facilities is the rule rather than the exception and the number
of studies devoted to this topic has proliferated (Wolpert et al 1972; Centaur
Associates 1979; Ley and Mercer 1980; Mazur 1981; Smith and Hanham 1981;
Powell 1 9 84; Mitchell and Carson 1 986; C airncross 1 990; Freud enburg and
Pastor 1 992; Bailey and Faupel 1 992).
Counterposed to the growing incinerator industry is the dual problem
of the contraction of landfills.

According to reports, NIMBY movements

have forced the closing of over two-thirds of the operating landfills since 1 9 79
(Wasson, 1 987; Frumkin 1989; EPA 1979 ) . As a result, much has been written
on the subject of how to encourage community acceptance (Anderson 1977;
O ' Ha re 1 9 77; Powell 1 984; Sorensen et al 1 984; Carnes 1 982, 1 983; Inhaber
1 992) . Several studies have dealt with community organizing efforts (Wilson
1 989; Knoll 1 990; Hudson 1 990; Christrup 1 990; Thompson 1990), and C ohn
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(1982) who has done a critical review of the literature. However, Ladd and
Laska (1991) point out that there is a lacuna in the literature with respect to
the "pre-implementation" phase of siting controversies.

Their research

addresses this problem in a study of a Louisiana community faced with a
proposal to build an incinerator in its backyard . Freudenburg and Grambling

( 1990) support their critique and have urged sociologists not to ignore the
"impacts that take place before the first shovel of dirt is turned" (Freudenburg
and Grambling 1990, p . 2). Reich (1991) argues that although a number of
single-case studies exist for a number of chemical disasters for Love Canal
(Levine 1982), Bhopal (Shrivastava 1 987), Seveso (Conti 1 9 77; Whiteside

1979), and Michigan's PBBs (Chen 1979; Eggington 1 980), "none adop ts an
explicitly comparative approach and none places the issues of power and
powerlessness at the center of the analysis" (Reich 199 1, p. 14). The present
research is an a ttempt to satisfy the needs expressed by Freudenberg and
Grambling (1990) and those of Reich (1991) by presenting a case study of the
"pre-implemention" phase of a siting controversy where the issue of power
and powerlessness is at the center of the analysis.

3.7

The Emergence of Grassroots Opposition to the CSDP
Four entities emerged in Kentucky in opposition to the Army's plan to

build a nerve-gas incinerator complex in Madison County, Kentucky. There
were two major groups, "Concerned Citizens of Mad ison County" and
"Common Ground: Kentuckians for Moving the Nerve G as" (which later
evolved into the Kentucky Environmental Foundation, Inc . ( KEF } ), and two
smaller groups, "Other Voices" and "Common Ground of Fayette County ."
While Concerned C itizens and Common Ground hold the high-ground in
1 09

terms of visibility in this struggle, we feel that these other groups also deserve
to be included in the chronicling of citizen activism at LBAD.

3.7.1

Concerned Citizens of Madison County
If one were to try and p inpoint the beginning of the opposition

movement in Kentucky, i t would most likely be F e b r u a ry 1 6 . 1 9 8 4 .
"Concerned Citizens of Madison County" was the name chosen b y the first
group to become active . They mobilized almost immediately and as a direct
result of the Army's first public briefing. One of the founding members of
Concerned Citizens observed, "We were the only game in town then ( 1 984) ."
The first meetings took place in the office of a photographer.

One of the

founders of Concerned C itizens described their fledgling mobilization efforts:
"We were trying to figure out how to get a grip on this issue," she said. "We
were educating ourselves. We were totally away from any na tional interest.
Congressman Hopkins got involved; Rob ert Rangel was appointed by
Hopkins to keep us informed. "
Philosophically, Concerned C itizens are very different from the other
group : the former conservative and wanting to play uby the rules" and the
la tter of a decidedly more liberal b ent, claiming to have more global
environmenta l concerns .

In describing their d ifferent philosophies or

"styles,"one of the founders of Concerned Citizens said, /'They {Common
G roun d } want the Army scalped; I want the threat lifted from this
community." Despite their differences, which in many cases are strengths,
the groups have worked together successfully for almost nine years. Their
complementarity has allowed them to reach different constituencies and
through their v arious and sundry social networks, enabled them to put
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together a fairly formidable force in opposition to the Army's plan. However,
despite appearances to the contrary, Concerned Citizens and Common
Ground are both tied ideologically and culturally to the prevailing system of
p ower.

Both view the Army's incineration decision as a "glitch" in the

system rather than as a direct result of the operation of the system, although
some members of Common Ground would dispute this allusion to their
being in the "mainstream." One of the co-founders of Concerned Citizens
expressed their ideology quite succinctly: "When all is said and done," he
said, " we have civilian control of the military in this country, and the
Army's plans can be changed as they need be, if enough of us will speak up
and let our elected officials know how we feel" (Richmond Register, J anuary

26, 1988, p. 1).
The Steering Committee of Concerned Citizens is drawn heavily from
upper middle class families who are also long-time residents of Richmond.
In fact, several families of founding members are distinctly upper class.

This

is not the typical profile of citizens who protest against the government; and
Concerned Citizens are preoccupied that they not create the impression o f
"Army bashing." There i s a strong belief here that "the system works;" hence
their strident attempts to put pressure on elected officials to reel in the Army
and m a ke them a ccountable.

But one can also d iscern a grow ing

disenchantment with the "system" as the perception grew that the avenues
set up for citizen participation were simply props. As one activist put it, "We
h ave lost all faith in the process as meaningful to the decision, other than it
builds up in their minds as 'The Scoping Game."'
Among members of Concerned Citizens of Madison County, there is a
famous author, Harvard grad uate and former war correspondent; the
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d aughter of a b ank president who is an avid environmental and social
activist, a homemaker, a photographer, two real estate b rokers, a city
magistrate, an insurance executive, the Mayor of Berea (who 1s also a
p hysician), the Chief of Staff of the Pattie A . Clay Hospital, a retired
newspaper reporter; a current newspaper reporter, a prominent orthodontist,
two professors at Eastern Kentucky University (EKU), the president of a small
environmental company etc. One of the founders likes to point out that both
Republicans and Democrats fill their ranks and notes with pride, that within
the functioning of the group, women have equal status with men. There is a
fierce sense o f community here, as in Berea.

One of the founders o f

Concerned Citizens describes their early beginnings:
The notice abou t a public meeting appeared as a
small notice in an obscure p art of the newspaper.
They { The Army} do not do one bit more or less
than they are required to do. The article said: 'The
Army plans to do this and you are invited to come
and hear about what we are going to do.'
Lifestyle tends to determine how much time members c an devote to
the group's work. Members assert that the group shares a certain rapport that
has developed as a result of friendships that span decades. They speak about
the high degree of trust which allows them to openly disagree without fear of
being ridiculed or shut out of the group .

"We've been through a l ot

together," one member mused, "we have a lot of respect." They also describe
their meetings as "very disorganized in an organized sort of way." "We listen
to each other. . . sometimes we agree to disagree." This informant confessed
that she has walked out of meetings many times because of frustration. Still,
Concerned Citizens goes on. They grabbed hold of this issue like a ferret on a
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snake and the Army has not been successful in dislodging them even though
they have tried many times to "redirect" their energy into more "acceptable"
channels .
Concerned Citizens have been o n the cutting edge of this issue from its
inception and have been responsible for bringing the citizens' concerns to the
a ttention of decision makers at the state level, in the Pentagon and in
Congress. Their strategies have focused primarily on intensive letter-writing
campaigns---financed at their own expense---and lobbying efforts directed at
local, state and federal officials both at the Pentagon and in Congress. It w a
through the efforts of the founders of Concerned Citizens t h a t a very
p rominent law firm in Lexington, Kentucky allowed one of its finest
attorneys to do a considerable amount of pro bono work for the movement.
Summing up their resolve, one long-time resident of Richmond and
prominent member of Concerned Citizens said, "I think we all pretty much
know, we are not leaving and we are not living with an on-going incinerator.
Our great grandparents lived here."

3.7.2 Common Ground: Kentuckians for Moving the Nerve Gas
Although Concerned Citizens had been around for several years,
citizens of Berea were also becoming heavily involved in the nerve gas
controversy. It was becoming obvious to concerned residents of the Berea
community that another group was needed---one that represented their
unique perspective on the issue. In the Fall of 1987, a second group formed at
LBAD (Kentucky) calling itself, "Common Ground: Kentuckians for Moving
the Nerve Gas." As the name implied, their early efforts were focused on
getting the Army to transport the weapons out of LBAD and away from tha t
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community. According to a member of the Steering Committee of Common
Ground, the name "was chosen to emphasize the commonalties of the two
groups { i. e., Concerned Citizens of Madison County and C ommon Ground }
despite their ideological differences. An activist who spoke out at the Army's

1984 briefing, commented later, "It d awned on me rather quickly that the
powers that be were counting on the a cceptance (quiescence) of their idea
because of their p restige." He recalled an incident which precipitated not only
his own entrance into the struggle, but also set the stage for the later
formation of Common Ground. He recalled:
I got up to speak. I said I was a veteran and so I had
some insight into how the Army operates generally.
I felt that the people in the community were being
shortchanged . I felt they were not being told the
whole story. I felt that if people knew more, they
would not allow the Army to go ahead with this
plan unchallenged. Everyone stood up and clapped.
It was my cameo performance. The response was
overwhelming.
As this brief example illustrates, charismatic leaders have played a
signifi cant role in the formation of the opposition groups a t LBAD. In fact,
b oth groups have their share of charismatic leaders. It could easily be argued
that the Steering Committees of both groups are comprised of nothing b u t
charismatic personalities. A t the very least, they are all leaders in their own
right. Although very different in their styles, the groups have been able to
use their d ifferences to their a dv antage, drawing upon very d iverse
c onstituencies and serving a s reality checks on the Army ' s v arious
p ronouncements and documents .

H owever, this i s not to say that the

emergence of strong personalities is responsible for the emergence of these
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key opposition groups. The very strong pre-existing social network ties are at
least as important (if not morel in the mobilization of these groups.
As interest in the controversy grew more and more intense, an activist
gave this account of her experiences at a Steering Committee meeting of
Concerned Citizens. As she explains it:
I went to a meeting. Nobody was interested in who I was.
They had their own agenda. This was about powe r . To
them it was a techn ical problem. I was concerned that
people couldn' t get involved . They {CCs) d idn't want to
face the fact that they . . . I brought it up ... the idea of doing a
petition drive to bring this to the attention of the p ublic.
Our Peace group worked on the petition drive. We were a
little group of 10. We obtained 7000 signatures. We did it
very intensely--one month. It illucidated the issue.
Later, she added, "I j ust couldn't see any way for ordinary people to get
involved in the Concerned Citizens group ." It became obvious that a new
group was needed to accommodate Berea citizens' concerns.

"What I was

looking for," she confessed, "was a totally different style ... We made efforts to
involve people." However, another member remarked that, "this was never
seen as a group in antagonism to Concerned Citizens."

Common Ground

a dvertised their meetings in the newspaper, held their meetings in the local
b ank and opened meetings up to the public immediately. "Once the group
got established, we would have meetings ad hoc," according to one of the
founding members .

Speaking about the d ifferences between Common

Ground and Concerned Citizens this respondent replied: "Concerned Citizens
are more affluent (some have been here for genera tions); Common Ground
are more transplants . Many are not even Kentuckians; however they have
strong ties to the community." As one member expressed it:
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Common Ground i s more grassroots type--
concerned with public education, public awareness
of the issue. If the nerve gas is moved, Concerned
C itizens would dissolve. Common Ground have
broader goals. They oppose incineration; whereas
the focus of Concerned Citizens is completely local.
Common Ground has more global concerns.
Another member of Common Ground made this observation about
the differences in their strategies: He said, "They {Concerned Citizens) believe
they can win this way.

Their political strategies are b ased on small-town

Kentucky politics. Strategy equals Good Ole' Boy--Sit Down and Talk . . . "
While Concerned Citizens' social network ties include a small cadre of
very close friends and business acquaintances, Common G round d raws
members from a social network that revolves around a small community
organization devoted to peace and justice issues, the Berea In terfaith Task

Force for Peace.

One Common Ground activist describes h is early

introduction to the movement through this organization. "General interest
carne first," he said. "I belonged to a group, the 'Berea Interfaith Task Force for
Peace'.

A group where all like-minded ex-hippies met in the Union church

every Saturday night. The task force held a peace vigil at the depot site every
Saturday morning."
Included in their ranks is a formidable array of d iverse talents and
interests drawn from many social classes.

Their membership includ es: a

former Vietnam veteran, a college professor, a nurse, several carpenters, two
ex-priests, a community organizer, and an assortment of artists and musicians
all committed to the conviction that the Army will not build a nerve-gas
incinerator in Madison County. All share a strong sense of "community", a
p assion for this cause, and a belief that they will succeed. Both Concerned
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Citizens and Common Ground's early efforts were directed at getting the
Army to move the nerve gas out of Madison County to either a central facility
(i.e. Tooele, Utah) or to a regional facility (Pine Bluff, Arkansas) . Initially,
transporting the weapons o u t of LBAD was the defining goal of both
Concerned Citizens and Common Ground alike. This was the single issue
around which both groups entirely agreed. However, at one point, Common
Ground's rhetoric became more strident calling for a broader commitment to
close down the Army's entire Chemical Weapons Destruction Program. This
reflected an on-going debate within the group which involved deciding a t
what level t o fight the Army's plan:

whether t o a i m a t closing down the

whole program or whether to focus on their individual site. The latter won
out.

"We will shut down this program! ! " gave way to, "There will be no

nerve-gas incinerator in Madison County ! "
I n an effort t o educate the community about the issue, Common
Ground has sponsored petition drives, two rock concerts, and several public
meetings .

Steering Committee members have pa rticipated in radio and

television talk shows, held public debates with Army personnel, and written
letters to the editors of all the local papers. They have put a great deal of effort
into coalition building with other like-minded anti-incineration groups, e.g.
Greenpeace and the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, to mention
only a few, and they have served as advisors to opposition groups at other
sites in their efforts to organize against the Army's plan. Although external
organizations have been helpful, they were not the driving force behind the
c i tizens '

oppositi on movement in Kentucky, or elsewhere .

As a

spokesperson for Greenpeace once remarked when this controversy was in its
early stages, "If Greenpeace disappeared, this opposition would not go away."
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In 1 990, Common Ground incorporated under a new name, "The
Kentucky Environmental Foundation" or KEF, Inc. KEF was granted legal
non-profit status (501c3) in 1991. KEF's stated purpose, according to Common
Ground ' s newsletter, Com mon Sense, "is to disseminate information and
educate the public on environmental issues." And, "since the most pressing
environmental issue in Central Kentucky is the p roposed nerve-gas
incinerator, KEF has identified the nerve gas issue as its focus." Currently six
people are serving on the KEF board, all from the Steering Committee of
Common Ground . When asked why they didn't just incorporate Common
Ground, a KEF spokesman replied that tax laws place restrictions on the
activities of non-profit corporations, particularly in regard to political action.
Thus, Common Ground could remain independent in its political and
lobbying a ctivities (Co m m o n

Sense

Newsletter, no d ate) .

KEF, Inc . ' s

executive director explained that their position regarding strategy w a s t o take
a tiered approach which included intensive lobbying efforts with federal and
local officials, monitoring Congress and grass-roots activities. It was felt that
working at the local level exclusively would not be sufficient to achieve the
goals of the organization.

Common Ground leadership a gree in principle

that some form of d irect action may be required at some future time;
however, they argue that a t this point in time, it is not yet warranted . It is
conceivable that C ommon Groun d ' s incorporation a s the Kentu c ky
Environmental Foundation, Inc. will mitigate further their willingness to
risk direct action.
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3 .7.3

Common Ground / Fayette County
This branch of Common Ground was started by a Lexington Realtor,

twenty-year resident of the area, and member of the Berea Interfaith Task
Force for Peace. He commented that it was particularly difficult mobilizing
people in F ayette County, possibly because the media has portrayed the issue
as a Madison County problem. Nevertheless, in response to requests from
the leadership of Common Ground, with whom the resp ondent has
maintained a long-standing friendship, the citizens of Fayette County were
enlisted in the struggle against the Army. In speaking about how the group
got off the ground, the leader replied,
My first thought was, of course, getting the message
out. So I went to groups, anywhere people gathered
together---Kiwanis C lubs, Peace Groups, City
Government, the E nvironment Commissions--
anywhere. During the Gulf War even though it was
not related, it was related.
In addition to these forays into public education on the issue, the group
wrote articles, passed resolutions, helped a dvertise scoping meetings and, on
occasion dealt with the media.

One problem mentioned by the group 's

founder w as the fact that "Everybody is spread pretty thin, keeping a life and
job ." Not many people are aware of the existence of this little group, but the
existence o f an Army opposition group in Fayette County is imp ortant
bec ause of the low visib ility of this issue there and because o f the m ulti
million dollar thoroughbred race horse industry which has refused to
acknowledge that the incinerator problem could potentially affect them. This
attitude has been aided by the media who repeatedly refer to the nerve-gas
incinerator as the Madison County incinerator. In an unusual stance for a
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Kentucky activist, this informant expressed the opinion that to argue to
transport the weapons elsewhere was a narrow point of view.

3.7.4

"Other Voices" (People United for Environmental Justice)
The entity "Other Voices" took shape in 1 99 1 .

It evolved out o f

Common Ground, i n response t o ideological differences with both Common
Ground / KEF and Concerned Citizens.

The founder of "Other Voices" felt

that Common Ground was losing touch with the people and expressed
frustration with both groups' "reactive" stance vis-a-vis the Army. Believing
that a more frontal attack was called for, the founder mobilized like-minded
women sympathetic to the goal of p reventing the Army's p lanned
incinerator complex in Madison County .

In describing her feelings for

forming the new group, the founder rep lied, "I am so d amn sick of
responding to the Army---why can't we in itiate something! " There were
other gender-related issues which contributed to the split, as did questions
about p ower shifts away from Common Ground ' s earlier democratic
practices. The initiator of "Other Voices" single-handedly embarked on an
ambitious campaign a ttacking the Army's emergency preparedness plan,
known as CSEPP (The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program).
A plan was formulated to place an a dvertisement in the local
newspaper questioning the adequacy of the Army's emergency plan for the
community.

Call ing the Army's emergency plan, "Grand Illusions," the

article critiqued the Army's latest publicized emergency plan which had been
recently d isseminated to the public that summer in the form of a glitzy, high
gloss, scenic calendar.

Several hundred individ uals and organizations

sponsored the advertisement which appeared in the local newspaper. (Berea
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Citizen, August 14, 1992). At one point, the leadership of "Other Voices" with
the help of a few like-minded citizens, sponsored a demonstration at the
depot site which was attended by the author and several members of
Common Ground.

"Other Voices" also feel differently about the value of

direct action. Whereas leaders of Concerned Citizens prefer "working in the
trenches" to accomplish their goals and view any type of direct action with
derision---i.e., "showboating," leadership of "Other Voices" sees non-violent
direct action as "the right of the citizens to demonstrate their feelings on an
issue." "Other Voices" attempts to attack the myths surrounding the CSDP,
and is deeply committed to the importance of drawing people into the
struggle.

And the movement is all the richer for their particip ation, for

through their efforts to view the controversy from another perspective, they
mitigate m any of the Army's myths of all powerfulness. Perhaps it is this
diversity that gives the movement at this site such vitality.

3.7.5

The Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG)
In November of 1991, Common Ground and Concerned Citizens

sponsored the first International Meeting of Citizens opposed to the Army's
incineration plan. In addition to representatives from all eight CONUS sites,
the conference included delegates from the organized opposition against the
Army's JACADS facility (Hawaiian Islands) as well as a representative from
the former U.S .S.R. Greenpeace Action also sent representatives. The media
was very much in evidence. . The purpose of the conference was to d iscuss
strategy and share ideas. The meeting, held at the Richmond, KY Holiday
Inn, lasted the entire weekend. The groups are linked together nationally as
the Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG),
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communication is either

by telephone or via ECONET, an environmental electronic bulletin board . As
a result of the conference, delegates developed an Accord which outlined the
group 's thinking about the task of d isposing of chemical weap ons .

The

following are a few of the recommendations contained in the document
entitled, "The International Citizens' Accord on Chemical Weap ons
Disposal" (November 1 0, 199 1 ) :
A l l use of incineration or plans t o use incineration
or any o ther open ended-as opposed to fully
contained-disposal system for chemical weapons
destruction should be halted at once;
Defense Department should immediately expand
its investigation into alternative technologies;
The Army should commission site-specific studies
at each chemical weapons site;
There should be greater citizen involvement in all
d ec ision-making p rocesses and interna t io n a l
treaties and conventions;
Env ironmentally unsound technologies for the
demilitarization and disposal of chemical weapons
must not be exported;
In negotiating international chemica l weapons
a g r e e m e n t s , the imp a c t o n p e o p l e a n d
communities must b e a central concern;
If, as a last resort, transp ortation of chemical
weapons must be undertaken, it should be only for
final treatment and / or d isposal, a fter necessary
s ta b i l i z at ion, w i th the consent of a ffec te d
communities, and b e consistent with the above
stated goals.
The transportation issue caused some consternation, however, because
transp ortation out of LBAD had been the cornerstone of the citizen ' s
opposition movement in Madison County, KY.
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However, this last accord

demonstrates the utility of the conference as this issue was hammered out
and d issected for m any hours.

Eventually, the conference arrived at a

compromise position, which was acceptable to most participants.
The foregoing account of the conference is not intended to be a
comprehensive account of the events of that week-end. The conference was a
learning experience and a v aluable opportunity to share concerns, offer
support and create feelings of empowerment. It was an exercise in c o u n ter

hegemony. In the end, "Not in My Backyard" evolved into "Not in Anyone's
Back Yard" (Silton 1993) . Since then, other similar conferences have taken
place.

3.8

The evolution of Issues and Non-Issues
Several issues have evolved as "key" in the minds of citizens who

oppose the Army's plan to incinerate nerve-gas weapons at the LBAD.
Among them are the following: (1) programmatic vs. site-specific stud ies; (2)
· public safety; (3) chronic effects of low level exposure to by-products of
incineration; (4) continued use of the incinerators; (5) transportation of the
stockpile out of LBAD; (6) alternative technologies.

3.8.1

Programmatic vs. Site Specific Approach
Issues evolved as time went by and it is fair to say that a central "core"

of issues has remained throughout the history of the struggle.

Foremost

a mong these (although there really isn't a "first") is the Army's decision to
use a generic approach to conducting the risk assessment associated with the
d isposal plan. This is referred to as a "programmatic" approach. Basically, the
Army decided to lump together all eight sites for the purposes of developing a
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risk assessment. The "issue" here is that citizens wanted the Army to conduct
site-specific studies, i .e, studies that would take into account the uni que
features of each site, such as population density, topography, etc. before
building an incinerator at that site .

The final report of the Kentucky

Community Review Support Contract, (the Army-funded community study
group in Richmond, KY) discussed this issue. The report states:
Making a PROGRAMMATIC (generic) decision with
limited site-specific information means that many
of the deep and troubled concerns of this area get
"defined out." People are site specific and safety is
site specific. Shouldn't a PROGRAM be designed
with those in mind? (Blackwell et al, Kentucky
Community Review Support Contract, November
1987, p. 19)
The evolution of this issue (i.e., the SSEIS) is a story in its own right and will
be examined more fully in Chapter four in the context of the NEPA process.

3.8.2 Public Safety
"Safety first, and by the way, no incinerator too," wrote Trav is Flora in
an article dealing with the citizen opposition to incineration at LBAD (Berea

Citizen, October 14, 1993). Concern over public safety is at the height of citizen
concerns about the CSDP. One person asked, "Do those who make decisions
then live with the possible consequences or does extensive bureaucracy mean
that some decide and others endure? " (Blackwell 1987, Kentucky Community
Review Support Contract, p. 19).

Another Concerned C itizen commented

that
health and safety should be given p r i m a cy over
every other factor--'way ahead of whatever is in
second place. ' This primacy must pervade the
1 24

choice of alternatives, the planning to follow, and
It must be
the imp lementation of the plan .
operational, not just rhetorical! (Blackwell 1 987,
Kentucky Community Review Support Contract, p .

19).

3.8.3 Chronic Effects: The Anatomy of a Non-Issue
The Army has focused on catastrophic accidents in p reparing its
emergency preparedness plans for the communities who host the stockpile,
but has ignored completely the chronic effects to the communities from low
level exposure to the by-products of incineration.

The main point of

contention is whether small but lethal amounts of nerve agent and toxics like
d ioxin would escape from the incinerator into the atmosphere. A spokesman
for Greenpeace Toxics Campaign flatly charges that "the dioxin issue has been
suppressed" (Personal Communication 7 /30/91). The Army says that federal
regulations a llow a tiny amount of nerve gas to be released into the
a tmosphere---52 p arts per trillion. "That's equivalent to destroying 99.9999
percent of the nerve gas and letting the rest escape to be dispersed by wind "

( The B irmingham News, Sunday, May 31, 1992, p . C 5). Indeed, the Army
brags about the fact that the incinerators will destroy agent to the level of "six
nines"; however, knowledgeable experts admit that even under the most
ideal circumstances, this level of efficiency is difficult to achieve.

And

considering that these incinerators will be operating twenty-four hours a d ay,
seven days a week for at least a year---longer in some cases, it stretches
credulity to believe that the Army will be able to maintain that standard . The
Army says it can't measure amounts smaller than 52 p arts per trillion and
assures skeptics that they have never monitored nerve gas coming out of
their stacks.
1 25

In fact, the Army has completely foreclosed even any d iscussion of
"incineration" per se, except to defend it as the "safest" and "most efficient"
method for destroying nerve agent. This "decision by fiat" is typical of how
the issue (which has, of course, become a "non-issue") has been handled .
Nowhere in any of the CSEPP (Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Program) documents is there

any

mention of the d angers of incineration.

Indeed, the Army has routinely dismissed the community's expressed fears
regarding stack emissions by simply repeating the phrase, "The Army will
comply with all applicable environmental laws and regulations."

3.8.4

Future Use of Incinerators
"I f you build it, it will stay," so predicted Ben Haskell, one of the

organizers of an opposition group at the Anniston Army Depot (New York

Times, Thursday, September 24, 1 992, p . A-16) . His wry remark sums up the
feelings expressed by most citizens who oppose the Army's nerve gas
incinerator plans .
A l th ough

Public

Law

99- 1 45,

the

"Department

of

Defense

Authorization Act of 1 986," mandates that the incinerators be razed once the
stockpile is destroyed, few believe they will be destroyed. PL 99-145 stipulates
that "Facilities constructed to carry out this section may not be used for any
purpose other than the destruction of lethal chemical weapons and
munitions, and when no longer needed to carry out this function, such
facilities shall be cleaned, dismantled, and disposed of in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations" (PL-99-145, November 8, 1 985: Section 1 4 1 2,
p . 99 STAT. 747) . The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army assured the
a u thor that they would be d estroyed
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"Pac-Man style"

(Persona l

C ommunication: A cting Assistant Secretarty of the A rmy for Installati ons,
Logistics and Environment to author, July 29, 1991).
However, laws can be changed and many doubt that a multimillion
dollar facility with state-of-the-art technology will be scrapp e d .

The

incinerator complex at LBAD alone is estimated to cost half a billion dollars

(Richmond Register, May 30, 1991, p. 2) ! In fact, in the words of a member o f
Concerned Citizens, "Future use i s a foregone conclusion." Voicing concerns
about the escalating costs of the program, Congress commissioned studies on
the feasibility of the continued use of the incinerators.

The MITRE report

issued in January of 1991 entitled, "Engineering Analysis for Future Use o f
Chemical A gent Demilitarization Plants:

Feasib ility a n d Desirability,"

suggests several uses for the future of these facilities, thus adding fuel to the
fire on this issue (MITRE Report 199 1 ) . A brief quote from that report (which
one activist subtitled, "How to Circumvent the Law with regard to the Future
Use of Facilities," p resents a chilling specter {fro m

the c o m m u n i ty ' s

perspective, of course } o f what may come to pass. The following are some
possible alternative uses for the facility at Umatilla Depot Activity (UMDA) in
Oregon as outlined in the MITRE report:
It has a lso been s uggested that the chemical
demilitarization p l a nt be m a de a v a i l ab le for
commercial hazardous w aste d isposal a fter its
mission is completed . The Hermiston Development
Corporation is p articularly interested in exploring
the possibility of having the facility turned over to
the private sector for this p urpose (Person a l
C ommunication) . There i s a market for such
services in the area . . .Another possible use would be
to m aintain the facility intact and under A rmy
control for use in the disposal of military hazardous
waste . . (MITRE Report 1991, p. B 8 1 )
-
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Management alternatives for future use include: ( a ) G overnment
Ownership and Operation; (b) Government Ownership and Contractor
Operation; (c) Transfer to Nongovernment Ownership and Operation
(MITRE report 1991, p . 6-12, 6-13).

Ironically, the latter is the a lternative

citizens fear most. In discussing the possible transfer of the incinerators to
non-government ownership, the report states that, "This option is best suited
to cases where the demilitarization plant is located at an installation
scheduled for realignment (PUDA, UMDA and the Bluegrass Activity of
LBAD) and for which the government has not identified a feasible or
desirable future use" (MITRE Report 1991, pp. 6-12;6-13).
Two laws however, affect the demilitarization plant future use options:
Public Law 98-407 and its corresponding Army regulation (AR 200-1 , 1-35 [a]

[6]), prohibit the use of any DOD facility for the storage or disposal of a ny non
DOD toxic or hazardous wastes (MITRE 1 99 1 ) . Beyond Public Law 98-407,
RCRA has the largest potential to affect the demilitarization plant future uses.
The MITRE Report states that "RCRA's comprehensive and prescriptive body
of regulations introduce uncertainty and complexity in determining the
regulatory desirability of any future use" (MITRE report 199 1 , p. 6-10).
Congress recently commissioned the MITRE Corp . to conduct another
"Future Uses" study.

This latest assessment is scheduled for delivery to

Congress in FY (fiscal year) 1 994 (U.S. Army Materials Destruction Agency:
Annual Status Rep ort on the Disposal of Lethal Chemical Weapon s and
Material, Department of the Army, December 1 5, 1993).
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3 .8.5

Transportation
"FLY IT OUT," was the conclusion of the independent citizens' review

committee set up to study the problem of the disposition of the chemical
weapons at LBAD. The cornerstone of the opposition efforts, the raison d 'etre
of both Concerned Citizens of Madison County and Common Ground / KEF
was the transportation alternative.

They forcefully advocated transporting

the stockpiled weapons out of LBAD to either a national or a regional site,
citing the Army's excellent record in transportation of chemical weapons .
The groups point out that there has never been a fatality involving the
transportation of nerve agent and cite the Army's considerable experience in
this area (See Chem ical S tockp ile D isposal Program : Chem ical Weapo n s

Movement History Compilatio n . June 1 2, 1 987). Opposition groups at LBAD
are quick to point out the Army's unmitigated success in transporting the
U.S. stockpiles of chemical weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany to
the facility on Johnston Atoll. Citizens at LBAD cry out for "equal treatment
with the Germans . " (For a fuller description of this effort, see article:
"Removal of U.S. Stocks from Germany Sparks Debate," August 13, 1 990,

Chem ical and E ngineering News, pp. 1 0,1 1 ) .
Indeed, the Army did conduct transportation studies early on, although
these studies only involved the movement of the M55 rockets. The Army's
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Concept Plan ( 1 986) d i d discuss severa l
transportation options and concluded that airlift using C 1 4 1 B aircraft would
be a possibility for supplying regional plants, "although the potential benefit
of using higher-capacity aircraft requires additional study" (U. S. Army CSDP
Concept Plan 1 986, p. B-23). This study concluded that munition trains would
be the best mode of transport. The FPEIS did include expanded studies on Air
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Transportation and on the partial-relocation option.

The FPEIS states that

"The p artial relocation alternative would require from 900 to 1200 flights for
shipment of the APG inventory and from 1200 to 1 500 flights for shipment of
the LBAD inventory" (FPEIS 1 988, p. xiii) .

In each case, the destruction

technology would remain the same as that emp loyed on Johnston Atoll
(JACADS), i.e., incineration in separate furnaces for each o f the several
comp onents o f the weapons, e.g., agent destruction, exp losive and
p ropellents, metal d econtamination, and d unnage d isposal.

Under the

section titled, "Key Findings," the FPEIS reads, "Continued storage, national,
and p artial relocation alternatives are rejected from further consideration
based on the methodology's first stage of human health impacts. Basically, the
comp arisons are made first, for human health impacts and then for
ecosystem and environmental impacts" (FPEIS 1 988, p. xvii). On this b asis,
the "environmentally preferred" alternative is selected.
A rm y ' s c al c ulus

showed on-site

In this case, the

incineration to be preferable

to

transportation.
Initially, " the Army determined that the costs of the transportation and
on-site incineration options were comparable" (Richmond Regis ter, May 30,

1991, p . 1 ) . However, one of the founders of Common Ground / KEF argued
that "based on information he has reviewed, the cost of transportation would
be about a fourth of the cost of on-site disposal" (Richmond Register, May 30,

1991, p. 2) . However, cost was not the only variable considered in the Army's
decision to go with on-site destruction over transportation. When word of
this possibility reached people in states a djacent to the transportation route,
numerous negative messages carne from political figures decrying the Army's
intent to move weapons through their territories. The Army, bowing to this
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pressure, decided against transporting the stockpiled weapons.

The A rmy

insists that "Cost has never been the d riving factor in this program"

( R i c h m o n d R eg i s ter, May 30, 1 99 1 , p .2).

However, there is evidence to

support the contention that, initially, incineration w as selected because it was
thought to be the most efficient and cost-effective method for destroying the
weapons. In a document obtained form the Defense Technical Information
Center (OTIC) [A d ata base not available to the general p ub lic, but only to
Army contractors and subcontractors], Army personnel clearly indicate that
cost was indeed a big factor in the selection of incineration. In speaking about
the "baseline technology" i.e., inc inera tion , the Army said, " The life-cycle
costs will ultimately determine the demilitarization system configuration"
(Lurk 1 984) .

3.8.6

Alternative Technologies
Up until 1 992, when C ongress mandated that the Army consider

alternatives to on-site incineration, the Army had simply dismissed the issue
of alternative technologies out o f hand ( Incineration Alternatives Act o f
1 992) . The issue was "defined out," and any and a l l discussion of alternatives
focused on w h e re

the d estruction by incineration w as to take place.

Questions about whether incineration was the best choice were not on the
agenda by the time the citizens were brought into the process. The FPEIS
( 1 988, Section J . 1 . 2 . 1 The Disposal Alternatives) l ays out the "alternatives"
considered by the Army, they were: On-site d isposal, Regional Disposal or a
Central o r National Disposal Center.

Under the regional a l ternative,

m unitions stored in the eastern region of the country would be shipped by
rail to Anniston Army Depot, Alab ama, while those in the west would be
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shipped to Tooele Army Depot, Utah. Under the national (or central facility)
alternative, all munitions in the continental U.S. would be shipped by rail to
Tooele Army Depot for destruction (FPEIS January 1988).

A "no-action"

alternative was also considered and the report stated that "the major risk
elements { relevant to continued storage} are relatively rare, externa l or
natural catastrophic events, such as tornadoes and aircraft crashes. Storage
related accidents are typically very low

in

their probability" (FPEIS 1988, p. J-4) .

In speaking about the risk of continued storage, one of the co-founders of
Concerned Citizens reported that the Army had conducted a study of the state
of the stockpile at LBAD. She said, "The Army refers to ' deteriorating' or
' aging stockpile' . Our stockpile has the safest, lowest rate of leakage. There is
some pitting. We at LBAD had the least amount of pitting. The Army looked
at propellant;

they were most concerned because over time the stabilizer

evaporates, but what they said was that in another 25 years, all that stuff
would have to be given another hard look because of the stabilizing stuff.
They set up a system for examining the stockpile on a routine b asis ." Yet in
other documents, the Army states that continued storage is the alternative
with the highest risk. This seeming contradiction is due to the fact that the
risk assessment was done on a programmatic (generic) basis, and not on a site
specific basis.

The "programmatic" risk analysis identified the "continued

storage" alternative as the one with the highest risk. However, this is not the
case at LBAD.
Citizens repeatedly h ave criticized the Army for failure to consider
alternative technologies, only to be told that other methods had been tried
(for example, the neutralization method used at Rocky Mountain Arsenal
discussed earlier ) and found wanting. The Army quickly dismissed other
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methods, e.g., those suggested by Greenpeace as "Blue Sky" technologies,
meaning untried, unp roven (See Picard i 1991 , Alternative Technologies for

the Detoxifica tion of Che m ical Weapons:
p repared for Greenpeace International) .

A n I nfo r m a ti o n

Docu m e n t

The one aspect o f all these

alternatives that remains key is the "closed loop " concept. This means that
nowhere in the process is there an outpouring of emissions or waste products
into the environment. Several methods have been suggested as alternatives
to incineration. They include:
Biological Method s- where microorganisms
are used to break down organic chemicals by using
them as nutrients
•

N e u t r a l i z a t i o n - a v ariety of chemical
reactions designed to de-a ctivate the chemical
agents
•

P l a s ma Arc- A ful ly contained thermal
p rocess that insures comp lete destruction of
organic chemicals.
•

S u p e r c r i t i c a l W a t e r O x i d a t i o n - utilizes
temperatures and pressures of water above the
critica l point of wa ter, in a closed system, for
hazardous waste treatment.
•

Photochemical Degredation- exposure to UV
radiation as a method of breakdown of CW agents.
•

•
E l ectrochemi cal Oxida tion- electric current
p assed through a solution of silver nitrate, the
water molecules form highly reactive hyd roxyl
radicals which can oxidize substances.

S t e a m D e t o x i f i c a t io n - Ste a m r e forming
chemistry .
•

Kentucky Environmental Foundation, Inc . Prepared Statement,
Executive Director, to Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, June 16, 1 992.)
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( S o urce :

T he Army's intransigence regard ing the issue o f alternative
technologies has been noted by several authors . For example, in reviewing
the Army's Global Commons Environmental Assessment (EA) in which the
Army recommended using incineration at the Johnston Atoll facility, Hardy

(1990) argued that:
The Army's failure (in the SSEIS, the glob a l
commons EA, and i n Germany) t o even consider
a lternative disposal methods is unreasonab le.
Incineration i s not the only means by which
chemical weapons can be disposed of. Recently, new
methods using b iology and new kinds of organic
chemistry have been utilized to break d own
chemicals such as those stored in the European
stockpile. (Hardy 1990, p. 7)
He suggested that these alternatives (which embody the " closed loop "
concept) could be used in two ways. "First," he wrote, "they could be used for
on-site destruction of the chemical agents.

Second, they could be used to

reduce the nerve agents' toxicity--by thousands of times--before shipping
them over seas to their final disposal area" {or to a central or regional facility
as in the case of the CONUS stockpile) (Hardy 1990, p. 7).
In 1 992, Senator Wendell H . Ford asked the Office of Technology
A ssessment to conduct a study into alternative technologies for the
detoxification of chemical weapons. The OTA reported that p resent work
with alternative technologies is focused on treatment of hazardous wastes
other than chemical weapons and suggested that market forces alone could
not be expected to lead the development of alternative CW destruction
technologies beca use the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons is small
compared to industrial chemical waste. "If an alternative is to be developed,"
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writes OTA, "government will have to be depended on for at lease some of
the support" (Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 1 992, p.9).
On February 7, 1 994, the National Research Council, the operating
agency of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of
Engineering, released its long-awaited report from the Committee on
Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies (NAS 1 994). The report
is a 200-page document which took one and one-half years to develop . It is
available to the public through the National A cademy Press for $40.00.
Members of the Citizens Advisory Commission (CAC) appointed to evaluate
the report, had only two weeks to formulate a response. Those who have had
an opportunity to review the report are disappointed claiming that "they (the
NAS} focused on validating incineration" (Personal Communication: C o
founder Concerned Citizens of Madison County to CGD: 2 / 13 /94).
Activists from other sites also got the impression that the Army wasn't
seriously considering alternative technologies.

Persons in attendance at a

Public Meeting in Anniston, Alabama in the summer of 1993 came away with
the impression that alternatives weren't being seriously considere d .

In

recording her impressions of the meeting, one researcher wrote, "This sense
that the Army is not really considering alternative technologies b ut rather is
trying to bolster their decision to incinerate was evident throughout the
evening" (Field Notes: Cathy Solheim 1993: U.S. Army Public Meeting on the
CSDP, Anniston, Alabama). Finally, with respect to the issue of alternative
technologies, Lenny Seigel ( 1 992) from the National Toxics Campaign made
this observation:
Three issues stand out. First, the continuation of
the present program is automatic once the Army
submits its reports. The problem is that the Army
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would consider any change in technology to be an
admission of error. Thus, it has a bureaucratic
imperative to recommend a gainst alternatives
(Letter: Lenny Seigel, Pacific Stud ies Center to
Executive Director, KEF, Inc., August 27, 1 992).
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee studying
a lternative technologies works under the Board of Army S cience and
Technology which is chaired by John Longwell (MIT) and Gene Dyer
(Bechtel); thus, the outcome of the Alternative Technologies study can hardly
be surprising in light of the fact that Bechtel National, Inc. is one of the prime
contractors for the CSDP. The U.S. Army awarded Bechtel a $240-million
dollar, nine-year contract in 1 988 to dispose of the chemical weapons stored at
LBAD and the seven other sites around the country (Berea Citizen, December
1, 1 988) .
The l a test development in the quest to find an alternative to
incineration, and perhaps the answer to the opposition movement's prayers,
comes from a small company in Rockwell, Texas---Aquron Corp . Aquron has
developed a brand-new "alternative" to incineration for the destruction of
chemical weapons and they have presented their findings to the Army (The

Berea Citizen, September 1 6, 1 993) .

Apparently, this new technology is a

neutralization process . The president of A quron said in an interview, "We
can build a mobile unit. The whole thing could be mounted on an 1 8-wheel
trailer and hauled around from site to site," thus reducing the need for the
construction of permanent facilities.

"The process involves a four-stage

process. We are prepared to neutralize the whole stockpile for 3% to 5% of
the current incineration program.

Plus, we c an neutralize the whole

stockpile in a year and be gone . . . We can neutralize the whole stockpile for
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the cost of two sites," says the President of Aquron. (Telephone Interview

9 /20/93).
Obviously, if what he says is so, it would have profound implications
for the Army 's current CSDP which is built around on-site incineration.
However, Aquron faces difficult hurdles in its quest to get the Army to p ay
attention to this new process, not the least of which is the fact that they
cannot get live agent to demonstrate the efficacy of the process. Thus far, they
have worked their process only on small quantities available through the
local university. However, this informant said that the Army was planning
to provide them with the means to conduct some demonstration tests before
Army personnel involved with the CSDP.

3.8.7 Decontamination: The "Other" Non-Issue
The idea of decontamination has not even emerged as an issue by the
great majority of citizens who oppose the CSDP.

Even the most highly

informed proactive of the citizens are likely unaware of the possibility of such
a need. The Army has assiduously avoided any mention of decontamination
in public education materials and the Army keeps a tight lid on what
information does reach state emergency managers, much less the general
p ub lic .

Despite the Army's claim that there is a low probability o f any

significant off-post contamination, decontamination procedures are being
studied at length (Munro et al 1991; U.S. Dept. of Health 1990; Watson and
Munro 1990; Watson et al 1991). Much of the Army's thinking on the subject
comes from researchers at the national laboratories, e.g., The Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, TN.
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A good deal of research on decontamination for the CSDP remains
hidden away in some of those obscure government planning documents that
remain at the DRAFT level so that they cannot be released for public review.
The concern for continued study of decontamination is driven by the fact that
"Neither s afe levels of residu al contamination, accep table monitoring
methods, nor acceptable and effective decontamination methods have yet
been promulgated for the general population" (Shumpert and W atson 1991,
p. 3-4) .

Bear in mind that what l ittle is known about nerve-gas

contamination is derived from d ata obtained from military training manuals
which b ased their conclusions on projections of what would happen to
healthy, adult m ales under b attlefield conditions, and studies w ith agent
simulents under controlled laboratory conditions. In the "unlikely" event of
an off-post release (i.e., an accident where a plume of nerve or mustard agent
traveled beyond the Army depot into a nearby community), l ittle is known
about what could be done to prevent contamination of waterways, foliage,
pets, foodstuffs, houses, etc. In some c ases, people may not be able to reenter
their homes for weeks---possibly months .

Although such an accident is

unthink ab le, the Army admits there is a small probability that it could
h appen.

3.9

Depth and Breadth of Community Support
From its earliest beginnings in 1984, support for the movement to

oppose the Army 's incineration plan at the LBAD site was broad-base d and
substantial. Where people at many sites were only dimly aware of the CSDP
until fairly recently, a rand om telephone poll of 100 Madison County
residents conducted in 1984 showed 77 percent (77%) of those polled would
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not favor an incinerator at the depot or in the county. Only fifteen percent

(15%) would support building the facility; eight percent (8%) were undecided
(Richmond Register, August 27, 1984).
As a result of the collaboration of the two complementary groups, the
movement quickly moved from "reactive" to "proactive" and in the process,
garnered enormous community support.

What happened in Mad ison

County is similar to McAdam's ( 1982) account of groups in the C ivil Right's
Movement of the 1 960. He wrote, "By confining their attacks to targets that
were narrowly defined , both substantively and geographically, movement
groups were able to concentrate their forces so as to offset the basic resource
d iscrep ancy between themselves and their opp onents.

The result was a

narrowly circumscribed, highly focused, effective insurgent camp aign"
(McAdam 1982, p. 151).
The list of political persons and organizations

m

support of the

citizens' opposition to the Army's on-site incineration plans for Madison
County, Kentucky includes officials in local, county and state government.
The following government officials came out

m

support of the citizens'

opp osition and a gainst the Army ' s plan: U. S. Representative Larry J .
Hopkins; Senator Wendell Ford; Senator Mitch McConnell; Senator Walter
"Dee" Huddleston ( 1984); Governor Martha Layne Collins; and Lieutenant
Governor, Steven Beshear. In a letter (July 22, 1 986) to Chairman Nichols,
C ongressman Hop kins and Members of the House Armed Services
Committee, Senator Ford stated his objections most vigorously .

He wrote,

"Let me offer a few words in perspective . . .The materials were brought here
without consent of and without consultation with the people. I think it is
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high time that the Army listen to them." Senator Ford 's sentiments are
typical of those expressed by other political figures.
Community organizations opposing the Army 's plan include: The
Richmond City Board of Commissioners (Resolution No. 84 - 1 3); Health Help,
Inc.; The Madison County Fiscal Court (Resolution, May 7, 1 984); The
Richmond Chamber of Commerce; Kenvirons, Incorporated; The Kentucky
Resources Council; Lexington-Fayette Urb an County Council ( May 16, 1 985,
Resolution); the Faculty Senate of E astern Kentucky University; the Faculty
and corporate officers of Berea College; The Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition, and
Local Lodge 859 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
W orkers AFL-CIO.
include:

N ational organizations supp orting the opposition

The Sierra Club (Cumberland Chapter); Greenpeace Action; The

N ational Taxies Campaign, Citizens' Clearing House for Hazardous Waste,
and the Highlander Center. At one point, a petition carrying 1 72 signatures of
Madison County teens and pre-teens opposing incineration of the weapons a t
LBAD w a s delivered t o Congressman Hopkins.
However, one organization, The Madison C ounty Grand Jury
supported the Army's plan to build a nerve-gas incinerator in Madison
County.

In an article which appeared in the Richmond Register ( December

19, 1984), the Grand Jury cited the reported deterioration of the rockets as a
reason for its recommendation.
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3.10

Community Review Studies: The Co-optation o f Citizen Protest
As a result of the hue and cry that went out from the citizens o f

Madison County, two community study groups were eventually formed there
to study the nerve gas issue: ( 1 ) the Mad ison County Task Force on Chemical
W e apo n s , appointe d b y U . S . C ongressman Larry J . Hopkins (ranking
Republican on the Investigati ons Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Commit tee) in June of 1 984, and (2) the Kentucky C o mm u n i ty
Review / Study Group (1987)---the latter study was supported by Army funds.
In this section we will briefly describe the origin of these independent
community stu dy teams, describe their funding, and discuss some of their
conclusions as well as the Army's response to their find ings. As we review
these studies, the length of time they took, their economic cost and learn
about what the Army finally did with their conclusions, it is useful to recall
G aventa's observation that "increased p articipation it is assumed, will not
meet power constraints" (Gaventa 1980, p. 8).

3.10.1 The Madison County Task Force on Chemical Weapons
U. S. C ongressman Larry J. Hopkins, ranking member of the House
Armed Services Committee called into being the Madison County Task Force.
Rep. Hopkins appointed a fifteen member team, broadly representative of
Madison Countians to study the nerve gas i ssue .

The study took

approximately a year and a half to complete Qune 1984-May 1 986).

Meetings

were held twice a month and were open to the public. Several members of
the Task Force traveled (at Army expense) to the Army's prototype facility in
Tooele, U tah, CAMDS (Chemical Agent Munitions Destruction System)
141

which is a one-third size prototype of the incinerator planned for LBAD. In
describing the group 's work, one Task Force member talked about his
experience:
The Army sent us copies of all the documents we
requested . They never held b ack. I never had the
feeling that anything was withheld . We attended
some contractors meetings. When our schedule
permitted, two of us would go. I attended two in
Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), one in Tooele
Army Depot (TEAD), and one at the Oak Ridge
National Lab . We had enough money for travel.
We aske d questions at the sites. I respected the
openness of the Army. Our input was received
courteously. Of course, one never knows whether it
was received courteously and then dismissed.
While most members of the Task Force remained somewhat skeptical
of the Army's plan (and its motives!), some members were duly impressed by
the Army. As one task force member (President of the Richmond Chamber of
Commerce) stated, "I was impressed by the Army's marshalling o f their
forces . . .I haven't made up my mind (on incineration) yet" (Courier journal, ,
July 11, 1984, p. 1).
A fter nearly two years of study, the Task Force made the following
recommend ation:
We h ave by majority vote concluded that building
an incinerator in Madison County for the disposal of
chemical weapons would be wrong and that
transportation to a Regional site (Anniston) or
National site (Tooele) by train is the best local and
also national solution to the problem. It also is the
most ethical and moral solution to a m iserable
situation anyway one looks at it. (Statement -On
Chemical Weapon Disposa l : Dr. Oris Blackwell,
Speaking for the Madison County Task Force, May

21, 1986).
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A ccording to Task Force Members, the Army never directly responded
to their conclusions, although their findings are summarized in Volume 3 of
the FPEIS ( U . S. Department of the Army, Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, 1 988, Vol.
1 ,2,&3).

3.10.1.1 The Trip to Tooele
Periodically the Army has flown citizen groups to Tooele, Utah, to tour
their proto type facility---the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System
known as CAMDS

In August of 1 984, the A rmy flew twenty-seven

Kentuckians---including nine members of the Madison County (Citizens ' )
Task Force o n Chemical Weapons, and a n assortment of community leaders
to the Tooele site for an intensive workshop and tour. The trip was set up in
order that Kentuckians could gage the the facility's safety first hand, according
to various news reports.

According to Brigadier General Bobby Charles

Robinson, who led the tour, the reaction to the trip was "so encouraging." He
said, "the Army was glad to pick up the tab because it wanted the public to be
'totally informed of the issues' surrounding the military's efforts to get rid of
the obsolete rockets

.

.

. " (Lexington-Herald Leader, August 19, 1 984, p. A-18).

The Courier Journal

reported on the trip as follows: " A largely

skeptical group of Kentuckians received a red-carpet welcome in Utah
yesterday from Army officials who want to build a nerve-gas incinerator in
Madison County" (Courier Journal, August 16, 1984, p . 3). In addition to the
nine members of the Citizens' Task Force were deans and professors from
b o th E a s tern Kentucky University and the University of Kentucky,
a dministrators from Pattie A . Clay and Berea Hospitals, state environmental
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officials (Courier Journal, August 16, 1984, p . 3). Participants were housed a t
the Hilton Hotel in Salt Lake City and, prior t o their tour of the facility, were
invited to attend a Discussion Workshop in which they were introduced to
some o f the p rinc ipal technologic al concepts, p rocesses and personnel
involved in the CSDP. One newspaper reporter wrote, "They are receiving
free air fare, meals, lodging, and elaborate briefings in a cavernous hall at the
Salt Lake C ity Hilton Hotel" (Courier Journal, August 1 6, 1984, p. 3). The
article continued, "Officials of the Army Material Command, which is footing
the bill, said yesterday they did not know how much the trip will cost."
Since this p articular contingent was made up of citizens from among
the most vocal opposition, every attempt was made to accommodate their
questions and concerns. The Army reassured them that the final decision on
the destruction technology had not yet been made and that their visiting this
site at Army expense was completely consistent with NEPA.

At one point in

the discussion workshop, General Bobby Robinson, in an attempt to reassure
the skeptics, said, "You see, the community and the state officials and the
Army are partners in whatever decision is made. And, indeed, we will be

partners in whatever decision is made, not only at Lexington Bluegrass, but
also at other installations where several items are b eing stored.

They will

have to be d isposed of in some manner" (Transcript: Tooele Army Depot
CAMDS Overview and Discussion Workshop, August 15, 1984, Salt Lake City,
Utah, p. 1 17) .
The Army arranged for several such trips over a period of years.
C itizen activists from other communities have b een invited and various
government and community leaders, both local and national, h ave toured
the facility, including a delegation from the former Soviet Union.
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All

visitors to the site upon arrival were supplied with gas m asks along with
atropine kits.
On one such trip in 1985, an alarm went off indicating the presence of
agent in the p lant's ventilation system.

At that time, 40 visitors from

Kentucky and four other states were touring the facility. All were quickly
evacuated. The story was picked up by the Associated Press and was carried in
the local newspaper, the Richmond Register.

The headline rea d : TOOELE

ARMY DEPOT, Utah, (AP) "NERVE GAS LEAK PROMPTS EVACUATION
OF VISITORS" The story began, "Community leaders from five states, getting
a first-hand look at a prototype plant for destroying nerve gas weapons, were
evacu ated when alarms warned of a nerve agent leak" (Richmond Regis ter,
Wednesday, May 1 5, 1 985, p . 1 ) .

Fortunately, none of those present were

injure d .
The Army immediately turned the event into a publicity coup . They
claimed that the incident proved they could handle any such eventuality. A
number of citizens who were present during the tour voiced their approval of
the Army's h andling of the situation,

which turned into positive feelings

regarding the nerve-gas incinerator in general.

One said, ''I'm personally

convinced that on-site destruction is the best method " (Richmond Regis ter,
May 1 4, 1 985, p. 1 ) . Brad Park, then director of the Richmond Chamber of
C ommerce s a i d , "I was very impressed with the seriousness and
professionalism of the people out there ... The system goes off when there's
just the tiniest bit of agent in the air, even if it is not enough agent to kill a
flea," he said (Richmond Register, May 14, 1985, p . 1 ) . But others were not
impressed. A local political elite commented, "It's obvious they haven't got
the bugs worked out yet.."

An activist stated that the incident was "the most
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d ramatic possible demonstration of our concerns about this h ighly
experimental incinerator;" . . . then he added, "This is exactly the same process
they w ant to put right here in an area where 1 7,000 of our young people go to
school within four miles of where they would put the smokestack of a nerve
gas incinerator" (Richmond Register, May 14, 1985, p. 1 ) .
Upon returning from that trip, several members were interviewed b y
the press a n d asked t o discuss their impressions.

The Messinger Inquirer

(Friday, Sep t.20, 1985) ran a story which read,"TOUR DOESN'T SWAY
GROUPS OPPOSITION TO INCINERATOR." And, indeed, at least one
member of the Task Force continued to express misgivings about the plan. He
said, "Having visited the plant in Tooele, I can say this is an experimental
process . . . This is a bad site. It is a bad decision" (Testimony: Discussion
Workshop, Salt Lake City, Utah, August 15, 1984, p. 2 1 0 ) .

Several other

members of Concerned Citizens remained very skeptical despite trips to the
Tooele facility.
But not everyone remained skeptical. It is safe to say that a number of
people were influenced positively b y what they saw at Tooele .

For one,

Umatilla Mayor Don Armstrong said, 'Tm personally convinced that on-site
destruction is the best method . I'd really like to see the project proceed as
expeditiously as possible" (Richmond Regis ter, May 14, 1 985, p. 1 ) .

The

minutes of the Task Force meeting held on August 28, 1 984 (after the Tooele
trip) record one Task Force member saying that he was " quite impressed with
the technology at Tooele. He was impressed with m achines that measure in
p arts per trillion, and the personnel were very thorough in explanations of
their areas, always willing to answer any questions asked by the group "
(Minutes: Madison County Task Force on Chemical Weapons, August 22,
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1 984, p . 4 ) .

However, a year later, this individual's position hardened

somewhat against the idea of incineration. He was quoted in the newspaper
as having said, "For the people of Tooele, it is comforting that the alarms go
off at a level of reasonable safety b u t it is small comfort to people
contemplating the possibility of a similar installation in a populous area like
central Kentucky (Richmond Register, May 1 5, 1985, p. 1 ) .
Another member o f the Task Force, Judge Botner w a s also favorably
impressed with the Army's Tooele Facility. At the Public Meeting held by the
Task Force to d iscuss their trip, he contrasted the a ttitude of personnel in
Utah with those in Richmond.

According to the record, he stated that,

"Everyone he talked with locally at Salt Lake City seemed to trust the Army
and all seemed to work together. He felt that some of our citizens had lost
their trust here in Richmond and Madison County" (Memo: Announcement
of Task Force meeting in Richmond, Kentucky, August 28, 1 984, p. 3). These
statements, along with those from representatives from other sites, leave no
doubt about the efficacy of efforts at co-optation.

3.10.2 Kentucky Community Review /Study Team
The idea for an independent citizens' study of the CSDP grew out of a
p ublic hearing on the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
(DPEIS) which was held in August of 1986. At that meeting, a member o f
Congressman Hopkin's Task Force posed a question t o the Undersecretary of
the Army who was present at the meeting. She asked, "Why can't there be a
local independent study-review group funded by the Army to make the
communities' concerns, interests, and suggestions known to the Army teams,
contractors, and sub-contractors in a timely fashion for possible inclusion in
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the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement?" (The question is
p araphrased and the person who posed it also mentioned a dollar amount--

$100,000) (Final Report: Kentucky Community Review Support Contract,
1 987, p. 3).
Undersecretary Ambrose agreed immediately to fund such studies
saying he " thought it was a good idea and that it should be possible"
(Blackwell 1 987, p. 3). The group was to be a technical Peer Review Team
under the d irection of an expert in the area of environmental health and
would be composed of p rimary reviewers in the area of chemical
demilitarization, risk assessment, meteorology, and other technical personnel
on an as-needs b asis.

In the letter, it was suggested that this study be

conducte d " conc urrently with the d evelopment o f the Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and the Site-Specific Imp a c t
Statement."
Subsequently, on January 23, 1 987, the Army's first community study
contract totalling $116,000.32, was awarded to E astern Kentucky University for
the p urpose of establishing a citizens' study group tha t would provide
independent and objective public input into the problem of d isposal a t the
local level (Final Report: Kentucky Community Review Support Contract,
1 987) .

Dr. Oris Blackwell, Professor and Chair of Eastern Kentucky

University's Department of Environmental and Health Science, was asked to
chair the study. Five people served on the study team. The contract was
entitled, "Kentucky Community Review Support Contract" .

Members

traveled to Tooele, UT, to Oak Ridge National Laboratory to meet with people
p reparing Environmental Impact Statements, and to other sites.

One

member recalls, "We had enough expense money to cover travel. We were
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sent notices of meetings. When our schedules permitted, one or two of us
would try to go . . . We asked questions at the sites. I respected the openness of
the Army. Our input was received courteously. " Team members also met
with contractors. A member recalls, "EKU gave us a place to meet and places
to store files. . . Dr. Blackwell was the number one person---the boss. He carried
enormous clout."
A fter ten-months of intensive study, the Community Review Team
issued its report. The report concluded, "The overall conclusion of the Study
Team is that the 1 .6% of the U. S. Chemical Weapons stockpile currently
stored at Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot should be airlifted to Tooele,
CAMDS facility for destruction" (Final Report: Kentucky Community Review
Support Contract 1987 p. 3). Upon release of the report, Dr. Oris B lackwell,
principal investigator, expressed optimism that the Army would be receptive
to the citizens' concerns.

He told a reporter, "The Army has been listening

very carefully," and later he added, "They have both encouraged and allowed
us to feel a part in the problem solving process.

Our opinions have been

sought and listened to" (Berea Citizen, November 25, 1987, p. 1 ) .
Following completion o f this community study effort, a member of the
study team was approached by the Army to write an article for "The
E nv ironmental Professional" ---a journal of the National Association of
Environmental Professionals. The Army was hoping to gain political capital
by touting its willingness to go above and beyond the call of duty in fostering
p ublic p articipation in the program.

C a l l in g these groups a form of

"unconventional public participa tion," Carnes ( 1989) indicated tha t the
Army-funded study teams went beyond what is required by NEPA, and this is
probably correct since NEPA does not require that the entity that plans the
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action pay for potentially-impacted communities to conduct their own
independent studies.

This p articular issue of The

E n v i ro n m e n ta l

Professional ( 1989) was dedicated to the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
and the professor was asked to write about the Army-funded study groups,
which he d i d .

The article he wrote was entitled, "Public Input To the

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program NEPA process" (Hindman 1989). In the
article, professor Hindman praised the groups' inclusion in the process. He
wrote, "The team was authorized by the command structure to p articipate in
the process. The team was not an "outside" group. Army staff had orders to
assist the team in identifying and getting access to documents, information,
and meetings. Team members rarely sensed that individual staff members
were being circumspect or withholding information" (Hindman 1989, p. 295).
"Other study teams," he argued:
stayed outside the process and analyzed the results
in written reports. . . In contrast, the team b ecame a
part of the group that developed the FPEIS. Their
views b ecame part of the debates that led to
decisions on what topics would be studied and how
data would be evaluated . Professional staff had to
j ustify conclusions not only to professional peers,
but also to informed citizens before the conclusions
were accepted. (Hindman 1989, p. 295).
When questioned about how he carne to write the article, the author
replied, "The article I wrote was at the request of Oak Ridge. They fed me
some information . . . They were interested in how public input could be
quelled / controlled . They wanted to get it off their backs so they could get on
with their jobs ." The experience had a positive impact on this professor in
terms of his perception of the Army. "I changed my opinion of the Army,"
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he said, " in that they are just a bunch of people doing their job . . . I (don't) see
them as a monolith nor as unstoppable. Stereotypes got broken down."
However, the inference to be drawn from all this is that the Army had
gone " above and beyond the call of duty" to involve people in the process---a
notion which the facts call into question, for regardless of the money the
Army produced for community-based independent studies, the people were
still left out of the decision-making loop, and the conclusions of the studies
were largely ignored when they went against Army prerogatives. Hindman's

( 1 989) insistence that the Citizens' Study Team had enormous impact on the
Army because of their inclusion in the "process" is curious in lieu of what
the Army actually did with the information.

3.11

Army Response to Community Study Groups' Conclusions
Citizen activists greeted these newly-created study groups with great

optimism if not euphoria. However, their happiness over what appeared to
be a victory for the communities was short-lived.

Despite the rhetoric of

" inclusion," the report issued by the "Kentucky Community Study / Review
Team" met with the same fate as the report issued by the "Madison County
Task Force on Chemical Weapons." Basically, it got filed and largely ignored .
When questioned about the ultimate d isposition of t h e Kentucky
C ommunity Review Final Report, another member of the Study Group
remarked, "The final report was duly sent to the Army and they d uly noticed
it." Another member of the study team speculated on why the Army didn't
do more with their report.
changed things .

He said, "They (the Army ) listened to us and

November 1 987 everybody (i.e., all the Army-funded

community study groups) had to have them in all (at) the s ame time.
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However, the FPEIS was due within a month or two. The Army was so tied
up in generating this other document {i.e., the Final Programmatic EIS } that
they were either too busy or not interested in reading {it} ." A knowledgeable
attorney assigned to assist the community activists in their opposition efforts
said of the Army, "They have tried to buy their silence with financing their
study group then ignoring it."
Some of the issues the citizens raised were incorporated in an
Appendix to the FPEIS (see FPEIS 1988, Volume 3, Appendix R, Evaluation of

Community Groups ' Inputs), together with the Army's responses. Appendix
R of the FPEIS contains a brief, site by site, overview of the issues and
concerns expressed by the community study groups, followed by the Army's
response.

However, the Army did not act on the substantive issues raised.

The Army used a variety of strategies to divert a ttention away from the fact
that they were not going to alter their "Preferred Alternative." For example,
they would often point out that the FPEIS, "is written now in clearer
fashion"( FPEIS 1988, Volume 3, p. R-10), responding to criticisms that the
DPEIS was unclear about many important issues. Another favorite stratagem
was to direct the reader to another section of the three-volume report for a
"fuller discussion" of the topic at hand, or it was stated that the Army had
a lready studied this p articular issue (for example, the transporta tion
alternative) and found it wanting, thereby fulfilling their requirement to
"respond" to citizen inquiries. A typical example of the former comes from
the NAAP Community Study. The group at Newport raised concerns over
the risk analysis and associated assumptions regarding the prob abilities of
risks, to which the Army in the FPEIS (1988) responds: "The methods and
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assumptions of the risk analysis are detailed

m

the risk analysis report

{ Appendix J } " (FPEIS 1988, Vol. 3, p. r-1 6).
Last but not least, and probably most pernicious, is the tactic of assuring
the public that an issue would be more fully elaborated in a future document,
for example, in a site-specific study, even going so far as to say that, "Data cited
in the community study may be useful in the site-specific NEP A document. "
Since the issue o f detailed site specific studies was foremost i n the minds of
citizen activists, this dodge was very effective b ecause it gave false
reassurances.

3.12

Community Review Studies at Other Sites
The Army offered local citizens at the seven other sites an opportunity

to undertake their own local studies (Fed. Reg .. 52:4646, Feb . 1 3, 1987) , but only
four others took them up on the offer: ( 1 ) Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG),
MD., (2) Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA), Arkansas, (3)

Umatilla Depot Activity

(UMDA) in Oregon,(4) and Newport Army Ammunition Plant (NAAP) in
Indiana (Personal Communication: Public Affairs Officer, Office of the PM for
Chern. Demil. , Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. 1 /9 /94) (See Table C-3; C-4) .
With their Army funds, the citizens at the Aberdeen Proving Ground
(APG) hired E.A. Engineering of Towson, MD. to conduct the study for them.
E.A. Engineering concluded that, "the concerns of the citizens were valid and
that the Army should go b ack and look at alternative technologies."

The

Aberdeen, Maryland group of C oncerned Citizens reported a similar
disaffection with the whole public participation process.
The Citizens' Study Team assembled at the Umatilla (Oregon) site also
expressed concerns about the fate of their study. They suggested a need for
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professional conferences in order to bring the matter to the attention of the
b roader scientific community and to validate their results through the
normal peer-review process. In their report they stated, "Our review is a ' one
shot' affair. It's too easy for Army personnel to dismiss a criticism by saying,
' Oh, that subject is covered in a report that will be out next month" '
(Umatilla Study Group 1987, p. A-42) . And, indeed, that i s exactly how the
Army handled many of the concerns raised by the community stud ies, largely
by indicating that things would be dealt with in a vaguely distant future site
specific document.
Ultimately, though, the Umatilla Study Group came out in support of
the Army's incineration plan.

The make-up o f the team may have had

something to do with it. Rather than being composed of concerned citizens
from the community, the team was made up of civil engineers and
toxicologists from the local university---Oregon State University .

They

concluded, "The study team feels that the operation {sic) in the demil facility
are well thought out and should be as risk free as possible . . . The incineration
(demil) p ermit is thorough and should be approve d .

The projecte d

atmospheric emissions are attainable and not hazardous t o human health"
(Umatilla Study Group 1987, p. iii) .
The Pine B luff Arsenal (PBA) community study also supported the
Army's decision. Working out of the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff,
they wrote, "Based upon our findings, conclusions and other pertinent
recommendations, we firmly support the Army's "preferred" programmatic
disposal alternative: The On-Site Disposal Alternative" (Demecs et al, 1 987:
PBA Community Review Study, p . i i) . However, under Section 1 .1, under

1 . 1 .3 Recommend ations, the study group called upon the Army to b egin
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immediate site-specific studies of the PBA area. It should be noted that the
Army-funded community study at Pine Bluff Arsenal was performed m any
years before there was any organized opposition at the Pine Bluff site. The
document is b asically a rubber stamp for the Army's program, and is
definitely not a thoroughgoing critique of the existing policy.
In Newport, Indiana, the site of the Newport Army Ammunition Plant
(NAAP), the Concerned Citizens of Vermillion, Parke, Vigo, Fountain and
Tippecanoe Counties also took advantage of the Army's offer to conduct an
"independent" citizen's review of the Draft Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (DPEIS) which included plans for an incinerator at that site.
In addition to concerned citizens from the above-names counties, this group,
similar to APG, hired expert consultants to advise them, but the citizens
remained in control of the process. They concluded, "If safety considerations
are, indeed, meant to outweigh all other concerns surrounding the nerve
agent disposal project, the national disposal option, especially in the form of a
desert siting of the incinerators (see p . 22 of report) would emerge as the
option of least risk" (Community Review Final Report (NAAP} 1987, Section

1 1: Major Recommendations, p. 25) .
The Newport team also accused the Army o f obfuscation in the w ay
they handled queries from citizens. They observed that in response to much
criticism regarding the Army's Draft Environmental Impact S tatement
(DEIS) , the Army produced (mostly during 1987) "a steady stream of rewrite
volumes. These are generally of a much improved quality, but prevented us
from arriving at an overall evaluation of the disposal plan" (Community
Review Final Report ( NAAP} 1987, p. 5). Specifically, they argued that "the
newly developed addenda to the EIS, although much superior to the July 1986
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statement, still leave m any questions unanswered, and above all, h ave
obstructed many issues by the addition o f reams o f quantita tive risk
a ssessme nts that tend to impart to the study an air of objectivity and reliable
risk assessment" (Community Review Final Report 1987, p. 5).
Considering all the time and money (at least $500,000) spent on these
independent community studies, and the fact that the studies p roduced in
excess of 1 ,000 pages of text, one could reasonably ask what was accomplished .
On the one hand, the studies a re claimed to be evidence o f the Army ' s
willingness to involve citizens i n the p ro cess, and indeed, Army Public
Affairs moguls point this out at every opportunity.

On

the other hand, as one

of the co-founders of C ommon Ground (Kentucky) commented: "Immediate
and since, almost nothing---except PR for the opposition (i.e., the Army).

{ There are } cumulative effects however ... As we proceed, perhaps we will find
later that it {i.e., the report} will carry weight in a federal court as evidence.
It' s valuable rhetorically, but not substantively. "

3.13

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The Army' s half a million dollar Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

at LBAD has been another source of controversy a d d ing to the A rmy's
complications in dealing with the population at the Kentucky site. In the fall
of 1989, the Army appointed retired Brig. General Merwyn Jackson to oversee
the C ounty's emergency plans for the CSDP at LBAD.

A fifteen-member

community team was assembled to assist in making decisions regarding the
EOC which included local political elites and c itizen activists . . The
government agency FEMA (The Federal Emergency Management A gency) is
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funding the $555,670 project, according to the local newspaper (Berea Citizen,
September 1 3, 1989, p. 1).
A citizen and member of the EOC p anel accused the local Army
representative o f making unilateral d ecisions and not consulting the
committee. There were bad feelings created because the facility was slated to
be built in Richmond on North Keeneland Drive rather than at the Madison
County Airport, which was argued to be a more central location. An activist
from Berea echoed a comment that rings throughout this controversy, "The
steamroller is still rolling," he said, "I feel the committee was left out. We felt
it was already decided when we started talking" (Berea Citizen, September 13,
1989, p . 1 ) .
The ostensible reason the Army gave for building the facility w a s to
enhance emergency preparedness capability in the area.

However, citizen

a ctivists who are also medical personnel have questioned the wisdom of
putting so much money into building an EOC . As one physician/ activist put
it, "We're not ready. There are five (5) respirators at Berea Hospital and five
(5) at Pattie A . Clay Hospital in Richmond; . . . The staff are not traine d . "
Another issue that irked members of the citizens' committee appointed to
work with General Jackson on matters relating to the EOC, was the fact that
he set the meetings at inconvenient times, e.g. at 1 :30

P.M.

in the afternoon.

One member of the committee remarked, "I requested several times in
writing, 'Please have meetings at a different time" On one occasion, a citizen
said he wrote to the Pentagon requesting sixty gas masks for his people to use
in case of an emergency. The Pentagon told him he could "buy them from a
surplus store . " (Personal Communication: activist to author 1 / 1 7 / 92) .
Another member of the study team told me that although the citizens'
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opinions were not taken into account in terms of "whether" or "where" to
site the EOC, however, they were given the opportunity to select the saying
that was to go on a plaque which was to be affixed to the building. After some
deliberations, the committee selected Thomas Jefferson ' s famous quote,
"Eternal Vigilance is the price of freedom." Marcuse ( 1968) has commented
on just these types of limited choices, which he says are indicative of a kind of
democratic "unfreedom" prevailing in advanced technological society .

He

wrote,
Under the rule of the repressive whole, l iberty can
be made into a powerful instrument of domination.
The range of choice open to the individual is not the
decisive factor in determining the degree of human
freedom, but what c a n be chosen and what z s
chosen by the individual" (Marcuse 1968, p . 7) .
Allowing citizens to select the quotation for the EOC plaque (and calling that
c itizen p a rticipation), while p reventing them from having any say
whatsoever in whether they want the EOC and all it stands for, is ludicrous
in terms of what is at stake.
Commun ity leaders continue to speculate on a possible " hi dden
agenda" for the expensive EOC. Notwithstanding its potential usefulness in
the "unlikely" event of an "off-post" release of nerve agent, the Mayor of
Berea was quoted in the Berea Citizen as saying, "the money could be better
spent upgrading medical facilities and stockpiling drugs that could counteract
the effects of the deadly nerve gas, which is stored underground at the depot"

(Berea Citizen, September 13, 1989, p . 10). There is little room for doubt tha t
the community's suspicions m a y be quite accurate when w e examine the
Army's list of functions for the EOC .

For we discover, that in a d dition to

establishing "a communications network 'of surprising magnitude,"' the EOC
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was also designed "to establish a public-relations effort to quell what Jackson
called, ' rumors constantly floating' . 'This may be the largest challenge,"' he
said (Berea Citizen, September 13, 1989, p. 10).

3.14

The 'Colonized' and 'Colonizer' : The Army Depot as a Colony of the
Pentagon
The relationship between the communities a djacent to the Army

depots and the Pentagon is similar to that of 'colonized' and 'colonizer' as
described by Gaventa (1980), Memmi (1967) and Balandier (1966) . Gaventa

(1980) writes:
The establishment of dominance includes the
development of an administrative relationship by
the dominant society over the dominated, either
through the direct control of the representatives of
the former, or through the development o f
collaborators or mediating elites amongst the latter . .
. In short, the colonization process involves the
development of a mobilization of bias ---a set of
predominant values, b el iefs and institu tional
procedures that operate systematically to the benefit
of the colonizer at the expense of the colonized . It is
the development of a second-dimensional power
relationship (Gaventa 1980, p. 32).
The events surround ing the Army's b u il d i ng an E mergency
Operations Center (EOC) at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot show clear
evidence of power processes at work.

The depot (e.g., LBAD) is in a

dependent position vis-a-vis the Pentagon, by virtue of (a) myths about the
power of the Pentagon and, (b) by sheer force of economics. Military leaders at
the Pentagon are in a position to dictate what happens at Army depots. In the
case of the EOC controversy, retired Brig. General Merwyn Jackson, stands
b e tween the Army and the community , and while appearing to be
representing the interests of the community in terms of preparing the
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emergency response plan, he is in reality representing the Army's interests.
Because LEAD is the most recalcitrant site in the entire CSDP, it became
important for the Army to establish a way of "mitigating" (one of the Army's
favorite euphemisms) the very vocal opposition.
Gaventa (1980) has written at length about the role of what he called

mediating elites in maintaining power processes. He writes : "The dominant
institutions and social values that affect the Valley from beyond have often
been found to be mediated by a local or regional elite" (p. 258). There is ample
evidence that the Army's media ting elite used the position to further
promote the Army's preferred alternative, i .e., incineration.

Memb ers of

Common Ground reported seeing Gen. Jackson on a T.V. program talking to
local school bus drivers about the merits of incineration. They thought this
curious and wondered what his {Jackson ' s ) remarks had to do with
emergency management, since ostensib ly that was his primary function.
According to reports, General Jackson was also seen giving informational
talks to ladies clubs, business and civic groups on incineration.

Gaventa

( 1980 ) has written, "Though appearing from within as spokesmen for the
local situation, the elite are intertwined in interests and outlook with the
absentee forces upon which their own relative d ominance in the loca l
situation depends" (Gaventa 1980, p . 258) .

A t the p resent time, the

incinerator complex at LEAD has been placed on hold pending a permit from
the state of Kentucky, and may, in fact, never be constructed .

(1967) reminds us,

"In

As Memmi

order for the legitimacy to be complete, it is not enough

for the colonized to be a slave, he must also accept this role" (Memmi 1967, p .

88 9 ) . I f such i s the case, then the Army has its work cut out for it in Madison
-

County.
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3.15

Building a Movement: Opposition Grows at Other Sites
The local ized citizen opposition at LBAD has rapid ly grown into a

nationwide movement against chemical weapons incineration.

While this

research is largely confined to examining the forces at work at the Lexington
Bluegrass Army Depot, it is incumbent on us to at least briefly describe the
situations at the other seven sites that house the CONUS stockpile . We will
also examine other protest actions such as the one in the former Soviet
Union at Chapayevsk and the Hawaiian Islanders opposition to the Army's
JACADS facility located on Johnston Atoll (Kalama Island) in the South
Pacific.

3.15.1 Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) {Maryland }
Aberdeen Proving Ground, situated on the Chesapeake Bay twelve
miles northeast of Baltimore is within an eighty mile radius of Washington
and Philadelphia. The Proving Ground is a major research and development
center for both chemical and biological weapons and employs 20,000 civilians
and military personnel. The agent are stored here represents only 5% of the
total stockpile. No nerve agents are stored at Aberdeen, only ton containers
of mustard agent which are stored in the open adjacent to an airstrip (Weide
Field) which has recently become the subject of heated debate between the
Army and the citizens. The Army's new training facility for the CSDP is also
situated at APG.
Second only to LBAD in the ferocity and level of sophisticated
organization, is the citizens' opposition movement at the Edgewood Area of
A b e r d een

P r o v ing

G r o un d .

Founded
161

in

1 98 6

by

a

fe i s ty

homemaker I environmental activist, they first c a lled themselves, the
"People's Environmental Coalition" which later became "Concerned Citizens
for Maryland's Environment, Inc. (CCME)." Fearing that they would become
"the East coast's hazardous waste site," citizens began organizing around the
theme of getting the Army to do site-specific studies of the area, which they
felt certain would demonstrate to the Army that the Aberdeen site was not an
appropriate place to b uild an incinerator, noting that "there is a lr e a dy a
Superfund site here . "

They also vigorously supported the idea o f

transporting the stored mustard gas out of APG.
The founder of CCME recalls that after the release of the Army's
programmatic decision, the Army told them "Not to worry---It's just a draft,"
and indicated that when they released the site-specific programmatic
statement, things might change. She indicated that the Army said that the
transport report would be considered .

As a result of these promises, she

recalls:
We were quiet for two years .
We were not
organized . . . We were sitting for two years doing
nothing but talking to the Army I 1984-1986} . . . We
suspect the Army made the decision to incinerate
first . . . We were not organized as a community. We
were just a bunch of little groups."
Another activist expressed similar sentiments in describing the early briefings
held by the Army at the Aberdeen site. "In the beginning, " he said, "the
Army held regular monthly meetings at a conference center at the arsenal
and then little things started to irk me." He continued:
I went religiously once a month !between 1985-1986} .
T o b e honest, it's hard t o sustain the drive. It's hard
to keep up. That's the beauty from the Army's point
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of view. They've learned their lessons well. They
were wearing us down. It's like a big headache that
won't go away. Sometimes you get so frustrated.
Both o f these citizens were members of the A rmy-funded ($1 00,000)
community review study team at the Aberdeen site. When asked what the
Army did with the report, he commented, "File 13."

"Then we really got

angry," he said, "we went into the community and got some positive results."
In his study of young radicals, Kenneth Keniston (1968) made an
observation that might serve as a summary description of the experiences of
the citizen's group "Concerned Citizens for Maryland's Environment. " He
wrote, "What is most impressive is not their secret motivation to have the
System fail, but their naive hope that it would succeed, and the extent of their
depression and dissolution when their early reformist hopes were frustrated"
(Keniston 1968, p. 127).
In 1 986, CCME went about b uilding a grass-roots organization. They
went door to door h anding out flyers, people donated b oth time and
resources, e.g, printing. The founder of CCME describes their early efforts .
She said:
At first, when the Army states that there will be
scoping meetings, nobody comes. Now, I call up and
we go into the community. You've got to get out!
In February we filed with the authorities . . . People
only respond by being yelled at. We used to think
you could sit back---you have to get out there!
They also began linking up with other like-minded entities, e.g., Common
Ground / KEF, Inc. in Kentucky.

At one point Citizens' C learinghouse for

Hazardous Waste (CCHW) invited them down to participate in a workshop
on incineration and Greenpeace w a s helpful in p roviding technical
information as well as moral support. They looked to the Kentucky groups
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for leadership and support and began forging communication lines and
developing strategy.
scoping meetings.

They wrote letters to the editor and sold buttons at

The media in the vicinity of APG has reportedly been

"very cool, very conservative, very much in favor of the Army." In terms of
strategy, CCME decided that " the boss of the Army is Congress . . . so we've
targeted Congress." In January 1991, CCME was still asking the Army to
conduct site-specific studies.

In a letter to the Honorable Helen Delich

Bentley, the President of CCME said, "the Army must go back and do site
specific environmental impact studies for each of the eight sites and treat each
s ite as the unique site that it is" (Letter from President CCME to the
Honorable Helen Delich Bentley, July 22, 1991 .)
Another problem faced by C oncerned C itizens for M arylan d ' s
Environment (CCME) involves the loss o f political support. The founder of
CCME talked openly about the possible co-optation of a political leader who
was formerly a strong supporter of the citizens' opposition. This is how she
explained it:

"We lost a valuable person.

vehemently against the Army.

She changed sides. Used to be

She was waiting for an appointment from

the county executive. Now she is on the Army's side."
More recently, a second opposition group has joined the struggle
against the Army's incineration plans at the Aberdeen Proving Ground.
Calling itself the "Coalition for the Safe Disposal of Chemical Weapons," the
group 1s composed of citizens from Kent County and the surrounding
environs .

This group mobilized in 1992 shortly after

60

Minutes aired its

segment on the Johnston Atoll incinerator and the CSDP.

At first people

began searching for informa tion and asking questions of the Army.
According to one of the founders of the Kent County group, "The Chern1 64

Demil Program at Aberdeen responded to the people not by answering their
questions, but by sending stacks of documents like the Emergency Evacuation
Plan prepared by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Record of Decision,
the MITRE evaluation of the GB rocket campaign and others" (Statement by
John E . Nunn III before Committee on Government Operations, Second
Session, 1 02nd Congress, Chemical Stockpile Program, June 1 6, 1 992, p. 2).
In a bold action, the Kent County group once persuaded the local
politicians to refuse federal money for emergency preparedness related to the
CSDP.

They later recanted this position.

They set up a speaker's b ureau

which sent speakers to schools, rotary clubs, private clubs and business
associations to talk about the proposed incinerator.
not alw ays gone smoothly at the APG site.

However, things have

As one a ctivist and 30-year

resident of the Edgewood area commented, "This is not a popular issue. The
real estate people in Harford County are against us. {Out of } 1 80,000 people --7500 to 8000 work at Edgewood Arsenal. APG comes in second only to the
port of Baltimore which brings in about 1 .5 billion to the area; APG pulls in
about a billion."
In April of 1 992, the Kent County group sponsored a symposmm at
Washington C ol lege in Chestertown, Maryland in which they invited
individuals from several government agencies. The Army elected to send
the Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director for the Chemical
Demilitarization Program who has a reputation among the activists for being
extremely witty and personable, but nonetheless 1 00% behind incineration.
The meeting was well attended --- over 1 000 people. However, it did not
prove fruitful for the citizens and many questions went unanswered . As a
result of this meeting, an activist said, "a handful of citizens grew almost
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overnight to over 8,000 people" (Statement by John Nunn 1 992, p .2). Later on
in his statement, John Nunn reported that over 4,000 people signed a petition
opposing the incinerator and advocating exp loration of alternatives to
incineration at Aberdeen. In addition to these individuals, the Kent County
group mobilized opposition from twenty-four other local groups in the
Aberdeen area including: The Chamber of Commerce, Farm Bureau, Kent
County PTA, Kent Conservation, Kent County Commissioners, M ayors and
many more.

Construction of the APG incinerator facility is scheduled to

b egin in 1 99 7 according to the latest version (June 1 994) of the CSDP
Implementation Schedule (see Appendix C).

3.15.2 Newport Army Ammunition Plant (NAAP) {Indiana)
The Newp ort Army Ammunition Plant is situated

m

Verm illion

County, in west central Indiana. The installation is located approximately 24
miles southeast of Danville, Illinois and 26 miles north of Terre Haute,
Indiana. The chemical storage area and proposed CSDP site is located in the
eastern p art of NAAP approximately half way between the installation's
northern and southern borders. The nearest residential community is located
approximately 4 km from the site (DRAFT, Evacuation Time Estimates for
Newport Army Ammunition Plant and Vicinity 1 99 1 ) .
Army d ocuments describe the area surrounding t h e NAAP a s
predominantly rural i n character. The nighttime population within 5 km of
the proposed site is estimated to be about 935, with approximately another
3,560 within 10 km; 21 ,000 within 20

km;

and about 80,000 live between 20 and

35 km of the plant site . (Emergency Response Concept Plan for Newport
Army Ammunition Plant and Vicinity 1 989) .
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A member of the Newport

Citizen's Study Group accused the Army of spending big money to wm
residents' support for incineration, citing the Army's b u d get fo r an
Emergency Operations Center in the Rockwell area which is estima ted to cost
approximately $400,000. Another EOC is going up in nearby Clinton, and the
town's former m ayor was recently designated as its director.

The Army's

tactics, a citizen claims, are seen as "nothing more than a bribe" (The Salt Lake

Tri b u n e , Utah, Sunday, January 3, 1 993, p. A-8 ) .

Construction of the

incinerator facility at Newport is tentatively scheduled to begin in 1998. (See
Table C-2).

3 .15.3 Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) {Utah}
Tooele Army Depot in Tooele Utah, with the largest a mount of the
nation's stockpile of chemical weapons (42.3 %) ironically has the least
citizen's resistance to the Army's grand plan. Currently Tooele Army Depot
is the largest employer in Tooele County and the second largest federal
employer in the state of Utah (Proceedings of Discussion Workshop, Salt Lake
City, Utah, August 15, 1 984, p. 3). The Depot occupies 44,092 acres in Tooele
County, Utah and lies about 36 miles south-southwest of Salt Lake City. The
depot consists of two areas 20 miles apart. The North Area is three miles
southeast of Tooele City, the county seat. The South Area, approximately 45
miles from Salt Lake City contains 19,364 acres and is horne to the Army's
Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) . Tooele County is the
second largest county in Utah, containing over 4.4 million acres .

The

county's population is roughly 32,800, 19,000 of whom l ive in Tooele City

(Richmond Regis ter, Saturday, August 1 8, 1 984, p. 1 ) .

Tooele stores ton

containers of nerve agent as well as mustard and an assortment of rockets
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and /or spray tanks containing either HD, HT (mustard) or (nerve agents) GB
or VX. Additionally, a small amount of Lewisite is stored at TEAD.
Obviously, the Army is a major presence, and despite the negative
press caused by the Dugway Sheep Kill in 1968 when 6000 sheep died as a
result of an Army chemical weapons test gone awry (Van Kampen et al 1 968),
the people are somewhat blase about the Army's activities. TEAD already has
been horne to the Army's first trial facility, i.e., the Chemical Agent Disposal
System (CAMDS) for many years. According to the p aper, the attitude about
the plant that destroys deadly agents seems to be "It's in Tooele" rather than
its 45 miles from Salt Lake City and Provo" (Salt Lake Tribune, January 3,

1 993, p . A-8) . Tooele was the unanimous choice for a Western incinerator.
Opposition to the Army's plan isn't non-existent, though. Currently,
there are two active opposition groups at this site. One is an outgrowth of the
Sierra club and another, more recent group calls itself, "the Downwinders."
The Tooele groups have done some interesting things to bring the matter to
the attention of the populace.

Their strategy has been to attack the Army's

emergency preparedness plan. They have charged that CSEPP, the Army's
emergency p rep aredness plan for the storage sites is, " like the fallout
preparedness plan of the SO's, being prepared by government officials, with no
p ublic input" ( Utah Sierran, June /July 1992, p . 6). According to activists in
Utah, d uring the three years the Army has been working on the plan,
millions of federal dollars have be poured into increasing the CSEPP staff, in
replacing an outmoded computer system, and in sponsoring monthly
meetings at a local hotel conference room, complete with all the amenities.
Instead, activists insist the money would be better spent on training medical
personnel or hazardous-materials response teams.
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Additionally, they fear

that with other sites lobbying to have their stocks transported out, Utah will
become the central disposal facility for the stockpile.
At one time, activists placed bandages (as if bandages would be of any
use with nerve gas) in packages destined to be handed out by the Boy Scouts
d uring the summer of 1992---the Army's "Yellow Bag Program" ( U t a h

S ierra n : June /July 1 992) . These packages were intended to b e used b y the
Army as "educational" material concerning emergency preparedness; thus,
mocking the Army's credibility on the "safety" issue and causing Army Public
Affairs moguls some consternation. They worried that this group 's "milita n t
"

tactics would spread to other sites (Field Notes: ORNL Tasking Meeting,

1 993). And worry they should, because as Gaventa (1980) has pointed out,
"Once the p atterns of quiescence are broken, the likelihood of further a ction
by B increases and the options for control wielded by A decrease" (Gaventa
1 980, p. 25). Marcuse (1968) has also theorized about why this type of tactic is
often so effective. He writes, "Their opposition hits the system from without
and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which
violates the rules of the game, and in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game"
(Marcuse 1 968, p.256).
Despite the creativity of the citizens' opposition movement at this site,
the Army has completed construction of the first full-scale nerve-gas
incinerator in the continental United States at Tooele, Utah and has begun
the next step called "systemization" which involves testing the various
components of the system.
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Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) { Arkansas)

3 . 15.4

Second only to Tooele Army Depot, Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas has
the largest percentage of unitary chemical weapons with some 12% of the U.S.
stockpile.

When the Army was considering regional sites, Pine Bluff was

cited as a likely candidate for disposing of weapons east of the Mississippi,
although their first choice was Anniston, Alabama. A variety of agents are
stored at PBA including the nerve agents VX and GB and mustard agents H,
HD, and HT.

All are stored in earth-covered ammunition b unkers c alled

i gloo s .
The Arsenal i s at the heart of Pine Bluff, a city of 60,000. Little Rock,
Arkansas capital with a population of 1 80,000 is 35 miles to the north. Pine
Bluff Arsenal is in a decidedly rural area where poverty is a fact of life. The
citizens' opposition movement in that area--Families Concerned About
Nerve Gas Incineration--is led by Regina Dooley who worries about the
environmental effects of an incinerator on the local citizenry. "It only hurts
us worse because we're poor," she said in an interview in the Pine Bluff

Commercial (Sunday, August 2, 1 992, p. 1 ) . Dooley explained that people in
the area are "so busy trying to stay alive that they don' t have concern for what
is going on around them." She stresses the need to educate people on what
has been going on. However, judging from remarks made by one of the local
political elites who said, "I can't understand where you're coming from. I
trust the experts to protect the citizens" (Pine Bluff Com mercial, Thursday,
August 20, 1992, p .1 ) , there is more than j ust the fact of poverty driving the
quiescence of the people of Pine Bluff. It is quite obviously an "Army town."
General sentiment favors the Army's view and people are supportive of the
incineration plan .

According the Army's latest implementation schedule
1 70

(CSDP Implementation Schedule, June 1 994), construction of the incinerator
complex at PBA is scheduled to begin in September of 1995, testing in 1 998,
and operation is to begin in 1999.

Anniston Army Depot (ANAD)

3.15.5

Anniston's stockpile of rockets, mortars, land mines and containers of
nerve and mustard gas represents 7.1% of the U.S. total stockpile of unitary
chemica l weapons, and, like Pine Bluff, some site prep aration for an
incinerator has been funded and is proceeding. The nearest city to the storage
facility is Anniston, a town of 27,000 people, eight miles east of the depot.
Birmingham is 60 miles west of the Army base; and Atlanta is 90 miles east.
Although the Army's disposal program for the chemical weapons has
ignited formidable opposition elsewhere, the newsp apers report that, " it's
stirred barely a ripple of interest in Calhoun County. Elected officials have
b een unanimously supportive. Public hearings have been scantily attended"

( The A n n iston S tar, June 1 5, 1 992, p. 3A) . The Salt Lake City Tribune also
reported on the situation at Anniston with regard to the chemical weapons
program. In August of that same year (1992), a story appeared in the NATION
section of The Salt Lake Tribune, having b een p icked up from the L o s

A ngeles Times. The story, entitled, "Pending Chemical-Weapons Destruction
Raises Fears," described the relationship between the Army and the
townspeople in the vicinity of the Anniston Army Depot. It began with these
words:
The folks here have always been friends with their
military neighbors. God-fearing and patriotic, this
quiet corner of the Deep South, halfway between
Atlanta and Birmingham, Ala., is proud to be home
to Fort McClellan and the Anniston Army Depot,
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the area's largest employer. (The Salt Lake Tribune,
August 1 6, 1992, A-12).
The article goes on to say that evidence of this support exists in the
form of six monuments to the veterans of every conflict from the Civil War
to the Vietnam War which grace the center of town.

So when "Families

Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration" began organizing, they had their
work cut out for them. According to opposition leaders, "many people don't
even know that Anniston Army Depot will be one of eight U.S. sites where
the munitions will be burned" (The Anniston Star, June 1 5, 1 992). "Very few
people knew what was going on," another activist commented. However, in
the summer of 1 992, housewives began learning about VX and GB chemical
agents and M55 rockets. The newspaper reports that, "Business people and
blue-collar workers, b raving the resentment of a conservative and pro
military m ajority are starting to organize" (The Salt Lake Tribune, August 1 6,
1 992, p . A-1 2) . A ccording to reports pro-military feelings in Anniston run
very high and public officials all support incineration. The Salt Lake Tribune
rep orts that "Nowhere have pro-military feelings been as great as in
Anniston, which got its chemical weapons in the 1 960s and where local
officials today all either support the incineration plan or have not taken a
stand" (The Salt Lake Tribune, August 16, 1 992, p. A-12) .
Those w h o oppose incineration have been supported i n their
organizing efforts by the activists in Kentucky, specifically, the leaders of
C ommon Ground and the Director o f the Kentucky Environmental
Foundation, but it has been an uphill b attle. Vickie Tolbert, a member of
"Families," speculating on why organizing was so difficult at this site said,
''I'm not really sure why there's been so little public involvement . . . The only
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thing I can think of is that we have a history of being a little bit apathetic and
trusting as far as being taken care of around here" (The Anniston Star,

6/15/92, p. 3A).
A noted scholar who has written extensively about grassroots
environmental movements around the issue of hazardous waste disposal has
followed the activities of citizen groups involved with the CSDP in Anniston,
Alabama. (Bailey 1989; 1992; 1993; 1994) . In the course of his work, he has
come across two groups in Anniston who have mobilized around the CSDP.
One group opposes the Army's incineration plan ("Families Concerned
About Nerve Gas Incineration') the other supports the A rmy---the
countermovement! He characterizes the citizen opposition group there as "a
fairly urb an, urbane and cosmopolitan group . "

The pro-Army group at

ANAD, called "Citizens for SPRING" (which stands for " S afe P r o v e n ,
Reliable, Incineration o f N erve G as"), has a n executive director and seven
standing committees. According to Professor Bailey (whose field notes of the
Army's public meetings have provided keen insights into the forces at work
at ANAD), SPRING is led by a retired Army employee whose wife is the
Protocol Officer at the Depot.

In August of 1993, "Citizens for SPRING"

sponsored a p ublic forum in which they brought in the Army's " heavy
artillery," i.e., the Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director for the
CSDP and the Public Affairs Officer from Program headquarters at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, MD. Citizens for SPRING published a flyer in which they
d etailed their beliefs abou t the safety of incineration and the d ub ious
prospects of finding an alternative technology. The document prominently
d isplayed a quotation from Franklin D. Roosevelt which says: "The only limit
to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today" (Citizens for
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SPRING , no d ate, 853 Brookhaven Road, Anniston, AL. 3620 1 ) .

This is

similar to the military's use of Thomas Jefferson's quote, "The price of
freedom is eternal vigilance," being used to defend the ideology of deterrence!
Professor Bailey and his staff concluded what others have also deduced,
that the Army is really not interested in exploring anything other than
incineration. During the question and answer session at a public meeting
which was held on August 15, 1 993, at Anniston City Auditorium, someone
inquired whether equipment had been ordered for the Anniston incinerator.
The answer given was, "Yes, ordered before alternative technologies report.
1 7 million dollar investment.

Will NOT be a factor in decision about

Anniston" (Field Notes, Bailey 1993, p . 4). Construction of the ANAD facility
is scheduled to commence in 1 995; testing is to begin in 1997 and the facility is
to be fully operational by 1999 (CSDP Implementation Schedule, June 1994).

3.15.6 Umatilla Depot Activity (UMDA) {Oregon)
Umatilla Army depot sits in a semi-arid corner of northeastern Oregon
six miles from the C olumbia River.
population 1 0,000.

The nearest city is Hermiston,

Within a 65-mile radius, however, are Walla Walla,

Washington and Pendelton and Richland, Oregon.

Umatill a ' s 5,200-ton

stockpile of lethal munitions is 1 1 .6% of the total stockpile. According to a
statement made in a report issued by the Army-funded community study
group at UMDA, "There is strong support from the majority of the citizens
for this project. The Army has good credibility in the area around Umatilla"
(Umatilla Study Group: Final Report 1 987, p. A-1 8 ) .

However, there 1s a

viable and well-organized group of citizens who oppose the plan.

The

citizens' group called "Citizens for Environmental Equality," worries that
1 74

d ioxins will end up in the food chain.

Given that Hermiston is an

agricultural-based economy, this is a prime concern to activists at UMDA.
The design work for the proposed incinerator at Umatilla was about 90%
complete as of April 1993, however, further work was put on hold until after
the A lternative Technologies report.

According to the Army's timetab le,

construction of the incinerator facility complex is scheduled to begin d uring
1 995, testing through 1 998, and incineration is to commence in 2000 (CSDP
Implementation Schedule, June 1 994) .

3.15.7 Pueblo Depot Activity (PUDA) {Colorado}
Pueblo Depot's 9.9% of the nation ' s stockp ile haunts some of the
1 00,000-plus residents of Pueblo 14 miles to the west. The public is skeptical of
the Army's motives, according to one member of the Sierra Club who heads
the citizen protest group at PUDA.

He reports that "enormous sums of

money are being pumped into 'sustaining incineration' which is an archaic
and unreliable technology" (The Salt Lake Tribune, January 3, 1 993, p . A-8).
However, the incumbent congressman for the district would rather the
weapons be destroyed on site than transport them over land, although he
admitted not being wedded to the concept. Recently, the Rocky Mt. Chapter of
the Sierra C lub has been permitted to have representation on Governor
Romer's CW A dvisory Committee, as part of powers granted to governors
under the 1 992 Defense Authorization Act.

Finally, a second opposition

group has formed in Colorado: "Citizens for Safe Chemical Weapons"
(Common Sense: A Newsletter of Common Ground funded by KEF, Inc .,
April 1 993).
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3.16

The Case of Chapayevsk: Citizen Opposition in the former Soviet
Union.
Like the United States, the former Soviet Union has amassed its own

deadly arsenal of chemical weapons---approximately 50,000 tons according to
the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs (DTIC, Le Monde, 29 December 1 987) .
These weapons were produced and stored at the military complex at Chikany,
which is, in the words of one military expert, "without doubt the largest
chemical warfare complex in the world " (DTIC, International Defense Review

1987, p . 6) . "Chikany is located about 600 km to the southeast of Moscow, on
the Volga, in the immensity of the Russian steppes" (DTIC, In terna tio n a l

Defense Review 1 987, p .6).

(The population of Chiknay i s about 5000 ) .

According to reports, there are not less than nineteen different types o f Soviet
chemical ammunition stored there---everything from artillery shells to
technical missile charges.

The new Multila teral Chemical Weapons

Convention, (CWC) mandates the destruction of these weapons as well as
those of the United States and requires that the U. S. and Russia cooperate on
destruction technology.
The Russians have tried neutralization as one method of destroying
their CW stockpile.

In

October of 1987, a group Western experts were invited

to tour the Russian complex and to witness an example of their l atest
destruction technology, i.e, neutralization. In 1987 the Russian government
began construction of a large chemical weapons destruction factory (utilizing
a neutralization process) at Chapayevsk (population 90,000) about 500 miles
southeast of Moscow---and then promptly closed it b ecause of c itizen
opposition. "The Chapayevsk facility was completed last year but the public
objected to it, citing environmental concerns, so the government decided to
close it," explained Mikita P. Smidovich, the deputy head of the Soviet
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delegation to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (News Focu s :
Chemical and Engineering News, August 12 , 1990, p . 1 8 ) . Commenting on
the unusual situation in the former Soviet Union, Chemical and Engineering

News editors commented that:
Such ecological concerns, almost de rzgueur in the
United States are hardly expected in the Soviet
Union. But the fact is, Soviet green movements are
b aring their teeth and closing down chemical and
neutralization facilities in increasing numbers"
(Chemical & Engineering News, 1990, p. 18).

The Wall S treet Journal

reported that, "In Russia, every aspect of

destruction--- from how to do it, to how to p ay for it, from who should do it
to where it should be done---is embroiled in debate" (Wall Street Jou rnal,
February 25, 1993, p. A-6, Col. 2). Changes in the social structure brought
about by perestroika have severely impacted the State's ability to implement
any plans regarding the destruction of both chemical and nuclear weapons.
As one Russian Parliamentrian complained, "We can't m ake any decisions
now without the consent of the locals . . . We underestimated the changes in
society and the role of the mass media, so we didn't p ay enough a ttention to
the people" (Wall S treet Journal, February 25, 1993, p. A-6, col. 2). The lastest
government plan for the destruction of chemical weapons is running into a
similar m inefield of opposition, according to observers of the Russian scene.
"Even before the Russian Parliament began debating the plan last month, the
legislature in Chuvash rejected a destruction facility on its territory," writes
House and Revzin (Wall S treet Journal, February 25, 1 993, p. A-6).

The

success of grassroots efforts to halt destruction technology in the former
Soviet Union does pose questions worth pondering: Is not the Jeffersonian
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ideal of 'government by the people' more alive now in the former Soviet
Union than perhaps in the United States which advertises itself as a
democracy? Will the government of the United States learn from them and
accede to the will of the people, or, will the Russians learn from our
government how to quell citizen uprisings through co-optation and
propaganda?

3.17

Hawaiian Islanders oppose Kalama Island (JACADS) facility.
"Remoteness is Just a State of Mind," so said the delegates from

Hawaii, members of the Chemical Weapons Working Group, the group of
citizens who met in 1 992 in Richmond, KY. to share ideas and exchange
information about the Army's Chemical Stockpile D isp osal Progra m .
Johnston Atoll (otherwise known a s Kalama Island), which lies 2,109 nautical
miles from San Francisco and 717 nautical miles southwest of the Hawaiian
Island chain, is home to the U . S . Army' s first fully-operational chemical
weapons disposal facility---JACADS---the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent
Disposal Facility, which has been conducting Operational Verification Testing
(OVT) on chemical weapons since 1 990 .

However, to the peop les of the

Pacific Region, Johnston Atoll is in their backyard, and they are quick to point
out that the U.S. military's insouciance regarding their complaints about
being the d umping ground for every conceivable military toxic w aste is now
legendary.

"The Army has not been truthful or forthcoming and have

covered over their decision with jargon," the Hawaiian delegate said .
But the JACADS facility is not the first insult to the environment
perpetrated by the U.S. military on Johnston Atoll. During the Second World
War, the island was reportedly used as a nuclear test site, and, according to
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Greenpeace, Johnston Island has also been the site of the acciden tal sinking of
nuclear weapons (Greenpeace Pacific Campaign map 1989). After the Second
World War, the a toll played an important role in testing and storing
American chemical weapons. Some 300,000 artillery shells containing nerve
and mustard gas have been kept there since 1971 (New York Tim es, July 27,

1990) .

The island is very small---only 3,000 feet by 600 feet. It remained

unclaimed until 1 858 when C. J. Johnston, a British mariner d iscovered it
along with another tiny sister island in a semi-circular coral reef. The atoll
has been designated a national wildlife refuge and is operated by the Defense
Nuclear Agency and the Department of the Interior.

The island is

uninhabited, save for the Army personnel who work at the $240 million
d ollar incinerator facility complex; however, this does not mean that the
surrounding m arine environment and the people of the surrounding islands
are not affected by what goes on there (Ember 1990).
In theory, U.S. bases abroad are required to meet the environmental
standards of stateside installations. However, in reality, no U.S. or foreign
agency has the authority to enforce or even m o n i t o r the environmental
compliance at U.S. installations lcoated outside of the United States .

U.S.

b ases abroad are governed by status of forces agreements with each host
country, and those agreements say l ittle about environmental p rotection
(Seigel et al, 1991). Greenpeace has long been at the forefront of a campaign to
m ake the U.S. military accountable for its actions in the Pacific. Since 1971,
Greenpeace has been actively working with the peoples in the region to create
a nuclear-free, pollution-free Pacific.
The Army has turned a deaf ear to the pleas from the people of the
Pacific Region for a moratorium on activities at Johnston Atoll. The latest
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insult sterns from the U. S. Department of Defense's p lanned shipment of
the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons stored in the Republic of West
Germany. A representative from the Office of Hawaiian Affairs wrote, "It is
an affront to Pacific peoples that there has been no consultation about this
U . S . -West German a greement .

Among others, the government o f

Micronesia (as reported b y Hawaii Public Radio Pacific Islands News) strongly
condemned the unilateral decision by the United States Government to
destroy these highly d angerous substances in the Pacific without consulting
P a cific peoples .

This is a very heavy-handed colonial a ttitude and

undermines any overtures towards trust and equality in establishing
democracies in the Pacific" (Akaka 1990, p . 1,2) .
The term 'subaltern classes' used by Spivak (no date) when referring to
the peoples of the Third World, applies to the inhabitants of the Pacific
Islands. She asks, 'Can the Subaltern Speak'? and answers in the negative--
'the subaltern cannot speak' (Spivak, no date), because Western forms of
d iscourse (and this includes the Military) construe these people as "other"
with all the attendant negative baggage that entails. The end result is not to
take them seriously and to trivialize and marginalize their concerns.

They

a re the victims of a virulent form of white racist imperialism and
technocratic colonialism.
3.18

Countermovement Activity (The Backlash)
No chronicling of the history of the citizen opposition to the Chemical

Stockpile Disposal Program would be complete without a look at the backlash
that erupte d .

Mottl (1980) argues that the analysis o f reaction,

as an

ineluctable part of social conflict and change, has not received sufficient
analytical treatment in the social movements literature.
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She defines a

coun termovement

as a particular kind of protest m ovement which is a

response to the social change advoca ted by an initial movement. As stated
e arlier, c itizen opposition movements against

incineration at the various

depot sites have been gaining momentum and strength; therefore, it is not
surprising that a reaction should occur, particularly in view of the fact that
many of the communities adjacent to the storage sites could be described as
" Army towns," in which c itizens a re linked b o th economica lly and
i deologically to the existence of the depot.
The first indication of wha t could be termed " countermovement
activity" occurred a t LBAD (Kentucky) in the winter of 1 992. Several "Letters
to the Editor" began appearing in local newspapers in and around the
Berea / Richmond / Lexington area supporting the A rmy's incineration plan.
Often, these letters were signed by retired Army peop le or retired depot
workers.

Members o f Common G ro und / KEF and C oncerned Citizens

responded to these editorials once they began appearing. Keeping up with
this type of work is extremely tedious and yet it is important to keep the issue
before the people. Unfortunately, many of these letters were relying heavily
on "facts" supplied by the Army, and as with all propaganda, were filled with
half-truths often mouthing the Army's own standard legitimations for the
p rogram, stressing the safety of incineration and the alleged d angers o f
continued storage (e.g. see "Letters t o the Editor," Berea Citizen, February 27,

1992)
In terms of c ollective countermovement a ctivity, Anniston Army
Depot (ANAD) seems to be the first site where an organized group effort has
evolved in support of the Army. Although we have d escribed this group in
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great detail in a previous section, it may be useful to examine the phenomena
further within the context social movements theory.
Mottl (1980) argues that "movements and countermovements ought to
be seen as elements of common social processes of collective action centering
on reform" (Mottl 1980, p. 620). This implies a dialectical relationship, and
indeed,

such

an a n a lysis

can b e j u stified

when

looking

at

the

"movement/ countermovement" activity with regard to the Army's CSDP .
Mottl

(1980)

o u tl ines

seve r a l

p o s t u l a tes

thought

to

describe

countermovements. According t o Mottl (1980), movements challenge groups
higher up in the stratification hierarchy, while countermovements are
oriented against challenges from below. This can be readily demonstrated
with respect to the Anniston Army Depot groups "Families Concerned About
Nerve Gas Incineration" and "Citizens for SPRING . "

Opponents of the

Army's plan (i.e., "Families" ) generally try to influence Congress and
sometimes even the Pentagon in their efforts to halt incineration; whereas
SPRING directs its efforts to citizens in the communities at large in an effort
to "prevent" the opposition from stopping the construction of the
incinerator, which they believe would mean loss of jobs in the community
and which would set a dangerous precedent for Army /Community relations.
Additionally, Army prestige in the community is being challenged by the
opposition forces, and with it, the status of military personnel. This challenge
goes against the grain in this historically "Army" town. Since the leader of
the countermovement in Anniston comes from the military , we might
analyze this as a form of s ta t us politics .

An entire literature on "sta tus

politics" has emerged to explain how such threatened groups defend their

"lifestyles" (Gusfield 1963; Zurcher et al 1971; Page and Clelland 1978). Ferree
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and Miller ( 1 979) . argue that ' a definitive feature of countermovements is the
use of a single idea as an ideological lever for the mobilization of disparate
constituents to preserve the status quo '(Mottl 1980, p. 621 ) . The ideological
lever used by the countermovement at Anniston is the all-too- familiar one
which exaggerates the dangers of continued storage while insisting that
incineration is the only viable alternative. They have also cleverly played on
people's fears about chemical weapons being transported to Anniston from
other sites. "Citizens for SPRING Agree that ANAD Should Not Become a
Regional Disposal Site. We Don't Want Other States' Stockpiles! " proclaims
their newsletter.

This is a theme which resonates well w ithin the

community and is a salient rallying point. Not surprisingly, SPRING enjoys
the wholehearted endorsement of the depot commander who once said in an
interview, "Take away incineration and it could take the Army anywhere
from eight to fifteen years to come up with another means to destroy its
chemical weapons . . . the risk of storage is far greater than the risk of
incineration" (The Annis ton S tar, August 2 1 , 1 992).

As the opposition

movement continues to grow, we can expect to see more of this type of
activity develop at other sites.
3.19

Movement Update
What began in Kentucky in 1984, as a small grass-roots effort of a few

committed activists, has grown continuously throughout the decade to
include all eight sites.

Since 1 99 1 , the movement has gained momentum.

Tooele, Utah has two groups who oppose the current incineration plan. Pine
Bluff Arsenal now has a very vocal, organized opposition group w ith a
steering committee of at least twelve. Maryland has two very strong groups
and is in the process of drafting restrictive permitting regulations similar to
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Kentucky and Indiana. A second opposition group has formed in Colorado-
"Citizens for Safe Weapons Disposal." Alabama's opposition to the nerve-gas
incinerator is growing and legal action is being considered by ANAD
incineration opponents because, according to charges, the Army violate d
NEPA a n d RCRA regulations by beginning site preparations a t the Anniston
site without a permit. In addition, construction of the incinerator facility at
that site, will be delayed at least 15 months after House-Senate negotiators
b arred spending for the project in September of 1 992.

The A n n iston S ta r

reported that "the ANAD provision i s one o f several congressional proposals
that could further hobble the controversial incineration program" (Th e

Annis ton S tar, September 9, 1 992, p . 1 ) . Not only have several new groups
formed, but the political climate has shifted somewhat in the direction of the
anti-incineration camp.

According to the New York Times (5 / 1 8 /93), "the

C linton A dministration plans to bar the development of new hazardous
waste incinerators for 18 months." Additionally, both Kentucky and Indiana
have now p a ssed very restric tive laws regarding hazardous w a ste
incinerators' stack emissions. According to an article which appeared in The

Village Voice: :
The law, passed by the Kentucky General Assembly
32-0 in March of 1992, requires the Army to show
that 'no a lternative method of tre a t ment or
d i s p o s a l , i n c l u d i n g , b u t n o t l i m i te d t o ,
neutralization and transportation to a less populated
site, exists that creates less risk of release or harm to
the public or the environment. ' (The Village Voice,
October 6, 1992, p. 18)
The law requires the Army to prove its process would destroy 99.9999
percent of the material b urned, making it difficult to obtain the necessary
permits to begin construction. Indiana has passed similarly restrictive laws
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concerning stack emissions; other states have similar plans. A further piece
of legislation that bears on the CSDP is the Federal Facilities Compliance Act
(FFCA) signed by President Bush in 1992. Within two years of its signing, the
law stipulates that federal facilities (such as the Lexington Bluegrass Army
Depot et al) will be regulated by the same environmental compliance laws as
U. S. private industry. This is significant, because up until this time, federal
facilities have been exempt from federal environmental laws. However, the
Army has said it will "voluntarily" comply with existing state and federal
laws. Up until now, there has been no way to enforce such regulations. Now
there will b e .

The most recent development involves the Defense

Authorization Act of 1993 which requires the Army to certify that on-site
incineration is indeed the safest method of disposal a fter seriously
considering alternatives. The reports are due later this year (1994) .
Nevertheless, despite the apparent successes of the opposition, the
Army's incineration plan for the destruction of the U. S. stockpile of unitary,
chemical weapons marches inexorably onward. While citizen groups may be
able to forestall deployment of incinerators at one or two of the sites, the
Army's Implementation Schedule (see Appendix D) gives no indication that
a shift away from incineration is

in

the offing. Indeed, the Army is not bound

to take the advice of the studies commissioned to investigate alternative
technologies.

In a letter to the Director of the Kentucky Environmental

Foundation, a representative from the Pacific Studies Center argues that,
"The problem is that the Army would consider any change in technology to
be an a dmission of error .

Thus, it has a b ureaucratic imperative to

recommend against alternatives" (Letter from Lenny Seigel, Pacific Studies
Center to Executive Director, KEF, Inc. 8 / 27 /92). But the struggle is far from
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over, and as of this writing, (May 1995) there is evidence that the opposition
movement may be gaining supporters in Congress.

3.20

Summary and Conclusion:
In terms of the grassroots opp osition movement that began in

Kentucky, indigenous social networks played an important role, not only in
mobilizing people against the CSDP but in sustaining an effective level of
insurgency throughout the many long years of organizing on the issue. In
the language of the leading theoretical p aradigm for analyzing social
movements, the Resource Mobilization perspective (McCarthy and Zald 1982;
Gamson, 1 968; Gerlach and Hines 1970; Heberle 1951; Klandermans and
Oegema 1987; Morris 1981; Walsh and Warland 1983; Cable, Walsh and
Warland 1988; Aveni, 1978) the local social justice organizations in Berea and
the closeknit network of friends and business acquaintences in the respective
communities p rovided both a b asis for social action and the necessary
indigenous resources to carry out effective insurgency. The groups recruited
from different social networks, thus adding strength and diversity to an
already well-estab lished tradition of political action.

While these are not

fund amentally " ch arismatic" movements, charismatic leaders do play an
important role in this movement. Their penchant for coalition b uilding and
their abilitly to develop effective strategies to counter the Army rhetoric
spewing out of the Pentagon Public Relations offices, appears to have
contributed to their success as well.
In conclusion, a fitting slogan for the citizen-led opposition effort
comes from the words of one of Concerned C itizens leading spokesman,
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quoting Marshall Foch, the French General who said, "We fought to the end,
and then we fought beyond the end of the end."
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Chapter 4

The Second Face of Power:
NEPA, The Army, and the Myth of Public Participation
'But the people were given the immense satisfaction of having been consulted, of
having been given a chance to debate, of having --- so it seemed to them --- their
opinions solicited and weighed. This is the democratic appearance that no
authoritrian government can do without.
Jacques Ellul 1965. Propaganda: The Formation of Men 's Attitudes

4.1

NEPA: The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

4.1.1

Bac kground
The late s ixties and early seventies were a time of unprecedented

heightened public awareness about environmental issues. Indicative of this
new consciousness was the celebration of EARTH DAY (April 22, 1970), which
drew two hundred fifty thousand people to Washington D.C. and involved
"teach-ins" and speeches all over the country all united "in what amounted
to be the equivalent of a national town meeting on America's environmental
future" (Manes 1990, p .45) .

Commenting on EARTH DAY, Christopher

Manes ( 1 990) wrote, "Even in a time of mass protests against the Vietnam
War and racial injustice, E arth Day represented an impressive d isplay of
p ublic support for a political ideal---the preservation of Americ a ' s
deteriorating environment" (Manes 1990, p .45) . Riding this crest o f popular
support for the p reservation of the environment, the last few years o f the
1 960s, and the following decade of the seventies, ushered in remarkable
successes for environmentalists both in the legal and political arena (Manes
1 990).

Several new laws affecting the environment were p assed, e.g., The

Clean Air Act 1 970, The Clean Water Act 1 972, The National Toxics Control
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Act 1976, and The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act {RCRA } 1 976.
First and foremost among these new legislative initiatives was the law for the
p rotection

of

the

environment

known

as

N E PA--- The

Na t i o n a l

Environmental Policy Act of 1 96 9 (Public Law 91-190 a s amended). Signed b y
President Nixon o n January 1 , 1 970, the Act was hailed a s the answer t o our
environmental woes and characterized as "A comprehensive 'national
charter for protection of the environment"'(Hunscher 1983, p. 336). A t last
the country was facing up to its obligations to live in harmony with the
planet.
Caldwell (1979) argues that by the late 1 960s there was widespread belief
among environmentally concerned and politically active citizens that federal
agencies and programs were themselves leading factors in environmental
d egradation.

He argues that "Environmental issues had pitted organized

citizen groups against governmental agencies responding primarily to what
their critics perceived as relatively short-term and narrowly defined economic
interests" (Caldwell 1979, p. 1 ) .

The National Environmental Policy Act

( 1969), for better or for worse, was going to change the way federal agencies
dealt with the environment---or so it seemed.

4.1.2

The NEPA Review Process: An Overview
The first step in the NEPA review process for an action for which an

EIS is required is the publication of a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register.
This notice states how scoping (the pub lic involvement process) will b e
started . The preparer of a n EIS can be a federal agency, a state agency or local
agency in conjunction with a federal agency (such as a state DOT), or a third
p arty contractor, such as a national laboratory. After the public notice appears
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in the Federal Register, meetings are held to determine the major issues to be
addressed; then a DRAFT Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is prep ared .
This i s normally followed b y a 45-day public comment period . Comments are
submitted and all substantial concerns are supposed to be ad dressed.

A

FINAL EIS is then published followed by a Notice of Availability (NOA)
which appears in the Federal Register.

There is a review period of 30 days

before the Record of Decision (ROD) is published.

The ROD includes

mitigation obligation and is the decision on the action (Bear 1 987) .

Under

certain circumstances, for example, heightened public scrutiny and concern,
or if potential for extreme danger to publics exists, then a supplemental EIS is
often required. There are exceptions to these rules; however, we will not go
into those at this point.
NEPA has been fraught with misunderstanding and controversy;
therefore it is important to understand the limitations of the Act---what it is
not. According to Lynton Caldwell, a leading expert on the law:
NEPA is not primarily (a) a full disclosure law; (b) a
vehicle for citizen involvement; or (c) a regulation
of agency procedures.
The Act contributes
importantly to each of these objectives, but they are
incidental to its main purpose and none were
primary reasons for its enactment. NEPA is what its
title declares: a policy act. Its purpose was to state
for the first time and in a single p l a ce, a

comprehens ive n ational comm itmen t to protection
of the e n v i ro n m e n t
and to b ack up that
commitment with a corresponding reorientation of
specific policies and programs of the administrative
agencies of the United States government (Caldwell
1979, p. 1).
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Because it is strictly a policy act, i t lacks enforcement mechanisms and
IS

therefore subj ect to widespread

misunderstanding a n d

d iverse

interpretation, if not outright abuse by powerful vested interests who then
make a fetish of complying with the p rocedural requirements as manda ted by
the Council on Environmental Quality.

Commenting on NEPA 'a lack of

enforcement mechanisms, one activist remarked:
NEPA says that out of concern for the environment
people must have input Overall, it is without teeth.
Yes, the input is there, but there is nothing there to
make ! the Army live up to its obligations}.
In addition to p reparing environmental impact statemen ts, NEPA
ca lled on the lead agency to consult with and obtain comments from any
other federal agency possessing jurisdiction or having special expertise with
respect to the environmental impacts involved in the proposed action. These
agencies are referred to as "cooperating agencies. " Coopera ting agencies for
the CSDP include the Dep artment of Health and Human Services (DHHS),
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), as well as innumerable state and local agencies
involved in the process of emergency response.

The purpose of requiring

input from cooperating agencies is to reduce agency bias or "tunnel vision,"
as well as to balance the differing goals of federal agencies and meet the Act's
overall goals of protecting and enhancing ecological values (Wilson 1 987) .

4 . 1 .3

CEQ: The President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
The agency created to implement NEPA and to create regulations and

p rocedures is the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) .
Section 202, Title I I of the Act states that: "There is created in the Executive
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Office of the President a Council on Environmental Quality (hereinafter
referred to as the "Council") " (Bregman 1 992, p. 203). The functions of the
Council shall be as follows:

( 1 ) Assist the President by preparing an

Environmental Quality Report; (2) gather timely, authoritative information
concerning the conditions and trends in the quality of the environment; (3)
review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal
Government in light of Title I of the Act; (4) develop and recommend
national pol icies to foster the imp rovement of the environment; (5)
document and define changes in the natural environment, etc. (Bregman
1992) .
The Council 's role is a coordinating one;

it is not a commenting

agency in the sense that its comments are attached to impact statements.
Thus, no inference of approval or disapproval can be drawn from CEQ's
failure to comment on either draft or final statements. In short, the CEQ is
responsible for setting up policies and procedures that federal a gencies must
comply with in regard to NEPA. As long as a statement is made available to
CEQ, that agency will be able to fulfill its role of internal a dv iser to the
Executive Branch and to the President as outlined by NEPA (EPA 1 976) .
Among other things, the CEQ i s responsible for setting u p guidelines
regarding the prep aration of NEPA documents and has suggested that
agencies take steps to reduce excessive paper work as well as reduce delays.
Specifically, they encourage agencies to " integrate the NEPA process with
other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and
decisions reflect environmental values, to avoid delays later in the process
and to head off potential conflicts" (Bregman 1992, p. 215).
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4. 1 .4

The E.I.S ( Environmental Impact Statement)
The b ackbone of NEPA is the now-infamous Environmental Impact

Statement, commonly referred to as an "E .I.S."

NEPA was designed to

basically answer the question, "What is the impact of the planned project and
how can it be minimized" (Bregman 1992, p. 2)? The Environmental Impact
Statement or EIS, is designed to help answer this question. The idea for such
a document came from Professor Lynton K. Caldwell of Indiana University at
Bloomington. Professor Caldwell has written extensively about NEPA and its
ramifications (Caldwell 1977; 1979; 1 983; 1988; 1989; 1990).
Each Environmental Impact Statement must include: (1) a detailed
description of the proposed action; (2) discussion of the probable impact on
the environment; (3) any adverse environmental effects that c annot be
avoided and possible mitigation measures; (4) alternatives to the proposed
action; (5) an assessment of the cumulative, long-term effects of the proposed
action including its relationship to short-term use of the environment versus
the environment's long-term productivity (EPA 1 976) .

Not every planned

federal project requires an EIS, however. The CEQ has established guidelines
so that when there is doubt, entities (also referred to as the "potentially
responsible p arties") can perform an Environmental Assessment (EA) first.
The EA is reviewed by the lead agency and, on occa sion, by the

U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA ) . I t determines whether there may
be negative impacts on the environment, in which case a full EIS is involved.
If the EA shows no impacts worth considering, then a Find ing of No
Significant Impact (FONSI) is published in the Federal Regis ter, and the
project moves forward (Manes 1 992) .
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Basically, an Environmental Imp act Statement is supp osed to do
exactly what the name implies, and that is, provide input on possible impacts
from a given project.

According to paper prepared by the Environmental

Protection A gency, "NEPA requires each Federal agency to prep a re a
statement of environmental imp act

m

a dvance of each major action,

recommendation or report on legislation that may s ig n ifican tly affect the
quality of the human environment" (EPA 1 976,

p.

l ) . "The s ta tement's

p rimary purpose," the EPA continues, "is to disclose the environmental
consequences of a proposed action, thus alerting the decision-maker, the
public and ultimately Congress and the President to the environmental risks
involved" (EPA 1 97 6,

p.

l ) . The actions for which federal agencies must

prepare impact statements must be both "major" and "significant."
As first conceived, an EIS was to be long enough to discuss the
potential impacts of a project comprehensively, but not so long or complex as
to preclude understanding by any literate person. The framers envisioned
document of reasonable length.

a

For example, Council on Environmental

Quality (CEQ) regula tions stipulate page limits on EISs. Section 1502.7 of CEQ
regulations reads: "The text of final environmental impact statements (e . g. ,
paragraphs ( d ) through (g) o f 1502 . 1 0) shall normally be less than 150 pages
and for proposals of unusual scope or complexity shall normally be less than
300 pages" (Bregman 1 992, p . 225 ) . However, for a variety of reasons, EIS
documents have grown both in complexity and scope to atrocious lengths.
The FPEIS for the CSDP includes three volumes and runs to several thousand
pages. And this is typical of EISs for major projects at this level of complexity.
Caldwell (1977) decries the fact that EISs have grown to such proportions. He
once wrote that, "It is regrettab ly true that the Environmental Impact
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Statement has been misused . . . Abuse of the EIS has resulted primarily from
either misunderstanding of the Act or from attempts to evade or subvert it"
(Caldwell 1 977, p. 1 1 ) .

Reflecting on its early history, he added, "No one

that was involved in the Act had any idea of what it would become . " He
observes that "they are putting too much into them." "I don' t think you need
sixteen documents.
through the courts .

Some of that is done deliberately, " he says," to get
Someone can a lw ays say, ' Oh, you forgot this

species . " ' (Telephone Interview 6 / 1 2 / 9 2 ) .

Bregman ( 1 992) has also

commented on the disparity between the ideal and the real use to which EISs
are put. He wrote, "Ultimately, of course, it is not better documents but better
decisions that count. NEPA's purpose is not to generate paperwork---even
excellent p aperwork---but to foster excellent a c tion" (Bregman and
Mackenthun 1 992, p . 215) ..
Preparing EIS's has now spawned a brand new growth industry,
complete with professional conferences, journals (e.g., The Jou rnal of EISs ) ,
and the potential for huge profits for professional contractors (for example,
national laboratories) who undertake EIS preparation for the government or
industry .

This "professionalization" has serious implications for citizens

who wish to challenge a proposed agency action, not the least of which is the
fact that the average citizen seeking to question the efficacy of a particular
project often has to contend with mountains of obfuscating quantitative data
gathered by "experts" whose paychecks are signed by the entity that plans the
project. One contractor, familiar with the inner-workings of preparing EIS's
for the Army's CSDP at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge,
Tennessee), estimated the cost of preparing one EIS at around $ 1 . 7 million
dollars (Field Notes, ORNL, May 1 993).
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4.2

Programmatic: The Generic Approach to Environmental Impact
Assessment
On July 1, 1 986 the Army released the Draft PElS which outlined their

plan to develop a generic approach for the disposal of the weapons, i.e,
"programmatic" vs. site specific. (see Executive Summary, p . xv of report,
"Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program : In defense of the Programmatic
Approach"n .d.). The Army also took the opportunity in the FPEIS to again
defend its choice of a "programmatic" approach with statements such as this:
"This sta tement is programma tic rather than site-specific because the
proposed action to dispose of the stockpile is both national in scope and
involves a number of separate but related activities" (FPEIS 1988, Vol . 1, p. 1 7).

" Moreover," the report continues, "the decision t o begin the NEPA

process on this program with a programmatic statement was made in
consultation with the President's Council on Environmen tal Quality (CEQ)
(See Appendix I)" (FPEIS 1988, Vol. 1, p. 1-7). The Associated Press reported
that the Army said, "It is a logical step to prepare one environmenta l impact
statement to cover the demilitarization of the entire stockpile" (Ri ch m o n d

Regis ter, October 3 , 19 85). "Translated into plain language", Congressman
Hopkins ( 1 986) once remarked,"'Programmatic' means the Army took all
eight sites in the United States where chemical weapons are stored, lumped
them together, ran them through a computer, hired some consultants to
interpret the results, and then hired an expert in doub le talk and government
euphemisms to write a report hardly anyone could rea d , m uch less
understand" (Testimony, U.S. Rep . Larry Hopkins: Field Hearings before the
Investigations Subcommittee, House of Representatives, House Armed
Services Committee, July 25, 1986) .
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The rationale for utilizing a generic approach is spelled out fairly
clearly by Gustafson ( 1 985) who spoke at a conference on environmental
assessment and waste management.

He wrote, "One mechanism fo r

exped iting the process without taking any shortcuts or ignoring relevant
issues is to prepare programmatic or generic environmen tal impact
statements dealing with key issues. The EIS's could serve as the basis for rule
making which process when complete in essence says: "This is the way things
are going to be done, the matter is settled and will not be the subject of further
debate or legal action"(Gustafson 1985, p. 60) ! The article goes on to describe
exactly how this process works to preclude from consideration any and all
issues which the entity does not want openly discussed by publics.

"Site

specific, process specific environmental assessments," he writes, "may then
tier from the programmatic and generic EIS's and the results of the rule
making process, thereby identifying the issues which are OPEN FOR DEBATE
a n d negotiation"

( G u s tafson

1 9 8 5 , p . 60 ) .

Therefore, the use o f a

programmatic approach can be deliberately employed to limit public discourse
to consideration of what are "safe" issues for power holders .
One of the issues "defined out" by the Army's NEPA process for the
CSDP include (among other things) choice of destruction technology. No EIS
was ever prepared on the choice of technology to be used . All attempts to
have this dec ision (on-site incineration) reviewed have given rise to
innumerable bureaucratic stumbling blocks both legal and "extra legal ." We
will describe some of these measures in sub sequent sections .
include

the

creation

of

new

" i nstitutional

Briefly, they

b a rrie r s , "

e .g.,

the

Intergovernmental Consultation and Coordination Board (ICCB) and the
addition of new steps in the NEPA review process
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4.3

Criticisms of NEPA
Criticisms of the Act come from two directions : agencies which must

prepare EISs, and citizen groups attempting to penetrate the process. On the
one hand, a gencies responsible for complying with the p rocedural
requirements of the law charge that "NEPA burdens the agencies with an
unreasonable search for alternatives" (Caldwell 1 979, p.6), to which Caldwell
responds, "The requirement that agencies consider alternatives to proposed
action reinforces what should be in any case considered as good planning and
budget practice" (Caldwell 1979, p. 6).
Other criticisms of the Act stem from frustration between the real ity
and the idea l .

Three maj or criticisms are leveled a t NEPA .

First and

foremost is the charge that it is simply a p roced u ra l law. To this charge,
Caldwell ( 1979) argues that an agency does not fulfill NEPA 's requirements
simply by preparing an EIS---"unless the test of adequacy includes a gency
consideration of the substantive goals declared by Congress, along \vith the
systematic and interdisciplinary balancing of values that the Act requires"
(C aldwell 1 979, p.4).

The second criticism stems from the fact that "the

potentially responsible party, " i.e., the entity that proposes the action, is
empowered to prepare the environmental impact statement, which is a little
like the fox guarding the hen house.

A third, and perhaps less obvious

weakness is to be found in the operation of the law and that is, the NEPA
process, specifica lly as it relates to the CSDP, acts like a gigantic "filtering"
mechanism, similar to the one described by Chomsky (1988) in conjunction
with analyzing the effect of media frames on the dissemination of modern
forms of prop aganda.

This filtering system allows for the suppression of

certain issues by ' defining them out' while allowing
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"safe " issues to be

examined . We will describe this process in more detail later in the section
d ealing with the Final Programmatic Environmental Imp act Statement
(FPEIS).
4.4

The NEPA Process and the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
The Army's NEPA process for the Chemical Stockpile Disp osal

Program

resembles the Hydra, the many-hea ded monster of G reek

mythology, slain by Hercules. Each head of which when cut off was replaced
by two others .

The dictionary metaphorically refers to the Hydra as "a

multifarious evil not to be overcome by a single effort" (Webster 's Seventh
New Collegiate Dictionary 1 965, p. 406).

The likeness is most apt when

speaking about the Army's NEPA compliance (or "non-compliance") for the
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. Every time citizens thought they had
been able to keep the Army's moves in check, the Army would bring forth yet
a n other

obstacle,

create

another

esoteric

institution

(e.

g.,

the

Intergovernmental Consultation and Consulting Board-ICCB) or invent new
steps in the NEPA process, i. e., PHASE I and PHASE II Site Specific EISs . All
these steps are designed to retard and I or impede any real progress on the
issues citizens raised; all are designed to maintain the status quo.
The Army's NEPA process for the CSDP actually began with versions
of disposal programs that predated the Congressionally mandated CSDP
(C arnes 1989 ) .

In 1984, the U. S. Toxic Hazardous Materials Agency, the

predecessor to the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization or PM
Cml Demil, published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Regis ter to
prepare an EIS related to the disposal of MSS rockets stored at three
installations:

Lexing ton-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD), Anniston A rmy
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Depot (ANAD), and Umatilla Depot Activity (UMDA ) .

Scoping meetings

were held in the respective towns adj acent to these facilities . In April of 1 985,
the Army's NEPA activities were red irected to include two additional
installations storing M55 rockets: Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) and Tooele Army
Depot (TEAD) (C arnes 1989).

By the time Congress came around to

mandating the destruction of the entire stockp ile, the Army was well
rehearsed in NEPA regulations.
As with a ll NEP A projects requiring an EIS, the first step is the
publication of a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register.

Consistent

with this requirement, In January 1986, the Army published a Notice of Intent
to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the disposal of the
total chemical warfare stockpile currently in storage at eight Army
insta llations within the continental U. S. Next a draft report was prepared .
The Army selected the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge, Tennessee)
as the prime contractor to prepare the EIS documentation for the CSDP,
although other subcontractors assisted in collecting d a ta ( e . g . , S . E .
Technologies ) .

4.4.1

DPE IS: The Draft Programmatic Environmental Imp act Statement

(DPEIS)
The first NEPA documentation to be released was the DPEIS (July 1 ,
1 986) . The normal 45-d ay public comment period was extended (July

1-

September 23) to two full months because o f the high level o f public concern
with the program . The DPEIS considered the following options: (a) continued
storage; (b) on-site disposal; and (c) off-site transportation of the stockpile
(Carnes 1 989).
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Almost from the day of its release, the DPEIS came under heavy
criticism . After reviewing the document, a staff attorney for the Kentucky
Resource Council, said the document was riddled with "conceptual flaws and
informational gaps." He went on to charge that "The Army has not complied
facially or substantively with the requirements of NEPA" (R i c h m o n d

Regis ter, August 29, 1 986), and suggested that the environmen tal scoping
process now under way for the program be abandoned because it was "so
flawed that it is impossible to patch it up " (Richmond Regis ter, August 29,
1 986, continued from page 1 ) .
Citizens i n Madison County were u p i n arms . The R ichmond Register
rep orted: "Madison Countians who spoke at the environmental scoping
meeting which Ambrose opened made the situation even more disagreeable
for the Army launching a fusillade of criticisms at the Army-prepared Draft
Environmental Imp act Statement.

Many called the document ' fata lly

flawed " ' (Rich m o n d Regis ter, August 29, 1986, p. 5).

First and foremost

among the criticisms leveled at the Army with respect to the DPEIS had to do
with the choice of a "programmatic" vs. a site-specific approach and
particularly the generic nature of the risk assessments . In his criticism of the
DPEIS, Senator \Vendall Ford said, in a letter to the House Armed Services
Committee, "This one-size-fits-all attitude of the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement just doesn't work" (Letter, Senator Wendall Ford to House Armed
Services Committee, July 22, 1 986) . In defending the programmatic approach,
the Army said that the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) advised
them that a programmatic approach (i. e., a programmatic EIS and a Record Of
Decision

followed

by

site-spe c i fic

env ironmen t a l

a s sessments

or

environmental impact statements) was the appropriate approach to ensure
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full compliance with NEPA (U.S. Army: CSDP Public Hearings, no d ate, p . 3).
In evaluating the choice of using a generic approach prep arers of the
DPEIS at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory admitted its shortcomings.

One

person wrote, "The generic approach adopted for the DPEIS did not work. .
. The risk analysis information bordered on being incomprehensible; . . . There
was no defensible reason why relocation of a part of the stockpile (i.e., from
some installations but not others) was not viable" (Carnes 1 989, p . 44 1 ) .
Additional criticism stemmed from the fact that the risk assessments dealt
with highly unlikely scenarios, e.g., lightening striking the igloos, rather than
focusing on the much more likely possibility of an accident resulting from
normal operations.

Additionally, it was argued that there was little

discussion about the risks to human health and the environment posed by
incinera tion per se, and no discussion of c u m u lative impacts of long-term
incineration, although consideration of cumula tive imp acts is required by
NEPA regulations. Other criticisms were raised with respect to the Army's
use of a destruction efficiency concept---the famous "six nines." This referred
to the Army's assertion that the incinerators would burn nerve and mustard
agent at an efficiency level of 99.9999% ("six 9's")---a near impossible standard
even under ideal cond itions .

Unfortunately, d estruction and removal

efficiencies (DREs) are not measured during actual, routine operations, but
are determined during a one-time only "trial burn" (GREENPEACE Toxics,
"N.d"). The EPA Science Advisory Board ( 1 985) expressed concern on this
issue as follows:
Research on the performance has occurred only
under optimal b urn conditions and sampling has,
on occasion, b een discontinued d u ring upset
cond itions which take place with unknown
frequency . Even relatively short-term operation of
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incinerators in upset conditions can greatly increase
the total incine rator emitted loa d ings to the
environmen t .
Finally, i t was charged that the DRAFT Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (DPEIS) summarily rejected consideration of alternative
destruction technologies referring back to the NRC (1 984) report in support of
incineration . All in all, the Army's presentation of the DRAFT document for
the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (DPEIS) was a flash point for the
monumental political struggle and cat-and-mouse game between the Army
and the citizen opposition that is the centerpiece of this research.

4.4.2

FPEIS: The Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Sta tement
The Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (FPEIS) was

released on December 30, 1987, and in January 1988 public hearings were held
in Edgewood, MD; Newport, IN; and Richmond, KY.

This document was

supposed to answer the criticisms raised in the DPEIS and set the stage for
further development of the CSDP. Shortly after the release of the FPEIS, and
consistent with NEPA procedure, Secretary Amb rose issued a Record of
Decision (ROD) ! Feb ruary 26, 1988} stipulating on-site disposal o f the
stockpile. The Army identified its "Preferred Alternative" which was also
l isted as the environmentally preferred alternative---the on-site disposal
option (FPEIS 1 988, Vol.

1,

p. xviii).

The document, which ran to three

volumes and several thousand pages, attemp ted to address the maj or
criticisms leveled at the Draft EIS; and hence contained reference to
"expanded" transportation studies (see MITRE Corporation 1 987). The FPEIS
carefu lly laid out the "alternatives" it weighed in selecting its "Preferred
A lternative," they included: ( 1 ) Continued storage of the stockpile at each
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existing storage location; (2) the on-site disposal alternative; (3) regional
disposal centers located at ANAD and TEAD; (3) national disposal center
located at TEAD; (4) partial relocation .

"For each of the program disposal

alternatives, the disposal technology would be the same as is to be employed
at a facility under construction by the Army at Johnston Atoll where
incineration in separate furnaces is to be used for agent destruction, explosive
and propellent destruction, metal decontamination , and dunnage disposal"
(FPEIS 1 988, Vol. 1, p . xiii). In defending their decision to go with thermal
destruction, the Army once again fell b ack on the 1984 NRC report.

The

FPEIS states, "Incineration is endorsed by the National Research Council as
the best and safest method for destroying chemical agents" (FPEIS 1 988, Vol. 1 ,
p . xiii) .
In supporting the validity of the FPEIS, the Army declared that, "This
document is supported by site visits by the authors (see Sect. 6) to each
CONUS installa tion and its environs, meetings with c itizens and
consultations with local, state, and federal agencies (see Table 1 .3 . 1 FPEIS),
literature searches, and numerous studies prepared since publication of the
DPEIS" (FPEIS 1988, Vol. 1, p. 1-1 1 ) . More often than not, site visits turned
out to be one-day affairs where Army personnel flew in, toured the depot and
flew out.

In

short, data gathered from these types of "site visits " is

questionable at best and is perceived as just "going through the motions ."
Although the FPEIS outlined both the venue for the destruction of the
weapons and the technology to be used, no EIS was ever prepared on the
choice of technology. The discussion of "alternatives" is a most interesting
one for two reasons: First, NEPA requires consideration of alternative modes
of action, in fact, the heart of NEPA is comp arison of alternatives . Second,
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although the Army has carefully laid out "alternatives" (see Table C-6 FPEIS )
they have avoided the issue of alternative technologies , dismissing out of
hand any method other than incineration. As stated earlier, the Army did
not prep are an EIS on the cho ice

of technology, although there is every

indication that not doing so violates at least the spirit of NEPA. Bregman
(1992) describes how the process is supposed to work:
A fter a review of the information m an EIS
concerning the various alternatives, an intelligent
decision concerning how to proceed can be made.
Most of the time, the Preferred Alternative is
selected, b ut mitigating measures are applied to
minimize negative environmental effects. . . On
occasion (perhaps 5% of the time), one of the other
alternatives is selected to rep lace the Preferred
Alternative. In rare instances, the Do Noth ing
alternative prevails and no action is taken (Bregman
1992, p. 2) .
In the case of the CSDP, we aver that the "decision" regarding the
choice of technology was made prior to the publication of the FPEIS and even
prior to the publication of the DPEIS, thus leaving the door wide open to the
charge that the Army had successfully subverted the NEPA process to its own
advantage. NEPA practices and procedures, while appearing to be dynamic
components of social change, are in fact, mere pillars of the status quo .
4.4.3

SSEIS: The Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement (SSEIS): The
Evolution of a 'Nondecision'
No single issue has caused more rancor or provided a clearer window

on the processes of power than the Army's refusal to conduct site-specific
studies consistent with the expressed wishes of concerned citizens and state
and local government officials. The odyssey began in 1 986 with the release of
the DRAFT PElS and continues to the present time .
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One citizen-activist

offered this opinion on the subject:

"The Army has compromised itsel f on

this issue. If I were going to have any moral indignation at all, it's about this
issue."
If, as Gaventa ( 1 980) argues, n o n -decisio n s- (i. e., what is not done
because of institutional inertia or neglect ) must be considered a form of
power, then the issue of the SSEIS is the quintessential examp le of n o n 

decisio n . making.

Bachrach and Baratz ( 1970) in Power and Poverty

,

define

a ' n o n -decis io n ' as:
A decision that results in suppression or thwarting
of a la tent or manifest challenge to the va lues or
interests of the decision maker. To be more nearly
explicit, nondecision-rnaking is a means by which
demands for change in the exis ting alloca tion of
benefits and p rivileges in the community can be
suffocated before they are voiced, or kept covert; or
k illed before they gain access to the relevent
decision-making arena; or, failing all of these things,
maimed or des troyed in the decision-implementing
stage of the policy process. ( Bachrach and B a ratz
1970, p. 43) .
T o say that the Army has equivocated on the subject o f site specific
stu dies is to be truly kind.

The folly of placing a nerve-gas incinera tor at

Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot amid such a densely popu lated area (or at
Aberdeen Proving Ground---also densely populated) and within one mile of
an elementary school, seemed self-evident to everyone---excep t the Army.
Opponents were certain that if the Army carne down and d i d a careful
examination of the site, (i.e., a "site-specific study") they would realize that
the decision to burn the weapons on s ite was lud icrous---if not downright
dangerous.

Commenting on the Army's grudging compli ance with the

community's request, an activist remarked, "ORNL (i. e. the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory) did slipshod work. They didn't come here and look at
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our site. They came here for a half day. We've asked and Ambrose promised
they would do an on-site study."
The subject of a site-specific study was first raised at a public meeting
held in Richmond, KY. January of 1 986 where U. S. Congressman Larry
Hopkins is reported to have said in answer to a query from a concerned
citizen about the generic nature of the DRAFT document: "Let me, if I may,
this morning, for the benefit of some of you who may not have been here, we
were able to glean from the Army this morning a commitment now on the
record and to this panel that they would give to us an on-site environmental
impact statement" (Transcript of Field Hearings: 1986, p. 2 1 1 ) .
At a subsequent public meeting held in M a y of 1 986, the Army
emphasized that a decision had not been reached on the ultimate disposition
of the weapons. They (the Army) indicated that once a decision was reached,
they could be "flexible" and would still be able to treat each site as an
individual case. The Army has continually held out the "carrot" that it might
alter the programmatic decision if a certain set of circumstances proves
different from the assumptions that underlay the EIS. For example, the Army
stated, "The Programmatic EIS that is being prepared will offer the Secretary
of the Army the flexibility to make alternative decisions b ased on the
variability of the problems of the eight sites . . .

For instance, it would be

possible for the Secretary of the Army to make one decision for one site or
one class of sites and a different decision for another class of sites" (U. S .
Army, Transcripts of Public Meeting, May 1 986, Richmond, KY, p . 1 1 2,1 1 3 ) .
To the uninitiated, this statement seems clear enough . It seems t o b e saying
that it is possible for one site to have on-site incineration while another site

207

has their weapons transported out. And that certainly is how the citizens of
Madison County interpreted it.
Basking in the Army's assurances, the people of Madison County,
Kentucky were, if not euphoric, guardedly optimistic. The local newspapers
ran a spate of articles detailing this sea of optimism.

For example, T h e

R ichmond Regis ter ran a story which read: "As you know, the Army has
agreed to prepare a Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement (SSEIS) on
the effects of an incinerator here in Madison County" (July 28, 1 986, p. 4). U.S.
Representative Larry Hopkins who had called for the field hearing in
Madison County called it "a crucial breakthrough for us."

Later, he was

quoted as saying the Army's announcement to do a site specific study was like
"a new lease on life" for the area. (Lexington-Herald Leader, July 30, 1 986) .
Later in the summer another article appeared which echoed similar
optimism: "The Army has said that information gathered during the pub lic
comment period could influence the A rmy to choose one of the rej ected
alternatives or some combination of alternatives " (Rich m o n d Regis ter,
8 / 27/ 86, p . 1 2 ) . However, this optimism was short-lived as it b ecame
apparent that something quite different from what they had come to expect
was taking place. The first blow came at a public hearing held by the Army in
Richmond, Kentucky .

The penultimate obfuscation c ame from one of the

A rmy 's EIS prep arers who explained the Site Specific EIS process for the
CSDP:
If he (i.e., the Secretary of the Army) makes, say two
alternative decisions based on some collection of
variables: population density, ecologically sensitive
areas, human health, those kinds of variables, there
would then be, as required by NEP A and CEQ, . .
. regulations and interpretations of those regulations
that are requirements for a site spec ific NEPA
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document and that document would add ress how
the particular decision for that particular installation
would be implemented. . .
(Carnes, U. S. Army Transcript of Public Meeting,
Richmond, KY. May 1986, p. 1 13).
He went on to explain, "If it is determined . . . that the decision is a {sic}
on site disposal, the site specific NEPA document would look at how that
p articular alternative would be implemented and what is the best way of
going about doing that" (Transcript, May 1 986 Public Scoping Meeting for the
CSDP: Richmond, KY. ,p. 1 1 3). In other words, site-specific stud ies would
turn out to be collecting information (i.e. new data) which would facilitate the
implementation of the Record of Decision (ROD) whatever that may be.

In

the case of the CSDP, it would answer the question of where would be the best
place to site the facility on the depot (i.e. which parcel of land among the
1 5,000 acres of LBAD would be best suited for the incinerator facihty), not

whether on-site incineration was the best choice for this particular site.
In the course of the public scoping meeting described above, the
citizens became aware of the fact that what they were hearing was that the site
specific studies were going to come AFTER a decision had been made. This
seemed quite illogical to the citizen who posed the question. The exchange
went something like this: CITIZEN: "It is possible, as I understand it, tha t on
July 1 st we're going to hear, or we might hear, that the Army's preferred
solution would be on site incineration at all sites . . . That decision would have
been reached without any kind of detailed Environmental Impact Statement
from this area . Are we agreed so far? ANSWER: "Yes ."
About this time, the normally conservative Lexington Herald Leader
ran an editorial exp ressing doubts that the Army' s new initia tive would
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change the status quo. The article read, "Another nerve gas study won't alter
the political reality . . . It's unlikely that yet another study will cause the Army
to do an about face on all its previous work. . .What the Army probably hopes
is that the latest study will quell some of the local furor over on-site
destruction and strengthen its defense should the issue wind up in court"

(Lexington-Herald Leader 8 / 30 / 86). That statement proved to be prophetic.
As time went by, rumors began surfacing that put the Army's intentions
regard ing the SSEIS into question.

"What we are hearing n o w is that the

Army claims that a site-specific study would be j ust for the purpose of
"implementing" their decision. In other words, a study would not be in any
way a fresh look at our unique problem, but would simply serve to j ustify
their decision" (Richmond Register-. January 26, 1 988).
Obviously, the citizens were convinced that an honest appraisal of
their particular situation would result in a decision against using incineration
and would make the transportation of the weapons out of LEAD more likely.
And, indeed, there was good reason for them to believe this. A veritable host
of Army generals, Pentagon officials and Army contractors gave every
ind ication that such studies were in the offing---if not immediately, then
surely somewhere down the line.

Attempts to clarify the Army's position

brought further reassurances from the Army that site specific studies would
be done. What was not said, but could only be discerned by inference, was
that these studies would be done a fter a decision had been made and not
before such decision, as the citizens expected.
The first of these reassurances came from a consultant at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, the contractor charged w ith developing the EIS
documentation for the CSDP. He said, "I would not be surprised if a site210

specific environmental impact statement would be required for the
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot"---a curious statement since si te-sp ecific
studies were already part of the Army's NEPA compliance program

(Richmond Register, May 6, 1 986, p . 1 ) . In July 1 986 after the release of the
DPEIS, Lewis Walker ( Deputy for the Environment, Safety and Occupational
Health Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations
a n d Logistics:

Pentagon) testifying at the House Armed Services

Subcommittee on Investigations Field Hearing (Richmond, KY. ) said that,
"Regardless of the Record of Decision (ROD), the Army will conduct site
specific env ironmental impact studies in the fo llowing circumstances:
Where there is heightened public concern or controversy or when the
hazards and risks are unique or great"(Richmond Register, 7/25 / 86, p . 1 ) . To
which Congressman Larry Hopkins replied, "Given these factors, I'm going to
assume . . . that a site specific analysis is going to be made here at the
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot . "

"Yes, we intend to do that here in

Lexington," Walker replied, adding that "the local depot meets the criteria for
a site-specific study" (Rich m o n d Regis ter

7 / 2 7 / 86, p . 1 ) .

The Army's

"mishandling" of the truth on the issue of site specific studies goes far beyond
mere "waffling" and, as evidence will show, indicates a rather deliberate
attempt to cloud over the issue w ith jargon

designed to mislead citizens into

believing they were being heard. Nothing could be further from the truth.
In the following months, the local newspapers were rife with stories of
citizen optimism regarding the impending site-specific studies.

On

Sep tember 1 1 , 1 986, The Richmond Regis ter ran a story on page one which
recounted Dr. Oris Blackwell's address to the faculty of Eastern Kentucky
University.

During the luncheon lecture, Dr. Blackwell said that he was
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beginning to sense "some cracks in the armor" of the Army's incineration
plans.

B lackwell cited recent Army concessions---like its a greement to

prepare an environmental impact statement for the local depot---as evidence
of the success of area citizens who oppose the construction of an incinerator
there.

Around that time, The Lexington -Herald Leader

ran a story that

began, "Last month incinerator opponents won an important concession
when the Army agreed to commission a "site-specific" study for Mad ison
County if Marsh (then Undersecretary of the Army) decided to build an
incinerator there" (Lexington Herald Leader, August 1 986, p. B-3).
A growing w ave of op timism continued throughout 1 9 87.
December 1 9 87, The Rich mond Regis ter

ran this head line:

In

"On-Site

Incineration Decision Expected ." The story went on to point out that "the
decision may not be final in regard to the Richmond depot which has been
promised a

site- specific environmental

impact study

that would take into

considera tion economic, environmental, and safety features" ( R i c h m o n d

Register, December 1 987).
In 1 988 the Army put a new spin on the notion of site-specific studies.
The discourse changed and the the Army began gradually referring to these
studies as part of a "tiering process" tied to the Record of Decision (ROD). Col .
E lray Whitehouse, (Commander of the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot)
speaking to the press, said that the Army was simply following the guidelines
set out in the National Environmental Policy Act ( 1969) that the Site-Specific
Environmental Impact Statement be tiered to the original programmatic
decision. Army spokesmen stood by their position that "the site-specific study
would be a 'tiering' process to implement the Record of Decision," scheduled
for around February 13 (Richmond Register, 2 / 2 / 88, p. 2) . This came as a big
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surpnse to opponents of incineration who were firmly convinced that they
were making progress with the Army on the issue relating to the choice of
technology while hammering away at the uniqueness of each depot site.
Indeed, according to CEQ regulations (1502.20), agencies are encouraged
to tier their environmental impact statements to eliminate repeti tive
discussions of the same issues and to focus on the actual issues ripe for
discussion at each level of environmental review. Bregman ( 1 992) writes that
"tiering may also be appropriate for different levels of action" (Bregman 1 992
p. 230). Whether CEQ regulations requ ire that SSEISs be tied to the Record of
Decision (ROD) in the manner described by the Army is another question.
This may have come about as a result of Army contractor's tinkering with the
NEPA process to make it fit the Army's needs. Army contractors admit to " . .
. restructuring the EIS and making revisions associated with the new
structure . . . "(Carnes 1 989, p. 443) .
The fact that the site-specific studies were tied to the Record of Decision
(ROD) meant that the long-promised studies would not be done until after a
decision had been made on how to dispose of the weapons .

Sort of like

putting the cart before the horse. In a speech to the Madison County Fiscal
Court on January 19, 1 988, a prominent member of the community said,
"The Army is now calling the site-specific statement a document to
implement the programmatic at the local level.

"It's just to see how (the

Army) is going to put it in. That looks like what's coming down the line"

(Richmond Register 1 /25/88, p. 1 ) .
Throughout 1 988, citizens and government officials continued to press
the Army for cla rification on the status of the site specific studies.

For

example, on February 3, 1 988, Wallace Wilkinson, then Governor o f
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Kentucky, wrote a letter to Brigadier General Nydam in which he stated, "The
Army needs to evaluate site-specific information prior to making a decision"
(Letter: Governor Wilkinson to Brig. Gen. Nyd am, February 3, 1 9 88).
Additionally, in a four-page critique of the three-volume FPEIS, the Kentucky
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet wrote: "We would
like clarification of the Army's intentions in preparing site-specific NEPA
documentation" (Kentucky Natural Resources Environmental Protection
Cabinet, p. 1 ) . During this time, the Army continued to reassure citizens that
they were being heard. Speaking to the press, one Army spokesperson said, "I
am reaffirming our commitment to do a site-specific environmental impact
statement that would relook the impact of the record of decision (ROD) in
eminent detail in the Madison County area. . . However, the Army will not
examine other alternatives once Undersecretary of the Army James R .
Ambrose makes a n official decision" (Richmond Register 2 / 2 /88) . .
Finally, on April 10, 199 1 , the Department of Defense (DOD) published a
Notice of Intent to prepare a Site-Specific Environmental Impact statement
on the CSDP. The first step in what was to be a two-stage process was to hold
a public scoping meeting.

The notice in the Federal Register read:

"This

announces the Notice of Intent to prepare an SSEIS on the potential impact of
the design , construction, operation and closure of the proposed chemical
agent demilitarization facility at Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, Kentucky .
. . Notice is further given of the Army's intention to conduct a scop ing
meeting to aid in determining the significant issues related to the proposed
action at Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, as well as Federal, State and local
agencies, participation and input are welcome." (Federal Register, Vol. 56, No.
69, Wednesday, April 1 0, 1991 .)
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4.5

PHASE I and PHASE II Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statements
(SSEIS)
Normally, the final step in the NEPA process is the preparation of site

specific documents. However, in the case of the CSDP, that process has been
divided into two parts or "phases":

The Phase I Site Specific EIS (SSEIS) and

the Phase II Site Specific EIS (SSEIS) . The first stage, the Army explained,
would consist of gathering updated and new data at each of the eight sites and
comparing that data with the data used for the original programmatic EIS.
The second phase of the program would begin when the first phase was
completed and would consist of the actual writing of the site-specific
documents.
The Army claims to have initiated the two-staged process at the urging
of Representative Larry Hopkins, the congressman whose district includes the
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot. In a letter to Hopkins, John W. Shannon,
Assistant Secretary of the Army for installations and logistics wrote, "As a
result of several meetings with your staff, the Army has decided to begin a
two-phased approach to conducting site-specific environmental documents"

(Richmond Regis ter, May 12, 1988, p. 1 ) . Commenting on the plan, Hopkins
stated, "A lthough this plan does not provide everything I wanted, it does
move the Army away from its initial position of recklessly plowing ahead
with its programmatic approach with little regard for site-specific concerns
and characteristics" (Richmond Register, May 12, 1 988, p. 1 ) .
I n trying t o clarify the rationale behind this approach, the Technical
Director for Chemical Demilitarization explained that the p urpose of the
Phase I Study was to say, "If I knew in 1988 what I know today, would I have
made the same decision?" In speaking to the press he explained it this way.
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In other words, "During that process,

researchers would b e continually

running a check and balance of the wisdom of the original decision" (Berea

Citizen 2 / 4 / 88, p. 1 ) . At the same time, Army representatives reassured local
residents that a site-specific study would closely examine the impact of the
Army decision on the local area.

However, if the Under Secretary of the

Army's Record of Decision (ROD) was on-site disposal, the Phase I Site
Specific Study would not revisit the transportation alternative.

It would

simply be for the purpose of collecting "new" and "updated " data bearing on
the implementation of the Record of Decision. The Phase II Site Specific EIS
Studies would then deal only with m itigation s trategies and disposal facility

s iting within the installation boundary. An activist asked General Nydam if
the Army would take "a totally fresh look at how the decision would affect
Madison County and the surrounding area ." "If you're asking if we would be
relooking at the transportation aspects of it if the decision were made on-site,
the answer is 'no'" (Berea Citizen 2 /4 / 88, p. 1 ) . However, the General later
added, "Yes, we would take a fresh look at how that decision to build an
incinerator on-site would affect Madison County" (Berea Citizen, 2 / 4 /88, p. 1 ) .
According t o a bulletin board display at the O a k Ridge National
Laboratory which purports to explain the NEPA process for the CSDP, the
Phase I report "bridges the gap between the FPEIS and the Si te-Specific EIS"
and, using new d ata, "attempts to show on a site-by site b asis that on-site
disposal was not an incorrect choice" (emphasis added) (Field Notes, February
1, 1993) .. If, the Army argues, the Phase I environmental report concludes that
on-site disposal no longer looks like the environmentally p referred
alternative, the Army will reassess the alternatives to the site . If however,
the Phase I report s upports or valida tes the selection of on-site disposal, the
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Phase II Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement (SSEIS) will deal only
with the question of HOW BEST TO IMPLEMENT THE ARMY'S DECISION.
When questioned about why such a staged approach was necessary, the
Army responded that "sequencing will allow the Army to get the most
updated and complete information for the site-specific environmental
documents" (Commander, et al. May 12, 1988 p. 4). However, knowledgeable
experts charge that Phase I and Phase II are "non-processes," and point out
that there is nothing in NEPA which allows for a Phase I without having a
Site Specific E IS.

There are indications from Army documents that they

didn't expect any change in the original on-site incineration decision . Again,
in defense of the two-staged approach, the Commander of the LBAD wrote:
"If, as expected, the Site-Specific document doesn't change the on-site disposal
d ecision, the faci lities still cannot be constructed until the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permits are approved by the state "
(Commander, et al. May 12, 1988 p. 5 )

.

The Army gave reassurances that the PHASE I study would be
reviewed by an "independent" agency (i.e., the Argonne National Laboratory
which depends heavily on Army contracts), and then certified to Congress.
According to the Army, data used in the FPEIS to select the environmentally
preferred alternative are identified, and more recent and more detailed site
specific data of the same types are gathered .

After re-computing the five

measures of risk, the results will be examined to determine if on-site disposal
is still the environmentally preferred alternative (Army Rep ort: Chemical
Stockpile Disposal Program Site Specific NEPA Review Phase I Criteria).
After comparing the risks, "If no significant differences in the data bases are
revealed, the Army validates the programmatic decision for that site and the
217

SSEIS is then developed as Phase II of the process" (General Busbee and
A gency Statement: Before Subcommittee on Environment, E nergy and
Natural Resources, Committee on Government Operations, p. 5 ).

4.5.1

Data Collection for Phase I
Data collection for the Phase I Report was undertaken by the Oak Ridge

National Laboratory (ORNL) and the final reports were to be validated by the
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL).

In addition to serving as a quality

assurance check on the original programmatic decision, data was also
collected in support of the Army's massive emergency response program, the
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) .
However, the data collection effort attained gargantuan proportions
and is worth examining in its own right.

In conjunction with the Phase I

study, the Army planned to collect "new" and "updated" information of a site
specific nature in order to weigh the impacts of the Record of Decision on the
various sites.

The volumes prepared by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

in support of the Phase I Study, once assembled, filled several book cases.
This "new" and "up dated " site specific data contained, for example,
information regarding the general population and popul ation trends
surrounding each site; population figures for nearb y counties; sensitive
p op u l ations; d aytime population d istribution; nighttime p op ula tion
distribution; transient populations, number of employers with more than 100
employees; meeting and convention centers with total visitor seating capacity
of at least 300; recreational facilities, annual events and attendance, state and
federal public areas within 100 km of the site; schools and colleges with 1 00
miles; d ay care facilities; nursing homes, hospitals and number of beds, etc .
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etc.

A d ditionally, the Phase I Reports for the Lexington-Bluegrass Army

Depot (LBAD) contain an entire book devoted to e ach of the cities of
Richmond and Berea respec tively which give detailed lists of teachers,
professors, etc. In addition to enrollment facts and resident student figures,
the Berea College section contains information on the college's student
demonstration policy (Field Notes 1 993). The Army will argue that all this
informa tion w as collected in support of their enhanced emergency
preparedness effort, and indeed some of this data is plugged into the Army's
plume dispersion models which are used to predict how far a toxic plume
will travel should their be an accident involving an "off-site" release of nerve
or mustard gas. However, it stretches credulity to argue that knowledge about
the college's student demonstration policy is in any way remotely connected
to effective emergency response. The question remains, what is the purpose
of this over-kill data collection effort?

4 .5.2

Phase I & Phase II: Non-Compliance with NEPA
In addition to citizens ' complaints regarding the nature of the site

specific studies undertaken by the Army, an environmental lawyer familiar
with the controversy charged that the Army's Phase 1 / Phase II process was in
non-compliance with NEPA .

In a letter to an Army representative at

Aberdeen Proving Ground, the attorney wrote, "The apparent intent of the
Department of the Army as indicated in the Notice is to use the "Phase I"
process to supplement the record of the Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement released in January 1988 (FPEIS).

This is in direct violation of

NEPA which requires preparation of a supplemental programmatic EIS so as
to conduct all decision making

m

a manner subject to public review and
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comment and due process consideration" (Letter: Environmental Lawyer,
Wyatt, Tarant & Combs to Ms. Marilyn Tischbin, Department of the Army,
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD., April 25, 1991, p. 5 ) . The letter stipulates
that 40 CFR § 1502.9 (c) ( 1 ) of The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ")
regulations state that agencies:
shall prepare supplements to either d raft or final
environmental impact statements if . . . (i) there a re
s ignifi c a n t n e w c i rc umstances or info rm a t i o n
relev a n t t o environmental concerns and bearing on
the proposed action or its impacts [emphasis added ] .
Furthermore, according to the complaint, "a plethora of new information
which bears directly on the Department's decision to incinerate has arisen in
the five years since the Army issued its Draft PElS" (Letter: Wyatt, Tarant &
Combs to M. Tischbin, April 25, 1991, p. 3). Nor is this the only quarter from
which criticism emerges.

Lawyers for the Kentucky Resources Council

(Frankfort, Ky.) also raised serious questions about the legality of the Army's
Phase I & Phase II Site Specific Process. A lawyer who represents the Council
wrote:
It is the belief of the Council, grounded in NEP A
and judicial interpretations of the law, that a site
specific environmental impact statement which
does not include a reconsi d e r a t i on o f the
programmatic decision is inconsistent with law . " In
addition, "the promise of a Site-Specific EIS in the
future is m e a n i ngl ess [emphasis added] if later
analysis c annot cons i d e r a l t ernatives to the
programmatic decision" (Fitzgerald, Comments of
the Kentucky Resources C ouncil, Inc. on Final
Programmatic Environmental Impa c t Statement
Chemical Demilitarization Program, p. 2 )
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4.5.3

Phase I Conclusions
To d ate, all Phase I studies have been comp leted although not all

reports have been released for public review. Final Phase I reports for Tooele,
Anniston, Umatilla and Pine Bluff Arsenal have been released although,
a ccording to an Army spokesman, the Pine Bluff Arsenal EIS has been
restarted .

All of the above valid ated the Army's selection of on-site

incineration as the "preferred alternative . "

For example, the princip al

conclusion reached by the ANAD Phase I Report, and confirmed by Argonne
National Laboratory (ANL) was that "on-site disposal remains valid for
disposal of chemical agents and munitions stored at the Anniston Army
Depot" (Alabama) (Hunsaker Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions
Stored at Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama, Final Ph ase I
Environmental Report Alabama, Final Phase I Environmental Report) .
The Phase I Reports from Pueblo (PUDA), Aberdeen (APG), Newport
(NAAP), and Kentucky (LBAD), have been placed on hold (although Pueblo's
should be out in the next two months) pending a review of the Alternative
Technology report (Ap ril 1 994) (Personal Communication: Marilyn Tischbin,
Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Edgewood, Maryland, May 3, 1994 to author) . These reports
exist in a sort of "informational limbo" as DRAFT documents. However, the
DRAFT documents give some indication of how the Army is leaning on the
issue at these sites. For example, the Phase I DRAFT report for Pueblo Army
Depot (PUDA) concluded that "on-s ite d isposal remains v a lid as the
environmentally preferred alternative for PUDA" (U.S. Army, 1991, STATUS
DRAFT:

Phase I Environmental Report-Disposal of Chemical Agents and

Munitions Stored at Pueblo Depot Activity, Pueblo, Colorado). The report
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states that, "If one adds the off-site transportation risks---addressed in the
FPEIS, but beyond the scope of this Phase I Report . . . the on-site alterna tive is
clearly preferable . . . " (U.S. Army, Phase I Report: PUDA 1 99 1 , p. 6- 18). In
another example, the project leader in charge of overseeing the Phase I study
for Aberdeen Proving Ground concluded also that nothing had changed and
recommended that the original on-site decision stand, commenting that "If
we cave in to one group, we'll have to cave into them all . " (Field Notes :
ORNL 8/26/91).
As stated earlier, if the Phase I Reports validate the original on-site
decision, the Army will move to Phase II of the program which will simply be
the implementation of the Record of Decision (ROD) .

The momentum is

b uilding and there is every indication that when all is said and done, the
contra ctors hired to perform these stu dies will validate the on-site
incineration decision at every site---with the possible exception of the
Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) in Kentucky.

In this case, the

RCRA permitting regulations will become the primary stop gap for citizens
wishing to block the construction of the incinerators.

4.6

'THE SCOPING GAME' : "What Do These People Want? ! "
The role o f the Scoping Meeting a s a mechanism o f social control

cannot be overstated. The process of "scoping" is defined by the regulations of
the Council on Environmental Quality. Section § 150 1 . 7 of CEQ regulations
states: "There shall be an early and open process for determining the scope of
issues to be ad dressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a
proposed action" (Bregman 1 992, p . 219). According to the Council, scoping is
defined as the identification of the range of actions, alternatives and impacts
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to be considered in an Environmental Impact Statement.

Scoping is the

p rinc i p a l

requ i ring

method

for involving

publics in projects

an

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and the scoping meeting has become
the tool for both the dissemination of information about a project and an
effective means of social control .

For example, one of the well-known

mechanisms of power described by Bachrach and Baratz ( 1970) {see Chapter 2 )
i s agenda setting. This tool was employed very effectively by the Army ( and
on more than one occasion) at scoping meetings. A citizen activist gives this
account of one such meeting which took place in Richmond, KY. in 199 1 :
We're supposed t o have input. We got t o call who
spoke when. We were supposed to initially. At the
last second word came out that the Army had a
"new game plan" {i. e., the order of speakers was
arbitrarily changed ) . It scared us because, you never
know what someone was going to get up and say.
As it turned out, at least the citizens were full of
passion, unrehersed spontaneous passion.
According to Bear (1 987), scoping is used to identify impacts that need
to be addressed in the EIS and to identify impacts that are insignificant and
can be eliminated from further consideration.

The CEQ has published

guidelines for federal agencies to follow with regards to scoping. As part of
the scoping process, a lead agency is directed by the CEQ to "determine the
scope ( § 1 508.25) and the significant issues to be analyzed in depth in the
environmental impact statement" (Bregman 1 992, p. 219). Additionally, lead
agencies are empowered to "Identify and eliminate from detailed study the
issues which are not significant or which have been covered by prior
environmental review (§1506.3), narrowing the discussion to these issues in
the statement to a brief presentation of why they will not have a significant
effect on the human environment or providing a reference to their coverage
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elsewhere" (Bregman 1 992, p . 219). Thus, the control over issues is placed at
the outset in the hands of the lead agency ( in this case, the U. S. Army) who
is then free to "define out" of consideration issues which it feels are not
significant. This policy has disastrous implications for citizens who choose to
oppose a p articular project, for whoever defines the issues to be held up for
p ublic debate has the power to define out of existence any issues which it
deems threatening to the status quo.

Such restriction is exac tly what has

happened on numerous occasions with respect to the Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program.
Some insight can be gained about this process by scrutinizing the
transcripts of a typical scoping meeting for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program. The following examples, taken from the scoping meeting on the
Phase I Site Specific Environmental Imp act Statement (SSEIS) for the
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (April 25, 1991, Richmond, Kentucky), are
illustrative of the point. At the beginning of the meeting some introductory
remarks were given by a consultant at the Oak Ridge National Labora tory,
who was involved in preparing the Phase I Site Specific Report for the Army.
As he explained to the assembled citizens:
One purpose of the NEPA process is to provide the
d ocumentation .
These are the environmen t a l
imp act statements, a n d the reason we're here
tonight is to collect information for the preparation
of a site-specific EIS for the LBAD. The EIS is
intended to insure that the decision-maker (i.e., the
A r m y ) is fully informed in regard to the
environmental aspects and the environmental
implications of this proposed activity . . . As I said
earlier, we're here to collect information" (U. S .
A rmy, Transc ript of Public Scoping Meeting,
Richmond, Kentucky, April 25, 1991, pp. 18, 19).
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By emphasizing that the purpose of the meeting was limited to "collecting
information," it was made clear that this was not the proper place to discuss
controversial issues such as alternative technologies, the continued use of the
incinerators or the hazards associated with incineration, etc .
continued:

Zimmerman

" I should like to emphasize that the environment is only one

element in tha t dec ision process.
e n v ir o n m e n t

I should also emphasize that the

is the sole purpose that we're here tonight.

Other

considerations that enter into this decision process are 'technical factors . ' As
the G eneral mentioned, the ability of the JACADS high-temperature
inc inerative p rocess to meet regulatory stand ards, to meet muni tions
stand ards, to meet hazardous waste standards, is to be considered in a
d ifferent forum and different process than what we are entered into this
evening" (U. S. Army Transcript, Public Scoping Meeting, Richmond, KY,
April 25, 1991, page 19, line 1-16).
As I said earlier, we're here to col l ect information.
The purpose of this scoping meeting is to sol icit
pub lic comment. It's to solicit comment on this
proposed action in order to allow the development
of a site-specific EIS, particul arly a SSEIS that
concentrates on significant issues while no t wasting
time or effort on those issues that are insignificant
or of minor importance." (p . 19)
One could ask---insignificant to whom? Of minor importance to whom?

4.7

The Ambiguous Role of Public Participation and NEPA
The role of public participation in the NEPA process with respect to the

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) is highly contentious. Public
participation, as such, is like the bogeyman to the Army, or at the very least it
is viewed as a pain in the neck--- something to be dealt with and gotten over
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with. Nevertheless, public participation is an essential part of the EIS process.
Proponents of early public involvement argue that it has the potential for
leading to a better project, as well as improving the possibility of a welcome
from the residents of the project area.

In order for projects to proceed

smoothly, however, p ublic p articip ation must b e handled " corre ctly"
meaning, citizen opposition must be cha n neled effectively or else the whole
project can become mired in delays . The principal vehicle for this proper
channeling of citizen opposition 1s, of course, the scoping process and
particularly, the scoping meeting.
Some argue there has been an unusually high amount of p ublic
scrutiny and input into the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (Hayes
Holgate 1 990; Hindman 1989), whereas others charge tha t said input is merely

pro forma.

The Army points to the funded community study groups as

evidence of increased public participation in the program; but the suggestions
and recommendations of these groups (when they go against A rmy
preroga tives) are, more often than not, ignored as has been discussed in the
preceding chapter.

In defending the Army's "Decide-Announce-Defend"

strategy with respect to the CSDP, a high-ranking political appointee at the
Pentagon argued that, "NEPA allows them {i.e., the people) to observe the
decision, but not to make the decision. " (Acting Assistant Secretary of the
A rmy: Installations, Logistics and Environment, The Pentagon, July 29, 199 1 ) .
This attitude certainly flies in the face o f the spirit o f the law, but i t is one to
which the Army subscribes.
Some authorities claim that all that is required by the law (i.e. NEPA) is
that citizens have "input" into the process (the Army seems to interpret the
law this way); while others insist that the spirit of the law is honored only if
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citizens are involved in the decision-making process itself---a more radical
interpretation which means citizens in a community would have veto power
over projects.

The truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes,

according to experts knowledgeable about the law (Personal Communication:
Lynton Caldwell 6 /21 /92) .
According to Bregman ( 1992), public particip ation is both implicitly
included in the NEPA process and explici tly mandated in CEQ regulations .
Bregman ( 1 992) writes that, "Public involvement requirements are specified
for all NEPA reviews under 40 CFR Chapter V (Parts 1500-1508), as well as for
particular programs" (Bregman 1 992, p . 37). However, he argues that NEPA
does not absolutely stipulate that citizens participate in the decision-m aking
(and there's the rub ! ) , only that citizens have INPUT.

This input can take

many forms, ( e . g . scoping meetings, community study groups, etc . ) .
However, entities are not under any obligation to act o n the information,
only to listen and acknowledge such input. Within the scope of the present
law as it stands, there does not seem to be any statutory way for citizens to
have control of the decision-making process . The last word always devolves
on the entity that proposes the action; in this case it's the Army. Bregman
( 1 992) argues that only in rare cases is an action other than the preferred
alternative taken. "Most of the time," he writes, "the Preferred Alternative is
selected" (Bregman 1 992, p. 2) .
In conclusion, most NEPA experts and federal agencies recognize the
potential benefits of public involvement, however, and firmly support the
public participation component of the Act as public input often leads to
improvements in design and better projects. Bregman (1992) suggests that the
earlier in a study public participation is sought, the greater the likelihood that
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the study will be completed on schedule and within budget and will be
socially and politically acceptable to the local citizens (Bregman 1 992, p. 44) .
H e further insists that "consultation with interested parties be undertaken
before agency decisions are made" (Bregman 1992, p. 39) .

4.8

Summ ary
The foregoing discussion adds considerable weight to the argument

that the Army's response to citizen requests that each site be considered
sep arately is purely pro forma. The studies in support of the Phase I Site
Specific EIS began in 1 991 and many are not yet completed as of this date.
This has both positive and negative aspects.

From the standpoint of the

Army, there is considerable expense attached to undertaking these additional
studies in addition to the delays in implementing the program . On the other
hand, it buys time with which to fortify arguments for on-site incineration
and to institute aggressive public "education" programs. From the standpoint
of the citizens who oppose the Army's current on-site incineration plan, it
seems obvious that the Army was simply going through the motions and was
using the process to validate its earlier decision without really giving serious
consideration to the many new developments both in destruction technology
and in population density that could have (or should have) p rovided the
evidence to support a redirection of the program.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the citizen involvement
component in NEPA, although weak in terms of changing outcomes, does
allow putting vast amounts of sand in the gears of the decisional machine. It
is a (moderate) triumph of previous struggles to put citizen input on the
agenda. Clelland argues that, "The convoluted struggle to erase such input is
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very expensive

m

time and energy and does drive superordinates crazy"

(Personal Communication, March 1995) .
In this chapter we have been looking primarily at second dimensional
power relationships. Those which involve, among other things, the "rules of
the game" which operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of the
Army. In the next two chapters we will take up the subject of how p atterns of
power are maintained by attempts to control the universe of discourse. We
will move into the realm of the third dimension of power, which Gaventa
( 1 989) says is "the least developed and least undersood mechanism of power"
(Gaventa 1980, p . 15). We will examine the legitimations and the myths tha t
support the status quo and attempt t o illustrate how

these p a tterns are

instilled, how they are maintained, and what happens when these patterns
are challenged .
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Chapter 5

The Third Face of Power:
Legitimations, Ideologies and Myths

'Hobbes ian state author ity is masked for the multitude by a disp lay of images
st aged for the p urp os es of ratifying t he peop le's sense of living in a Lockean
society of maximum freedom and government on t rust .'
Frederick M. Dolan, 1991. " Hobbes and/or North: The Rhetoric of
Ameri can Nati onal Security" in Arthur and Marilouise Kraker,
Ideology and Power in the Age of Len in in Ruins , .

5.1

The Third Dimension: Language and the Discourse o f Power
In Power a n d Powerlessness, G aventa (1 980) argued that the least

developed and least understood mechanisms of power are those of the third
dimension. In speaking of the third dimension of power, of course, we are
speaking about the various means through which power "influences, shapes
or determines conceptions of the necessities, possibilities and strategies of
challenge" (Gaventa 1 980, p . 15) . Applied to the problem under consideration,
it means examining the way the Army attempts to shape the way the problem
is framed through the production of myths, control of information, creation
of ideologies (or reinforcement

of existing ideologies) and legitimations.

Powers third d imension can be c learly seen in this remark, w h ich
surprisingly, was made by one who is active in opposing the A rmy' s plan:
"The way the A rmy works is like a freight train.

It has tremendous

momentum. The best you can do is to alter its course. "
W e will begin with a discussion of language and its central role i n
defining (or warping) reality. W e will examine the various legitimations the
Army has offered for the destruction program and the institutions created to
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support this function, and fina lly, we will ana lyze the p redominant
id eologies and myths with some conj e c tures about their p o ss ib le
consequences . Hence, we will examine the connections between language use
and unequal relations of power, particularly in the United States with respect
to the U. S. Army's Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. Part of our task
will be to examine Army discourse surrounding the issue and to expose the
'taken for granted' aspects to language which hide underlying i deologies. In
addition to exploring some of the predominant ideologies that infuse the
issue of the chemical weapons destruction program, we will look at the
prod uction of myths, discuss the various legitimations and attempt to relate
these to the emergence of institutional structures and practices that support
Army prerogatives.

5.1.1

Euphemisms of Domination:
In a provocative article in which she examines the euphemisms

e mployed by the military with respect to our nuclear arsenal, Cohn ( 1987)
d escribes the rationale behind what she calls techn os trategic discourse. Here
we are referring to the all-too familiar phrases such as "collateral damage"
and " friendly fire. " She notes that "men's reference p oint in technostrategic
discourse is not themselves or even white men, is not human beings at all, it
is the weapons" (Cohn, 1 987,p . 162).

She believes that such discourse

functions as an "ideological curtain" disguising the real reasons for political
d ecisions . This ''ideological curtain" functions to mask reality and serves to
b lunt our realization of what is really taking place.

It is the linguistic

equivalent of the p sychological defense mechanism known as " denial."
Similar processes are evident in the Army's discourse surrounding the CSDP.
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For example, the choice of the phrase "a permitted operation," which came
up several times at a community meeting on alternative technologies at
Anniston Army Depot (Alab ama), is a prime example.

When referring to "a

permitted operation," the Army was supposedly referring to activities
surrounding the construction of the incinerator facility a t the depot.
However, it was never explained what activity the phrase referred to or

where the permission came from or exactly who gave the permission. It was
left to the audience to infer that whatever activity the phrase was referring to
had been legitimated by some higher authority, e.g., the E PA (Auburn
University: Field Notes for August 1 993, Anniston, Alabama ANAD).
Fairclough ( 1 989) raises another important issue with respect to the
relationship between power and modes of discourse, and that is the question
of access to discourse. Who has access to which discourse, and who has the
power to enforce constraints on access.

The most notable example of this

with respect to the Army's Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program involves the
"Response To Query" (RTQ) system . Developed under the auspices of the
CSEPP Public Affairs Subcommittee, the system is designed to identify and
respond to questions and concerns from the CSEPP community ( i . e . ,
emergency managers in the states, Depot commanders, etc .), the public, and
the media. The system works in this way: (1) Questions are solicited from the
CSEPP community and fielded to headquarters in Washington; (2) Public
Affairs personnel review the questions and come up with a pat answer: one
which will answer the question in a way that is consistent with the Army's
point of view; (3) the questions and their "correct" answers are then made
available to a fairly wide audience consisting of emergency managers in the
states---Depot commanders, liaison officers, etc. The questions and answers
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are then incorporated in CSEPP documents that can be used to "educate" the
public about emergency response and the CSDP in general.

It should be

stressed that at no time are answers formulated by personnel at the state or
local level. The "correct" answers come from headquarters in Washington.
What Response To Query

(RTQ) is really about is standardization, control

over the universe of discourse, and limiting access. The Army argues that
this level of control is necessary:
The decentralized nature of CSEPP, involving 1 0
states, 32 counties, and a t least five Federal agencies,
demands a program-wide system to ensure that
managers and staff at all eight CSEPP sites provide
consistent, accurate, and timely responses to both
public and news media queries. The RTQ system is
intended to meet that need first, by identifying
those questions and concerns already being asked of
or anticipated by CSEPP managers and staff, and
second, by providing the answers . (CSEPP Update,
September I October 1991, p. 1 1 ) .
They conclude with this statement which appears in italics in the text
to emphasize its importance: "Information provided through the R TQ sys tenz

is not in tended for proactive use" (CSEPP Update, September /October 1 99 1 , p .
1 1 ) . What does this statement mean i n terms of controlling access? I t means
that although the public will be permitted to hear some of the answers, they
will not have input as to how the questions are framed at the outset. The lists
of questions and answers are not meant for general distribution, but are
meant to be used as tools to insure uniformity of response from all concerned
parties. RTQ is not intended to open up new issues, nor can it be viewed as a
real attempt at dialogue. Citizen groups do not have input or access to the
Response-To-Query system .

The RTQ system will be revisited later in the
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discussion of Army propagand a at which time which we will attemp t to
explain how RTQ fits into the more global propaganda schema.

5 . 1 .2

What Does the Word 'SITE' Mean?
The Army's obsessive need to control the universe of discourse goes

beyond merely employing euphemisms and extends to concern with the
usage and mean ing of words as well . One example comes directly from an
Army newsletter called, CSEPP Update, which reads: "The word SITE as it is
used by the chemical surety com munity is o ften mislea d ing and
misrepresents what is actually intended by the writer. Why?

There are

numerous meanings for the word site. It's actual meaning depends on how it
is being used and the connotations used before and after its initial use"
(Ellenberger 1 992, p . 8).

This document originates from the office of the

A rmy's C h ief Public Affairs Officer at FEMA (Federal Emergency
Management A gency) headquarters in Washington, D. C . The piece quoted
above is from an article

entitled, "What Does the word SITE mean ? "

El lenberger ( 1 992) argues, that the word "site" h a s picked up s inister
meanings when used in the context of emergency response and he wishes to
a dvise those who are involved in writing documents for the Army's
weapons disposal program, to be careful of its usage. He cautions that use of
terms such as " incinerator s i te " may conjure up negative images in the
minds of some people. He suggests that other words such as " location" be
substituted for the word "site" whenever possible. So instead of 'stockpile
site' or 'incinerator site', you speak a location instead . The rationale for this
suggestion is contained in the following paragraph which is reproduced here
in its entirety despite its length:
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The major concern is that . . . If this meaning is
p revalent in chemical emergency p rep aredness
lite rature, continued use of the more generic
meaning could lead to the wrong perception;
(emphasis added } that is, the installation, facility,
location, to include the surrounding civilian
community will equate to the problem area, when
in fact nothing is further from the truth. These are
the exact areas where emergency preparedness is
being improved and these locations are being made
safer to prevent them from becoming a SITE.
Bottom line--Let's start using the NCP and the new
AR 50-6 definition of the words site and on-site and
eliminate the use of the more generic meaning of
these words . . .
In another example of this phenomenon, the use of the term "safe" has
undergone transformation through the years.

An Army document prep ared

in 1986 contained the words: "The U. S. Army is actively planning for the safe
and environmentally accepta ble disposal of obsolete and unserviceable
chemical warfare agents and munitions" (ORNL 19 86, Report No. 61 97, p. 1 ) .
This contrasts markedly with later language usage where principals were
directed to avoid the use of the word "safe" altogether (CSEPP Update 1991,
which c autioned emergency managers and others concerned with the
Chemical Stockp ile Disposal Program to "Avoid the Word 'SAFE' when
Talking About Risk"). The newsletter goes on to describe how participants at a
professional development workshop on risk communication were opposed
to using the term "safe" to define risk to the public, "whether it relates to a
substance such as dioxin or to a plant or other site, like a land fill" (C S EP P

Update 1991, p . 9 ) . One workshop participant cautioned, "If you mean safe is
zero risk, then your credibility goes down real quick when there is some
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exposure." The CSEPP article prescribes the following precautionary strategy
to avoid the above-mentioned pitfalls:
It's better to talk about m i n i m a l or a c c e p ta b l e
levels of risk. Public affairs o r public information
practitioners should encourage discussions about
risk between an organization and its neighbors in
o rd e r to b u i l d t r u s t ( C S E P P
Up d a t e ,
September /October 1991, p . 9).

5 . 1 .3

Army 'Newsspeak' and the CSDP:
The Army has developed its own version of "newsspeak" for the

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP). The Army's stockpile disposal
plan is known in the halls of the Pentagon as "chem demil" ---bland Army
shorthand for an emotional issue---the destruction of 27,000 tons of unitary
chemical weapons in specially designed high temperature incinerators, most
of which a re located near thriving popula tion center s .

The term

'demilitarization' (demilitariza tion for short) is an Army term meaning "to
render unusable for any military purpose" (Transcript, February 16, 1 984,
Public Meeting, Richmond, KY. p. 1 ) .
I n classic Orwellian fashion, numerous euphemistic "inversions"
appear regularly in Army documents relating to the CSDP. They also crop up
in briefings, in newsletters, at scoping meetings, and in pro fe ssiona l j o u rnals
as well. Some of the more notable examples include the following (N. B. This
is not an exhaustive list, but it does provide a window of opportunity to see
how language affects the way the problem is framed from the Army's point of
view) .
In the Army's carefully crafted rhetoric, one speaks of "selective
incentives" (not bribes) to make hazardous waste facilities more appetizing to
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local communities (Carnes and Sorensen 1983). The community opposition,
which is in fact na tional in scope involving all eight storage sites, is labeled
"locational conflict" or "localized

resistance," and the vociferous citizen

opposition is referred to as a "siting controversy," thus minimizing the
central role of power.

In terms of dealing with affected publics, otherwise

referred to as "sta keholders," the Army speaks of "building consensus,"
"maintaining citizen concurrence," or "channeling opposition. " In terms of
the potential risks associated with the program, the Army talks about the
need for "mitigating public concern," and about "perceived risk" (as if there
were no real risk) . In this regard, the word "accident" is assiduously avoided;
instead, we speak of a chemical "event," or an off-post "incident" (meaning a
plume of deadly nerve gas which travels beyond the installation boundary),
or an off-post "release. " One never speaks of nerve gas, only "agent. " One
never speaks about how many people might die as a result of a chemical

even t, instead, we speak of "no-death downwind distance." One does not use
the word weapons but "munitions ." The Army speaks about "Getting the Job
Done," and about "Lessons Learned . " The Army never lies, they just say they
"mishandled the truth." "Public education" and "public outreach" become
euphemisms for propaganda . In speaking about the NEPA review process,
professionals refer to agencies that initiate actions calling for the preparation
of Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) as "potentially responsible
parties," or PRPs; thus masking the fact that in the scheme of things, the deck
is stacked in favor of this entity.
Some other items worth mentioning in this lexicon of technostrategic
discourse are the euphemisms employed to describe the toxicity of agent and
probable fatalities. Terms such as LDso (Lethal dose to 50% of those exposed),
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and LCtso (Statistically derived concentration-time integral, lethal for 50% of
"reference population"), are derived from an older statistic, the "Mortality
Index" which rated degrees of toxicity and was usually expressed as: ( 1 ) The
lower limit of irritability; (2) The limit of supportability; and (3) The Mortality
Product.

The Mortality Product, also termed the Lethal Index or the H a b e r

Product W which:
gives the toxic power of the asphyxiants and of
those poisons absorbed through the skin . It cannot
be experimentally determined on the human
subject, and experiments are normally made on
animals: cats, rabbits, calves and dogs" (Clark 1 968,
P· 3).
Notice the deliberate banality of the term "reference population." Here
we could be referring to infants (for example, newborns), children, the
disabled, or the elderly. The term "reference population" is denuded of the
emotional imp act that would be associated with speaking about death by
nerve gas.

Notice also that the more modern statistic al terms have been

stripped of their older references to "poisons" or "mortality," but the things
that they refer to are no less dangerous. Finally, mention should be made of
the curious linguistic practice of making verbs out of nouns, e.g, "task"
becomes "tasking" or "tasked" as in "The Oak Ridge National Laboratory was

tasked to study the problem of reentry."
Fairclough (1989) who has explored the connections between language
and power, posits a dialectical relationship between the two . He argues that
the relationship between discourse and social structures is not a one-way
relationship, but instead represents a dialectical one. He writes:
It is because the relationship between discourse and
social structures is dialectical in this way that
d iscourse assumes such importance in terms of
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power relationships and power struggle: control
over orders of discou rse by institutional and
societal power holders is one fa ctor in the
maintenance of their power (Fairclough 1 989, p . 37).
He further argues that, "As far as the social world is concerned, social
structures not only determine social practice, they are also a product of social
practice" (Fairclough 1 989, p. 37) . The language emp loyed by the Army in
documents and statements relating to the CSDP, attempts to: ( 1 ) limit the
scope of the problem; (2) minimize the breadth and strength of the
opposition; (3) minimize the threat and the consequences of a potenti al
chemical accident; (4) redirect our attention away from public sa fety concerns
by tauting its emergency preparedness plan as a panacea and ( 4) trivialize
other issues the Army wishes not to discuss . At the same time, the A rmy
focuses on its instrumental goal of destroy ing the weap ons in the most
efficient way manner, and we would add---with the least possible interference
from citizens.
Following Fairclough's (1989) analysis, the Army's choice of discourse
is directly rela ted to the numerous challenges mounted by citizens who
oppose the on-site incineration plan.

Citi zen opponents of the A rmy' s

current disposal plan, being fully cognizant o f the centrality o f language in
defining the problem, have mounted numerous challenges to the A rmy ' s
' definition of the situation', through newsletters, circulating petitions,
sponsoring public forums, writing letters to the editor, talking to reporters
and newsp aper editors, writing letters to friends and p ublic officials,
p artic ipating in p ublic debates with A rmy representatives, educating
Congress, sponsoring conferences, etc . They have attempted time and time
again to force the Army to clarify its positions. They have challenged the
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Army's rhetoric concerning the alleged "safety" of incineration on numerous
fronts .

Their attempts to expose the myths behind the Army's various

pronouncements have been nothing less than heroic. Their stick-to-itiveness
has been a source of great consternation to the Army, causing one Army
spokesman to declare in desperation, "What do these people want? ! "

5.2

The Function of Legitimation
Legitimation is the process of "expla ining and j ustifying" the

institutional order.

The problem of legitimation has been examined by

numerous scholars, most notably in the work of Habermas ( 1 973) and Berger
and Luckmann (1 967) from whom we take our point of departure. Berger and
Luckmann (1 967) begin their discussion of legitimation by reminding us that,
"All social worlds are precarious. All social worlds are constructions in the
face of chaos" (Berger & Luckmann 1967, p. 103). This said, they go on to
assert the primary necessity for all societies to defend and promote their view
of re ality.

They distinguish between first-order and second-order

objectivations (of meaning).

First-order objectivations have to do with the

"taken-for-granted " world view incorporated by the child in the process of
primary socialization. During this process, the world view of the particular
society into which the child is born is absorbed into consciousness in its
totali ty----without question or need for justification. Berger and Luckmann
( 1 967) p oint out that legitimation has both cognitive and normative
elements. Not only does legitimation tell an individual why a person should
perform one action and not another, it also tells him why things are the way
they are. Legitimation explains the institutional order by ascribing cognitive
validity to its imperatives. Add itionally, integration in one form or another
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is also a typical motive underlying attempts at legitimation (Berger &
Luckmann 1967) .

Thus the Army makes much of the fact that the NEPA

process, particularly the public scoping meetings, are there to bring people
" into the process , " when, in reality, they are part and parcel of the

legitima t i o n

process for the Army' s program.

In fact, we argue that the

NEPA process itself has been co-opted by the Army for the purpose of
legitimation.
The earliest and simplest forms of legitimation are those which simply
affirm: "This is how things are done." The second level deals with theoretical
propositions in rudimentary form: proverbs, moral maxims and wise sayings
are common on this level. The third level of legitimation contains explicit
theories b y which an institutional sector is legitimated in terms of a
differentiated body of knowledge, for example, rules of kinship as developed
and administered by elders of a clan. Berger and Luckmann ( 1967) state that
"with the development of specialized legitimating theories and their
administration by full-time legitimators, legitimation begins to go beyond
pragmatic application and to become 'p ure theory" ' (p. 95) .
universes constitute the fourth level of legitimation .

Symbolic

Berger & Luckmann

(1 967) write, "These are bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different
provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic
to tality" (Berger & Luckmann 1 967, p. 95).

Here we enter the realm of

language and types of "discourse" which serve to reinforce the "correct" view
of reality. Berger & Luckmann (1967) stress the importance in understanding
the "taken for granted" nature of these symbolic universes. They come to us
as if they were inevitable and immutable laws, forgetting that they are human
c reations and must be sustaine d and reaffirmed from generation to
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generation .

This is the problem of legitimation.

Berger and Luckmann (1969 ) write:

In The Sacred Canopy,

"The problem of legitimation is to

explain w hy the p articular arrangement that has developed in a particular
society, in whatever sequence of historical accidents, should be faithfully
adhered to, even if it is at times annoying or downright painful" (Berger 1 969,
p. 20 ). With respect to this point, the Army hides behind NEPA procedures
to affirm its right to control the process.
Yet another strategy for reinforcing power is the careful employment of
the symbols and rituals of power. We are reminded of the centrality of these
symbols of "ideological hegemony" from writers such as Habermas (1 975) and
Lukacs ( 1 9 7 1 ) who wrote about the importance of symbols in mainta ining
dominance :
Legal privilege, deference, prohibitive ritual display
and their many manifestations are means o f
d o m i n a t ion w h i c h a r e e xe r C i ses m t h e
establishment of legitimacy. The key point here is
that they come into being as a result of a l ready
existing relations of super-and sub ord ination
(Wenger 1980, p. 367) .
The Army has made good use of its already-estab lished position of
dominance through the use of ritual disp lays .

Anyone who has attended

scoping meetings is familiar with the spectacle of Army personnel in
uniforms and the profusion of American flags. A citizen from Richmond,
KY., commenting on the early years of the opposition movement there said :
W e had lots of meetings with the Army . . . There
were lots of meetings. They were very intimidating
to us. They wore their uniforms. They were
trained in a manner that was professional. They
didn't know our names.
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Another interesting illustration of the use of symbols to legitimate the
stockpile destruction program involves the creation of the Chemical
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) logo. In 1991, FEMA and
the Army approved an official logotype for use on all CSEPP printed
materials. The logo was a triangle representing the three tiers of government
involved with the CSDP: federal, state and local.

According to their

newsletter CSEPP Update, the logo was created :
To p roject a consis tent graphic image of our
program . . . Its graphic elements are designed to
solidify and strengthen CSEPP identification in each
community. . . The Public Information and
Education Standards recommended that the logo be
used for CSEPP letterhead, CSEPP publications,
briefings, transp arencies and sli des and CSEPP
signage (CSEPP Update: September / October 1 99 1 , p .
2, 3).
The CSEPP logo was in use until the summer of 1 992 when it was
discontinued because of a special set of circumstances (see Chapter 6 for
details).

In the following sections we will review the typical legitimations

offered by the Army and examine some of the institutions and practices that
support the legitimation function.

5 .3

Army Legitimations for the CSDP
Since its inception, the Army has offered numerous j usti fications for

the existence and the necessity for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
(CSDP).

Some of the major legitimations proffered by the Army have already

been mentioned in a previous chapter, e.g., the Congressionally-mandated
destruction deadline, the dangers of continued storage (i.e., the deteriorating
243

s tockpile argument), the alleged "safety " of incineration, our international
treaty agreements to eliminate chemic a l /biological weapons ( i . e . the
Chemical Weapons Convention {CWC J ), the potential economic benefits to
the affected communities in terms of job creation, etc. All of these rationales
have been debunked by factual demonstrations of their specious character.
However, there is more to the process of legitimation than merely making
pronouncements. In the next section, we will undertake an examination of
some institutional arrangements that have evolved as a are part of this

process .
5.4

The ICCB and SARA Title III: Legitimating Practices and Institutions
SARA Title III, otherwise known as Public Law 99-499, the Superfund

Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, also known as the Emergency

Pla n ning R ight-To-Know Act of

1 986,

was created in response to the disaster

in Bhopat India in which several hundred people were killed due to the
release of toxic chemicals. Title III's primary objective is to force states and
communities to plan for these types of accidents.

To accomplish its goals,

Local E mergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) were established in
communities.

These local committees were responsible for: " ( 1 ) gathering

data on chemical facilities and disseminating that information to the public
(" right-to-know " L and (2) incorporating public p articipation in chemical
hazards planning" (Feldman 199 1 , p. 1 34). For a variety of reasons, not the
least of which is the paucity of resources available to the LEPCs to carry out
their mandate, Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) have fallen
short of the mark set for them by the law.
The A rmy, anxious to gain acceptance for its program of on-site
incineration, and being fully cognizant of the added burdens placed upon
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these local emergency planning committees, seized the day and superimposed
another institutional structure, the
Coordination B oards (ICCB s)

Intergovernmental Consultation and

on to the already-existing Local Emergency

Planning Committee (LEPC) structure created under SARA .

Among other

things, the ICCB added to the LEPC structure the fact of centralized control
and coordination from the Pentagon. This statement taken from the minutes
of the Kentucky ICCB meeting which was held in Lexington on October 6,
1 989, is indicative of the Army's thinking on the matter:
f. There will be a Steering Committee meeting at
the Pentagon in November. We need to be looking
at such things as political and economic differences,
etc . We need to develop a central theme that we
can utilize in these programs (Mi n u te s : LBAD
ICCB Meeting, Lexington, KY., October 6, 1 989, p. 2).
Title III requires that LEPCs be comprised of relevant state and local
o fficials, police, fire, civil defense, p ublic health, environmental a ffairs,
transp ortation personnel, members of the mass media, and designated
community groups (Feldman 1 989, p . 1 6 ) .

While the Army is not legally

obligated under SARA Title III as are private enterprises engaged in similar
activities, the DOD agreed to voluntarily comply with certain aspects of the
law, and employing an expansive interpretation of the Act, decided that the
goals of the newly-created ICCB structure would best be served by including
the following components: " ( 1 ) Army participation in local LEPCs; (2) Army
selection of persons to serve on ICCBs; and (3) development of emergency
notification and warning systems in cooperation with local communities"
(Feldman 1 989, p . 2).

Through these channels, Army influence penetrates

deep into the local social structure.
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Concern about emergency response for the CSDP is a legitima te
concern of the A rmy (nearly $8,000,000 has been allocate d ) , but so is
community a cceptance of incineration technology.

We argue that the

primary reason for the creation of this additional bureaucratic tier is to
control the information flows into the community concerning the CSDP and
to attempt to co-opt important members of state and local governments and
other "d iverse interests" into compliance with the A rmy ' s Chemical
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP).
There is little doubt about the Army's intentions to use the newly
created ICCBs as a vehicle for gaining community acceptance for the Army's
program.

Feldman ( 1 988) writes about "Maintaining Citizen Concurrence

and Gaining public Support through Intergovernmental Consultation"
(Feldman 1 988, p. 1 4 ) .

Later, he proposes that, " Intergovernmental

Consultation and Coordination can reduce public opposition by provid ing
institutional arrangements to mitigate socio-economic impacts arising from
implementation of this program" (Feldman 1 988, p. 14).

He goes on to

describe various methods by which the Army can induce communities to
accept the CSEPP program by using either (a) tax-equivalent payments in lieu
of revenue losses resulting from the necessity to upgrade emergency
preparedness infrastructure; (2) anticipatory compensation payments prior to
an action; or (3) incentive-building measures which might include providing
technical assurances of quality control in program management, mitigating
health and safety concerns, upgrad ing emergency response capab ilities
(Feldman 1 988). Indeed, the Army's decision to build Emergency Operation
Centers in communities adjacent to each of the stockpile sites, represents such
an effort.
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Feldman ( 1 989) argues that because SARA Title III encourages the
participation of "d iverse interests" in emergency planning (e .g., the mass
media), the presence of these organizations on local ICCBs "may also produce
a climate more conciliatory from that which prevailed during the p ublic
hearings I scoping meetings phase of the CSDP" (Feldman 1 989, p. 3).

In

defending the need for the creation of this additional bureaucratic structure to
supplement the already-existing Local Emergency Planning C ommittees,
Feldman (1989) argued that:
While effectively facilita ting install ation-local
c o mmunity contact and l i a i son for CSDP
emergency pl anning, however, LEPCs c annot
preform all intended aspects of ICCBs. Non
emergency planning activities, such as public
information and education, channeling public
concerns to the Army, should be provided by ICCBs
(Feldman 1989, p. 1 ) .
Because these local commi ttees are not autonomous from the
structure, they are very dependent on on the Army's good will in order to
obtain the needed goods and services necessary to cope with any untoward
accident resulting from CSDP operations . This indebtedness helps to insure

complia n ce and allows the propaganda function to flourish without being
obvious.

Feldman's (1989) research into LEPC functioning at the various

stockpile sites, indicated an almost universal lack of resources necessary to
deal with the joint responsibilities imposed upon them by SARA and the
CSDP.

He reiterated this failing at a Hazardous Materials Management

Conference in 1 99 1 , where he said: "Currently, the sole sources of fiscal
support for LEPCs are state and local government revenues (often derived
from a special chemical facilities' operator tax) (Feldman (April! 1 99 1 , p. 1 3 5).
This is one of the reasons they are so vulnerable to Army influence.
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He

found, for example, that in Alabama, "public information management, in
general, is not up to expectation," and additionally, his report noted that, "the
state lacks adequate resources for information management, data processing
and clerical support" (Feldman 1 989, p. 9) . In Arkansas, he found that no
money had been appropriated for Title III implementation. With respect to
Colorado, he wrote, "Title III has been funded by estab lished emergency
planning budgets of other agencies. Pueblo does levy a small fee on chemical
facility operators" (Feldman 1989, p. 1 0) . In Indiana, he reported that there is
no " Right-To-Know" law and noted that for 1 9 8 7-88, Ind iana h a d
appropriated $65,000 for Title III implementation.

This translates into one

full and two part-time staffers and a small office.

In Kentucky because of

financial constraints, he reports, a "less than perfect effort" of Title III
implementation exists. (There are other reasons that may explain Kentucky's
"less than perfect effort" with respect to Title III implementation. It may also
be due to the Army's lessened credibility and influence at that site and to the
A r my ' s inab i l ity to co-opt important members of state and local
governments). Feldman (1989) makes much of the organization and super
enthusiasm of the LEPC in Fayette County, Kentucky as compared with that
in Madison County, Kentucky. The fact of the matter is that Madison County
(the site of the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot) is more likely to be affected
by an off-site release from LBAD, but it is also the site of the most vociferous
and tenacious opposition movement. In an attempt to put a positive "spin"
on events at LBAD, Feldman (1989) stresses the importance of "personal
rapport" in the success of the ICCB program. He reports that in Madison
County, for example, this rapport was developed over a period of eight
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months in a series of one-on-one meetings "which were very constructive"
(pp. 25-6) .
In Maryland, he found that while unable to devote much money to
l o cal em ergency p l anning,

Maryland

had a head

start on SARA

implemen tation because i ts own hazardous materials p l a n had been in
operation since 1 9 87.

In Oregon, although no SARA Title III funding has

been made available to Oregon, the state's RTK law has been funded
sep arately for some time.

Finally, in Utah, he reported that Ti tle III

imp lementation funds had been made availab le by the legislature, but had
not found their way to counties. Ho-wever, this is where the need for fun ding
is felt (Feldman 1 989).

5 .4. 1

M itigating Public Concern through 'Compensation' :
The financial resources being thrown a t these communities via ICCBs

in an attempt to enhance their read iness to handle a chemical accident are
substantial. In conjunc tion w ith discussions concerning the role of ICCBs in
enhancing public acceptance of the Army 's emergency p lan, compensation
looms as one possible avenue of entry, as this statement demonstrates:
A principal means of mitigating public concerns in
pe rceived risk laden programs is compensating
communities for their impacts (Carnes, et al., 1 983) .
This can be a prime fac tor ha stening public
acquiescence toward such programs. The Army,
working in conjunction with FEMA, is committed
to upgrading emergency response infrastructure at
CSDP sites ( U . S .Army, 1 9 89 a ) . Initially, this
u p g r a d e p rocess i n v o l v e d expe n d i tu res of
$1 00,000/CSDP state, with several upgrade stages yet
to be completed, as well as additiona l fu nds
(Feldman ! May l 1 99 1 , p. 1018).
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According to Feldman (1988) "Four different but complementary goals
of ICCBs have been identified: ( 1 ) meet with requirements of federal laws; (2)
maintain citizen concurrence with, or gain public support for a program; (3)
m aximize program e ffectiveness by minimizing delay and legitimizing
decisions; and (4) promote democratic values shared by members of the
public" (Feldman 1 988, p. 1 3 ) .

It is the second of these goals, that of

m ain taining citizen concurrence, that concerns us here, for we are arguing,
that legitimation of the on-site incineration decision through the co-optation
of community social structures is the raison d 'etre for the Army's creation of
the ICCBs. An Army Public Affairs Officer, gave the Army's version of why
the ICCB was created, "To create a format to present a reasoned argument of
what's going on" (4 / 28/92 Personal Communication to C .Griffith Davies).
Indeed, ICCB is considered by some as "a potential form of alternative dispute
resolution {or ADR} (Bear 1989) likely to increase the chances for constructive
solutions to environmental conflicts by avoiding impasse" (Feldman {May}
1991, p. 1 0 1 9) . However, ICCB board participants at the Lexington Bluegrass
Army Depot site in Kentucky, paint a rather different picture. According to
Kentucky representatives, ICCB meetings are very top-down affairs with the
A rmy setting agendas, showing viewgraphs, giving briefings, etc .

One

informant remarked, " ICCB was originally sold to the communities as an

information conduit but it's been totally subverted into emergency response."
A knowledgeable Kentucky state official commented, "I was concerned about
spend ing so much time on emergency response. "

The reference to

"emergency response" refers specifically to CSEPP---the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Prep aredness Program---the Army's grand plan d esigned to
protect citizens from a chemical accident resulting from CSDP operations .
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The focus on emergency response

IS

very significant, for if one becomes

enmeshed in the workings of the Army's Chemical Stockpile Emergency
Preparedness Program (CSEPP), one buys into the idea of the inevitability of
on-site incineration.

Citizens who oppose the Army's plan in Kentucky

realized this early on, as did the citizen activists in Maryland who, at one
point, refused to accept money from the Army for emergency response.
5.4.2

The ICCB and Control of Information:
In conjunction with centralized control from the Pentagon, the Army

imposes tight controls over the flow of information emanating from national
ICCB meetings .

While declaring that the process of information exchange

through the consultation and coordination process is a vital component of
the program, they tolerate only two types of information flow at the national
level, i. e., from Army officials at the Pentagon to the local ICCB; from the
local ICCB to the Pentagon.

Information to the general public (and that

includes citizens in the affected communities) is carefully controlled and
monitored . An Army directive flatly states:
All information provided by the Army to Local and
Programmatic ICCBs which is in draft form and I or
has not been cleared for public dissemination shall
be treated as sensitive, confidential, and {is} to be
withheld from public disclosure until cleared by the
Army for public release (U. S. Department of the
A r m y , Procedures of the CSDP Programmatic and

L o c a l In t e rgo v e r n m e n tal Co n s u l t a t io n
Coordination Boards, no date, p . 4 )

and

.

While minutes are kept of the local ICCB meetings, none are kept of
the national meetings, and all ICCB meetings are closed to the p ub lic
( although at times, visitors are permitted at local meetings) . Feldman (199 1 )
writes that "The status of meeting closure, practiced b y a l l ICCBs, i s a
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contentious issue" (Feldman 1991, p . 1 0 1 7). The Army's rationale for meeting
closure can be seen in the following statement: "The prevailing view is that
ICCBs are a "buffer" between the general public and the Army, offering the
former the opportunity to channel their concerns to officials having access to
the CSDP, while offering the latter a good communication forum for the
candid airing of concerns" (Feldman 199 1 , p. 1 0 1 7) . The Army feels that access
should be controlled to "expedite frank discussion of concerns" (Feldman
1 991, p. 1 0 1 7) . The real reason behind this need to control access to these
meetings is that they want to prevent the general p ublic from hearing
discussions concerning such things, for example, as: (1) the re-entry problem
which involves decisions as to when and under what circumstances persons
may return to their dwellings after a chemical accident involving stockpile
destruction activitities---a very sticky issue for the Army and a potentially hot
potato for Army Public Affairs moguls; or (2) the problems with testing at the
Johnston Island facility; or (3) discussions about b ids and the amount of
contract awards etc.

While the Intergovernmental C onsultation and

Coordination Board (ICCB) is not the main pillar in the A rmy 's arsenal of
institutions and practices designed to win public support for the incineration
of chemical weapons, it is not insignificant. Although its influence is subtle,
it represents yet another example of power processes at work, it c reates
another b arrier to participation. An appreciation of its various workings and
underpinnings can help to illuminate other parts of the puzzle.

5.5

Ideology and Myth in the CSDP
Closely associated with the concept of legitimation is that of ideology,

which Berger and Luckmann (1967) describe as, "ideas serving as weapons for
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social interest" (Berger & Luckmann 1 967, p . 6).

According to their

formulation, ideologies are the underlying assumptions (or presuppositions)
embed ded in particular conventions and depend on the power relations
which underlie these conventions. However, Clelland notes that '"ideology'
is more o ften viewed as explicit rationalized d o ctrine"

(Personal

Communication, March 1995). Ideologies are means of legitimizing existing
social relations and differences of power simply through the recurrence of
ordinary, familiar ways of relating which take these relations and power
differences for granted (Berger & Luckmann 1970).

What are the underlying

assumptions or presupposition that underscore Army rhetoric vis-a-vis the
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program? In this section we will explore some
of the more obvious ideologies and the myths that support them.

5.5.1

Ideologies and the CSDP
One of the most frequently employed ideologies to emerge in the early

days of the CSDP was what we refer to as the ideology of harmony. The idea
that "we're all in this together." The idea that we share a common goal (i.e.,
that of getting rid of chemical weapons) and a common purpose. Marx gave
the fullest expression to this notion when he wrote: "The ideas of the ruling
class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling

material force of society, is at the same time its ruling in tellectual force" (The
German Ideology, pp. 64-66).

He further argued that each ruling class

conceives its ideas to have the status of immutable, inevitable laws . "For each
new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it," he wrote:
is compelled, merely in order to carry through its
aims, to represent its interest as the common
interest of all the members of society, that 1s,
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expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the
form of univers ality, and rep resent them as the
only rational, univers ally valid ones (Marx &
Engles,The German Ideology (1845-6) (1970) p . 65).
W e see the echoes o f this sentiment expressed i n the Army's defense o f
the programmatic decision a s doing, "What's best for the country." Marx
fu rther argued that during normal periods, ( i . e . , not during periods of
upheaval or revolu tion), the maj ority of the subordinate class in most
societies hold the belief that the society is working for their interests---or, at
least, that it is the best possible society at the present time (Sherman and
Wood 1989).

Finally, mention should be made of Gramsci's notion of

"cultural hegemony" since "harmony" is an idea generally accepted by both
superordinates and subordinates thus making it difficult to combat.

5.5.2

Eliade and the Function of Myth
The function of myth according to Eliade (1958) is to provide a model,

an exemplar, an archetype. "The main function of myth," he writes, "is to
determine the exemplar models of all ritual , and of all significant human
acts" (Eliade 1958, p . 410). Unfortunately, the original term 'my thos ' came to
denote "what cannot really exist" and in usage came to mean "falsehood " or
" illlusion. "

However, Eliade (1958) argues that this is not how we should

understand "myth . " He directs us to look upon myth rather as the ancients
looked upon them, as "exemplars" and models or patterns of behavior.
According to Eliade, "Myth is an extremely complex cultural reality, which
can be approached and interpreted from various complementary viewpoints"
(Eliade 1963, p. 5). Myth taught man the primordial stories that gave him his
existential identity, and for contemporary Americans, the myth of democracy
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(i. e., the belief that the

U.

S. i s a democracy

m

the classic sense) holds

preeminent place among all our cultural myths.

5 .5.3 The Myth of Democracy
In the beginning (1984) the Army relied heavily on calls for patriotism
to secure the cooperation of communities. In attempting to convince them
that the weapons were everyone's problem and their rapid destruction was in
everyone's best interests, they made it seem as if it were their patriotic duty to
cooperate with the Army's incineration decision.
The Army's rhetoric of "we're all in this together" did not hold sway
very long in Kentucky. Therefore, Army replaced patriotis m argument and
began relying on what we call the myth of democracy. Belief in the ideal of a
Jeffersonian Democracy (i. e., 'government of the people, by the people, and
for the people') runs very deep in Richmond, KY. Belief in democracy as a
cherished v alue is to b e found among all the persons interviewed in
conjunction with this program--- Army personnel as well as citizen activists
of varying political persuasions. For example, in describing the early d ays of
organizing Concerned Citizens of Madison County in Richmond, KY . , one
informant said the Army held many meetings with local citizens in the early
days (circa 1 984). As this Concerned citizen recounted: "Before the meeting,
you can't imagine the turn out.
done was before your eyes.
speak."

It was swelling .

What every person had

Democracy and we the people were about to

When asked to speculate on the probable outcome of the c itizen

protest at LBAD, that person replied, "I feel that they will gradually phase out
this site because of the number ---we have less (i.e., LBAD has only 1 .6% of
the stockpile)--- and this is a democracy." Another example comes from the
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account of an activist who was present at the hearing in which testimony was
given before the House Armed Services Committee .

Spea king about the

Army, the informant said:

They were damn mad . They were summoned by
the duly-elected representatives of the people. We
had our day. [Associate] and I were treated fairly.
That night, we passed the Jefferson Memorial. It's
true. We the people have the right to redress our
grievances. That made me feel great. If you have a
plausible concern, then you make yourself heard .
These eloquent expressions embody our most fund amental political
beliefs; yet they symbolize what we perceive to be true, rather than what is

actually true. Following Eliade's ( 1 958) formulation of myth as a pattern or
archetypal model, the ideal of democracy, i. e., 'government of the people, by
the people and for the people' is the quintessentially American myth. It is the
model by which we judge other governments and our own conceptions of
right and wrong behavior stem from our belief in this model . However, the
myth can be employed by powerful interests to control the behavior of
citizens. It can be used to thwart any attempts at rebellion. By evoking this
myth, as the Army has done on numerous occasions at scoping meetings, in
the press, in face-to-face encounters with opponents of the program.

The

ideals of democracy which revolve heavily around citizen p articipation in
and control of government, can be effectively used to dissipate dissent. Let us
make note here of the dialectic of "cultural hegemony . "

The ideology of

democracy does encourage dissent and does force the Army into an incredibly
convoluted decision process. That is, this aspect of cultural hegemony is quite
expensive for superordinates.
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On numerous occasions, the Army has cautioned citizens to be patient
and to have respect for "the process."
equated with democracy.

"Having respect for the process " is

Here, instead of being the actual practice o f

democracy with all the potential chaos of a genuine "give and take" situation,
we have the Army making a fetish out of the process and equating that with
democracy. For example, citizens of Madison County (Kentucky) were told at
a public hearing on the Draft Programmatic EIS which took place in 1986 that:
This is not your only opportunity to be heard; there
are ways to be heard, by written submission, by
paying attention to the process that the law requires
us to follow here, in particular, taking note that a
final statement o f evidence, record, material,
comments, positions and the like has not been
prepared and will not be prepared until we have
had all of that material to consider (Transcript :
CSDP Public Hearing, 2 8 August 1986 p. 8 ) .
The effect of employing predominant myths i n the service o f vested
interests is one way of entrenching their power. It allows opponents of the
stockpile destruction program to perceive the present problem as just a blip in
an otherwise equitable system of checks and balances; it serves to secure the
status quo because it forces people to be self-policing. It is inimical to any type
of direct action as it makes this approach seem almost " unAmerican . "
"Working through the system," to borrow a phrase from the sixties, becomes
an exercise in futility as the system works to absorb controversy in an endless
round of bureaucratic procedures and regulations.

The entire opposition

movement is encapsulated and opposition is not so much crushed, as it is
kept in its proper place---"channeled" into a cul de sac as it were.
Even among citizen activists, there are those who are unaware that
they are being manipulated . Of course, this is clearly an example of the third
257

dimension of power, i. e., where people have internalized the controls even
when it is not in their interest to do so. In such cases, people see what they
want to see. They see groups of citizens proudly standing up for their beliefs
against what they believe is a bad decision, what we have come to expect as
the essence of democracy.

They see the government making some

concessions---again, democracy in action. What many fail to see, is that their
range of choices is so constra ined as to preclude any r e a l practice in
democracy.

This was Marcuse's (1968) point exactly when he wrote, "The

range of c hoice open to the individual is not the d eci sive factor in
determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what

is chosen by the individual" (Marcuse, 1968, p. 7) . This dichotomy between
appearance and reality is reminiscent of Machiavelli who argued that it is
important for rulers (or those who wish to maintain power) to at least create
the appearance that the old forms have not changed .
Related to the myth that America is a democracy is the idea that the
Army is subservient to Congress --- that Congress is the representative of the
people against the encroa chment of the military establi shment, and
furthermore, that Congress exercises real authority over the military. Even
members of Common Ground / KEF (Citizen group from Berea, Kentucky)
who generally hold a more skeptical view of the system, regard Congress as
receptive to citizens' concerns. One activist expressed great faith in Congress
and said that at one point the focus of their activity shifted away from the
Army to Congress because they were able to obtain more information from
Congress and because "Congress controls the purse strings. "
I n theory, Congress does control. However, i n practice, i t rarely works
out tha t way. Save for annual decisions about appropriations, there is little
258

oversight according to knowledgeable sources. As a member of Congressman
Hopkins' (U. S. House of Representatives) staff pointed out.

In theory, he

said, it is Congress that provides oversight and legislative { control) . . But he
was careful to point out that:
In real ity, { there a r e ) v a ry ing d e grees o f
interest/ oversight. What i s involved i s legislative
control of activities of a depa rtment of three
million people (the DOD) and three services, plus
all sorts of committees . Clearly, when you see the
scope of the Department of Defense (DOD), you can
see why {it is difficult to scrutinize the workings of

the A rmy too closely ) .
Additionally, another factor has entered the picture of the modern state
which clouds the issue even further---that of the ascendence in the power of
lobbyists, which the framers of our constitution could not even have
imagined . Comments from concerned citizens who had gone to Washington
to observe the Congressional deliberations concerning the Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program when it was in its infancy, recall seeing "the suits" (as they
put it) in the gallery quietly observing the proceedings. They were sure these
were lobbyists for the incinerator industry .

Nevertheless, efforts to track

down specific lobbying activities for the CSDP have proven fruitless, largely
because reporting procedures are inimical to tracking down who gave w h a t
t o whom . . (Although w e understand that this is changing) .
Nevertheless, as a general rule, the citizens who organized to oppose
the Army's plan, believe fiercely in the ability of the system to change in
respond to their pressure. Therefore, there is no need for the state to bring
out its repressive forces, for as Parsons (1966) pointed out, "A power system in
which the only negative sanction is the threat of force is a very primitive one
which c annot function to mediate a complex system of organizational
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coordination---it is far too b lunt an instrument" (Parsons, 1966, p . 260). Thus,
perpetuating certain ideologies and playing upon myths is more effective in
maintaining power processes.

In this case, the myth that America is a

democra cy along the Jeffersonian model is very useful to the A rmy, for it
engenders the notion of 'playing by the rules' and fosters cooperation with
the complex NEPA procedures and regulations which the Army uses to its
advantage. As they are fond of reminding the citizens who oppose the plan,
"We will comply with the law." Our analysis is in harmony with Althusser's
( 1 971) statist conception of power, where power is located in the state (as
opposed to the people) and its various components, from the Armed Forces
and the pol ice to the schools and churches---c alled by Althusser, the
'repressive state apparatus' and the 'ideological state apparatus' respectively
(Bocock 1986) . If we are to know the limits to the power of the state we must
understand the premises from which it derives its power. In the case under
consideration, the Army's ability to c all upon the enduring cultural myths is
of vital importance in the maintenance of its power.

5.5.4

Hierophanies and Kratophanies
"To the p lace of the skull we have come."

These were the openmg

lines from the script of a peace vigil (i.e., demonstration) which was held in
Kentucky at the site of the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot on April 1 7, 1 992.
A small group of a ctivists and sympathizers from the community stood
around in the light rain outside the gate to the depot to give witness to their
opposition to the proposed nerve-gas facility. Participants in the peace vigil
placed paper cranes on the fence at the conclusion of the vigil as a symbol of
hope and empowerment.
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There are about 70,000 M55 "explosively configured " rockets stored at
the Lexington-Blluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) (See Appendix E). The rockets
contain the nerve agents GB and VX. The igloos (earth-bermed bunkers) are
90 feet long, 25 feet wide and 15 feet high. A local newspaper reported that
"there are approximately 2,500 rockets stored in each igloo which is designed
to be thinner on top so that if the rockets inside explode, the force of the blast
will go upward, then fall back down into the igloo. The igloos are also placed
far enough apart so that a blast in one will not detonate the rockets

m

another" (Lexington-Herald Leader, Tuesday, November 27, 1 984, p . 1 ).
One could see no evidence of the huge military presence that
afternoon . The igloos are not visible from the depot gate. They are stored in
the central portion of the depot and are not visible from the depot fence.
However, it was pointed out quite eloquently by one of the speakers that these
igloos represent the Army's version of "sacred ground " as they are heavily
guarded and hid den from view (to frighten off potential terrorists, we are
told) . They are modern-day h ierophan ies , i.e., manifestations of the sacred .
In this c ase they would also be categorized as k r a t o p h a n i e s ---i. e . ,
manifestations of power which are therefore feared o r venerated (Eliade
1 958) .

Kratophanies are simply another modality of the sacred ---one that

inspires fear.
The p henomenon of h i e r op h a n i e s and k r a t o p h a n i e s has been
discussed quite eloquently by Mircea Eliade (1958) in his now-classic work

Patterns in Comparative Religion.

Hierophanies appear in many forms, he

writes, "Everything unusual, unique, new, perfect or monstrous at once
becomes imbued with magico-religious powers and an object of veneration or
fear according to circumstances (for the sacred usually produces this double
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reaction)" (Eliade 1 958, p. 13). Anything---any object or person---may become
a hierophany, he explains and we can find examples of such things even
among modern-day civiliz ation.

"We must get used to the idea o f

recognizing hierophanies absolutely everywhere," h e writes, "in every area
of psychological, economic, spiritual and social life" (Eliade 1 958, p. 1 1 ) . A
hierophany implies a more or less clear choice, a singling out.

"A thing

becomes sacred in so far as it embodies (that is reveals) something other than
itself" (Eliade 1 958, p. 13). Durkheim ( 1 9 1 5) too has described the quality of
the sacred as "things set apart," "things forbidden." (We are reminded tha t
the word taboo, a Polynesian word also means "sacred" or "sacre"' in Latin.)
The igloos that house the "explosively configured " lethal unitary
chemical weapons at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot certainly fit
Eliade's description of kratophanies perfectly. These latter-day hierophanies
inspire dread and fear because they contain some of the most lethal weapons
of mass destruction ever created by man. (Recall that a drop of VX can kill a
man in minutes) .
The conceptualization o f the Army's nerve gas igloos as h ieroplz a n ies
1s directly related to the Third Dimension of Power. The presence of such
phenomena contribute greatly---enhance enormously---the perception of
power (and legitimacy) of the military, after all, the military are the possessor
and the guardians of these weapons. They are the "experts" in knowing how
to handle them, store them, deploy them.

5.6

Gramsci's Concept of "Ideological Hegemony"
Without entering into an extended deb ate regard ing the issue of

whether or not there is a r u l in g or d o m i n a n t ' class' in contemp orary
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American society, it is useful to look at Gramsci's concept of h ege m o n y .
which has relevance to our discussion. For Gramsci, hegemonic leadership
involves developing intellectual, moral and philosophical conse n t from all
major groups in a nation (Bocock 1986). Bocock (1986) points out that

"it is the

sheer taken-for-grantedne ss of he gemony that yields its full e ffects

---

the

'naturalness' of a way of thinking about social, economic, and political issues"
(Bocock 1 986, p. 6) .

Forgacs ( 1 988) comments that in Gramsci's prison

notebooks the meaning of hegemony is qualitatively modified:

"hegemony

comes to mean 'cultural, moral and ideological' leadership over allied and
subordinate group s . . .Hegemony in this sense is identified with the
formation of a new ideological 'terrain', with political, cultural and moral
leadership and with consent" (Forgacs 1 988, p. 4 23). Gramsci also insists that
hegemony is dynamic {dialectic} i.e., " is characterized by the combination of

force and consent variously balancing one another" (VII.2. in Forgacs 1988, p .
4 23) .

The fact that hegemony i s dynamic implies that i t must take into

account the interests and tendencies of subordinate groups. " In other words,"
Forgacs (1988) argues, "It presupposes an active and practical involvement of
the hegemonized groups, quite unlike the static, totalizing and passive
subordination implied by the dominant ideology concept" (Forgacs 1 988, p .
424) .

(Recall that m aintaining citizens ' co n s e n t

is also a key component of

Machiavelli's model . )
W e will elaborate further o n Gramsci's ideas regarding the dynamics of
engineering citizens' consent in the next chapter which deals with Army
propaganda. At this point the reader will excuse a minor digression while we
pick up one thread of Gramsci's argument concerning the force I consent
dichotomy. For this can be seen clearly in the Army's attempt to convince the
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citizens that the elaborate concrete fortresses built to protect igloos which
house these weapons of mass destruction and the concomitant security
measures which have grown up around them, are for their pro tection--
against "terrorists . "

As Sherman and Wood ( 1 989) remind us, ideologies

make use of social myths and one of the primary myths operative in this
controversy is the belief that the elaborate security systems at the Depots are
necessary "for protection against terrorists ." Do these measures really make
us more s a fe, or do they serve as legitim ations for the Army's secrecy
su rrounding the pro duction, use and stockpiling of weap ons of mass
destruction?

And, what effect, if any, do these measures have on the

willingness of opponents to attemp t any form of direct action or civil
disobedience?

To answer these questions we must turn once again to the

empirical data.
Speaking to an assembly of invited guests which included members of
Concerned Citizens of Madison County (Kentucky), General Hidalgo made
the following remarks at the Overview and Discussion Workshop held at the
Tooele Army Depot (TEAD). Colonel Hidalgo opened his remarks by stating
that "Special security measures preclude access to the grounds" (Hidalgo,
Transcript TEAD CAMDS Overview and Discussion Workshop 1 984, p. 1 22) .
This b are statement is a master stroke of understatement. During the course
of that session, in an effort to reassure citizens about the safety of the
stockpile, the General gave these graphic descriptions of the state'6 attempt to
secure the stockpile from untoward intrusion by "outsiders":

We are u s i n g t h e word s t a t e here i n the Gram s c ian s e n s e .
T h e s tate c o n s i s t s
o f t h e m e a n s of v i o l e nc e ( t h e po l i c e and t h e armed forc e s ) i n a g i v e n
te rri t o r y , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e s t a t e - fu n d e d b u re au c rac i e s , e . g . , t h e s e v e ra l
nati onal
l a b o ra t o r i e s .
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There is a 5,000 to 5,500 pound block of cement on
steel spikes sitting in front of each door to an igloo
(Gen. Hid algo 1 9 84, CAMDS Overview and
Discusion Workshop,p . 1 23);
Later he described the proposed destruction facilities in terms of their
structural integrity and their security against untoward intrusion:
The building would be a three-level rigid frame
steel building, which would contain steel reinforced
c oncrete explosive containment areas within
(Portion of transcript of proceedings of the Tooele
Army Depot CAMDS Overview and Discussion
Workshop, August 15, 1 984, p . 87);
The plant site would be approximately 1 1 acres in
size. It would be surrounded by security sensors .
Personnel would enter the site from this
position,through a guardhouse which is called an
entry control facility (Portion of transcript of
proceedings of the Tooele Army Depot CAMDS
Overview and Discussion Workshop, August 1 5,
1984, p . 87).
The reality of the inaccessibility to the stockpile sites is driven home
quite clearly to anyone who has visited any of the Army Depots where the
unitary weapons are stored and seen the signs posted on the Depot fence
which warn: "USE OF MAXIMUM FORCE AUTHORIZED."

One citizen

present on that tour described her feelings as she toured the Tooele Army
Depot's chemical destruction facility complex:
Many hours on a bus, and miles and miles of
driving . When I saw the guards with guns and
wire, it all became real to me.
Is it any wonder that citizens are wary of attempting any kind of civil
disobedience or direct action? With regard to this last point, early on in the
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interview process (1991), leaders of citizen groups who oppose the Army's on
site incineration plan, voiced the opinion that some form of direct action or
civil disobed ience would not be ruled out somewhere down the line. There
was talk of chaining themselves to the Depot fence.

Presumably, they

regarded this as a last resort if all else failed . One cannot escape the obvious
conclusion that the Army has, through the use of carefully-controlled
avenues for public participation, together with the implied threat of force
(Gramsci's force/consent dichotomy), been able to forestall just this type of
escalation .

The Army continuously assured the citizens during this same

meeting in 1984 that "the community and the state officials and the Army are

partners in this decision. And indeed, we will be partners {emphasis added )
in whatever decision is made" (Gen. Bobby Robinson 1 984, Transcript, TEAD,
CAMDS Overview and Discussion Workshop, Salt Lake City, Utah, p . 1 1 7) .
The repressive forces in place at the Depots where the weapons are
stored are a type of "insurance" for the Army, against terrorists---possibly, b u t,
surely, these repressive forces can be turned against opponents of on-site
incineration as General Hidalgo's remarks about the security in place at LBAD
make quite clear: "In answer to your question directly," he said:

"Yes, I

believe that at Anniston and at Lexington . . .I have personal knowledge that
those forces are drilled, trained in every aspect and equipped to cope with a
wide range of terrorists or dissident activities" (General Hidalgo 1 984, p. 1 23).

5.7

The Myth of Emergency Preparedness
In the ir e fforts to gain community acceptance for the on-site

incineration program, the Army has created a myth---The Myth of Emergency
Preparedness. The Army argues it is prepared to handle the eventuality of an
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accidental release of toxic nerve or mustard gas involving civilian population
centers .

(Here we are using the term " myth" in line with the common

parlance---to refer to "illusion" or as we noted earlier "what cannot really
exist " ) .

The author having spent several years at a national laboratory

working closely with various aspects of the Army's "grand emergency plan,"
i. e., CSEPP (Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program), has seen
firsthand how tenuous is the Army's claim that it can protect civilians in the
case of an accident involving the release of nerve gas into a populated area .
Up until the last half of this century, "Civil Defense" usually meant
protection against ordinary bombs (Keyes 1 982). With the advent of nuclear
missiles, an entirely new adj ustment had to be made.

During the fifties,

school children were trained in drills to "duck and cover" under their desks
as if this would afford any protection against the firestorm of a nuclear
explosion which Larson and Michells-Cyrus (1992) humorously describe as
"No worse than if a 500,000 ton baseball, hit on a line drive, were to strike
your home . "

The creation of the nerve agents (i.e., nerve gas) pose even

greater challenges in terms of adequate warning and protection against harm.
Not only because they are among the most toxic substances known to man,
but because they are colorless, odorless, and their presence---even in
microgram amounts---can be deadly.

Additional problems with protection

against these agents involve the various routes to exposure. For not only can
these gases be inhaled, they can also be absorbed through the skin; therefore,
just donning a face mask is not enough protection. Additionally, unless the
facemasks fits properly and are ready at hand, they are of no use at all.
Protection against the various agents that make up the unitary
stockpile of chemical weapons is complicated by the fact that research in this
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area is in its infancy. In 1989, the first systematic investigation of the effects of
in-place sheltering as protection against chemical agent infiltration was
undertaken at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee
(see Rogers et al 1990). The bulk of research that has been done by the Army
regarding the human health effects of nerve and I or vesicant agents has been
restricted to effects on young, healthy, males, under battlefield conditions .
Complicating this already dim picture is the fact that the only known
antidotes possess toxic properties of their own.

Atrop ine, for one, is a

hallucinogen, and its use is recommended only when agent exposure is
relatively certain and then should be administered only by trained personnel
(Rogers 1 990) . In a brilliant understatement, Stringer (1 986) observes that "the
measures employed to defend against chemical agents have u nfortunately
not achieved the quantum leap in effec tiveness seen in the a gents
themselves" (Stringer 1986, p. 1 1 ). Additionally, the Army has not solved the
reentry problem, and research in this area is fairly recent (Watson and Munro
1990; Munro et al 1 990; Munro et al 1991; Watson 1992, 1992, 1992; Argonne
National Laboratory 1991; Daugherty, M. et al 1990; Halbrook, R. S. et al 1992;
U. S. Department (HHS) 55 Federal Register 28940).
However, one of most troubling aspects

m

the entire oeuvre of

designing protective actions for chemical agent accidents involves the short
time available to warn the public. Data indicate that decision making among
community officials would take 15 to 20 minun tes under ideal conditions
(Rogers 1990). Rogers and Sorensen (1 988) found that "even assuming better
than ideal decion-making times of about 1 0 minutes in fast moving events,
many people would be exposed before being warned " (Rogers 1 990, p .39).
While the time of arrival of a toxic plume will vary depending on
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meteorological cond itions, the reader should be aware that, under certain
conditions, it is possible for a toxic plume to arrive 3 km downwind in 8
minutes. Now, admittedly, this would not present the same need for rapid
emergency response if it occurred on Johnston Island (JACADS) (the Army's
only full-scale test facility) as it would be if it occurred in Berea or Richmond,
Kentucky or in the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground (MD),
nevertheless, it presents one of the most difficult problems in terms of
protecting civilian populations from exposure to toxic gases.

5.8

The Creation of CSEPP: The Chemical Stockpile Emergency
Preparedness Program
Public safety was uppermost

m

the minds of Congress when they

funded the creation of CSEPP. As Public Law 99-145 stipulates, the destruction
of the unitary stockpile of chemical weapons is to be carried out in accord ance
with "maximum protection for the environment, the general public, and the
personnel who are involved in the destruction of the lethal chemical agents
and munitions referred to in subsection (a)" (PL 99-1 45, The Departme n t of

Defense A uthorization Act of
STAT. 747) .

1 986,

November 8, 1 985, Section 1412, p . 99

The Army's emergency prep aredness plan for the Chemical

Stockpile Distruction Program, known as " CSEPP" ( C hemical S to c kp i le
Emergency Preparedness Program), grew out of this mandate.
In 1 988, the Army asked the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to cooperate in the design, development and implementation of
C SEPP (Carnes, G arcovich and Shriver 1 99 1 ) .

A memoramdum o f

understanding (MOU) was drawn up between F E M A and the D A
(Department o f the Army) in which FEMA assumed responsibility for off-post
emergency planning activities. Subsequently, a Joint Steering Committee was
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instituted to serve as a focal point and provide oversight for CSEPP .

Six

subcommittees function to support the emergency planning effort, they
include: Planning Standards and Criteria, Reentry / Restoration, Training
Exercises, Public Affairs, and Automated Emergency Management and
Simulation Modeling.
Funding for CSEPP began in Fiscal Year 1 989 with the Dep artment of
the Army originally committing $1 00,000 for each of the eight sites with
chemical storage installations . As it became apparent that local communities
were not prepared for the new responsibilities imposed upon them by the
impending on-site incineration program, FEMA requested the Army to
release an additional $820,000 d uring Fiscal Year 1 989 to begin initial
upgrades. Eventually, the CSEPP budget blossomed out to $27 million for
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and $5.5 million for procurement.

(CSEPP Update: September /October 1991, p. 1-2) .
A ccording to the Army, CSEPP includes, " ten states, thirty-two
counties, and at least five Federal agencies" (CS EPP Update 1991, p. 1 1 )
includ ing, but not limited to: the newly-created U . S . Army Chemical
Material Destruction Agency; DOD (Dep artment o f Defense); EPA
(Environmental Protection Agency); FEMA (Federal Emergency Management
Agency); the DHHS (Department of Health and Human Services) and
n umerous other state and local civil defense agencies as well as several
N ational Laboratories (e. g., Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Argonne
National Laboratory, etc.), as well as their subcontractors .
CSEPP is by far the largest legitimation for the Disposal Program. After
CSEPP's funding began in 1 989, the Army immediately contracted with
various national laboratories (specifically the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
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in Oak Ridge, Tennessee) to begin conducting research into various ways of
protecting the public from an accident involving the release of chemical
(nerve or mustard gas) agents resulting from disposal operations . CSEPP's
very existence and its extensiveness are designed to support the belief that it is
possible to adequately respond to a catastrophic accident involving the release
of nerve / mustard gas involving a civilian population. CSEPP is like a giant
octopus with tentacles penetrating deep into the local social structure of the
communities adj acent to the stockpiled weapons. Its influence is both subtle
and profound, and, as we shall see, is no t limited solely to emergency
response.

It is the main prop agandizing vehicle and the purveyor of the

greatest myths, i.e., ( 1 ) that the process can be controlled; and (2) that the
communities, with help from the Army, are prepared (or can be prepared in
time) to cope with a major release of toxic nerve or mustard gas which crosses
the Army installation boundary. Michael Reich (199 1 ) discussed the d angers
inherent in putting blind faith in new technologies which make the Army's
reassurances appear unrealistic at best. He wrote:
Often, society reexamines the application of new
technology only after it is too late, after the device is
thoroughly integrated into social institutions, after
the device has produced a series of undesirable
second or third-order consequences, or worse, after
the device has caused a disaster and a body count.
The Army's emergency plan revolves around three princ i p a l
protective actions: ( 1 ) in-place sheltering; ( 2 ) evacuation; a n d ( 3 ) respiratory
protection. Of the three, evacuation seems to be the one most experts feel
offers the most promise of saving the most lives in the "unlikely" event of a
chemical acc ident relating to the operations of the d isposal program;
however, there are serious problems with relying solely on evacuation as the
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method of escape. Depending on the wind speed, direction of the plume and
atmospheric stability, it may be necessary for a great number of people to seek
shelter in place. All methods for protecting the public depend on obtaining
quick, reliable, information on exactly what has been released, which
direction the plume is likely to travel and what quantity of agent has been
released . In order to do this, sophisticated computer-generated atmospheric
dispersion models have been developed.

5.8.1

Plume Dispersion Models: " The Uncertain ty Principle: "
I n terms o f hazard prediction, researchers working o n atmospheric

dispersion models (computer programs which predict how far a toxic plume
will travel given certain parameters, e. g., meteorology, topography, etc . ) for
the Army have evolved some fairly sophisticated models.

Research in this

area has been going on at least since 1986 (Whitacre 1986) when the first of
these models (D2PC ) was developed by Army researchers at the Chemical
Research and Development Center of Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. The
work has continued since then, first at Los Alamos Na tional Laboratory
(Yamada et al 1989) and at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge,
Tennessee) where the current models were perfected and tested. However,
even the experts who are involved in developing these models are guarded
in their estimation of their effectiveness.

One researcher whose work is

highly respected in the field, speaking about

PA E C E

, (Protective Action

Evaluator for Chemical Emergencies) , which is actually a collection of
FORTRAN programs designed to help the user in analyzing protective action
scenarios, wrote:
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Uncertainty permeates the PAECE a t every
juncture: the dispersion model at best predicts the
expected exposure within + 50%; the decision-to
warn assumptions are b ased on limited cases; the
receipt of warning is based on extrapolations and
interpolations of limited d ata; public response is
estimated based on a limited number of previous
a c c id ents; imp lementation of in-p lace shelter
techniques is b ased on a limited number of trials .
Although any one of these uncertainties may be
e s t i m a t e d , the c o m b i n e d effect of these
uncertainties cannot be estimated (Rogers et al 1 990,
p.91).
Even as late as the summer of 1 992 when the author was engaged

m

writing a user manual to be used in conjunction with the latest version of
these air-dispersion models, (PADRE) P rotective A ction D ose R e d u c t i o n
Estimator, there was still a great deal o f tentativeness associated with their use
(PADRE User Manual, June 29, 1 992. Unpublished Draft).

Traffic models

(comp uter-generated models of traffic flow and p atterns) developed in
conjunction with evacuation scenarios, have also achieved a great deal of
sophistication, taking into account time-of-day, one-way streets, population
density, special events, meteorology, topography, etc. These models are used
in conjunction with air-dispersion models and are designed to assist decision
makers in deciding upon possible evacuation routes. They employ a zone
b ased emergency planning concept, a well-known method for developing
emergency plans (Carnes et al 1 989). Basicqlly, potentially-affected areas are
divided into three zones: the IRZ (immediate response zone; the PAZ or
protective action zone (an intermediate zone); and the PZ or precautionary
zone. The IRZ is the zone in closest proximity to the threat, for example, it
might be area within 3-1 0 km of a stockpile site (the actual distances may vary
substantially, based upon the circumstances). The capability to implement the
273

most appropriate protective action(s) very quickly is critical within the IRZ,
hence, w arning times are critical.

The PAZ defines an area where the

available emergency response times and the hazard distances associated with
them are sufficiently large to allow most people to respond effectively
through evacuation; the PZ is far enough away from the hazard to allow
sufficient time to both plan either evacuation or in-place sheltering.
5.8.2 "In Harms Way": Communities at Risk
The Army's probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) for the stockpile disposal
program (GA Technologies 1 987a, b, c, and MITRE 1987) identifies a whole
range of possible accidents with potential "off-site" consequences related to
disposal operations. Among those cited are storage accidents, transportation
accidents, handling accidents, and plant operations accidents. Included in this
risk analysis are catastrophic accidents caused by plane crashes into an igloo or
an earthquake.

The Army's risk analysis does not identify accidents with

extremely low probabilities (less than 1 Q- 8 ), or accidents resulting from acts of
sabotage or terrorism (Carnes et al 1 989) . The focus is on catastrophic external
events (earthquake,s plane crashes, etc.). However, the FPEIS ( 1 988) does list
some smaller accident scenarios involving possible everyday occurrences
such as forklift accidents or accidents involving the transpo rtation of
munitons from storage to the destruction facility.
Although Army documents flatly state the the possibility for accidents
resulting from disposal operations is extremely small and point to the low
probability of catastrophic accidents, it should be kept in mind that even
minor accidents of lesser magnitude could easily overwhelm local emergency
responders.

While the Army argues that the likelihood of an acci dent

involving nerve or mustard gas is extremely small, one researcher involved
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in studying protective actions wrote, "The universe of potential accidents
relevant to the storage and disposal of the unitary chemical stockpile is very
large" (Rogers 1 990, p. 67). Army people are firmly convinced that an accident
is unlikely, and pooh pooh any attempt to alter the impression that the
CSEPP can handle the problem of protecting the public. However, given the
comp lexity of the process and the high toxicity of the substances involved ,
this is a calculated risk at best. The question remains, what is an acceptable
level of risk and to whom is it acceptable?
Although it certainly is possible to exercise some control over what
h appens in the event of a chemical accident, nevertheless, it is very hard to
predict (and thus to prepare for) the combined effect of several things going
wrong at once. Perrow's concept of system accidents is p articularly germane
to the Army's chosen disposal technology and to the emergency plan now in
place to protect the public. Perrow (1984) argues that most high-risk systems
(such as the Army's reverse assembly thermal destruction system for the
CSDP) have special characteristics beyond their toxic or exp losive attributes
that make accidents in them i n ev i t a b le, even "normal."
qualities: i n terac tive complexity and tigh t coupling.

He ca lls these

When he speaks of

interactive comp lexity, he is referring to the possibility of simultaneous
multiple failures . He argues that we can prepare for and predict any one of
these failures, however, we are not prepared for the simultaneous failures
that are bound to occur.

"This interacting tendency is a characteristic of a

system," he states, "not of a p art or an operator; we call it the 'intera ctive
complexity' of the system" (Perrow 1 984, p. 4). Add to this mix the idea of
tight coupling, i.e., the system works very fast and cannot easily be turned off,
"the failed parts cannot be isolated from other parts, or there is no other way
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to keep the production from going safely" (Perrow 1984, p . 4). He argues that
interactive complexity and tight coupling will inevitably produce an accident,
thus, he feels justified in referring to them as normal accidents. He concludes
with the statement that although system accidents are uncommon, even rare;
this is not at all reassuring if they can produce catastrophes (Perrow 1984). He
gives Three Mile Island and the grounding of the Exxon Valdes as examples
of normal acciden t.s and argues persuasively that these were n o t c aused by
human failure as some have charged .
Looking at stockpile disposal from the standpoint of the destruction
technology alone, a very frightening picture emerges . However, if one pulls
b ack and takes a more global look, which takes into account all the variab les
relevant to emergency management (i.e., w arning times, how swiftly a
decision-to-warn is reached and communicated to the public, how quickly
people respond to warnings, evacuation scenarios, meteorological conditions,
population density, etc.), one can begin to question the Army's insouciance
regarding the possibility of an accident as well as the capacity of communities
to hand le an accident.

Where does that leave us?

Desp ite the Army

engineers' assurances about redu n dancies (b ack up systems) built into the
technology, Perrow's ( 1984) work does give us cause to ponder, to question
and, ultimately, to hold the Army and the various contractors accountable.?

7 For an i nteresting discussion of l iabil ity with res pect to the CS DP, read , "The
I s s u e of Tort Liability and the Acqu i sition of Emergency Equipment: Impacts
on State and Local Governments . ' ' p . 1 9 in Feldman, 1 990, Imp lications of SARA
Title III fo r Commun ity-Based Emergency Planning in the U. S. A rmy Chemical
ORNL/TM- 1 1 3 8 8 .
Stockpile D isposal Program:
The A cqu isition of Equ ipment.
A v ai l a b l e from the Nati onal Tec h nical Informati on Service, U . S . De partment
of Commerce, 5 28 5 Port Royal Road, S pringfield, V irgnia 22 1 6 1 .
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5.9

Summary and Conclusion:
We have surely not said all that could be said regarding the issue of

how language and its use supports certain power relationships, nor have we
fu lly

expl ored

all

the

multiple

interconn e c ti ons

b e tween

myths,

legitimations, and ideologies. Our goal was more modest: (1) To show the
numerous efforts, b oth institutional and linguistic that infuse the Army's
CSDP with its peculiar flavor and help to determine the course of its
acceptance by those who oppose or support its aim; (2) To demonstrate how
the modern 'state' approaches the problem of legitimizing its prerogatives to
its citizens; and (3) To illustrate the efficacy of the controls available to the
state.
We began this chapter speaking about the third dimension of power
which involves investigating the various m e a n s through which p ower
"influences, shapes or determines conceptions of the necessities, possibilities
and strategies of challenge" (Gaventa 1 980, p. 15). We h ave examined the
various myths which help perpetuate the status quo decision of the Army. It
should be noted that these various mechanisms (myths, legitimations,
eupemisms o f power) help shape beliefs about the " inevitabililtly" of
incineration as the only "possible" choice and about the sacredness of " the
process" as the only proper venue for asking questions.

Thus keeping the

level of dissent well within the bounds acceptable to the Army by portraying
the issue of the destruction of the weapons as a purely technical problem,
rather than as an exercise in power. In the next chapter we will take up the
issue of propaganda and we will further develop some of the ideas touched
upon in this chapter.
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Chapter 6

Propaganda and the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
(CSEPP)
' We cannot assume today that men must in the last resort be governed by their
own consent. Among the means of power that now prevail is the power to
manage and manipulate the consent of men. That we do not know the limits of
such power---and that we hope it does have limits---does not remove the fact
that much power today is successfully employed without the sanction of reason
or the conscience of the obedient.'
C. W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination (pp 40-41).

6.1

The Third Face of Power--- Propaganda and CSEPP:
In the previous chapter we presented several examples of what Lukes

( 1 974) describes as the third dimension of power in the form of myths,
ideologies and legitimations employed by the Army in defense of its program
of on-site incineration.

Analyses of power often assume tha t the absence of

grievances is evidence of concensus. However, the third dimension of power
forces us to consider the fact that a concensus can be m anipulated . Lukes
(1974) asks,
Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of
power to prevent people from having grievances by
s h a p ing their per ceptions, cognitions a n d
preferences in such a way that they accept their role
in the existing order of things, either because they
can see or imagine no other alternative to it, or
because they see it as natural and unchanageable
(Lukes 1 974, p. 24)?

In this chapter we will examine exactly how the state attempts to shape
the perceptions of citizens to suit its own purposes. The Army's attempts to
278

influence how citizens defined the situation did not begin in any formal way
that one could i dentify as 'propagand izing' until the c itizen p rotest
movement which started in Kentucky began to show appreciable gains at
other, formerly quiescent sites. Then and only then, did we see the systematic
development of propaganda on a national scale. It developed in concert with
the Army's emergency plan known as the Chemical Stockpile Emergency
Preparedness Program (CSEPP) .
As the Army's major p ropagandizing device, CSEPP serves a dual
purpose: (1) complying with the Congressional mandate to carry out the goals
of the destruction program in keeping with the 'maximum protection of the
public' (its manifes t function); and (2) functioning as the major p ropaganda
vehicle for the entire destruction program (its latent function --- in the sense
of a "hidden agenda").
We a rgue that in pursuing its aim to site eight nerve-gas incinerators
in the continental U. S., the Army has constructed an elaborate propaganda
campaign. The camp aign has several goals: (1) to enlist the cooperation of
state and local civil defense personnel and to utilize the infrastructure of
emergency response as a vehicle for "selling" the states on the p rogram; (2) to
prop up the Army's p restige and thus its credibility; (3) to make the idea of
destroying the stockpile by incineration seem i n e v i t a b le , i . e . , the only

sensible thing to do; (4) to create an aura of certainty surrounding "safety . "
That is, t o establish the idea that the Army, i n cooperation with state and local
governments, is p repared to handle any catastrophic accident related to the
destruction of the stockpile. Before returning to the empirical data, we will
spend some time discussing some of the theoretical perspectives that have
examined the phenomena of propaganda in the modern state.
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6.2

The Nature of Propaganda
A ccording to Lasswell ( 1950) propaganda consists mainly of political

symbols manipulated for the control of public opinion .

The definition

requires that symbols be manipulated, that is, specifically introduced for their
effect on public opinion. As Goebbels said, "We do not talk to say something,
but to obtain a certain effect" (Goebbels 1935) .

As far as definitions are

concerned, there seems to have b een an evolution in the United States .
From 1920 to 1933 the main emphasis was on the psychological: Propaganda
consisted of the manipulation of psychological symbols having goals of which
the listener is not conscious.

While definitions of propaganda multip lied,

A merican authors eventually accepted the definition given by the Institute
for Propaganda Analysis and inspired by Lasswell:

"Propaganda is the

expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or
groups with a view to influencing the opinions or actions of other
individuals or groups for predetermined ends and through psychological
manipulation" (Ellul 1 965, p. xii) .

Lasswell (1950) added that propaganda

relates only to controversial matters, not to those on which disagreement is
excluded by the group . He notes that nothing is implied in the definition
about the properties of the symbols themselves, b ut only about their function.
"The symb ols m a y b e (and, of course, frequently are) sentimentalized,
fallacious, irrational and so on" (Lasswell 1 950, p . 14) . Finally, Ellul ( 1965)
agrees with Lasswell's definition of the goal of propaganda which he says is
"to maximize the power at home by subordinating groups and individuals,
while reducing the material cost of power" (Ellul 1965, p. x, footnote).
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6 .3

Military Use of Propaganda
According to Chomsky ( 1 9 9 1 ) , the first mod ern g overnment

propaganda operation began under Woodrow Wilson's administration ( 1 9 1 6)
around the time of the first World War .

The W ilson administration was

committed to war and had to do something to rouse the generally pacifistic
citizenry; so it established The Creel Commission---a government p ropaganda
commission.

Within six months, the Commission succeeded " in turning a

p ac ifistic population into a hysterical, war-mongering population which
wanted to destroy everything German, tear the Germans limb from limb, and
go to war and save the world" (Chomsky 1991, p.9). There had already been a
p ublic relations industry in the United S tates where such things were
p ioneere d .

" This effort taught the lesson that state propaganda, when

supported by the educated classes, and when no deviation is permitted from
it, can have a b ig effect" (Chomsky 1991, p . 9).
The use of public relations men and propaganda techniques on a huge
scale dates from WWII (Cook 1962). At that time, the Air Force (then, the A i r

Corps) led the way. The Air Corps, ��thirsted for equal status with the Army
and Navy; it loaded its ranks with publicity men and pulled out all the stops
in a propaganda campaign to glorify i tself, its generals, its h eroes, i ts
potentialities---bombing alone could bring Germany to her knees" (Cook 1 962,
p. 9 1 ) . The pattern set by the Air Corps soon became the p attern for all the
services. Every service began swelling its ranks with publicity staff devoted to
the task of seeing that the American p ub lic got the correct perspective. "The
growth of the p ub licity services as a result was spectacular" (Cook 1962, p. 95).
This g randiose p ropaganda machine perfected b y the military, was
exercised on a g rand scale for the first time in the postwar b attle over
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universal military training. Cook (1962) observes, "Its effects were insidious
and far-reaching and helped to determine to a great degree the pattern of the
world in which we have lived ever since" (Cook 1 962, p . 97). He concludes
his analysis with this tr�nchant observation:
In the rabbit warren of the Pentagon, p ublicity
branches and bureaus spread in octopus fashion.
Each was designed to pluck a special nerve
controlling a segment of public reaction. No media
that was influential in creating and channeling
public was overlooked (Cook 1 962, p. 94).
In more recent times and in conjunction with the Chemical Stockpile
Destruction Program, the Public Affairs Subcommittee ---p art of CSEPP--
(CSEPP), has taken over this role.

Cook ( 1962) argues that the American

people have failed to recognize the full impact of the burgeoning propaganda
mill perpetuated by the military. He avers that it portends nothing less than a
radical shift in the basis of power in the United States. "The voting booth
would be retained," he writes, "so would the democratic trappings of our
society; b ut, increasingly, all the vital decisions would be influenced and
predetermined by the uniform---by men whose professional judgment it
would be positively unpatriotic to question" (Cook 1 962, p. 9 1 ) .

6.4

Characteristics of Modern Propaganda
According to Michael Parenti, "The first premise of propaganda in the

United States is that it doesn't exist, that there is no propaganda from the
established media and the government and that we have only 'information"'
(Barsamian Interviews 1 99 1 ) . However, Ellul (1965) cautions that we must
pay close attention to the relationship between ' information' and propaganda
because propagand a's content increasingly resemb les information.
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Ellul

( 1965) argues that " a surfeit of data, far from permitting people to make
j udgments and form opinions, prevents them from doing so and actually
paralyzes them . . . Thus the mechanisms of modern information induce a
sort of hypnosis in the individual, who cannot get out of the field that has
been laid for him" (Ellul 1965, p . 87). Furthermore, propaganda operates all
the time, and its major dedication is to a v o i d any kind of confrontation
regarding class struggle in the United States. Peterson ( 1 992) observes that,
"One of the goals of ruling class propaganda is to deny tha t i t's class
controlled" (p. 82) . As Marx and Engles pointed out, they (the power holders)
take their class interest and always try to represent it as the general interest.
In the milieu of the technological society, Ellul (1973) argues that propaganda
is simply the means used to prevent the State's prerogatives from being felt as
too oppressive and to make people consent willingly with its world view.

6.5

Ellul's Propaganda Model: The State's Necessity
Jacques Ellul (1965) has fashioned a view of propaganda and a method

of analysis that goes far beyond the conventional understandings on the
subject. It is to Ellul's model that we now turn. He states that, "Propaganda is
c al led upon to solve problems c reated by technology, to play on
maladjustment's, and to integrate the individual into a technological world"
(Ellul 1 965, p. xvii). He maintains that propaganda is the Siamese twin of
technological society. In his opinion, propaganda is needed for the exercise of
power simply because the masses have come to participate in political affairs.
"In

order for propaganda to be so far-ranging," he writes," it must correspond

to a nee d . The state has that need" (Ellul 1965, p. 1 2 1 ) . Unlike other writers
on the subject, he prefers not to give a definition. "I consider it more useful,"
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he says, "to proceed with the analysis of the characteristics of propaganda as
an existing sociological phenomenon" (Ellul 1965, p .. xii). He flatly rejects as
unrealistic all laboratory experiments that have been conducted with small
groups to gauge the effectiveness of propaganda, noting that propaganda is a
unique phenomenon that results, " from the totality of forces pressing in
upon an individual in his society, and therefore cannot be duplicated in a test
tube" (Ellul 1 965, p . vii), or as Henri Poincare once said, "It is the scale that

makes the phenomen a . ' '
Ellul ( 1 965) argues that even Democratic regimes are driven into using
propaganda because of the external challenges they face. In fact, he observes
that the democratic State, precisely because it believes in the exp ression of
public opinion and does not gag it, must channel and shape it. Furthermore,
in a democracy, citizens must be tied to the decisions of the government.
"This is the great role propaganda must perform," he writes. " It must give
the people the feeling---which they crave and which satisfies them---to have
wanted what the government is doing, to be responsible for its actions, to be
involved in defending them and making them succeed, to be 'with it'" (Ellul
1 965, p 126) . In the case of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, the U. S.
Army is subject to external pressures from Congress, U. S. international treaty
obligations, industry lobbyists, numerous government regulatory agencies,
and residents of the communities in question.
Ellul (1965) observes that, "Propaganda must be seen as situated at the
center of the growing powers of the State and governmental administrative
techniques" (p. xvii). Many people erroneously believe that it is the kind of
state that makes the effects of propaganda harmful. To this assumption, he
counters that this inherently pernicious process has the same effects when
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practiced by a totalitarian regime or an allegedly democratic one. He argues
that prop aganda renders the exercise of true democracy nearly impossible.
Propaganda as a phenomenon is essentially the same, he writes, whether
practiced in China or the former Soviet Union or the United States or, for
that matter, Algeria.

He includes the newly-formed Public and Human

Relations domain among the four areas that broadly cover the concept of
propaganda. Others areas include purely psychological action, re-education
and brainwashing, and psychological warfare.

Although "disinformation"

has also been mentioned as a component of propaganda, this is misleading in
that, strictly-speaking, Ellul's model eschews the view that propaganda is
concerned with disseminating lies or deliberate falsehoods.

Rather,

propaganda is concerned with truth, albeit a very circumscribed truth---half
truth, truth out of context. He notes that propagandists agree that lies must
not be told excep t

those that are completely unverifiable.

For example,

Goebbel's could lie about the successes achieved by German U-boats because
only the captain of the U-boat knew if he had sunk a ship or not. (Ellul 1 965,
p . 55 footnote).

Similarly, the Army cou ld lie about the exact size of the

unitary weapons ' stockpile because this information is class ified . Thus he
writes, "Falsehood bearing on fact is neither entirely useless nor to be strictly
avoided . Nevertheless, bear in mind that it is increasingly rare" (Ellul 1 9 65, p .
55).
Ellul points out that social sc ience has greatly enhanced the
effectiveness and scope of propaganda. In fact, he argues that propaganda in
the modern world would not be possible without it. "Without the scientific
research of modern psychology and sociology," he writes, "there would be no
propaganda, or rather we would still be in the primitive stages of propaganda
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that existed in the time of Pericles or Augustus" (Ellul 1965, p . 4) . In fact he
argues that Propagandists will inevitably have a better idea of how to utilize
the fruits of these sciences than many practitioners. The Propagandist must
first of all know the terrain on which he is operating. He must be able to
gauge the current trends in public opinion, and he must tailor the message to
the type of audience to be reached .

To this end, survey research, demography

and even the skills of qualitative field research can serve the Propgandist.
We wish to clarify at the outset our use of the term "Propagandist." In
using this term, we do not wish to convey the idea that propaganda is the
work of one individual. Rather, we are referring primarily to organizations
that make propaganda ---not to individuals.

A man standing on a street

corner passing out leaflets containing his own opinion about a subject is n o t
disributing propaganda. Organization is the sine qua non of Propaganda in
Ellul's model, and the Army's vast bureaucratic network financed by the
Pentagon has the necessary infrastructure to sustain such an enterprise.
Bec ause the Army's Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
(CSEPP) involves three tiers of government (federal, state and local), it is
perfectly poised to orchestrate an effective propaganda campaign on beha lf of
the CSDP that is capable of reaching a very wide and diverse group of
potentially-affected parties and also quite capable of sustaining itself over
time.
Ellul (1965) argues that propaganda has the following characteristics: (1)
Propaganda is sociological as opposed to merely psychological in character; (2)
Propaganda deals with simp lifica tion and repetition; (3) Propaganda is
d ialectical in nature and it must change according to circumstances; (4)
Propaganda must be total. It must use every means available. (i.e., it is not
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limited to the media as is the general conception); (5) Propaganda does not
tolerate discussion. With respect to the latter, Ellul ( 1 965) has argued that
propaganda ceases when real dialogue begins. The following section presents
a brief discursus on Ellul's characterization of modern forms of propaganda.

(1)

Propagand a is sociological :
It is with resp ect to Ellul 's ( 1 9 65) insistence that p ropaganda is

sociological in nature that, in our opinion, d istinguishes Ellul's model from
others. Rather than look at the discrete actions of either the propagandist or
the propagandee (who is assumed to be a passive receptor) Ellul directs our
attention to the interactive nature of the process and views it more as
dialectic rather than as a one-way, top-down imposition of information . As
Ellul (1965) describes it, the situation is actually the reverse of what we have
come to believe. "There is not just a wicked propagandist at work," he writes,
"who sets up means to ensnare the innocent citizen. Rather, there is a citizen
who craves propaganda from the bottom of his being and the propagandist
who respond s to this craving " (Ellul 1 965, p. 1 2 1 ) .

This perspective

und erscores his position regard ing the sociological character of modern
propaganda. For the individual, confronted with a dilemma throws himself
in the direction of a propaganda that justifies him and thus eliminates one of
the sources of his anxiety.
(2)

Propagand a involves s implifica tion and repetition : :
Ellul states, "Propaganda dissolves contradictions and restores to man a

unitary world in which the demands are in accord with the facts" (Ellul 1 965,
p. 159) . This effect is achieved through the twin processes of s implifica tio n ,
and repetition---two o f the characteristic processes o f propagand a. These are
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particularly salient concepts when analyzing the stockpile disposal program,
which presents the penultimate politico / technological conundrum .

Ellul

( 1 965) writes:
Without simplification, no public opinion can exist
anyway; the more complex problems, judgments,
and criteria are, the more diffuse opinion will be.
Nuances and gradations prevent public op inion
from forming; the more complicated it is, the
longer it takes to assume solid shape. But in the
case of such diffusion, propaganda intervenes with
a force of simplification (Ellul 1965, p. 205).
Answers to problems become clear-cut, black and white (i.e., the Army
says, "The stockpile is deteriorating and needs to be destroyed; "incineration is
a safe proven technology," etc . ) .

Thus, citizens facing the informa tion

overload presented by the complexities of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program are already predisposed to search for a ready anchor, and that anchor
the Army is only too happy to supply in the form of its emergency
preparedness program, i. e., CSEPP. Repetition figures prominently in this
process as an aid to solidify positions after they have been articulated .
Because propaganda is a slow, continuous process, not a "quick fix," repetition
becomes an important element in keeping the "correct" line in full view .
(3)

Propaganda is d ialectical in nature:
The dialectical nature of propaganda also assumes that it must remain

flexible and demonstrate an ability to change. Two examples drawn from the
empirical data will serve to illustrate this point. First, we can see a marked
contrast in the content of the Army's propaganda of the fifties and that of the
eighties and nineties with regard to protection of the public from toxic
chemicals. Early efforts were directed at showing off the various protective
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apparatus designed to protect civilians from chemical w arfare attack.

For

example, the U. S. Army Chemical Corps and the Office of Civil Defense
Mobilization developed a gas mask constructed to resemble Mickey Mouse for
children, which was displayed at the Andrews Air Force Base 1 959 Armed
Forces Day celebration (See Appendix E). More recently, Army propaganda
excludes any mention of protective gear, e.g., you will not see the baby bubble
for infants (see Fig. C3, p. C-14 in Rogers 1990), or the protective j acket and
hood for child ren (see Fig. C2, p. C-12, in Rogers 1990).

Current Army

propaganda dwells almost exclusively on the safety of the process, the
unlikeliness of an accident and the excellence of their e mergency
management plan, while all the time they may be glossing over a potentially
even greater danger.
Ad ditiona lly, Army rhetoric changed over the years in response to
public opposition.

At the early public meetings ( 1 984) held to discuss the

program, there was a great deal of talk about the "technical" aspects of the
incineration process in the belief that "a little knowledge is a d angerous
thing." The Army sponsored tours to their prototype facility in which they
flooded p articipants with information regarding the technical aspects of the
incineration process.

However, realizing that this was not succeeding in

quieting the opposition (in some ways it fed the fires of their skepticism), they
changed the focus of their discourse away from the technical aspects per se to
the emergency preparedness program itself as t h e " fail-safe " back up
mechanism.
However, the dialectical nature of propaganda can be seen most clearly
in the Army's response to the citizens in Maryland when in April of 1992, the
Kent C ounty Board of Commissioners p ublished an anti-incineration
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statement and divorced themselves and the county from CSEPP.

They

refused to a c cept federal (FEMA) money for enhanced emergency
management related to the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Program (CSEPP).

A statement given to the Army from the Kent County

group read: "We cannot, in good conscience and practice, continue to accept
grant funds for a planning program that we believe is indirectly tied to, and
coincides with, the Federal government's plan to construct a chemical
weapons incinerator at APG" (CSEPP Upda te: May /June 1 992, p . 4) .

The

Army countered by saying that, "Maryland CSEPP is needed because of the
threat that exists due to the presence of an aging chemical agent stockpile at
APG.

The means by which the stockpile is ultimately destroyed does not

guide the Maryland CSEPP and it never will" (CSEPP Update, May /June 1 992,
p. 4). Citizens dispute the fact that CSEPP is not directly tied to incineration.
Members of the Kent County group argue that the Army did nothing to
mitigate the risk posed to the community by the presence of the chemical
weapons prior to the disposal program. They like to point out that the cost of
mitigating the risk of continued storage of the weapons would be far, far less
than building a half a billion dollar incinerator facility.
A footnote to this episode has to d o with the context for the opposition
in Kent County, Md . Kent County has a population of about 1 7,000. There
are 8,000 registered voters. In April 1992, 7000 persons from Kent County,
Maryland signed a petition against the Army's on-site incineration plan for
that site (APG) citing concerns such as the potential long-term health effects
and the continued use of the incinerator.
The Army concluded from this experience tha t they had learned a
" lesson" and that lesson resulted in their changing their approach.
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"Maryland learned a difficult lesson," an Army directive lamented,

"If

we are

to take a proactive emergency management message to the citizens, it must be
generic emergency management and in no way linked to destruction of
chemical weapons" (CSEPP Update: May /June 1992, p. 4). The dilemma over
Kent County's recalcitrance caused the Army to do some soul-searching.
Quickly on the heels of this experience, the Army Public Affairs Office at the
Pentagon instituted sweeping changes in the way the Army presented
emergency management materials (and thus the entire stockpile destruction
program) to state and local emergency responders . Some of the changes the
Army recommended include the following:
All reference to CSEPP logo will be deleted from all
public information documents .
They ' ve b een
selling people on the idea that CSEPP was just part
of your regular, normal emergency prepa redness
program; the logo draws attention to the fact that
CSEPP is separate and related specifically to the
nerve-gas issue which the Army wishes to
downplay for obvious reasons. (Field Notes: ORNL,
July 13, 1992).
By July of 1992, however, Kent County was back in the program. What
caused this radical about-face in the space of only two months? According to
two informants, it was money --- lots of money. The money offered to the
community jumped from $50,00 to $450,000. "It was hard for them to hold
out," one informant said. The Army said something like, "We'll buy buses,
radios, etc ." For a poor rural community, this kind of money was difficult to
turn down.

Because the Army's emergency plan for Aberdeen Proving

Ground centered largely on evacuation, Kent County, would need buses with
which to evacuate its citizenry. However, there were conditions placed upon
the Army when Kent County finally capitulated.
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They insisted that the

Army's on-site emergency management staff person desist from engaging in
any public relations activities concerning the proposed incinerator.

4)

Propaganda is total:
Although scholars such as Gitlin (1980) and Chomsky ( 1 988; 1 99 1 ) have

contributed greatly to our understanding of modern propaganda techniques
by analyzing how the mass media is used as a propaganda vehicle, mass
media are only one part of propaganda. Ellul (1965) argues that propaganda
must be total, in the sense that every means available must be used. Ellul
(1965) writes that "the Propagandist must utilize all of the technical means at
his disposal---the press, radio, TV, movies, posters, meetings, door-to-door
canvasing" (Ellul 1 965, p. 9). Because, he agues, there is no propaganda as
long as one makes use of, in sporadic and random fashion, a newspaper
article here, a poster or a radio program there . . . Each usable medium has its
own particular way of penetration" (Ellul 1 965, p. 10). He contends that, "the
very fact that the effectiveness of each medium is limited to one particular
area clearly shows the necessity of complimenting it with other media" (Ellul
1965, p. 1 0).
The aim of the propagandist is to get as much saturation as possible to
severa l discrete aud iences; therefore, a mix of metho ds, strategies and
techniques must be available.

These may include movies, T . V., radio

programs, interv iews, appearances on talk shows, posters, flyers, news
briefings, conferences, scoping meetings, door-to-door c anvassing, feature
articles in newsp apers, Letters to the Editor, etc.

Ellul ( 1965) writes that,

"propagand a tries to surround man by all possible routes" (p . 1 1 ) . The Army
has utilized all the above-mentioned methods---and then some--- in getting
its message across.
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To begin with, the Army's CSEPP Update (the newsletter sponsored by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and distributed widely
to interested parties) contains a wealth of information on the Army's vast
p ropaganda machine rela ted to the Chemical Stockpile E mergency
Preparedness Program (CSEPP) . There is a regularly featured Public Affairs
segment called, SUBCOMMITTEE HIGHLIGHTS, which reports on the latest
media event or project related to Public "Education . "

For example, the

May /June 1 992 issue talks about a Communica tions Workshop that was part
of a national conference.

Numerous other public relations efforts are also

mentioned. The editor reports that, "Expected to be competed by press time is
the emergency management calendar materials for local reproduction; The
Public Officials briefing materials have been sent into the field; Several States
have requested assistance in public affairs plan development; Work is
continuing on a national video and citizens ' brochure" (CSEPP Update,
May /June 1 992, p 4). Another issue of CSEPP Update reports that "Successful
Media Interviews" a primer on med ia relations for non-public a ffa irs
professionals, was distributed at both the National Conference (June 1 -4, 1 992,
Huntsville, AL) and the Public Affairs Conference .

"Other products in the

pipeline," the editor boasts, "include the CSEPP Orientation brochure for the
general public and press kits. In addition, the 'PIO Handbook,' a manual for
public affairs professionals involved in CSEPP was distributed in September"

(CSEPP Update, p. 1 1 ) .
Evidence o f a n intensive campaign, which coincides with E llul's ( 1965)
conception of propaganda as "total," is buried in one of the government
planning documents prepared by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
support of the Army's plan to install alert and notification systems (i. e.,
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warning sirens, etc .) at the various stockpile sites .

The document entitled,

"Guidelines for Conducting Public Affairs Activities in Support of Alert and
Notification System Development, Installation and Operation" (FEMA, Final
Interim Guidance, September 7, 1 99 1 ) . The document represents a massive
public education effort to p repare people for the inev itabi li ty of on-site
incineration and falls squarely into the category of the third dimension of
power.
The Introduction to this report begins: "An aggressive public education
campaign is an essential ingredient of the CSEPP alert and Notification
system if the public is to understand and accept it" (p. 2) . Ellul (1965) discusses
the imp ortance of public education as a form of 'pre-p ropagand a . ' "The
cond itioning of minds with vast amounts of information already dispensed
for ulterior purposes and posing as "facts" and as "education" (Ellul 1 965, p .
vi) . I n line with Ellul's (1965) contention regarding the role o f "education" in
the p reparing the way for propagand a, the Army report states that, "Pre
emergency public education must complement and support other elements of
the community's emergency preparedness program" (FEMA, Final Interim
Report, September 7, 1 99 1 , p. 3).
Given Ellul's (1965) assertions that propaganda must be total, the report
is

m

a sense a b l ueprint for the Army's prop aganda c ampaign for the

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. The report identifies various segments
(i.e., target populations) and outlines very specific methods and strategies for
reaching these audiences. The report is b roken down into several parts each
dealing with a specific topic area, e . g . , Goals, Assumptions, Basic Vs.
Enhanced Public Affairs Activities, Operational Concepts, Identification of
Information to be Presented , Identification of Media, and then of course,
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Standards .

Fin ally, and in concert with Ellul's ( 1 965) formula tion that

propaganda seeks to tailor its message to discrete audiences, we rea d : "The
public education materials (brochures, television and radio spots, newspaper
ads, public presentations, etc.) must be designed and disseminated to target
audiences" (FEMA, Final Interim Guidance,1 991, p. 4).
Under the BASIC Public Affairs Activities, the following topic areas are
listed: Army briefings; prepared news releases; attend ance at med ia editorial
board meetings; establishing a dedicated telephone line to receive public
inquiries; establishing, maintaining and using mailing lists of persons with
expressed interest in CSEPP; establishing information depositories for Alert &
Notification /CSEPP program materials; drafting and issuing radio / TV public
service announcements; preparing and distributing information for special
needs populations; developing and using RTQ (Response-To-Query), 1.e.,
questions and answers regarding Alert & Notification issues.
Enhanced Public Affairs Activities include: developing materials to be
included in local school curriculum; establishing and operating speakers
bureaus; conducting community involvement activities (e. g., calendar art
competition, mall demonstrations, county fair e xhib its); developing
promotional items for dis tribution at community fairs, ma lls, meetings;
conducting specialized briefings for targeted opinion leader groups (e .g.,
medical, legal, political, educational, religious, agricultural, etc . ) (FEMA: Final
Interim Guidance: 1991, p.13). The Army will argue that this massive Public
Education plan is necessary and that it has nothing to do with incineration;
however, adding the tag, "in support of Alert and Notification" in no way
changes the hidden agenda for this program, which we argue is purely Publi c
Relations designed to serve as a prop aganda launching pad for the Army's
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on-site incineration decision. As has been stated elsewhere, the Army's claim
about the fragility of the stockpile has been greatly exaggerated. We know, for
example, that at least at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) the
stockpile has been certified stable for at least 25 years. The claim that this
mammoth public education effort is simply to secure Alert and Notification
systems is spurious.

6.6

Army Propaganda Pieces
While the above-mentioned documents outline only a plan, the

following sections will describe actually existing materials that are part and
parcel of the Army's Public Affairs "project. " In keeping with Ellul' s ( 1 965)
dictum that propaganda must "surround man by every possible means," the
following information is a chilling reminder of the vast resources available to
the military to influence the public (FEMA: 1989-1992, A Proposal).

6.6.1

CSEPP Calendar
Of all the glossy four-color process "info " p 1eces the Army has

developed for general consumption regarding the stockpile disposal program,
none produced quite the stir among opponents of the CSDP as the 1 992-1993
Mad ison County Em ergency Preparedness Calen d a r . The calend a r ,
d istributed t o citizens o f the Berea / Richmond area a t the site of the
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, caused quite a stir. The calendar itself is a
visual delight, drawing cleverly on Berea's rich cultural traditions with
gorgeous photographs of bucolic countryside, historic build ings, and lush
flora .

The inside cover contains maps and evacuation informa tion and

explains the various protective action zones, which are part of the grand
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emergency preparedness plan. It also contains a glossary of terms, a drawing
depicting the location of the new Emergency Operations Center (the "E-0-C ")
and a space on the inside cover to write in your own personal evacuation
plan. The evacuation plan itself has been the center of intense debate among
citizen opponents and seeing this piece cleverly d istributed to area residents
rankled even the most tacit observers of the program. Again, there is no way
to evaluate the impression this calendar made in establishing the legitimacy
of the CSDP. But recalling Ellul's (1965) dictum that propaganda must be total
and must use every means available, the calendar is but one small example of
the resources available to influence the population. Because the Lexington
Bluegrass Army Depot was the site of the most intense opposition, a CSEPP
c alend ar could be viewed as an easy way to soft-peddle the on-site
incineration program to the unwary citizens of Madison County; but the
calendar itself, does not constitute Propaganda; it is only a small piece of the
p 1e.

6.6.2

"SRFX-9 1 "- The Video
"SRFX-9 1 "refers to the Army's training exercise, which was held in

Tooele, Utah during the week of June 1 0-14, 1 991 at the Tooele Army Depot.
The exercise was designed to train the emergency managers and technical
teams that would respond to an accident involving military chemical agents .
This exercise was the seventh in a series of annual exercises held at Army
depots across the country. SRFX-91 , which stands for "Service Force Response
Exercise," served as a pilot exercise for CSEPP, the Army's grandiose
emergency preparedness plan. According to an issue of CSEPP Update, " The
exercise included play by the State of Utah and Tooele County, Utah County,
297

and Salt Lake City, including the activation of their respective emergency
operations centers .

Exercise activity also took place at local care centers,

medical facilities, and traffic control points to evaluate protective actions
taken in communities near the depot" (CSEPP Update: September / October
1991, p. 10).
In March of 1 992, the Army released a video documentary on the
exercise entitled, "SRFX-9 1 : The Community Response."

The video which

la sts about 30 minutes, opens with a p anoramic view of the areas
surrounding the Tooele Army Depot (Tooele, Utah) and features the sounds
of bird s chirping prominently in the background . An Army's newsletter in
describing the video boasts: "The finished product employs animated maps
and other special effects as well as music and sound effects c reated
electronically in the editing room" (CSEPP Update: February / March 1 992, p.
1).
The exercise was designed to test the meta l o f emergency responders in
the area . However, the staged accident involved only mustard agent (Bear in
mind that 42% of the stockpile is stored at Tooele, most of it is nerve gas).
From what we could see, there was only one fatality.

There was hardly

enough drama to merit the hyperbole regarding the success of the exercise
which emenated from the Pentagon. Additionally, there was no clock in the
picture so one really doesn't get any information about elapsed time into the
incident, which would be very useful information. But the most disturbing
thing about the video, from the position of those who oppose the incinerator
complex, is the portrayal of protesters outside the depot fence. Opponents
were presented as "hippies" clad in bell-bottom blue jeans and carrying signs
(Certainly not the p rofile of citizens who comp rise the opposition
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movement.) And, of course, these were OUTSIDE the d epot fence.

There

isn't even a hint of the massive military presence that is waiting in reserve,
aside from warning signs on depot fences that advertise " Use of Maximum
Force Allowed-Keep Out." And, of course, there was the typical interview of
the "innocent by-stander" who says that he/she believes the weapons must be
destroyed and that incineration is the way to go. Copies of this video were
d istributed to FEMA regions and CSEPP states.

Copies were also made

available to local governments.

6.6.3

Videos for the General Public
While the training video described above deals with a fairly specific,

delimited area of the Army's overall emergency preparedness program, i. e.,
that of training experts to deal with a potential crisis, Army Public Affairs
persons have been busy devising other types of videos intended for viewing
by the general public. For example, CSEPP staff in Harford County, Maryland
planned to introduce a video entitled, "Partners in Preparedness" to all high
schools, middle schools, and 4th and 5th elementary school grades, as well as
private and parochial schools (CSEPP Update: October/November 1993, p. 1 ) .
I n addition, the Army plans t o use the video in presentations t o clubs and
associations, for example, Lions C lubs, Kiwanis C lub s, and the Harford
County chapter of the Association of Retired Persons. Harford County also
plans to provide a copy of the video to cable television stations as well as the
1 1 branches of the public library. CSEPP Update reports that copies of the
video were shipped to each CSEPP state (CSEPP Update: October / November
1993).
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6.7

The Mass Media
Despite the media blitz that surrounded the issue of chemical weapons

during The Gulf War, and considering its international ramifications, the
destruction of the U. S. stockpile of unitary chemical weapons has received
surprisingly little attention from the press.

Except for a few notable

exceptions, the national media (especially print media) has virtually ignored
the topic of the nerve-gas controversy---the entire chemical weapons disposal
program has fallen into a black hole of sorts. When the national print media
has dealt with the subject, it has framed the subject as a NIMBY ("Not-In-My
backyard "--- a strictly local phenomenon); they tend to parrot the Army's
imperatives about the necessity for destroying the stockpile. Whether this is
by accident or design, the fact remains that the CSDP controvery has been
largely ignored by the mainstream press (and, we might add, the alternative
press as well). The Army has shied away from employing the media as its
principal public education vehicle, although as noted previously, the Army
Public Affairs Office at the Pentagon has prepared a handbook for use by
Army professionals on how to deal with the media. The Army's posture vis
a-vis the press with regards to the CSDP appears to be one of maintaining a
low profile.

Opponents of the Army's plan lament this lack of attention

arguing that reporters are ignoring what could b e a Pulitzer Prize-w inning

story.

As the co-founder of Concerned Citizens of Mad ison County

commented, "This is the greatest David and Goliath story ever! " Some of the
notable exceptions include stories in The Washington Post and The New

York Times (e. g., The Washington Pos t, May 8, 1 986. "Maryland Officials
Probing

Aberdeen

Che m i c a l

Disposal;

" Th e

New

York

Times

INTERNATIONAL, Tuesday, October 31, 1989 "An Oratory Fades, Obstacles to
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Chemical Arms Pact Multiply. ") Articles have also appeared in The Chicago

Trib u n e, USA Today, Tlze LA Times and the Sava n nah Tribune according to
citizen activists .
However, the local papers at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot site
(Kentucky) have been fairly good about keeping the issue before the public
and representing the community's views fairly, with the possible exception of
the Lexington-Herald Leader , which, accord ing to activists, has been guilty of
such things as under-reporting the number of people attend ing scop ing
meetings, not returning telephone calls, etc .

The four local newspapers in

the Berea / Richmond area include: The Berea Citizen , The

R egis ter, The Lexington Herald Leader

and The Courier Joumal.

R ich m o n d
Between

them they published no less than sixty-four articles in 1 984 alone on the
nerve gas issue--- more than one per week. By 1 986, when a Congressional
Hearing took place in Richmond, that number jumped to 220! Coverage has
since tapered off considerably. However, there are still items in the paper at
least bimonthly.

(A sampling of headlines from the year 1 984 appears in

Appendix G-2).
Asked about their opinion of the media, citizens at LBAD believe that
the media has helped. One activist commented, "They {i.e., the local press )
have tried very hard to maintain objectivity. They always present the Army's
point of view later---an editorial debate of sorts. In their reporting, they try to
give both sides." According to this informant, "National news tends to be
more objective---non-interested parties.

They are not so educated on the

issues as the local press. They don't have the breadth." However, all in all,
activists feel the media has been a boon to the opposition.
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Another activist

from LBAD commented, "The med ia has been all important.

. . What

brought every single political person was the media (i.e., the local papers)."
Opponents of the Army's plan at other sites, however, p aint a different
picture of the role of the local media.

Although we only have detailed

information about the role of the media at LBAD, anecdotal information
points to the fact that Kentucky's local press differs markedly from the local
press coverage at other sites, which have more in common with the press
coverage at Aberdeen Proving Ground (Maryland ), where the local p ress
seems to favor the Army. Activists at APG report that the local media was,
"very cool, very conservative, very much in favor of the Army. Sometimes
they try to be objective, but it always seems slanted towards the Army ." The
founder of Concerned Citizens for Maryland 's Environment observed that,
" reporters

usually

a c cept the

Army ' s

definition

of the

situ ation

unquestionably when they say that continued storage is more d angerous than
incineration . "

Nevertheless, there was once a good piece in the B a l t i m o re

S u n , and appa rently the Evansville, Indiana newspaper did a scathing piece
on emergency response in 1993 (CWWG Newsletter, March 3, 1 993) . Beca use
these three sites : Kentucky, Maryland and Ind iana have the most well
organized and vocal opposition movement, there is obviously some
connection between level of mobilization and the media, at least at the local
level.

The exact nature of the dynamic is not well understood, but it may

have something to do with social network ties (i.e., reporters ties to the
community) or with the proa ctive attempt by activists to educate the media
about the issues .
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6.7.1

Broadcast Media
Although largely marginalized by the mainstream press, the nerve gas

issue has been picked up by the broadcast media. Several major networks
have picked up the story during the ten years that the controversy has
ensued. The most famous of these, of course, is the segment done by CBS's

" 60 Minu tes" news program which aired on January 5, 1 992.

The segment

was called, "Time Bombs," and disappointingly, but not surprisingly, the
segment regurgitated the Army's line about the d angers posed by the
deteriorating weapons (hence the name Time Bombs)---specifically referring
to the M55 rockets which are stored at LBAD. Although the television crew
impressed activists at LBAD with their thoroughness, the program does leave
one with the impression of the urgency attached to the demilitarization of the
weapon. Again, this emphasis supports the Army's point of view.
In the early days of the controversy (November 29, 1 984), CBS filmed a
panel discussion featuring depot representatives (i. e., Army experts) and
members of the Madison County Concerned Citizens group. Activists were
interviewed by a "CBS Good Morning" crew including reporter Robert
Pierpoint.

On November 2 1 , of that same year, the nerve gas issue was

discussed on "ABC /TV Good Morning America." In 1 99 1 , Sebia Hawkins of
G reenpeace P a c i fi c C ampa ign appeared on a PBS television show c al l e d ,

"America's Defense Monitor," which originates in Washington, D. C . on
station WHMM (Channel 32). In addition, Greenpeace has produced its own
video on the chemical weapons controversy called, "Scrapping Chemical
Weapons . "
Overall, the media has not played a dramatic role in the Army's
propaganda effort for the disposal program. Instead, they have placed heavy
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emphasis on the Public Affairs function of CSEPP and, as we have stated
elsewhere, CSEPP is perfectly poised to carry out this leading role.

6.8.

The Committee for National Security (CNS)
In 1 992, eight years after this controversy first began, a new entity

entered the fray in the form of "The Committee for National Security," also
known as CNS. CNS was created in 1 981 as a direct reaction to the election of
Ronald Reagan. It was started by Paul Warnke, an Arms Control negotiator
in the Carter Cabinet. (Paul Warnke was head of the American delegation to
S.A.L.T. when Carter was President.) CNS is staffed by retired military and
government officials interested in Arms Control issues.

It is based

W a shington, D . C . , and was sta rted with fo undation money .
knowledgeable source said,

A

"They got together a few hundred thousand

dollars { they were all well-connected } .
power elite . " '

m

Founders are all members of ' the

A CNS Newsletter boasts: "CNS is made up of over one

hundred men and women who are experts in various aspects of arms control
and other national security issues" (CNS Newsletter, no date, p. 4).

6.8.1

Horizontal Propaganda
CNS represents a new form of propaganda, which Ellul ( 1 965) describes

as horizon tal propaganda because it is made inside the group (not from the
top). It involves using knowledge of group dynamics and human relations to
overcome opposition and build consensus; its locus is the small group setting.
It is a form of integration (as opposed to agitation ) propaganda. Ellul (1965)
argues that horizontal propaganda is very hard to make particularly because it
requires so many instructors---but it is exceptionally efficient. "It is peculiarly
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a system that seems to coincide perfectly with egalitarian societies claiming to
be based on the will of the people and calling themselves democratic: each
group is composed of persons who are alike, and one actually can formulate
the will of such a group" (Ellul 1 965, p . 84) . "Progress is slow," Ellul ( 1 965)
writes, " there must be many meetings, each recalling the events of the
preceding one, so that a common experience can be shared" (p. 8 1 ) . According
to Ellul ( 1 965) each individual helps to form the opinion of the group, but the
group helps each individual to discover the correct line. " For miraculously,
it is always the correct line, the anticipated solution, the 'proper' convictions
which are eventually discovered" (Ellul 1965, p. 8 1 ) . All the participants are
placed on an equal footing, meetings are intimate, discussion is informal, and
no leader presides.

(In Project Victory's mediated dialogues, leaders are

replaced by facilitators . ) Now let us return to the empirical data and analyze
how this form of propaganda fits into the Chemical Stockpile Dispo sal
Program.

6.8.2

Project Victory
Project Victory is but one undertaking of the Committee for N ational

Security (CNS). It is a California-based "educational" organization that offers
workshops on conflict resolution and conducts dialogues on controversial
public issues. The Executive Director says he was approached by the Director
of the Committee for National Security (CNS) John Parachini, who had
obtained a $10,000 Ford Foundation Grant to conduct research concerning the
stockpile destruction controversy. CNS turned to Project Victory because of
its interest in conflict resolution techniques . The Executive Director agreed to
b ecome involved in the chem ical disposal controversy, and his first
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assignment was to conduct a survey of the communities a dj acent to the
stockpile sites .
On the subject of the chemical weapons controversy, one informant
said, "We take no position. We're not pushing incineration. We just want to
help people work together more effectively." They reiterated their neutrality
at the first meeting, at which time the Executive Director stressed that he was
not working for the government, that he was independent from the
government, and that they existed solely to conduct meetings in
communities with knowled geable people from both sides.

They were

neutral. "As far as we could tell," commented one particip ant, "they were. "
However, w e find CNS's claim t o neutrality suspect. A s Schattschneider
( 1 975) points out, "It must be assumed that every change in the number of
p a rticip ants is a b o u t something; that newcomers h ave symp a thies or
antipathies that make it possible to involve them .

"By definition, t h e

in tervening bystanders are not neutral" (Schattschneider 1 975, p . 4).
Project Victory's executive director has the squirrelly enthusiasm of a
salesman who can't stop talking about his product because he truly believes
in it; however, what he and his organization are really selling is sham
democracy

c o u ch e d

empowerment.

in the

rhetoric

of inclus iveness

and

c i tizen

Project Victory 's rhetoric is flamboyantly "democratic" but

driven by narrow speical interests. It is part of the new style of democracy
which emanates from "K" street in Washington---the seat of public relations
firms and "spin doctors" who utilize artfully constructed "opinion polls" and
can corral experts at a moment's notice to support any particular position.
The latest trend to emerge from this milieux are groups devoted to correct
situations where citizens put up roadblocks to what they consider to be
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undesirable governmental or corporate projects. "Mediation" techniques are
fast becoming the new religion.
Ellul (1965) argues that the aim of modern propaganda is not to change
ideas but to provoke action---to obtain an or t h o p r a x y .

The action that

propaganda seeks is not individual but collective. One must be mobilized
within the context of one's peers. The goal of collective action is the reason
why Ellul ( 1965) sees organiza tion

as fundamental to propaganda, precisely

because "without organization, psychological excitement leads to excess and
deviation of action in the very course of its development" (Ellul 1 965, p .29) .
Thus action must be integrated within the confines of a group. According to
Ellul (1965) propaganda is not basically interested in determining the truth or
falsity of dogmas, "it seeks instead, to unite within itself as many individuals
as possible, to mobilize them, and to transform them into active militants in
the service of an orthopraxy" (Ellul 1 965, p. 97).
The idea of praxis (action) is central to Ellul 's model, and indeed,
Project Victory stresses the importance of participation.

In their letter to

" community leaders" they write: "I hope you will plan on being an active
participant" (Letter to a Community Leader, Harford County, MD. June 1 ,
1992).

Additionally, they encourage these "community leaders" t o educate

their friends and colleagues about the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program.
This is the orthopraxy that the Committee for National Security (and, of
course, the Army) seeks and the reason the Army has allowed this group to
go into the communities and tamper with the discourse surrounding this
program .
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Project Victory's raison de etre seems to be the alleviation of what they
term, "the politics of gridlock," a catch-all phrase applying to recent grassroots
opposition movements that have had a moderate amount of success at
blocking the siting of hazardous waste incinerators nationwide.

As their

newsletter explains:
As you know, we believe that to overcome the
politics of gridlock, reflected in our current national
and glob al crises, requires a fundamental shift in
values and consciousness. All of our programs are
directed toward helping to create this shift in the
way we live our lives towards respect for self,
others, community and E arth. (Project Victory
Fund-raising letter, July 1 , 1 992).
While conflict resolution may indeed be their short-term goal for the
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, CNS and Project Victory have more
grandiose long-range goals, which call for fundamental change in the social
structure. What this change portends is anyone's guess, but it has something
to do with the way our democracy functions. To eliminate what they term

" the politics of gridlock" caused by our "national crises " may in fact mean
eliminating the messy aspects of a functioning democracy whereby citizens
can become obstreperous with respect to certain governmental programs.
In calling for a "fundamental shift" in the social struc ture, one
wonders what they have in mind to replace democracy? We aver that it is
the politics of engineering consent that is real business of both CNS and
Project Victory. The following few examples illustrate the type of work for
which Project Victory is known: they conducted dialogues b etween
environmental and corporate leaders in Silicon Valley on how to reduce toxic
waste; they facilitated a one-day training in conflict management and effective
communication for the University Lutheran Church in Palo Alto, California
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in December 1991; in March 1992, the President of Project Victory, facilitated a
one-d ay training session entitled, "Turning Conflicts into Mutual Gain."
Finally, in 1 992, they began work on a proposal to conduct a series of
interracial Dialogues designed to reduce violence and racism.

Project Victory developed a technique known as "mediated dialogues"
which it utilizes in an attemp t to bring contentious issues to resolution by
b ringing together opposing parties, not in an open debate, but rather in a
particular structured situation. Hence the term m edia ted dialogues, rather
than simply dialogues. Their newsletter says:
Proj ect Victory's innovative 1 0-step model of
Mediated Dia logue has been n a tionally
a c knowled ged as a pioneering effort a t true
communi c a tion and creative problem-solving
among people of divergent views. We use this
model to address particular conflicts or issues in
order to b uild consensus and generate win / w in
strategies (Project Victory Newsletter: July 23, 1 992,
p. 4) .
The newsletter explains that the 1 0-step approach

IS

intended for

structured meetings while the more informal four-step appro ach (STOP,
LOOK, LISTEN, DISCOVER) is used in less formal settings. The choice of the
word "d iscover" is very interesting. For Ellul ( 1 965) insists that in settings
such as these, individuals are led to " discover" the correct line. In this case,
that would be that incineration is the only real alternative for the disposal of
these weap ons .

Project Victory's newsletter describes the program it

conducted in Harford County, Maryland :
Theo B rown used Project Victory ' s 1 0-step
mediated dialogue process to facilitate a dialogue
between two experts---one representing the Army's
position that incineration is a safe technology, and
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one spea king for environmental groups who
believe that a better method of disposal can be
found. (Project Victory Newsletter, 1992, p. 3).
The writer pointed out that the dialogue identified areas of agreement
and disagreement, "so that future discussion of this vital question can focus
on the real areas of dispute" (Project Victory Newsletter, 1992, p. 3). Here is
another curious statement. If the question of the safety of incineration is not
the real issue, then what is the real issue? What are the real issues?
Finally, Project Victory's newsletter bears a logo which is strangely
suggestive of a Christian cross, which may or may not be an attempt to play
upon one of the dominant ideologies---the cross being suggestive of victory
over death. The resemblance is probably not accidental. However, it is not
clear what the " Vi c t o ry " in Project Victory

stands for, unless it refers to

victory over the politics of gridlock. This less than subtle attempt to insinuate
religious symbolism into a clearly secular endeavor leaves one with the
uneasy feeling that there is more going on here than meets the eye. At any
rate, it adds a curious flavor to their otherwise ordinary document.

6.8.3

Project Victory and "The Harford County Community Leader Dialogue
Forum on Chemical Demilitarization" (Maryland)
An informant for Project Victory s ays he spoke with activists at six of

the stockp ile sites but had no success gaining entrance to the community
around the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot in Kentucky. CNS and Proj ect
Victory spokesmen were summarily dismissed by the Citizen Groups around
LBAD and the newly-formed Kent County, MD. citizens group did the same .
However, they were able to gain a foothold in Harford County, Maryland---at
the Aberdeen Proving Ground site.
310

An activist at the Edgewood Area of

Aberdeen Proving Ground recalls her first encounter with representatives
from CNS with dismay.

Two members of this group came to her house

saying that they wanted to act as liaison between the grassroots activists and
the Army. She distrusted them . She commented, "If I receive any threats,
I'm out of here . "

At first, she rejected the idea, but was pressured into

participating by a local government official , who insisted that if she didn't
attend, the citizen opposition group would appear to be a "fringe" group and
would be discredited. She reluctantly agreed . She said the meeting was "by
invitation only" and that about 30 or 40 people attended . They included local
elected officials, a Chamber of C ommerce representative, numerous
educators, environmentalists and other civic leaders.

"The primary goal of

the evening," accord ing to Project Victory's spokesman, "was to identify
various aspects of chemical demilitarization of most concern to area
residents. "

One p articipant (a high school science teacher) recalled that,

"Ambassador Flowers (retired Arms Control negotiator) began the program
by giving b ackground information on the Arms Control treaties that have
made chemical demilitarization necessary." This informant also recalled that
Ambassador Flowers, although strictly speaking, not part of the deb ate, talked
freely with participants during breaks about how safely the Army could
destroy the weapons. Now recall that CNS insists on its neutrality in this
debate; nevertheless, they have permitted this type of behavior contrived for
its effect on the conscience of the participants. One participant described the
meeting as follows: " {Public Relations Officer for the Army} was permitted to
speak as well as several other 'Army experts .' The audience was invited to
ask questions. " The citizen activist herself was not permitted to speak nor to
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rebut any of the Army's information. "I was only allowed to ask questions,"
she said.
A second community dialogue forum took place on June 16, 1 992. The
question discussed was: "Does the proposed on-site incineration of the
mustard gas at Aberdeen Proving Ground pose a significant health risk? "
Again, the same participants heard presentations, this time o n the potential
health effects of the proposed mustard-gas facility at APG . In a letter to a
participant, CNS stated that the purpose of the second forum was to "clarify
the confusion many fee l when assessing the a c t u a l threat that chemical
demilitarization plans pose to Harford County residents ." Again, as if there
were no real threat, but only a perceived threat. A third forum examined the
issue of alternative technologies to destroy chemical weapons other than
incineration.

This meeting took place on August 3, 1992.

It involved a

presentation by two persons on opposite sites of the issue: Mr. Charles
Baronian, Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director for the CSDP and
Ms. Sebia Hawkins, Coordinator of Greenpeace's Pacific Campaign.

The

meeting consisted of presentations by each person and a question and answer
session later in the program. The facilitator again acted a s moderator.
Lest anyone have doubts about the efficacy of this type of program for
shaping opinion, the following two statements were given by one of the
p articip ants we interviewed: ( 1 ) "We have agreed to eliminate our chemical
stockpile with other European countries---that is the reason we had to get rid
of the unitary stockpile;" (2) "It needs to be incinerated because this material
has been there for 50 years. The chances are greater than transporting and
incinerating it." Each statement contains a half truth. As Ellul (1965) points
out, propaganda deals not with deliberate falsehoods, but with truth---half312

truth, and truth out of context. In this respect, we can examine these two
statements in an effort to glean just how cleverly this process works. The first
statement, made by a person who has a great deal of credibility in the Arms
Control area, is true---but only half true. Yes, the United Sta tes does have
interna tional treaty obligations to destroy existing stockpiles of chemical
weapons; however, timetables can be changed and have been altered in the
past. The real reason for the destruction of the stockpile originally had to do
with the Army wanting to get funding to build binary weapons, and in order
to ob tain this fund ing, Congress mandated the destruction of the unitary
stockpile as a condition. This information was not conveyed to participants.
What is particularly salient here is that this same informant observed that
most participants in these workshops, although educated individuals, were
not very well informed when they came in about the chemical stockpile
destruction program, and therefore, were susceptible to suggestion.
material was presented to them in a very digestible form .

The

The second

statement is purely and simply the Army's prime legitimation for moving
ahead with incineration. The idea is to portray alternatives to incineration as
taking ten years before they could be perfected and at the same time, create a
concern about the stability of the stockpile. Ellul (1965) has cleverly analyzed
this technique and states that, "A large dose of fear precipitates immediate
action; a reasonably small dose produces lasting support.

The listener's

critical powers decrease if the propaganda message is more rational and less
violent" (Ellul 1965, p. 86) .
Many of the citizens who were asked to pa rticipate in "Project
Victory's" mediated dialogues were no doubt flattered to be asked, since
ordinary Americans are seldom invited to participate in a personal way in the
3 1 3

larger debates, even by national civic organizations that presumably represent
them. In a twisted sense, Project Victory's leader does what political p arties
used to do for citizens---he educates, he agitates and he mobilizes. The Army
has nothing to loose by permitting CNS to meddle with the CSDP because
they disclaim having anything to do with the mediated dialogues or CNS.
However, Project Victory did obtain permission from the Army to conduct
these dialogues in the stockpile site communities even though the Army did
not actually p ay for them. The nature of the dialogues as described in in
interviews with participants, leaves the question of CNS's neutrality on the
incineration issue open to question
It is difficult to assess the long-term impact of projects like "Project
Victory . "

However, programs such as these are part of a national trend

toward trying to find ways to build consensus through conflict remediation
techniques in communities across the country where hazardous technologies
are being questioned.

6.9

The Role of National Laboratories and the Control of Information
Lukes ( 1974) suggests that power holders need not resort to extreme

measures to ach ieve thought control which is a third dim ensional power
relationship .

He argues that, "One does not have to go to the lengths of

talking about Brave New World, or the world of B . F . Skinner to see this:
thought control takes many less total and more mundane forms, through
control of information, through the mass media, and through the process of
socialization" (Lukes 1974, p. 23) .
Habermas (1976) supports this position. He argues that in the context
of the Western democracies, social control of opposition is achieved, not by
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outright repression, but by control of information (Habermas 1 976) . Chomsky
( 1 9 9 1 ) has also spoken on the subj ect of information control and its
implications. He says: "An alternative conception of democracy has been the
belief that the public must be barred from management of its own affairs, and
the means of information must be kept narrowly and rigidly controlled" (p .
8).
Control of Information figures predominantly in the exercise of power
m

the modern state.

However, it takes many subtle forms .

Information

control is one way power holders attempt to shape the way a situation is
perceived, and its use in the Stockpile Disposal Program is one which has
received scant attention. However, it is easy to see why this aspect of power
may have been overlooked . It is primarily because one of the features of the
modern state and the hallmark of the Army's Stockpile Disposal Program is
the production of vol u m inous

amounts of information .

This "information

overload" is aided by NEPA regulations and compounded by the extensive
d a t a - gathering c a p ab il ities

o f the n a t ional

labo ratories

and

their

subcontractors . Opponents of the Army's on-site incineration decision often
complain about being overwhelmed by too m u ch information, too m any
documents, yet another study, etc .

So, how is it that we can suggest that

control of information is not only employed, but effectively employed in the
service of keeping only certain kinds of information circu lating to the
"official publics." As we shall see, despite the appearance of openness, the
Army exercises tight control over what information "gets out" and the shape
it takes when it does. The national laboratories p lay a significant role in this
regard, but the Army always has the last word .
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There is a curious paradox with respect to "information" and the
public 's right to know in a democracy.

On the one hand, citizens demand

being kept informed, and the government is supposed to be accountable to
the people. Indeed, there are laws which explicitly mandate public disclosure
of information (e. g . , SARA Title III Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, also known as the EMERGENCY PLANNING
RIGHT-TO-KNOW Act of 1986) . On the other hand, government has a stake
in pursuing certain prerogatives .

Ellul (1965) offers some insight into the

rationale behind the State's desire to control information:
Propaganda can never reveal its true projects and
plans or divulge government secrets. That would
be to submit the projects to public discussion, to the
scrutiny of public opinion, and thus prevent their
success (Ellul 1965, p. 59).
First, although few (if any) documents relating to the Chemical
Stockp ile Disposal Program (CSDP) or the Chemical Stockp ile Emergency
Preparedness Program (CSEPP) are classified, documents produced by the
na tional laboratories for the Army are subject to a fairly rigorous and tightly
controlled distribution protocol. All documents go through various stages in
the course of their development from conception to their final end-point
distribution. They usually begin as DRAFT documents and / or "Preliminary
Assessments," and as such as not intended for release or publication. Later,
they may appear in FINAL DRAFT form, then move on to FINAL REPORT
status---again, these remain strictly internal documents .

At other times,

documents receive tentative approval for distribution to officers in
cooperating agencies for their review and comments .

A later stage might

involve distribu tion to certain " interested " parties and finally some
documents are released as Technical Memorandums (TM) and are available
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to the general public from the National Technical Information Service (U. S .
Department o f Commerce/ 5285 Port Roya l, Springfield, Virginia).

Many

documents relating to the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) are
available through this service for a fee. For example, the Army did release a
series of "Concept Plans" (one for each of the eight sites)� which described
how the destruction program would affect each site/ during the preliminary
phases of the stockpile destruction p rogram.

However/ these were very

genera l in nature and not particularly useful as instruments of persuasion,
although they did serve a purpose as legitimation devices for the Army. This
is why we believe they were made available for public release. For purposes
of information control/ many documents deemed by the Army to b e
potentially sensitive, are kept in the DRAFT form for years---some as long a s
five years.

Occasionally/ we have seen documents stamped "Sanitized for

Public Distribution . "

However, this is not the norm.

Not all documents

make it as far as public distribution/ however/ some do.
As stated earlier/ the Army maintains tight control o\·er the work
produced by its contractors at the various national laboratories. With respect
to the Army's stockpile destruction program/ the Public Affairs Subcommittee
(headquartered at the Pentagon), one of six subcommittees organized by the
Federal E mergency Management Agency (FEMA) as part of the Chemical
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), is the bottom line about
information is released and to who m . For example, research staff at the
Oak Ridge National Labora tory have been developing a training course for
E mergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) and Paramedics which will contain
job aids, video presentations, and comp uter-based modules.

The Army

routinely reviews all documents prepared by the staff of the national
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laboratories prior to release.

Research staff at the Oak Ridge National

Laboratory (ORNL) were dismayed to discovered on one occasion that the
Army had deleted entire sections of a document and replaced them with the
words "To be developed"---or required drastic revisions. This practice became
Stand ard Operating Procedure (SOP) and continued throughout the
development of the Training materials. Sections that were deleted included:
emergency medical services, reentry, etc. This practice continued to be an area
of great concern to research staff who took their charge to develop plans to
protect the public quite seriously. Someone speculated, "They may be worried
that these sections will cause anxiety about the program and therefore, felt it
was easier to leave it out. " (Field Notes: ORNL, Staff Meeting, Hazard
Management Group 7 / 13/92). This foot dragging is typical of the way power
holders deal with sensitive information which could be potentially damaging
to their case or could raise pesky questions about the real agenda. On another
occasion, contractors working on Environmental Impact Analyses for the one
of the sites in the destruction program were told that they could not
communicate directly to state level emergency managers, but instead had to
submit their questions in written form to the Army's Public Affairs officer for
approval.

6.10

Summary and Conclusion
As C. W. Mills (1959) observed, we don't know the limits of the State's

ability to control the thoughts of its citizens; however, Ellul's ( 1 965) model of
propaganda provides some insight into how the modern state goes about the
task of engineering the consent of citizens.

The fact that propaganda

s u rrou n ds us, as Ellul (1965) points out, makes it very difficult to analyze it,
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for we are confronted with a phenomenon and a force that is relatively new
(at least in its present form) and ubiquitous. We have argued in this chapter,
that the Army's emergency preparedness program (CSEPP) is a propaganda
apparatus and have presented evidence of a vast, heavily-financed Public
Relations ("public eduction") campaign directed from the Pentagon.
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Chapter 7

Discussion and Conclusion
'The denizen of the technological state of the future will have everything his heart ever
desired, except of course, his freedom.'
Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society. p . xvii

7.1

An Attempt at Synthesis
In this chapter we will attempt to draw together the various elements

of this research which have hitherto been treated somewhat individually. To
do this, we will try to answer the following questions: ( 1 ) What are the
conceptual components of the work and how are they related; (2) How do
they integrate into a conceptual system; (3) How does the work contribute to
theory; (4) What are the limitations of the study; (5) What are the possibilities
for future research in this area; (6) "What's To Be Done? ! "

7.2

Conceptual Components and their Relationship
This research purports to call in to question the validity of the

pluralists assumptions about political power in contemporary America where
participation is assumed to occur within decision-making arenas, which are
in turn assumed to be open to virtually any organized group . What is at stake
is the whole question of power and how the State uses it to maintain its
prerogatives.
We have employed the framework developed by Lukes ( 1 974), who
argues for a view of power that looks beyond the overt, obvious exercise of
power proffered by the pluralists .

His three dimensional view of power
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stresses mechanisms and strategies of control that remam hidden unless
brought to light in an analysis that takes into account what goes on behind
the interstices of power --- precisely a Machiavellian concept.
In the case under consideration, the first dimension of power can be
seen in the Army's decision over the choice of technology, which it
announced in 1 984. Following a pluralist methodology, we can only j udge
who is powerful by observing the "observable," i.e., by observing a c t u a l
decisions i n a c t u a l situations o f overt conflict. I n the absence of conflict,
according to pluralist thinking, there would not be an exercise of power.
Since pluralists characterize the situation as open and available to all, the
absence of challenge is merely an indication of consensus .

The major

decision affecting this program was the Army's unilateral decision to destroy
the stockpile through thermal destruction, i. e., incineration. However, since
that decision was made in secret somewhere in the halls of the Pentagon,
there was no "observable" conflict over that decision simply because people
didn't know about it when it was being made. Are we to assume then, tha t
no one objected?

Judging from the public outcry after the decision w as

announced, we know the answer is that many objected . Needless to say, there

is no observable conflict when decisions are made outside the bounds where
people cannot do anything about it, so our analysis of power does not stop
here.
The pluralists model takes no account of the fact that power may be,
and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively

safe issues . The second dimensional view of power involves the erection of
barriers to participation and control over issues through tactics such as agenda
setting, "decisionless decisions," and recourse to existing biases of the system
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or failing these, the creation of new barriers . The NEPA process, as we have
demonstrated, creates formidable barriers for citizens who opp ose
government projects, despite the fact that it also provides entry points for
opponents (citizen participation is a mandatory part of the law).
First, as we have argued, the entity who proposes the action is
empowered to prepare the necessary impact statements. This alone precludes
ordinary ci tizens from the p rocess because tremendous resources are
necessary to adequately prepare an EIS. The Army also engaged in a good deal
of what theorists refer to as 'non-decision making' in the creation of the
extra-legal NEPA steps described as the Site Specific Environmental Impact
Statement (SSEIS) and associated the PHASE I and PHASE II processes.
The SSEIS deb acle is only one instance of several where the Army used
non-decision making to lull opponents of the plan into believing that
someday, they would do what the citizens asked i.e., come down and conduct
individual site specific studies and then re-evaluate the on-site incineration
decision ---on a site-by-site basis. By adding these additional ("extra-legal")
steps to the already-cumbersome NEPA review process, they created yet
another formidable barrier to citizen p articipation, while at the same time
appearing to comply with citizens expressed wishes.

Time and again, the

Army sought to short-circuit attempts to widen the scope of the conflict by
delaying tactics, as was the case with the promises for site-specific studies and
by "defining out" certain issues they did not wish discussed openly by publics,
e . g . , the dioxin issue, the continued use of the incinerators beyond the
destruction of the stockpile, the long-term health effects of incineration, the
d econtamination issue, and, of course, the issue of w h e t h e r

to use

incineration at all or some other alternative. Recall the FPEIS which defined
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the three alternatives which the Army considered before making its on-site
incineration decision: ( 1 ) national site; (2) regional site; or (3) on-site) . In each
case, the decision was about where to conduct the incineration, not whether
to do it.
Finally, we come to what G aventa ( 1980) describes as ' the least
understood ' mechanisms of power --- those of the third dimension.

The

Third Dimension has to do with how an entity (in this c ase, the Army)
influences and shapes citizens' consciousness about the destruction program .
It has to do with explaining how dominant groups create the impression that
the status-quo is the only plausible reality and consequently attempts to
reformulate the situation along lines more in line with subordinates wishes
are not only undesirable, but also lacking in legitimacy.
With respect to the CSDP, we hear expressions of powerlessness
coming from some unsuspecting sources e.g., not only do

citizens feel

intimidated and frustrated by the NEPA review process, but there is evidence
that many state and local emergency managers are also exasperated in their
attemp ts to deal with the new responsibilities being thrust upon them in
conjunction with the CSDP. As one state emergency manager who had grown
weary of trying to live up to Army expectations with respect to the CSDP said,
"They are asking us to do things we cannot do" (Field Notes: November 1 1 ,
1991).
The Third Dimension of Power also relates to how the Army goes
about creating the impression that incineration is the inevitable and only

rea s o n a b l e

alternative .

For this we turned to Ellul' s ( 1 965) theory of

propaganda and we argued , that, quite clearly, the Army's emergency
preparedness program is the vehicle for a massive propagand a campaign
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d esigned to make the populace comfortable with the inev itability of
incineration through complicity with the CSEPP program.

In essence, the

Army has exercised control over issues, manipulated the NEPA process, set
agendas, controlled information, co-opted state and local leaders, used
"selective incentives" to co-opt community leaders, and instituted a massive
p ropaganda camp aign in pursuit of its goal of siting eight nerve gas
incinerators in the continental United States.
Finally, it should be noted that the success of the opposition
movement in Kentucky, Maryland and Indiana is due, n o t to their
participation in "the process," as laid out for them by the Army, but to their
taking a dvantage of the one Achilles heel --- that of state control of air
pollution control permits.

The citizens, having exhausted all the avenues

a v a ilable to them via "the process " ( i . e . , NEP A scoping meetings,
independent community review studies, site-specific reports, Congressional
hearings, etc.), went directly to the state legislators in their efforts to forestall
the construction of incinerators in their respective communities . Only then,
did they achieve the necessary leverage to block the Army's inexorable march
towards incineration. Although there are no state laws, strictly speaking, that
forbid the construction of nerve-gas incinerators, the laws passed in these
three states m ake it nearly impossible for the Army to obtain state permits for
operating incinerators (Ember 1989, p. 20).
7.3

Limitations of the Study
As a research paradigm, case studies present certain limitations, not the

least of which is their lack of representativeness.

However, because of its

scope, involving as it does three tiers of government as well as industrial
3 24

elites and at least half a dozen federal agencies, (including the military
bureaucracy), we argue that this study has the potential to illuminate certain
regularities and patterns of the social structure. Thus, despite the limitations
of this study, its value lies in the ability to reveal previously hidden processes
of power that are an integral part of the social structure of twentieth century
technological society, particularly in the United States.
However, there are some obvious limitations which we will try to
present in a brief synopsis. Admittedly, the present study cannot speak about
the very important issue of why it took so long for sites other than the
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) to mob ilize.

Unfortunately,

although there is anecdotal evidence that the Army's reputation for power
was responsible for the relative quiescence at many of the stockpile sites, we
did not conduct a systematic investigation of this phenomenon.
We believe the relative quiescence at other sites (e.g., ANAD, PBA,
TEAD, UMDA, PUDA) is related to the perception that the Army is "going to
do what it is going to do," and to the hegemony enjoyed by the Army at those
sites vis-a-vis the adjoining communities, many of these towns being very
much under the spell of the Army because of the depot's prominence in the
community as an important source of revenue and jobs. This is not true of
the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot site however .

The depot there no

longer holds the importance for the community that it once did.
We lack any b asis for comparing the sites with one another with regard
to either the mobilization of protest or the role of the media in sustaining
quiescence, nor can we evaluate the relative success or failure of the Army's
propagand a campaign.

A dmittedly, there is ample room left for future

researchers interested in grassroots mobilization surrounding hazardous
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waste incineration and the variables involved in either quiescence or rapid
mobilization.

It will also be up to future researchers to determine if the

patterns of power, which we have identified, are typical of the ones that
prevail in society with regard to other conflicts of similar scope.

7.4

Reprise: General Theoretical Import
We have argued that the Army has been able to put up formidable

barriers to participation, despite citizens efforts to widen the scope of issues to
be considered . In order to level the playing field (if this is even possible), one
of the problems facing us is the vast scope of power exerted by industry on the
government (i.e., Congress and certain federal agencies) .

For example,

Freudenburg ( 1 984) writes that, "Industry's success in forcing the EPA to see
itself as a 'neutral' judge of the various positions, rather than as an advocate
for the people --- its legal mandate --- is one measure of its immense power"
(Freudenburg 1 984, p. 64) . Coupled with the co-optation of the EPA (i .e., the
Environmental Protection Agency) we have the problem of the corruption of
NEP A (The National Environ men tal Policy Act of 1 969), particular! y, the
scoping process which has been turned into a tool of the powerful, where,
although the "letter" of the law is fulfilled, its spirit is egregiously violated, to
make matters worse, we have the ad ded feature of a powerful entrenched
b ureaucracy spewing out propaganda directed at creating a climate more
conciliatory to dominant interests ---the engineering of consent- -- on an
-

unprecedented scale which goes largely unrecognized as such, but hides
under the guise of public "education" and which denies its true class-based
nature.
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Finally, we come face to face with the limitations of science as a tool for
solving environmental health problems.

Freudenburg ( 1 984) cautions that

the relationship between science and politics is important and he reminds us
that d uring the Love Canal debates, "Every scientific finding became the
subject of controversy . . . scientists who studied health problems near the
d ump site disagree profound ly on the ill effects of that exposure"
(Freudenburg 1984, p . 58) . Similarly, in the case of the Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program (CSDP) experts appeared on both sides of the controversy .
On the one hand, we have Army experts testifying to the alleged "safety" of
the incineration process, and on the other hand we have credib le
scientist / scholars testifying to the unremitting d angers associated with
incineration --- both short term and long term.
There are p arallels here too with Pa renti 's ( 1 970) Analysis of the
Newark Community Union Project (NCUP) rent strike and traffic-light
issues .

The rationalizations used to defend the government's actions with

respect to the traffic-light issue, are very similar to those employed by the
Army in conjunction with the stockpile disposal program: (1) the insistence
that the problem needed elaborate investigation; (2) the claim that the issue
was not within a given authority's jurisdiction, or that this was not the
correct time o r place to raise certain issues;

(3)

the posing o f rigorous and

time-consuming legalistic procedures; (4) the ritualistic appearance of a public
official to investigate the question followed by disingenuous promises that a
solution was at hand; (e.g., the National Academy of Sciences numerous
"independent" studies of the problem); (5) and the constant admonition that
the protesters should exercise restraint and patience (Parenti 1 9 70 ) .

For

example, the Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director once called for
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"common sense" to prevail at Aberdeen IAPG l (Harford Cou n ty Sun, Sunday,
August 1 1 , 1 991, p. 7).
The situation facing us is described succinctly by William Greider (1 992)
in his book, Who Will Tell the People., Greider ( 1 992) argues that American
democracy is in much deeper trouble than most people wish to acknowledge.
If communities now feel distant from Washington, it's because they are, he
writes . He argues that we are experiencing a new kind of democracy --- "the
new politics," he calls it. We are seeing what he describes as:
the expensive politics of facts and information. Only
those who have accumulated lots of money (typically
major corporations) are free to play in this version of
democracy. Only those with a strong, immediate
financial stake in the political outcomes can afford to
invest this kind o f money in m a n i p u l a t i n g
governing decisions (Greider 1 992, p. 35).
Greider doesn' t offer any real solution to these dilemmas other than to state
that people must come together and fight to retain power.

However,

indica tions are that even this kin d of "coming together" or ci tizen
empowerment is going to come upon some formidable obstacles under the
present system. As Parenti ( 1 980) points out: "Far from the fluid interplay
envisioned by the pluralists, the political efficacy of groups and individuals is
largely determined by the resources of power available to them, of which
wealth is the most crucial. . . those who control the wealth of society enjoy a
persistent and pervasive political advantage" (Parenti 1 980, p . 304). Needless
to say, the military has great wealth as do the major corporations that have
now turned from making bombs to the business of building incinerators to
destroy existing munitions.
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Parenti ( 1 980) argues that some of our liberal elites b elieve our
problems can be solved within the present system, simply by changing our
"warped priorities." He argues that, "the political system will belong to the
people only when the resources of power belong to them, enab ling them to
effect their democratic will at all levels of private and public institutional life"
(Parenti 1980, p . 319). Given this caveat, Parenti doesn't hold out much hope
for structural change within the present system. He concludes that people
will not discard the present system no matter how it oppresses them until
they can conceive of an alternative that would be better. "It is not that they
don't want things to change, but they don't believe things

can

change --- or

they fear that whatever changes might occur would more likely be for the
worse," he writes (Parenti 1 980, p. 322).
If we have learned anything from this research it would be that our
taken for granted assumptions about the nature of our democracy must be re
examined in light of the evidence that we are in the midst of a shift in the
b alance of power away from traditional views of what a democracy is.
Whether a constitutional amendment for the environment, as some have
suggested (Caldwell 1989), would effect any significant change in the trend
away from citizen control of the government, is a moot point.

It doesn 't

appear such an amendment is in the offing. The recent successes of grass
roots environmental groups in preventing the siting of hazardous waste
incinerators could be construed as a ray of hope or a window of opportunity
toward greater citizen empowerment. If this study can shed some light on the
political climate within which the citizens of the twenty-first century must
labor, perhaps we have made a contribution.
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7.5

Stockpile Activities Update: (May 1 995).
The Army is steadfastly sticking to its guns with respect to incineration.

As recently as August 1 994, the Executive Program Manager for Chemic al
Demilitarization wro te that, "Both the Army and the NRC agree that no
alternative technology is currently available to replace the liquid agent
inc inerator" (Letter: Wa lter L. Busbee, Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Commander / Director to Mr. John E. Nunn, III, Co-Chair Governo r ' s
Commitee o n Alterna tive Technologies, August 1 9, 1 994, p . 3 ) .

Since tha t

time, General Busbee has been reassigned and a number of key players in the
drama have retired .
A ctivists report that gigantic strides are being made at the Army
research laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Groun d , MD. involving the
d evelopment of alternative technolo gies---p articularly neutraliz a tion
involving the most lethal of the nerve agents VX and the vesicant mustard.
A d d i tionally, ac tivists report that on a recent visit w ith individual
Congressmen (March 27, 1 995) attitudes had shifted somewhat and many
seem to be asking opponents of the plan for a "road map" a way out of the
CSDP conundrum. (Personal Communication: Executive Director KEF, Inc .
5 / 4 / 95) . (The CSDP has been subject to huge cost overruns and is now not
very popular with the conservative Congress) .
With regard to the current status of the citizen opposition movement,
it breaks down by site in the following manner:
Cluster I:
TEAD

(Tooele, Utah)

Facility built and undergoing
testing. Appeal of permit
pending.

Cluster II:
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APG

(Aberdeen, Maryland)

Nothing built yet; opposition strong

LB AD

(Richmond, Kentucky)

Nothing built yet; opposition strong

NAAP

(Newport, Indiana)

Nothing built yet; opposition strong

PUDA

(Pueblo, Colorado)

Nothing built yet; opposition strong

UMD A

(Umatilla, Oregon)

Nothing built yet; permitting process
underway; opposition strong

ANAD

(Anniston, Alabama)

Nothing built yet; permitting process
underway; opposition movement
gaining momentum.

PB A

(Pine Bluff, Arkansas)

Nothing built yet; opposition
movement still weak

Cluster III:

The sites in the southern states are, not surprisingly, were the last to
organize and are receiving assistance in this regard by individuals from the
more vocal sites. Much of the delay is likely the result of a combination of
factors: (a) the Army 's reputation for power in the communities adjacent to
these sites; and (b) their rural character .

At Alabama, organizers of the

opposition are considering law suits charging environmental racism.
Residents of Pine Bluff are predominantly black and activists charge that this
population has been largely ignored by the formal NEPA procedures.
7.6

"What Is To Be Done?"
In a recently released report prepared by the Battelle Corporation (1994),

Bradbury et al analyzed community viewpoints of the Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program and came to the following conclusions: They argued that
"it is increasingly evident tha t public protest over "risk" technologies is not
only about technology, it is also, and perhaps mostly, about people and
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human relationships" (Bradbury et al, 1 994, p. 1 .5). This agrees with our own
premise as stated in the Introduction, that the controversy surrounding the
destruction of chemical weapons is not primarily a technical controversy, but
is essentially a political problem ---i.e., it is concerned with power.
One solution regarding 'what's to be done' is proposed by Michael
Reich ( 1 991 ) in Toxic Politics . He writes that one alternative to government
regulation of industry is to depend on industry's self-regulation (Reich 199 1 ,
p. 278). H e dismisses this proposal almost a s quickly a s he suggests it, and
concludes that "such proposals, however, are not likely to be well received in
corporate circles" (Reich 199 1 , p . 278). He then suggests that various policies
could be adopted to insure that companies pay the cost of redress. Again, not
a proposal likely to succeed . Reich (1991) points out that increased regulation,
of itself, will not accomplish the goal of alleviating the present crisis .

He

notes that "conceivably, all the companies in our cases could have been in
compliance with TSCA and RCRA (Reich 1 9 9 1 , p . 278); new regulations
without enforcement will accomplish little.
Feldman (1991), one of the most articulate writers on public policy, has
described his suggestions for reformulating public policy in his book, Wa ter

Resources Management: In Search of an Environmen tal Ethic. He writes:
An optimal public policy would maximize the range
of alternatives under consideration and provide
lucid, scrutable information about all alternatives. It
would hold policy m akers accountable for the
consequences of their decisions and would assure
adequate time and methods for deliberation about all
relevant social goals (Feldman 1 99 1 , p. 15).
If we were to follow his advice, we might be paving the way toward
developing an environmental ethic that would help avoid the pitfalls created
by the present u n-regulatory

climate.
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Dr. Feldman ( 1 99 1 ) suggests that

ecofeminism might provide a useful paradigm for the development of such
an ethic.

Ecofeminists place heavy reliance upon: ( 1 ) examining the long

term consequences of environmental impacts; (2) self-management and direct
democracy; (3) open decision-making, with full and free discussion of all
available alternatives, stemming from the convic tion that the dynamic
processes of change and growth necessitate the free flow of information
(Merchant 1981 ).
Feldman (199 1 ) calls for a reemphasis on "process," but it is precisely
this emphasis on "p rocess" as opposed to "substance" that has allowed the
abuses of power such as we have described, to creep in. Under the present
system, the Army has made a fetish of "process . "

Broadening public

participation in the political process, in and of itself, is not the answer either.
The Army was quick to point out that the citizens were e m p o w e r e d to
participate in the process.
As we mentioned earlier, Lynton Caldwell's ( 1 989) answer is a
constitutional amendment for the environment. Perhaps this is the answer,
but we have doubts about the possibility of such a proposal altering the status
quo. The answer, if there is one, lies somewhere in the realm of generating
alternatives to the present politico I economic arrangement. Alternatives that
combine the high idealism of the ecofeminist perspective w ith ones that
embody real choice and veto power by publics, and real consequences for
would-be polluters.
However, most promising of all is a concept that has already been tried
in Denmark.

In answer to the question, "Can everyday fo lks p lay a

constructive role in complex decisions involving science and technology?"
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The Danish model seems to answer a resounding YES! The model, described
by Sclove (1 994) is referred to as the "Consensus model." As he describes it:
In 1 992 a panel of ordinary Danish citizens attended
two background briefings and then spent several days
hearing diverse expert presentations on genetic
manipula tion in animal b reeding.
After cross
examining the experts and deliberating among
themselves, the lay panel reported to a national press
conference their judgment that it would be "entirely
unacceptable" to genetically engineer new pets but
ethical to use such methods to develop a treatment
for cancer. Their conclusions influenced subsequent
Parliamentary legislation.
In order to institute such a program, the Danish government's Board
of Technology (an institution roughly akin to the U. S. Office of Technology
Assessment) begins by selecting a salient topic and then advertises in the
newspapers for volunteers. These volunteers are asked to send in a one-page
resume detailing their background and explaining why they are interested in
a particular topic.

About 15 lay persons are chosen to serve on panels.

According to Sclove (1 994), "These are genuine lay groups ranging, say, from
college-educated professionals (but excluding professionals in the topic under
consideration) to housewives, office and factory workers, or garb age
collectors" (Sclove 1 994, Memo, p . 1 ) .

Next a separate p anel is assembled

consisting of people with varying levels of expertise with the p articular
technology.

A final step is bringing these two panels together in what is

termed a "Consensus Conference," ---a three-day event bringing the lay and
expert panels together in a forum open to the media and the public at large.
Sclove ( 1 994) reports that Danish b usinesses, once skeptical have openly
embraced the idea of a "Consensus conference," as being useful in forestalling

334

the more common types of gridlock encountered when communities resist
projects involving hazardous technologies.
However, adopting this model to the United States will not prove easy.
Even though the panels' decisions have often been adopted by the Danish
Parliament, this doesn't guarantee the concept would have the same imp act
here. In the first place, the decision of the "Consensus Conference" is not
binding. The panels are only advisory. We have already witnessed what can
happen when the conclusions drawn by citizen advisory panels (for example,
the Army-funded Community Study Groups for the CSDP) go against vested
interests.

They are summarily ignored.

The Danish model does show

promise, however. It suggests a structure within which citizens can perform
the duties incumbent upon citizens who live in a democracy. It is perhaps a
beacon for the future.
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Appendix B

Table 1
Percent Distribution of Unitary Weapons Store d in the
Continental United States

Percetage of total

Site locaton

Tooele Army Depot, UT
42.3
Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.0
Umatilla Depot, OR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 .6
Pueblo, CO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.9
Anniston Army Depot, AL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnston Island, South Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. . . . . . . . . . . .
Newport Army Amunition Plant, IN. . . . . . .
Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, KY. . . . . . .
.

.

7.1
6.6
5.0
3.9
1 .6

(Source: U.S. Department of the Army, "Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement," Vols. 1,2,3, Office of the Program Manager
for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988).
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Appendix G
Methodology
I . The Research Paradigm
Essentially the research presented here is based on a case study of the
U.

S. Army's programme to destroy the U . S. stockpile of chemical weapons

{known as the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP ) } and o f the
citizens' movement that emerged to oppose the Army's on-site incineration
plan. The research is based on field work took place between April 1 99 1 and
June 1992 in the towns of Berea and Richmond, Kentucky, the site of the
Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot known as "LBAD" in Army documents and
to the residents as "the depot."
This is also a work of ethnography as I have sought to c ap ture the
distinctive interpretations of reality that were made by members of the groups
I studied---both the Army's perspective and that of the citizen activists. Since
the first task of field work is to assemble "richly textured and accurate
descriptions of events and activities in the lives of those studied" (Emerson

1983, p. 20), I found myself faced with a dilemma of sorts. The stockpile sites
are located around the country at eight different locations throughout the
continental United States as well as on a remote island in the South Pacific.
Lacking a grant with which to travel to many of the more remote
places, my choice of fieldwork setting was dictated by mere convenience. As it
happened, the choice of the LBAD site proved propitious for a number o f
reasons.

It was h ere that the earliest opposition movement emerged ---we

might say it " exploded" on the scene a fter one seemingly innocuous
precipitating event (from the perspective of the Army) . This being the case, I
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was able to track the growth of the movement first-hand and to gauge the
various responses this provoked in the Army.
My fieldwork was not limited only to this site, however. I was able
through the many contacts I made in Berea and Richmond, KY to gain
entrance to another field setting at the Aberdeen Proving Ground site in the
Edgewood Area of Maryland . During the course of the field work, I made
several trips to Aberdeen to talk with activists and to speak with Army
personnel at the Proving Ground . Additionally, I was able to spend a good
deal of time in Washington, D.C. interviewing military and civilian elites at
the Pentagon. I also had the opportunity to visit with staffers from
Greenpeace whose headqu arters is also in Washington. Finally, because I was
simultaneously involved in working at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, I had the unique opportunity to see first-hand many of
the Army documents relating to the Stockpile Disposal Program. In fact,

I

was

actively involved in preparing many of the site studies undertaken in
conjunction with the various protective action / evacuation scenarios. As one
would expect, this dual role presented certain constraints upon my research,
not the least of which was the fact that I had to curb my tendency to want to
side with the activists and to "do good." Additionally, I had the problem of
convincing citizens that I was not working for the Army. However, the other
side of this dubious position was that it allowed me access to documents that
would otherwise have completely escaped my purview and it gave me some
credibility with the higher strata of decision-makers in the military, whose
cooperation might not have been so easy to secure.
sheer conjecture.
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But, of course, this is

II. Participant Observation
My first contact in the field was made through the intercession of a
member of Greenpeace who provided me with a list of activists working at
the LBAD site. I made my first contacts by telephone. I explained my interest
in studying the p roblem of chemical weapons destruction and asked if a
meeting could be set up . A cook-out was arranged and I was invited to meet
all the members of the group (Common Ground) at one time. From there, I
set up individual interviews and l ater I contacted the key players from the
Richmond group and began a similar dialogue.
During the fourteen or so months of field work, I made as many trips
as I could manage to the Berea/ Richmond, Kentucky area. In the beginning,
this was almost weekly.

I usually stayed the whole week-end as I was

working p art-time in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and couldn't remain in the field
on a full-time basis ---although I would have liked to. I usually stayed w ith
activists or at the Boone Tavern Hotel. Often, my husband would accompany
me on these trips and he proved to be a valuable co-researcher. Having him
along a lso seemed to help me secure the trust of the activists.
interviews were conducted ---both formal and informa l .
hours and well into the night.

Lengthy

Some lasted for

Often these took p lace at Papa Uno 's

Restaurant --- a local restaurant in Berea and a favorite haunt of students and
residents of the small college town. Interviews were not tape recorded. I took
d etailed notes and transcribed them immediately upon returning to my
room. I also kept a log in which I made notes about the field setting.
While in the field, I took part in p l anning meetings (occasionally),
attended a peace vigil held at the depot, met regularly with activists, attended
numerous pot-luck suppers sponsored by the Berea Interfaith Task Force for
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Peace, met with members of the press, attended a gala rock concert ( fund
raiser) and was invited to attend the press conference sponsored by the
C hemical Weapons Working Group

{ C WW G )

(Richm o n d , KYL the

international coalition of activists from U. S. sites as well as from Hawaii and
the former U. S . S . R. I never had the opportunity to attended any of the
scoping meetings held at the sites. That phase of the project had been over by
the time I entered the field . However, I availed myself of the opportunity to
read over thousands of pages of transcripts of scoping meetings produced by
the Army from meetings held around the country.

III.

Primary Sources-The Interview Data:
Interviews were conducted with pertinent persons involved with the

CSDP both in the field, in Maryland , at the Pentagon and at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. A total of forty-five persons were
interviewed during the course of the study (July 1991 through September

1994), although 95% of the interviews took place between 1991 and 1 992.
A snowball sampling technique was utilized to obtain the names of
likely interview cand idates. Semi-structured interview sched ules were
develped in conjunction with each separate target group, i .e . , activists,
military elites, local political elites, members of the press, etc.

During the

course of the field work, multiple interviews were conducted with members
of Common Ground / Kentucky Environmental Foundation, Inc., C oncerned
C itizens of Madison County (Kentucky), and C oncerned C itizens for
Maryland's Environment (at the Aberdeen Proving Ground site, Maryland) .
A dditiona lly, I interviewed a number of political and military elites a t the
local, state and federal level.
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For example, in addition to citizens involved in protesting the CSDP, I
interviewed : mi litary officers and civilian government officials at the
Pentagon (includ ing Federal Emergency Management Agency {FEMA) staff),
professional staff members in the House of Representatives, local and state
political elites (e.g., the local mayor, state regulators, etc.), research staff at the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Army Public Affairs Officers.

Further

interviews were cond ucted with legal counsel for the citizens opposition
movement, newspaper reporters, and Greenpeace activists in Washington D.
c.

Interviews lasted an average of three hours, although many lasted five
or six hours. Interviews were not tape recorded, although detailed notes were
kept of all interviews and an informal interview schedule was drawn up
although not always adhered to.

Interv iewees often offered interesting

insights that might have been m issed had a fo rmat more s tructured
interview been forced upon them.

Additiona lly, because of my c lose

interaction with the activists over an extended period of time, I had ample
opportunity to develop new insights as events progressed, thus enabling me
to fu rther refine the theoretical framework. (A list of those interviewed
appears at the end of this section. Only job titles are given due to the privacy
regulations governing human research subjects as required by the University
of Tennessee's Human Subjects as required by the University of Tennessee's
Human Subjects Committee.

Other primary sources include my personal

correspondence with activists, field notes, log book, minutes of ORNL staff
meetings, etc.
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IV.

Secondary Data Analysis
The documents used for second ary data analysis include materials

d rawn from the following sources: ( 1 ) Oak Ridge N ation al Laboratory
pub lished technical reports (TMs); (2) archiva l data from the Berea College
Library, Southern Appalachian Collection which included : newspaper clip
files from the years 1 980 through 1 992 pertinent to the CSDP as well as
memorandums, personal letters, transcripts of public meetings, committee
reports, minutes of ICCB meetings, etc.; (3) thousands of pages of transcripts
from public scoping meetings; (4) the p rivate records and personal
correspondence of citizens with Army elites; (5) pertinent documents relating
to the early history and activities of Common Ground and Concerned
C itizens { a t least three boxes of d ocuments}; (5) news i tems and reports
obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center (OTIC ) , Defense
Logistics Agency, Alexandria, Virginia, an electronic database whose access is
restricted to the military and their contractors; ( 6) transcripts of public
meetings held at the ANAD (Alabama) site gathered by researchers at Auburn
University; (7) hundreds of assorted Army documents relating to the CSDP
and to CSEPP, the most noteworthy of which are, of course, Volumes 1, 2, and
3 of the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (FPEIS), final
reports of all the Army-funded study groups, the MITRE report on continued
use, etc .; ( 9 ) numerous government documents such as those produced by
FEMA, t he U . S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Office of
Technology Assessment, the Federal Register, the National Academy of
Sciences, the National Research Council, The Congressional Record, etc.; ( 1 0)
media such as videotapes of scoping meetings, documentaries prepared by
Greenp eace, and the videotape of CBS's 60 M i n u tes segment on the
393
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destruction of chemical weapons. Finally, the Army's two newsletters: CSEPP

Up d a t e and Chem ica l Dem ilita riza tion

UPDA

, and the opposition 's

newsletter, Com m o n Sense: A Newsletter of Com mon Ground

( funded by

the Kentucky Environment al F o un d a tion), were all v ery helpful

m

providing details and updated information about emerging events .

V.

Triangulation. Throughout the course of the research, every effort was

made to gather data from many sources and to check facts revealed in
interviews with authoritative documentation. At times, this meant tthecking
and rechecking certain factual information. Additionally, considerable effort
was made to interpret the interview data in a fashion consistent with the
differing world views presented by informants.

VI.

Qualitative Data Analysis
The analysis of the interview data was done with the aid of a computer

software package known as "HyperQual2" For Qualitative Analysis and
Theory Development. HyperQual enhanced greatly my ability to manage the
interview data. Nevertheless, while programs such as these surely are time
savers, it is still up to the researcher to do the conceptual work. The program
doesn't do your "thinking " for you.

But I was glad to have had the

opportunity to utilize this state-of-the-art technology in the analysis of the
date.

Of cou rse, in the case of interview data in which tape recorders are

used, programs such as HyperQual or Ethnograph are invaluab le because
taped interviews produce anywhere from thirty to forty pages of text.
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Appendix G-1
Newspaper Clip Files 1984
List of Headlines

1 1 /29

CBS films debate over nerve agent incinerator. (RR)

1 1 /26

Nerve Gas Disposal refined at Utah site / Army tests Nerve-Gas
incinerator at Utah

1 1 /27

Army's Plan to burn nerve gas has met skepticism in Madison
Plan to incinerate nerve gas has met doubts in Madison (LHL)

1 1 /26

Nerve Gas was once burned in open pits, sunk in ocean. (LHL)

1 1 /26

Nerve-gas disposal refined at Utah site. (LHL)

1 1 /25

Richmond lives anxiously with nerve-gas dilemma. (LHL)

1 1 /24

Utah governor says nerve gas should be destroyed on site. (RR)

1 1 /24

Kentuckyans arrive in Utah for tour of nerve-gas incinerator
( RR)

1 1 /22

Final word still out on nerve gas issue. (BC)

1 1 /22

Officials reveal emergency evacuation plan. (RR)

1 1 /21

Never Gas issue is discussed on ABC-TV

1 1 /20

Disposing of nerve gas: incinerator seems safest. (LHL)

1 1 /18

Report urges b urning gas in Madison (LHL)

1 1 / 17

Evacuation plan for citizens revealed by disaster officials. (RR)

1 1 / 17

On-site nerve gas disposal recommended.(RR)

1 1 / 17

Nerve gas report suggests disposal at storage sites.(RR)

1 1 / 17

Report Recommends disposal of nerve gas at current storage
sites.(CJ)

1 1 / 14

Officials Reveal emergency evacuation plan. (RR)

1 0/25

Doctor explains physical effects of nerve gas. (RR)

9/6

Riding it Out on the Horns of a Dilemma. (BC)

8/29

Citizens respond to task force report. (RR)

8/29

Hauling missiles to Utah would entail risks, too (LH)

8/23

Army strikes out on tour of Utah facility (BC)
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8/27

77-percent of locals opposed to Army's nerve gas

8/23

incinera tor .(RR)
Burning of one pound of nerve gas produces 1 .59 lbs. residue.
( RR)

8/23

Task Force Receives Briefing (photo in article) . Owen Grise. (RR)

8/22

At Tooele Depot : Scrap furnace used to burn nerve gas.(RR)

8/20

Unconvinced. (RR)

8/ 19

Some options to nerve-gas incinerator would spread danger(CJ)

8 / 19

*Visitors find depot welcome in Utah (LHL)

8/19

Task force returns from Tooele depot.(RR)

8/17

Tour doesn't change minds of task force. (RR)

8/ 16

Task force receives 4-hour briefing in Utah. (RR)

8 / 14

Nerve gas task force leaves for Utah Wednesday. (RR)

8/11

Army t o abide by state EPA regulations .(RR)

8 / 10

Nerve Gas inspection permitted. (LHL)

8/9

State says Army must obey waste law (LHL)

8/9

Army p lans meeting on rocket transport(BC )

8/9

Army finally on right track on nerve gas issue (BC)

8/7

New option is offered to dispose of nerve gas (CJ)

8/3

Army del ays hearing on shipping nerve gas rockets to
Utah(LH L)

8/2

Funds denied for nerve gas disposal at depot (BC)

8/4

Army talks on moving nerve gas set for '85 (LH)

8/1

EVACUATION for gas accident is discussed . (RR)

9 / 13

Army may fly gas out of Madison County (BC}

7/26

Nerve gas debate highlights U.S. polity (BC)

7/26

Congress cuts nerve gas funds .(RR)

7 / 19

Hopkins says Army Depot is getting new commander.(RR)

7 / 19

Ford questions the safety of rockets at Army depot.(RR)

7/12

Army invites task force to visit incinerator in Utah(BC)

7/11

Army tries to calm fears about disposal o f old nerve gas(CJ)

5/28

Army may import nerve gas to plant, EPA a lleges. (RR)
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6/21

General says depot won't get more nerve gas(LHL)

6/21

Depot won't get more nerve gas, Army says: Citizens' panel
voices concerns on incinerator. ( CJ)

6/19

Huddleston says Congressional inquiry possible o n nerve
gas . (RR)

6/15

ARMY depot to hold open house (RR)

6/ 15

Nerve gas group sets objectives (LHL)

6/7

Depot workers are also concerned about safety(LHL)

5 / 31

County seeks Congressional investigation.(RR)

5/28

Army may import nerve gas to plant, EPA alleges. (RR)

5/11

Madison requests nerve gas probe. (LHL)

4/19

Other options still open for nerve gas facility

4/ 19

Army wants to improve its image.(RR)

3/6

Court opposes destruction of nerve gas here (RR)

3/1

Ordinance to double number of employees(BC)

2/23

Additional 2,000 jobs coming to Army depot at A v. (RR)

2/23

Residents against plan to dispose of nerve agent( BC)

2/19

No easy answer to gas disposal (LHL)

2/18

Nerve gas disposal draws heavy opposition: Residents distrust
weapons disposal plan.(RR)

2/17

Mad ison area residents denounce Army plan to incinerate nerve
gas. (LHL)

2/9

Public hearing set on disposal of gas. (BC)

Legend:
BC
LHL=
RR =
CJ =

Berea Citizen
Lexington-Herald Leader
Richmond Register
Courier Journal
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Nerve Gas Chronology

A brief history of events pertamin g t o the chemiCal weapons stoc.kpde at the Lexing ton-Bl uegrass
Army Depot at Richmond, Kentucky. All events have bee n verified a.ncl documentea.

Early

1 940's:

Lexingto n Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAO) activity begun.

Early to Mid 1 960's: M55 rockets containing nerve agent transported by rail into LBAO.
Early

1 9 70's :

August 1 979:

Some nerve agent moved out by rail under strict secrecy.
Improper burning of smoke pots causes a toxic cloud. resultin� in 45 local citizens
The Army denies responsibility until independer.t �bservers identify LBAD as

hospitalized.
the source.
February 1 984:

, Spring . 1 9 84:
.
June 1 9 84 :

April

1 986:

Army announces h earing to explain plans for nerve gas in-:.:inerator. Over 300 citizens
attend, overtlowing the base cafeteria and expressing overwhelming rejection ot the plan.
•concern ed Citizens of Madison County• is organized in response to the Army briefing.
LBAO Security Guard kidnap s two co-workers. Incident ends ir. shoot-out with Richmo nd
City Police. ·
LBAD Employee barricades himself in his Richmond apanmem:

shots tired at police.

June 1 98 6 :

General munitions storage igloo at LBAD explodes do.& t!i ir·�rr.:ct storage prvcedures.

J uly

Army issues Draft Programmatic Environmsmal I mpact Statement.

1 986:

August 1 9 86:

Public hearing on the Draft Programmatic Environm ental Impact Statement.
to fund local study group.

J anuary 1 9 87:

Community Review Support Contract signed to fund study team headed by Dr. Oris

Army agrees

Blackwell.
November 1 9 87:

Community Review group issues report recommending air transport of the Richmond
stockpile to Tooele, Utah.

January 1 98 8 :

Army release s Final Programmatic EIS recommending on-site incineration.

January 2 9 , 1 988:

Over 2000 citizens pack the gymnasium at Madison C entral High School lor meeting with
Army Representatives. State and local officials join citizens in rejection ol the plan to
build an incinerator in Madison County. "'-'\'"' ,. ....,c ., p-'t "'l ''f'\ ') '.c... ... 1: -:. 1 ' lol. \J..........,.
.:...>- :....; , ·' � ':'fU-- '- ,...,h.......X )'--� '--) 1� ' "'- "-

February

Army announces Programmatic Record ot

1 98 9 :

becision to build

incinerators at all eight sites.

including Richmond, and that the Sile Specific EJS will not re-evaluate the options for each
site: it will only be used to decide where on the depot to build the incinerator.
November 1 989:

Congress approves funding tor a study of possible on-going use of the incinerators after the
nerve agent is burned.

May 1 990:

Army training exercise uses scenario of local protesters in conjunction with terrorist
activity. Scenario includes protest at front gate, gunfire. guards wounded, terrorist
sniper "disposed of."

J uly 1 990:

Chemical stOCkpile moved from Germany.
Compiled by Common Ground, 620 Blue Ucl<. Ad., Berea. KY
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Appendix I-1
Demographic Data for
Aberdeen Proving Ground
(APG)
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1 990 AND1 980 US CENSUS D ATA
Unltrd States

Maryland

Baltimore County

llarrord County

Kent County

1990

1980

19110

Total Population

248,709,873

226,545,805

4,78 1 ,468

4,21 6,975

Urban Population

692,1 34

655.61 5

1 82.132

145,930

11,842

1 6695

187,05 1 ,543

1 67,054,638

3,887,981

3.386,693

631 ,280

604,132

1 26,975

9 1 , 1 90

4 ,005

3,300

75.2191.

73.74'1o

8 1 .3091.

19.1791.

Rural Population

6 1 ,658,330

59,491 ,167

893,487

24.7991.

16.2691.

1 8.76'11.

19.69"

3,87 1 ,583

5,61 7,903

32,596

44,934

1 ..56"

2.4891.

0.68'Ao

1980

1990

1980

1990

1980

1990

1980

Urban and Rural Rfsldenc:e

Pr:n:ml

Percent

Farm Population

Pl:rc:enl (of total population)

80.31 "
830,281

1.07"

91.20'1o

92.15'1!.

69.70"

62.4991.

22.4091.

60,854

5 1 .483

55,151

55,1 36

1 3,837

1 3 ,395

30.30"

37.7891.

77.60%

80.23"

8.80%

1.85%

1 ,734

•

1 , 1 02

•

1 .207

•

0.25 ...

•

0.61"

•

0.00%

•

Eduatlonal Allalnmfnt

Persons 25 Yean and over

1 ,952.261

1 58,868,436

1 32.835,687

3,1 22,665

1 1 5,199

62,565

1 1 ,822

1 0.260

Percent hith school graduate of higher

75.20%

66.50%

78.40%

69 90"

18.40%

68.3091.

8 1.60"

64.10%

71 .40%

5 3 90%

Percent Bachdor's decree or higher

20.30%

1 6.20%

26..50"

22.1 0%

25.00%

1 8.80%

2 1 .50%

1 7 . 1 0%

1 6.9091.

1 2.60%

Persons 1 6 years and over

191 ,829,27 1

1 7 1,214,258

3,736,830

3,214.983

556,056

520,5 1 5

1 38,391

106.697

14,467

1 3.27 1

Pm:ons in labor force

125,1 82,378

1 06.084,668

2,639,896

2,108.754

381 ,531

345,3 1 8

102,019

12,031

9,197

7,691

65.26%

6 1 .96%

70.6

67.51'1.

6J.6

5 7 .96'1.

413,574

4 1 1 .225

Employmt nt

Percent

*'""
Cl
N

Civilian labor force
Emplll)'ed
Unemployed

Pr:n:cnt Unemployed

Anned Fortea

Pe:rc:ent
Jncomf (In dollars)

68.60'1.

104,449.8 1 7

2,592,878

2,06.5.5 1 1

380,440

96,76.5

66,6 1 3

9,128

7,664

97,639,35.5

2,4 8 1 .342

1,946.6 1 2

366.276

327.459

93..500

62,129

8,822

7,084

7,792.248

6,810,462

l l l ,S36

1 1 8,900

1 4 , 1 64

1 7.2 1 3

3,265

3,884

306

6.31 %

6.5291.

4.3091.

5.7691.

3.40"

6.19'1.

1 ,708,928

1 ,634,851

47,018

43,242

1 .3791.

1..54'-

1 .26'Ao

ln 1989

In 1979

ln 1989

2.0591.
I n 1979

3.70"

646

5,254

5,4 1 8

0.1"'

3.80%

7.5291.

ln 1989

In 1979

$38,837

Median family income

$35,225

$19,911

$45,034

$23, 1 1 2

$44.S02

Median non-family Income

$ 1 7 .240

$6,695

$24,482

$8,398

S24,Sll

Per-capita inC:ome

$ 14 ,420

$7,298

$17,130

$8,293

$ 18,658

Dal• 1101 provided

5.26"

1 ,09 1

$20,28 1

Pl:nmu below the poverty level
Pl:rccnl below the �ert,t: level

344672

0.20'-

$39,386

All persons for whom poverty sllbll is delamined

13.70

1 23,413,450

$ 1 6,841

Povfrty Sl•tus (1989)

66.30%

1 1.5.68 1 .201

$30,056

Median household income

•

65.5"'

2 1 640

In 1989

In 1979

$41 .680

$27,612

$24,4 1 3

$4.5,923

$ 1 0. 1 63

$23,356

$9,044

$ 1 6,612

3.47%

69
0.48%
In 1989

580
7 ..57'Ao
18
0.36'A't

In 1979

$30.104

$ 1 3 ,979

$30,328

$15.231

$ 1 6,347

$ 1 3,004

$14.2 1 2

$4,306

$ 10,065

$ 15,488

$6,502

In 1989

In 1979

In 1989

In 1989

I n 1979

In 1989

In 1989

In 1979

241 ,917.859

220,845,766

4,660,.591

4,1 1 8.381

617,7 1 4

642595

178.074

1 4 1 ,9 1 0

1 6.928

1 6,085

3 1 ,742,864

27,392,.580

385,296

404,560

37,154

9,122

10,638

1 ,943

1 3. 1 2'1.

1 2.40%

8.27'1. •

In 1979

9.82.,.

5.48%

33.1161
5.27'-

5 . 1 2"

In 1979

7.5091.

1 1 .48%

2 , 1 29
1 3.24'-

1 -2

Demographic Data for
Anniston Army Ammunition Depot
(ANAD)
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1 990 AND1980 US CENSUS DATA
United States

1990
Urban and Rural Residence
Tow Population
Urban Population
Percent

Rural Population
Percent

Farm Population

Percent (of total popula&.lon)

Educational Attainment
Penoos 25 Years and over
"""
Percent high school graduate or hi&her
0
"""
Percent Bachelor's degree or bl&her
EmplopDent
Persons 16 years and over
Persons in labor force
Percent
Civilian labor force
Employed
Unemployed
Percent Unemployed
Armed Forces

Percent

lacome (In dollars)
Median household income
Median family income
Median non-(amily income
Per�ita income
Poverty Status

All penons for whom poverty status is

determined
Penoos below abc poverty level
Percent below the 1!2vcnz lcvel
• O.U • po'ri.W

Alabama

1980

1990

1980

Calhoun County

1990

Talladega County

Cleburne County

1980

1990

1980

248,709,873 226;545.805 4,040,587 3,893,888 1 16,034 1 19,761
187,051 ,543 167,054.638 1,437,7 1 5 1,337,033
82,726
90.459
75.21 %
73.74%
«1.0291, 7 1.30% 75.53%
6().30%
61 ,658,330 59,491,167 1 ,602,872 1 ,556,855
33,308 29,302
39.98% 28.70% 14.47%
39.70..
24.79%
26.26t.
•
87,757
768
5,617.903
59 ,349.
3,871,583
•
2.25%
1 .47..
0.66 ..
1 .56%
2.48..

74,107
39,081
52.70%
35,026
47.30%
674
0.91 %

73,826
37,396
50.65%
36,430
49.35%

1 58,868.436 1 32,835,687 2,545,969 2,217,3 1 5
56.50%
66.90%
66.50%
75.20%
1 5.704JL
12.20%
16.20t.
20.30..

72,445
67.40%
1 4.204JL

65,34 1
57.60%
1 Ul04JL

46,091
«1.70%
10.204JL

40,547
49.10%
7.80%

8,101
49.80%
6.SO%

7,425
38.30%
5.80%

3,103,529 2,881 ,348
1 ,895,361 166,352
51.80%
61.10'11
1 ,870.381 1,634,743
1 ,74 1,794 1,51 1 ,928
128,587 112.8 1 5
7.5 1 %
6.90'11
24,980
30.609
18.404JL
0.80t.

90,240
5!1,865
61.90'11
5 1,249
46,899
4,350
8.50%
4,616
5.124JL

56.181
90,228
32,687
54,762
«1.704JL 58.20%
32.S46
46.833
42,549
30.069
2,471
4,284
7.«1..
9. 1 54JL
141
7,929
0.2.54JL
14.48t.

52,448
29,656
56.50%
29,414
26.755
2,659
9.0491,
242
0.82%

9,816
6,104
62.20%
6,074
5,74 1
333
5.50%
30
0.31 4JL

9,327
5.58 7
59.90%
.5,572
5,232
340
6.10'11
15
0.27%

191 ,829,27 1
125,182,378
65.26%
1 23.473.450
1 15,681 ,202
7,792,248
6.3 1 %
1 ,708,928
1.37t.

171,214,258
106,084,668
61 .96%
104,449,817
97,639,355
6,810,462
6.52%
1 ,634,8 5 1
1.544JL

In 1989
$30.056
$35,225
$11,240
$14,420

In 1979
$ 16,841
$19,917
$6,695
$7,298

In 1989

In 1979

In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 In 1 989
In 1989
$23,597 . $1 3,669 $23,802 $13,665 $21.378
$ 16,347 $28,340 $ 1 6. 1 3 t $25,225
$28,688
$4,589 $10,765
$10,894
$4,327 $8.540
$5,894 $ 1 0,704
$5,576 $9,700
$ 1 1 .486

In 1989

In 1979

24 1 ,971,859 220,845,766 3,945,798 3,813,014
723,614 719,905
3 1 ,742,864 27,392,580
1 8.904JL
1 2.40%
1 3. 1 2..
1 8.34'11

•
•

1!190

1980

1 2,730
�.908
12.80%
9,822
71.20%

1 2 .595
3 .0 1 4
23.93%
9581
76.07%

«<I

4.72..

•
•

In 1979 In 1 989 In 1979
$12.62!1 $21 .158 $1 2.782
$14,806 $25,900 $14,642
$3,826 $6.633
$3,637
$5,0 1 3
$4,981
$9,876

In 1979

In 1989

I n 1979

In 1 989

In 1979

1 10,981 1 J 1 ,6 1 8
1 7,385 18,231
1 S.664JL 16.33%

7 1 ,619
14,435
20.16%

7 1 .992
14,973
20.80%

12,653
1 ,936
15.30%

1 2.550
2,093
16.70%

In 1989

Appendix I-3
Demographic Data for
Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot
(LBAD)
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1990 US CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING SUMMARY
SUmmary Tape File 3A
•

Clark
Uahed States

KeahK'kf

Totll Population

2�11.709.173

3.685.296

29,496

Urban Population

1 81,05 1,543

1 ,910,1)21

1 5,799

75.21
61,651330
24.19
3,81 1,513
1..56'1.

5 1 .1
1 ,7l5,268
41.2
114,204
4.73'1.

1 58 ,1 68,436
15.20
10.30

Percatl

Estill
Rlebmoad

lena

15,799
1 5,799

57.501

2 1 .155
21,155

1 3,697
46.4
1 ,608
5.45'1.

100
0
0
0
O.OO'Io

52.7
27,227
47.3
2,666
4.� ..

1 00
0
0
0
O.OO'Io

9,1 26
9,126
100
0
0
0
O.OO'Io

14.614
2,116
19.3
1 1 ,798
80.7
807
5..52'1.

1 00
0
0
0
O.OO'Io

2,333,1 33
64.6
1 3.6

19,112
65.1
13

10,165
62.4
1 1.4

32,274
. 64.1
19. 1

10,054
65.4
19.6

5,14 1
66.5
26.1

9,170
46.5
5.4

1 , 1 45
46.7
7.4

191.129.211
1 25,112.371
65.26
113.413,450
1 15,681 .202

2,131,709
1,711,145
60.5
I,611JI4
1 ,563.960

46,210
29,576
64
29.444
27,242
2.202
7.5
1 31
0.29'1.

1 8, 1 32
10,7 1 6
59. 1
1 0.�6
9,474
1,172

1 1 , 1 34
5,640
50.7
5,637
4,866

124J54
7.4
29,831
l OS'Io

12.066
7,354
60.9
7,344
6.190
454
6.2
10
O.OI'Io

7J60
4,171
66.2
4,154
4,565

1,792.241
6.31
1 ,708.921
1 .37'1.

22,612
14,115
62.5
14,150
1 3,222
928
6.6
25
O. l l'lo

70
0.39'1.

219
6
11
0.23'1.

171
1 3.7
3
0.03'1.

2,117
955
43.7
955
857
98
10.3
0
O.OO'Io

$30,056
$35,225
Sl1.240
$ 14,420

$22,534
$27,021
$ 1 1 ,471
$ 1 1,153

$25,323
$19,089
$1 2,663
$ 1 1 ,655

$21 ,311
$27,052
SIO, I l l
$10,029

S I S.SBI
$21.441
S9.4'!0
$8,11 1

$11 ,622
$26.391
Sl 2,288
$9,102

Pat:cnt

Farm Population
Pm:cnt (of total populallon)

Coualf Wlaebater

Coualf

Urban and Rural Resldeac:e

Rurll Populadoll

Madlsoa

53.6

30,28 1

Coualf

I nine

2 ,8 1 6
2 ,8 1 6

ldueallonal Allalnmrnt
Pa- 25 Ycan iUid -

Pm:mt hl1h adloo1 1 radua1e ar hl 1hcr
Pm::all Dadu:lor'a depa� ar hi&hcr
>+:>0
0\

Emplo,meal
Ptnom 16 yean lnCI ova:
Ptnom 1n Iabar ron:e

Percent
CivUi1111 Iabar force
Employed
Unemployed
Pat:cnt Uac:mploytd
Armed farees
Pm:cnt

-

.

ll

Jaeame (198t0 la dolan)

Median housdlo1d lncarne
Median family Income
Median non·famlly Income

Pcr-apita lncome

$21 .543
$21 .50
$ 1 1 ,581
$10,132

$ 16,056
$19.223
$6.681
$7,474

$ 1 5.)66
S22.14l
$8,403
$7,972

I"PtrtJ SIIIIDI (1919)
All � far whom pcwctty ltatwl b dctamlnal
Ptnom below the poverty JeyeJ
Pm::all below the povaty leYel

24 1.977.859
3 1 ,7�2.164
13.12'1.

3,512.459
681 ,827
19.03'1.

29.1 19
5,142
11.66'1.

15,623
3,113
21.65'1.

5 1 ,109
10,1159
2 1 .2 1 'lo

1 6, 1 5 1
5,1 12
3 1.65'1.

7.165
l ,l65
11.36'1.

14.�65
4,199
29.0l'lo

2 .705
101
29.61 '1.

I -4
Demographic Data for
Newport Army Ammunition Plant

(NAAP)
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1 990 AND1 980 US CENSUS DATA
United States

1998
Urban and Rural Residence
Total Population
Urban Population
Percent
Ruml Population
Percent
Fn Population
Percent (of total populatloo)

�
0
00

1988

lndiau

1998

1988

Vermillion County

1990

1980

1 6.773
5,040
30.0.5"
1 1 ,733
69.95"
748
4.46"

18,229
5,267
28.89'!1,
12,962
7 1 . 1 1 '!1,

248,709,871
l87,0.S I,S43
75.21 1JJ
6 1 ,6.58,.330
24.79"
3,871 ,583
1 ..56"

226,545,80.5
1 67,054,638
73.74"
.59,4 9 1 ,167
26.26"
5,6 17,903 .
2.48"

.5,544,1.59
3,596,0 1 7
64.86..
1,948,142
3.5. 1 41JJ
188,133
3.39"

.5,490,224
3,S2S.298
64.2 1 "
1 ,964,926
35.79"

Educational A ttalnmenl
Persons 2.S Years and over
Percent high school graduate of higher
Percent Bachelor's degree or bigher

1 .58,868,436
7.5.20%
20.30"

132,835,687
66.50%
1 6.20"

3,489,470
7.5.60"
I.S.601JJ

3,135,772
66.40"
1 2.50CJ.

1 1 ,1 63
72. 10%
7.801JJ

1 1 ,268
60.50'!1,
7.80"

Employment
Persons 16 years and over
Persons In labor forte
Percent
Civilian labor force
Employed
Unemployed
Percent Unemployed
Armed Forces
Percent

1 9 1 ,829.27 1
12S,I 82,.J78
65.26CJ.
123,473,4.50
1 1.5,68 1 .202
7,792.248
6.3 1 '!1,
1 ,708,928
1 .371JJ

1 7 1 ,214,2.58
106,084 ,668
6 1.96CJ.
104,449,8 1 7
97,639,.3.5.5
6,810,462
6.52CJ.
1 ,634,85 1
l ..54'll

4 ,248.923
2,798,.370
65.86"
2.788,838
2,628,69.5
160,143
.5.74"
9,532
0.341JJ

4,080.934
2,.57.5,284
63. 1 1 "
2,.566,7.55
2,366.263
200,492
7.8 1 'l!
8,529
0.331JJ

13.082
7,538
57.62"
7,507
6,9.52
555
7.39'!1,
31
0.4 1 "

13,749
7,609
5.5.34'!1,
7.590
6,944
646
8 ..S I 'lrr
19
0.2SIJJ

In 1989
$30,056
$35,22.5
$17,240
$ 14,420

In 1979
$ 1 6,84 1
$ 19.9 1 7
$6,69.5
$7,298

In 1989
$28.797
$34.082
$ 1.5,379
$ 1 3,149

In 1979
$1 7,582
$20,535
$6,389
$7,142

In 1989
$22,339
$29,100
$ 10,177
$ 1 1 ,2 1 7

In 1 979
$ 1 4,1 1 9
$ 17,1 4 1
$6,556
$6,1 5 1

In 1 989
24 1 ,977,859
3 1 ,742,864
13. 12'l!

In 1 979
220,845,766
27,392,580
12.40CJ.

In 1989
.5,372,388
.573,632
10.681JJ

In 1979
.5,34 1 ,438
.516,190
9.66..

In 1989

In 1979

Income (In dollars)
Median household Income
Median ramlly Income
Median non-family Income
Per-capila income
Ponrly Status ( 1989)
All persons fot' whom poverty ltalus Is determined
Persons below lhe poverty level
Percent below the 22vert! level
•

Diu IIIOC poYideol

•
•

16,494
1 ,925
1 1.67'l!

•
•

1 8,0 1 6
1 ,925
10.68"
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Summary Tape File 3A
Arkaaut

Conoly

2411,709,87)

2,350.715

1 87,05 1 ,54)

115,487

1 ,2511,1911

62,004

53.5

72.5

1 ,092,.527

2),48)

Urban a nd Rural Rflidtlle«

Toul Population

Urban Populadon

75.21

Percent

R ur ll Popul won

..,..

.....

0

6 1,651.330
24.79

Percent
Farm Populallon

Pa-tmt (o( IOL&I population)

JeiTtrson

United Stain

.

46.5

27.5

l'tae BluiT Wbltt Hall Altheimer Wabbast'b
57,140

),849

988

3711

Saline
Rtdneld

County

1 ,082

64 . 1 8 3

57,140

3,1149

1 00

1 00

0

0

0

0

9811

)78

1 00

1 .082

1 00

33,00.5

24

1 00

II

0

5 1 .4

0

2.43�

2.9 1 "

O.OM.

0.14%

0

0

0

0

31,178
48.6

0

0

0.72'7.

0.�

O.OM.

1 .496.1 50

.5 1 ,74 1

34 , 1 1 6

659

2,)79

225

651

6.5.5

557

17.4

49.7

4 1 ,012

66.3

IJ.J

1 4 .6

40.9

1 6.6

1 2. 6

75 11

5.9

12 9

8.4

1 1 .9

1 1 .9

785

4 !1 ,6!1 1

3.117 1 ,.583

6)j89

615

1 .5 6 "

2.7 1 �

1 5 8,868,436
7520

0

475

Educational Altalamtlll

Penons 25 Yem and over

Percml high school sraduace or higher
Pm:mt B achelor's degru 01' higher

20.30

Employmtal
Pc:nonJ 1 6 yean and over

1 9 1 ,829.271

1 .800.0Hi

64.239

42,433

l lS,I81,378

1 ,077 . 1 .5 1

37,1 60

2 , 8 10

688

Pt:noru in I abo! forcc

261

65.26

.59.1

24,.50]

S7.8

1 .899

533

1 23,41),4.50

1 .066.361

36,899

67.1

1 27

Ci viii 1111 labof force

57.7

]51
I

48.5

67.9

I 1 5 ,68 1 ,201

�.289

33,236

5211

3,66)

2,707

1 67

101

3 1 .496

72,079

295

127

7,792.241

1 ,720

]51

510

6.11

8.9

1 ,609

1 ,708,928

1 0.783

6

t8

9.9

11.1

lS

29.887

6.31

56

261

I I)

12

0

19.7

3.4

0.�

0.41 '11.

0.27"

o.u"

0.�

5

5 I

1 .37�

0

O.OM.

0.64"

Pm:all

Employed

Unemployed
Percmt Unemployed
Armed Fon:eJ

Pm:cnt

24 ,)90
2 1 .68)

1 ,8 8 7

JIJM
64.8

70

0.14�

loromt ( 1 989, 1a dollan)
SJ0.056

S 2 1 . 1 47

S 1 1 .J21

S l9,143

$211,768

Medilfl ltmily incume

$35.223

523,395

$26.360

5 ) 1 .419

5 1 0,195

59.5 5 8

524,442

�<.apita inc:ornc

$ 1 4 ,420

5 1 0.320

S9,11S2

Medilfl hOW<:hold income

s 1 7 ,240

M�dian noo·f amily income

Poftrty Stallll ( 1 989)

All pcnons r.,.. whom pov1:11 y

IUIWI

�SON b<: low the pov1:11 y level

Pcn:alt below lbe poverty level

b determined

$9,.548

S9,.5)0

5 1 6,07 1
5 1 1 ,428

24 1 ,977 .8S9

2.292.031

8 1 ,244

5 5 , 1 62

43 7,089

3,840

) 1 ,742,864

1 9,4 1 0

1 5 ,28 3

329

1 3. 1 2"

1 9.07�

23.8�

27.7 1 "

8.57"

S l i .4 1 Z

5 1 4 ,688

SJ0,76 1

S l 6 .1 1 1

$ 1 7.500

S 3 5 , 719

5 1 1 .230

5 3 1 .8 � 5

$-4 ,999

59,700

S6,9S8

5 1 1 .95 1

S l l .333

$ 1 1 ,671

$5,989

99 6

37!1

188

1 ,082

1 88

1 02

39.).5"

49.74�

9.431.

S 2 8 .161

62 ,912

H·I S

9.2�

I-6
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Summary Tape File 3A

Pueblo

AY011dale Crowley

Crowley

Ordway

El PlUG

Co••tr

T-•

T-•

Couatr

�0
0
0
2,3.50
too
272
1 1..57'1.

3.946
0
0
3,946
100
394
9.98'1.

20
0
0
143
100
l9
1 1.93'1.

1.016
0
0
l ,O i 6
100
0
0.00'1.

397,014
374,089
94.1
22.925
5.11
161
0.22...

210
51.6
1

1 ,4,
6.5
12.6

2,UI
70.3
I

137
.5U
1.3

704
6 1 .4
1 1 .2

240,H l
IIJ.l
25.1

75,610
4 1 .211
54.6
41,146
37.313
3,133
9.3
141
O.IK

227
1 00
44.1
100
90
10
10
0
0.00'1.

1,104
1 ,002
.5.5.5
1 ,002
944
.51
u
0
O.OO'Io

3,199
1 ,143
3.5.7
1.141
1 ,067
14
6..5
2
0.06'1.

166
5I
34.9
.51
49
9
15..5
0
0.00'1.

190
365
46.2
363
336
27
7.4
2
0.25'1.

1911,563
21 5,0.50
12
1 16.047
112,530
13,511
7.3
29,003
9.7 1'1.

21 .553
25,714
1 1 ,701
10,347

20,50 1
24.997
1 1 ,417
10,161

14,167
1 6.563
6,761
6,315

20.526
22,303
15.395
10,101

1 6.011
11,345
9,455
6,971

1 1 ,175
13,000
6.667
4.«1

14.500
18.1«
1.956
1.533

29,604
33,932
19.164
tl,664

120,239
24,318
20.ll'lo

95.914
20,178
21.65'1.

331
145
42.90'1o

2,350
502
2 1 .36'1.

2,908
693
23.13'1.

243
112
46.0K

963
2J.t
24.JO'Io

380,785

Ualttd Slates

CoIondo

CoUII'J hthlo CllJ

Toul l'opulation

241,709,11)

Urban Popdalbl
l'l:rc:a!t
hRall
f�m� l'opullllon
l'l:rc:a!l (of tol&l population)

l17.0SUU
15.21
61,6511.330
14.79
3,171,5113
l .S6'1o

3.294.394
2.7U,749
12.4
.571,645
11.6
45, 1 1 1
1 .37'1.

123,051
l1D.652
19.9
12,399
10.1
911
0.75'1.

98,640
91,640
1 00
0
0
0
O.OO'Io

331
0
0
331
100
0
O.OO'Io

Ed•c:allolla1 Alttlameal
l'monJ 25 Yun and over
l'l:rc:a!l hlp IChool araduale or hlper
Fm:ad Bld!dlll'a depce or hlsher

151,161,436
75.20
20.30

2,1 01,o72
14.4
21

79,524
73.9
14

6].625
73.1
13.1

191.119.211
125,112.311
6.5.26
123,473,450
115,61 1.201
7,792.241
6.31
1.7011,921
1.37'1.

1,5 1 1,411
1,171,101
70.3
1 .732.719
1.633.211
99,01
!U
31,381
1..52'1.

94,MI
.52,310
,,6
51.107
41.431
4,676
9
203
O.ll'lo

S30,M6
$35.225
$1 7,240
$14.420

30,140
35,930
11.941
14,121

3.212,550
375.214
1 1 .61'1.

Booat

Dhlsloa

Urhaa and Rural ResldtDct

Runll'opuladola

,j::..
,_.

N

!mploJIIID
I l

l'monJ 16 yean and over
Pmonll ln labor rorco
l'm:all

Civilllll ldlor bee
Empl�JYed
Unempl�JYed
Pl:rc:a!t UnempiO)'ed
Anned forca
l'l:rc:a!l
llleomt (19t9, la doQan)

Median hoosehold lncDme
Median f1111Uy Income
Median llll·ll famlly IDcome
Pt:r-cepita lnc:ome

Pomtr Slatu (IH9)
All pcnoos for 1rhom povaty IIJ.llll It ddamlned
l'monJ below the poverty level
Pat:ad below the povaty level

241 ,977,.,9
31,742,164
U.t2'1o

39.519
10.38'1.

Appendix I-7
Demographic D a ta for
Umatilla Army Depot
(UMDA)
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UaWIIAitl

Summary Tape File 3A

llmaiDia
t.fort'OW
CMatJ H_..._ IWIJitW CMatJ ._.._
ana-

Ur\aa aad lttbl luWeaa

Tlllal l"opu!IIDI
Urt..t P�
Paeml
.... �
l'aCCIIl
Fum l\lpll•lbt
l'mml (of taeal�)

�

1-'

�

241.l09.1U
lll.IIS IJU
75.21
11-"1310
24.79

un.m

1.56'1

U41Jll

2.002.999
10.f
ll9.l12
l!U
ll,nt
1.42'1

59J49
33,510
su
�,119
43.3
2,1U6
4.41'1

10.040

10,040
100
0
0
0
0.00'1

!Aitatlollal AIIAlameal
Pmcnt 2S Yeen ancl cmor
l'aCCIIl blah IC:hool ...... • bl&ht
l'lr:n:all l.tdar'l 4cp� ......

151.161,436
7UO

1 ,155,169
IU

31,]11
7U

20.30

20.1

IU

I,OU
7 1 .9
1 1.7

lapto.r-ol
l'mol'll l6rurullll cmor
l'mol'll ln lala tGRI
l'accnl
C.W�n t.r.. ran.

191.129Jll
125,112,311
65.U

1,19U4l

2.191.1�
1,410,119S
64.4
1 .407,143
1,319.960
IUU

44JJI
21,011
51.9
27.914
25,611

1J20
4,611
64.1
4,661
4,19J

u

411

6.ll
1,701,911
Ul'l

1,.311

IQ.I

uu
0.16'1

32
om"

I)
D.ll..

SlO.OU
mm
SI7J10
$14,420

Sll.UO
$)1.336
$ 16.009
SlMU

$22,791
S11.4S9
Sll�OO
Sll,l71

S20.U4

EmpiOJcd
Ut�emploJcd
Paeml UMmplafool

Anacd FORCI
Pacal
bee•• (lm, la doDenJ
Medlla houehal4 .._
J.tc:dlq fllllDy llx>ooM
Mc:dl• --ramJtr ._.
Pw-o,lla baM
,...,. 11J Sbllll (1919)
II lkJcnnlncd
�'!non� bdcnr dll ponny lcM.I
l'aCCIIl bdcnr the pwa'IJ te-.d

IU.4l:t,4SO

11UIIl02

u

I.KJ
0

l!aillllllal Blll:d11:Iaus
lnta•

0

1,125
0
0

'""
100
3J
1.11'1

7.525
100
629
1.25'1

...
60.4
u

4,7))
7U
11.1

769
61.4
IU

4.44
61.9
u

I.OSJ
706
61
104
"'
69
9.1
1

5J44

910
722
U7
714
64 1
n

500
HI
su
H6
236

102
•
0.12..

D.IK

:s.m
64.4
3JU
JJll
310
9
u
1.23..

SUJ�
$24,449
Sl2.1l31
ll.il5
$9.719

$11,969
Sl6,12S
$1 ],094
$10,412

SH�OI
SIUU

241 .917.1'9
Jl,lU,JM

1.175.901
344,161

51.046
9,419

9.911
1,962

1 .m
290

1].12'1

12.41'1

16.51'1

19.16'1

11.10'1

lJ:J9

t,m
IUl'l

IAU
0
0
1,431
100
0
0.00'1

8'.1
0
0
m
100
0
0.00'1

....., lt•MWidl
4,191
4,t9l
100
0
0
0
0.00'1

41,1"
42,1" .
100
0

.....
20.331
lt.IIU
91
402

0

2

0

21

0.00'1

0.11'1

3,1146
1U
4.2

14,919
IU
1!1.1

10,181
51.7
1.1

30,196

14.010

20

U11
U61
6U
2.361
1.211
140

u
1
0.40'11o

u
0
1.110'1

S1l.ll6 s20.m
111.461 $11,116
$9,449
11 4.196
11 .632
$1.142

SlO,IU
131.419
$10.19)
$11,165

l,4 1 J
]IJ

690
1 14

4,IU
10]

22.12'1

IUl'l

14.40'1.

20,116

l9.39:t
1,461
l
31
1.111'1.

un
6U
1.7 34
1.116
1 .001
1 1 .5
2l
0.16'1

S21J6t
11,,024

SIU91
Sll,4lJ

117.609
$12,167

$9.904
SI,D16

61.9
20.155

4 1 .150
5,8 1 4
I :Ul�

19.904
6�10
]].01'1

I-8
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1990 US CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING SUMMARY
Summary Tape File 3A
T-It
Ualted Sllttt

Ullll

County

141,709,873

I,722,8SO

26,6l)J
18,174
68.30

T-It
CIIJ Staclton

Rush

St1nsbury

V•ller

Ve1110a Plrl COP

Ophir

Urb•a 1ad Runl Raldeaar

Tout Populalian
Urb111 Population
Pa-calt
Runt Populadan

Pa-calt
fum Population
Pcrcalt (of toll) population)

,.!;:..

,....,

0',

187,05 1,.543 1,499.375
87.00
75.21
61,658,330
123,475
13.00
24.79
1 1 ,685
3,111.583
0.68'1.
1.56'1.

8,411
3 1.70
254
0.95'1.

13,887
1 3,887
100.00
0
0.00
0
0.00'1.

-408
0
0.00
408
100.00
0
0.00'1.

375
0
0.00
375
100.00
26
6.93'1.

114
0
0.00

1 ,014
0
0.00

174
100.00
50
21.74'1.

1 ,014
100.00

IS
0
0.00
15
100.00

0
0.00'1.

0
0.00'1.

621
93.6
26.8

14
85.7
7.1

Eduartlota•l Alllblment

1 58,868,436

897,321

1-4.511

1,021

Paa:nt hl&h schooi iJ'Idu.&llll a' hl&ba-

75.20

17.3
1 1 .2

220
73.1
1.8

96
19.6

20.30

17.3
1 1.3

235
8 1 .3

Pcrcalt B lldldor'a depa a- hl&hct

15.1
22.3

3.1

8.3

PmonJ 1 6 yem llld ovct

191 ,129.27 1

1,1 5-4,039

1 1,988

9,685

254

274

PmonJ in labor force

125,182.311
65.26
123,473,450
1 1S,681.202
7,792.248
6.31

184,501
61
m.441
736,059

12.345
68.6
1 1 ,968
1 1 ,037
931
7.1

6,238
64.4
6.162
5.533
629
10.1

113
68.1
113
153
20

188
68.6
188
111
11

125
97
77.6
91
95

1 1 .6

9

2
1.1

76

0
0.00'1.

0
0.00'1.

0
O.OM.

Pmonl lS Yem llld over

EmpiOJitltDI

Pen:c:nt
Civilian Itt- roo:o
Employed

UMmp1oyed
Pau.nt Unemployed

41.389
5.3
7,053 .

377

1,708.921
1.31'1.

0.61'1.

1.10'1.

0.71'1.

Median household inc:omo
Mcdi111 famDy Income

$30.056
$35,225

$29,470
$33.246

$30,171
$33,507

$29,714
$33,389

$28.214
$32.500

$36,389
$37.222

Mcdi111 non-family Income

$17.240

$1 5,969

Sl4,160

$14,211

$12.500

Pa-capill lncome

$14.420

$ 1 1 ,029

$10.561

$ 1 1 .090

$9,038

Annc.d Fon:ca
Paa:nt

739

14

546
1).9
538
505
33

10
7 1 .4
10
10

6.1

0
0

I

0

1.08'1.

0.00'1.

$33,125
$35,750

$45,000

$26,875
$26,115

�

$2 1 ,1..5 0

$26,815

$22.500

$ 10,685

s

Sl·t.013

S25.l1S
$14,385

IIICOIIIt (l91f, la doDan)

$50,914

$21 .523

Pll'ftl'tJ StilUS (191f)
All pc:nons for whom pova1J lt&IUJ II dc:lennlned
Penon� below the povUI)' level
Pa-calt below the pmtUI)' level

241 ,917,859
3 1 ,742,864
13.12�

1 ,694.357
192.415
1 1 .36'1.

26.273
3,012
1 1.46�

13,746
1,641
1 1 .94�

401
42
10.32�

375
I
0.27�

114
3
1 .72�

1 ,014
6
0.56�

IS
0
0.�

1
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APPEND I X
Intervie w Guidelines for Grassroots Activists
1.
H i s tory o f the group. When i t w as f ormed, w hy, a n d how; soc 1 a l
character J s t i cs of: a ) m e mbersh i p b ) s t e e r i n g c o m m i t tee; m e m b ers h i P
number, number o f a c t i ve m e m b ers; organ i z a t i on a l f orce , l eg a l s t a t u s ;
re l at 1 on sh 1 p w i th o t h e r oppos i t i on groups; re l a t i onsh i P w i t h the l oc a l , s t a r e
a n d n at i on a l govern m e n t s . re l at i onshi p w l t h t h e m ed i a; I deo l ogy; resourc e
b a s e , etc.
Sam p l e quest i on: " P l ease descri be the e a r l y beg i n n i ngs o f your group."
(name o f s i te ).
_____

2.
3
4
5.
6.
7.
8
9.

1 0.
1 1.
1 2.

What h i stori c a l l y has been the re l at i onsh i p b e t w e e n the Army
the community?
What do you see as the major 1 ss u e ?

and

What are the goa I s of the movement, both short term a n d l ong
( F or th i s spec i f i c group a t t h i s s p e c i f i c s i te . )
How do you fee l about the Army's c l a i m that d e l ay s in

term ?

i m p l emen t i ng the program are a bad th m g ?
How is your group struc t ured?
H o w a r e dec i s i ons m ade w i th regard t o t ac t i c s / s tr a te g i e s ?
How of t en and m w h a t m a n n er do you commun i c a t e w l th other
groups in the coa l i t i o n ?
Some peop l e be l i eve that Greenpe a c e Is beh i nd the m ob i l i z a t 1 on
o f c i t i zens in opp os i ng the i n c i nerat i on o f chem i c a l w eapons. W hat
r o l e ( 1 f any ) has Greenpeace p l ayed i n mob l l l z l n g peop l e to
oppose the Army's p l an ?
Wha t s trategies have been used thus f a r to oppose the CSD P ?
About w h a t percentag e o f c i t i z ens i n th i s c om m un i ty support
e f f orts t o oppose the Army' s p l a n ? (Just a "guesst i ma te'' )

your

1 5.

Do you ac t i v e l y recr u i t n e w m em b e r s ?
H o w has the Army responded thus rar to the oppos i t i on ?
Do you th i nk the NEPA proce s s , spec i f i c a l ly, the s c o p i n g m e e t i ng s
w ere u s e f u l forums f o r a i r i ng you r v i e w s ? Why/ W h y n o t ?
What, I n your op i m on , has been the i mpact o f c i t i z e n oppo s i t i on on the

1 6.

Army' s p l a n ?
Descri be what happened a t the l as t scop i n g m e e t i ng you

1 3.
1 4.

a t tended?

( G i v e date and t i m e )

i 7.

Wha t do you d o < a s a group ) when y o u need goods, serv i ces,
l eg a l a dv i c e , pos t age, p r i n t i ng, etc. ?
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e.g . ,

Jnfonnal [nterview Schedule

Militarv/Government Elites
.I

Research Project
ChcmicJI S tockpi le D isposa l Program

1.

In 1 990, Lau ra H ayes Holgate did a master's t h esis entitled, "The Politics IJf
Chemical We a pons Production," in whkh she argued that there has be:l!n "J
high degree of pu blic scrut in y of the CSD P." DO YOU AGREE?

2.

Thus far, what has been the Army's position on the pu bl i c opp o sition to
in cm e ration?

3.

Sta t em ent : A reporter for the N ew York Tim es said, "In Utah and Alabama,
citizens say they are s atisfie d with how the Army conducted itself and h ave
rc-spnncted V'.rith overwhelming sttpport. How do you acL·ount for the
different responses at the different sites?

4.

H ayes H ol gate and others have argued t hat the stipulation for p u blic
pa rt icipati on in the reg1.1latory process (specifically the N EPA process)
opens the door t o de la ys and complications in the implementation oi
th e CSDP. What is your feeling about this issue?

5.

There is men t i on in the literature of the potential for a Presidential
wa1ver to remove military activities from the burden of compl yin g
with environment al re gul ations Is there such a waiver and what is
.

the possibility it would be used?
6.

STATEMENT: 1l1e CSDP is a huge program, t echnologi call y ve1y

sophis ticated, complex, difficult to evaluat e and fraught with
ambi gu ities. The CSDP propos es to destroy the U.S. arsen a l of 27,000
metric ton s of toxic lethal nerve and mustard agent in incinerators
constructed spe cifi cally for that purpose. This program has never been
done before on the proposed scale. Naturally, the program has

produced fears on the part of the citizens who live near the proposed

destn1ction sit es.
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How doc.."i the 1\.rmy evaluate the publics' fears? Are

some

reality

based while others are not? Which ones, in your opinion, are
legilirnalc concem'i? PJcasccommcnt.

7

Some of the publics' fears surround the issue of the continued '.lSC nt
th e incinerators. It is my understa nding tha t Public Law 99-145

authonzl!d thE; di�manthng of the
·mumtions were destroyed.

mcm

erat ors once the weapons

JJoes the Anny have ..ny pbms for tdtlizatton of thQ
beyond the destruction of the weapons?
8

9.

inCinerators

Wh o (or what a gen cy) is responsible for han dl i n g public re l a ti on s \'>1th

res p ect to the Chemlcal 5!ockpllc Disposal Program?
I know there are pl J n s tG present

a

wmkshop for emergency managers

throughout the n<.ltion t h1s fall. Are there any plans of a siml!Jr mturc
to educate

the publ!c wtt h the incineration process? If so, whi1t

are t b ev;

how and wh en will i he:v be im p lemented?

1 0.

M E D I A Jn your opmion, has t h e media been a help or a hindrance t�1
the CSDI'� Discuss Can you giVe exam p les?

·nunk you so much for your kmdness and pallence in answcnng my
other people in the Anny wit h whom f could spc.1k m

questions. Arc t h ere
conJunct10n WJth this

research pm;ecU

Would you be willing to giVe me
spoken With you7

a

NAMES:
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let t er of intmduc..iion or mJy I :;ay I've

Interview Schedule
MEDIA

How and

when did

you

first become acguainted with the nerve gas

cont roversy at LBAD'?
')

'-·

3.

Have you covered si mi lar stori e s b e fore ?
How is th1s controversy different ti·om or

simi l ar to

oth ers

you have

written <:�bout?
4

Can

you tell

me a little about th e lustotv of th e relattons between the

community and the depot?

5.

You":e covered the story for many years, what d o you sec as the major
i s sue j s'?

6.

Was the nelVe gas inci nerator issue selected for you or did you chGDse it
yourself?

7.

What is

the

editorial position oi the Richmond .Register w i t h respect l o lhb

issue7

8.

Did you cover the scoping meeting at the Oarke- Moore Middl e School l,1.:;l
Apnl?
What wr1s your impression of the proceedings?

9.

vVho / whr.lt are your main sources of infom1ation re ga rding

the 01cm1cai

Stockpile Disposal rrogram?

10.

Do you have a regul a r contact person in the Atmy?

11.

With

1 2.

the citizens opposing the plan?

Does the Army fumtsh you With press releases about new

developments?

1 3.

Have you e ver visited the depot ?
Under what drcumstances did you visit7 Did you have a

guided t our

Conference?

1 4.

Did

you

Witness the cxcrdse invoMng t h eir mock terrotist att�ck?
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1 5.

You've vvritten about a number ot the maJor controversies involved in
this issue , e.g., the S S E I S 1ssue, the "continued use " issue?
How has lhe

Am1y rc::,pundcd to the citizen opposition?
;:"tl1)' constraints

1 6.

Hc:we you ha d

1 7.

Have you met any of th e activists who oppose the indnerator7
Pleasedescribe:

1 8.

How would you characterize the two �·roups?

1 9.

How do you think the whole th in g is shaping up7
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placed on your wnl ing aboul th1s issuet

Date :

Ql:

_
_
_
_
_
_
_

Many people who have written about the CSDP c omment on the
d i fficulties faced by the Army in carrying out its

Con gres s ional

mandate to destroy the weapons and at the same time, do i t in
a manner consistent with the stipulati on that th i s be
accomplished with maxi mum protection of the public in m i n d .

How h a ve y o u tried t o d ea l with this q u e s t i o n g i v e n t h e
fact t ha t many people a r e wary of t h e choice of i ncineration
as the m e t ho d of c h o i c e ?

Q2 :

T hu s
pu blic

far, what h as b e e n the Army ' s p os it ion
on
o p p osi t i o n t o t h e i n c i n erat ion p ro p o s a l ?

the

S TATEMENT: A reporter for the New York ti mes sai d , " I n U tah an d
A labama,

c i ti ze n s

c o n d u c ted

itself and h a v e responded w i t h overwhelming

say

they

42 3

are

sati sfied

with

how

the

Army

support.

Q3:

How

you

do

d i ffe r e n t

for

account

the

d i ffer e n t

responses

at

the

sites?

- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - � - - - - -

Q4 :

Holgate
for

and

p u b l ic

p ro c e s s ( i . e.,

oth e rs

on

this

of the
issue?
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argued
in

the

that

the

s t i p u la t i o n

regulat ory

t h e N E PA p ro c e s s )
CSDP p rogram .
Wha t i s y o u r

s p e c i fi c a l l y

i m p l e m entation
fe e l i n g

have

part i c i p a t i o n

QS :

T h e re i s m e n tion i n t h e l i t e rature of t h e p o t e n t i a l for
a
Pres i d e n t i a l w a i v e r
to
r e m o v·e m i l i t ar y a c t i v i t i e s
from t h e b u rd e n of c o m p l y i n g w i t h e n v i r o n m en t a l
regu lations. Is th ere s u c h a waiver?
If so, d o y o u
t h i n k such a
thing will be used?

STA TE MENT:
s op h i s t i c ated,

T h e CSDP
complex,

an d

is

a h u g e program,

fra u g h t

w i th

techn ologically

ambiguiti e s .

The

v ery

pro gram

has prod uced numerous fears on the part of the publi c .

QS :

How does t he Army eval uate t he p u b l i c ' s fears ?
some reality-based w h i l e ot h ers are not?
What
y o u r assessm ent
threat?

STATEMENT :
c on t i n ue d
Public
once

use

Law
the

of the

's

S ome of the publics' fears
of

the

9 9 - 1 45

i n c i n era tors .

au thorized

weapon s/munitions

Q6:
Does
i n c i n e rators

p u bl i c

the

w ere

It

perception

of

Are
is
the

surround the issue of the
is

my

d i s m a n tl i n g

u n d er s t a n d i n g
of

the

i n c i nerators

d e s troye d .

t he A r m y h a v e a n y p l a n s for u t i l iz a t i on
b e y o n d t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e w e a p o n s ?
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that

of

the

Q7:

W ho ( or what
p u b l ic r e l a t i o n s
Disposal

QS :

a gency) i s respon s i b l e for h an d l i n g
w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e C he m i c a l S tock p i l e

Pr o g ra m ?

I kn o w there are p lans t o present a wor k s h o p for
e m e r g e n cy

m a n a g e r s t h r o u g h o u t t h e nat ion t h i s fa l l .
A r e t h e i r a n y s i m i lar p l a n s u n d e r w a y for p u b l i c
e d u c a t i o n t h a t c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e i m p l e m en ta t i o n p h a s e
o f the C SDP?

Med i a

Q9

What

is

your

i m p r ession

i n format i on regard i n g th e

o f how t h e

m e d ia

has

han d l e d

C SD P?

F A V O R A B L E / U N FA V O R A B L E ?

---------

------------------------------
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Q u esti onnaire # 5
Date :

Code:

Questionn aire for Me mbers of
Ken tucky Comm u n i ty R e v i e w Team

1.

How and when did you become a member of Con c ern e d
C itizen s ?

2.

I n your opi nion, w hat are the m a j o r i s s u e s
of Concerned C iti z e n s ?

3.

How did the Rich mond Study group come about?

4.

Can you descri be your role i n that study group?

5.

How w a s the group struc tured and what did you all d o ?

6.

D i d the Army c ooperate with your e fforts ?

7.

In your artic le , you said , "
to view the team

sought
public

concerns

existence
you

8.

could

1 0.

not

m ea n t b y t h i s .

be

(p .

a

A rmy
m eans

recogn izi ng
a l lo we d

to

s taff u n d o u b t e d l y
of mitigating

that

the

become

team 's
an

what

295 ) .

What d id the study group conc lude/ what were its
re c o m m e nd ations

9.

while

The
as

the s t a n d p o i n t

from

to

the

Army?

\Vhat d i d the Army d o with the report?
If you had it to d o over again, would you d o anyth ing
d i ffere n t l y with respect to the study team proce s s ?

11.

Did work i n g a s a member of the research team a l te r your
perceptions o f the si tuation or c a u s e you to rethi nk your
oppo s i t i o n to i n c i n erati on?

1 2.

In your article you arg ued that a key fac tor was the team's
earl y d e c i s i on to foc u s on participation i n the proc ess ( p . 2 95 ) .
Would

you

comment

427

on

this

s t at e m e n t ?

13.

You implied that scoping meetings w ere not effecti v e
mechanisms for " mitigating p u b l i c concern s , " a n d that study
teams offered more opportunity for real exchange of v ie w s .
D o yo u s e e p u b l iclly-fu n d e d s t u d y teams as t h e w a v e
of the future i n terms of i m p roving the N E P A pro c e s s ?

1 4.

What percen tage of the community would yo u guess are
opposed to the incineration of the weapons on-site at L BAD?

1 6

Has EKU taken any position on the issue?

.MEDIA:
1 7

I n _your opinion, how has the medi a reported t h i s issue?

18.

Has the media been a help or a hindrance to the opposition
groups at LBAD?

B IOGRAPHICAL DATA
1

9.

Have you been active i n other kinds of prote s t groups?

20.

What percentage of your time d o you devote to movemen t
ac t i v i t i e s ?

21 .

With whom do you most often

22.

A re other members of your family involved with Concerned
Citizen s ?

23

How h ave y ou managed to balance the roles of ac tivist/
s c h o l ar/ fam i ly perso n ?

24.

How long have you lived i n this community?

25.

D o other family members live i n this community?

26.

Do you own or ren t your home?

27.

Ed u c a t i o n :

interact about this i ssue?

Some HS (Circle One)
H. S. Grad
Some college
College grad/ trade school
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Grad u ate
28.

or Profe s s ional

Has thi s experience rad i c al i zed ; y o u i n other are a s of your
l i fe ?

29.

Could you su ggest anyone else with whom I c o u l d talk abou t
t h i s i s su e ?
Ot her mem bers of study gro up?

COMMENrS:
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VITA

Carol Griffith Davies received her A.B. from Boston College in 1975
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of Tennessee, Knoxville in 1987 and received her Ph.D. in sociology in 1 995.
Areas of interest include Political Sociology, Social Change, Sociology of
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University of Tennessee in Knoxville, TN and at Duquesne University,
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She currently resides in Pittsb urgh,

